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     © Alexander Tomov, Sofia, 1996
     © David Mossop (English Translation), Sofia, 1996
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     Sofia 1996


     Dedicated to the memory of my dear mother, Radka Tomova,
     whose dream was to be able to read this book.


     Contents

     Foreword 7
     Section One The Crisis
     Chapter One
     The Birth Of The Global World And The Crisis Of Modernity
     1. Integration And The Transition Of Civilisation 11
     2. The Birth Of The Global World 20
     3. The 20[th] Century - The Search Of A Model For The Global
World 24
     4. The Common Crisis And The Collapse Of The Third Civilisation 28
     Chapter Two
     Collapse No.I: The Explosion in Eastern Europe
     1. Decline And Death Throes 33
     2. Reform And Illusions 39
     3. Two Options And The "Mistake" Of Gorbachev 43
     4. The Collapse Of Perestroika 46
     5. The Explosion In Eastern Europe 51
     6. Return To A Difficult Future 54
     Chapter Three
     Collapse No.II: Global Disorder
     1. The Danger Of Chaos 56
     2. Geopolitical Collapse 61
     3. Economic Turbulence 63
     4. The New Masters Of The World 65
     5. The March Of The Poor 67
     6. A Number Of Pessimistic Scenarios 71

     Section Two The Fourth Civilisation
     Chapter Four
     Theory In The Time Of Crisis
     1. Forewarning Of The End Of The Two Theoretical Concepts 74
     2. A Return To The Roots Or The Main Thesis 82
     3. Main Conclusions And A Message To Alvin Toffler 85
     4. A Similar Message To S.Huntington 89
     5. The Need For A New Theoretical Synthesis 92
     Chapter Five
     The Fourth Civilisation
     1. Why A New Civilisation? 96
     2. Some Thoughts On The Transitions Of Civilisations 99
     3. The Distinguishing Features Of The Fourth Civilisation 103
     4. Inevitability And When It Will Happen 106
     Chapter Six
     The Dimensions of a New Synthesis
     1. Socialisation And The Deregulation Of Ownership 108
     2. Post-Capitalism 116
     3. Post-Communism 120
     4. The Approach And The End Of The "Third World" 126
     5. Balanced Development 129
     Chapter Seven
     Obstructions
     1. The Defenders Of The Third Civilisation 134
     2. The Great Threat - Media Imperialism 136
     3. Post-Modern Nationalism 139
     4. The Egoism Of Politicians 141
     5. Militant Religions 143
     6. A Cup Of Coffee In Apenzel 144

     Section Three Alternatives To The Fourth Civilisation
     Chapter Eight
     The New Economic Order
     1. The Economic Heart Of The Global World 146
     2. New Growth And New Structures 150
     3. Who Shall Dominate The World Economy? 154
     4. Is There A Need For Global Economic Regulation? 159
     5. Vivat Europa And The Death Of The Introverts 163
     6. The Levelling Out Of Economies 166
     Chapter Nine
     The Culture Of The Fourth Civilisation
     1. The Beatles, Michael Jackson And The Bulgarian Caval. 170
     2. The Travelling Peoples 174
     3. Man Without Ethnic Origin Or The Rebellion Of Ethnicity 179
     4. Global Awareness 183
     5. Multiculture And The Global Culture 186
     Chapter Ten
     The New Political Order
     1. The Twilight Of The Superpowers 190
     2. From Imperialism To Polycentralism 193
     3, The Fate Of The Nation State 195
     4. After The Crisis Of Political Identity 198
     5. The Global Coordinators 200

     CONCLUSION
     THE NATIONS WHICH WILL SUCCEED 202
     APPENDICES
     Bibliography

     INTRODUCTION
     At the end  of 1989 over a period  of just a few months one  of the two
world systems  collapsed. Together  with the two world wars this was clearly
the third turning point  in the history  of the twentieth century. For quite
some time now researchers and politicians in a number of countries have been
attempting  to find an explanation for the collapse of the Eastern  European
totalitarian  regimes  and  the  consequences for the  world.  Thousands  of
publications  and  political  statements have  come  to  the  concluded that
"capitalism swallowed  up communism" and that "liberalism has conquered  the
world". Fukoyama even went as far as to declare  the end of  history and the
establishment of a liberal world model. Others see it only as the end of the
Bolshevik experiment  and the social  engineering of  a series of  political
philosophers from  Rousseau  to  Marx.  After  the  victories of the  former
communist parties in Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria in parliamentary elections
in 1993 and 1994,  liberal passions grew cold and talk of the new  ascension
of left wing thought has appeared on the political agenda.
     What  really did happen  after 1989? Where is the world heading? To the
left or to  the right? Towards unified action or to division into new blocs?
Towards long-lasting peace or newrisks?
     Almost  everyone - theoreticians,  researchers and politicians  in both
the East  and the West were caught unprepared by circumstances.  The map  of
Eastern  Europe has  changed tragically  beyond  all  recognition. Dozens of
bloody conflicts have erupted. Europe  is being thwarted  at every moment in
its  attempt to unite peacefully.  The United States now without an enemy in
the world has felt an increasing need to change its global policies. Germany
and Japan  have  also  increased  their economic power  and  their political
confidence.
     In short, the  collapse of the Eastern European  communist regimes  has
profoundly  affected  the  present  and the future  of all nations  and  has
changed the  entire  world,  not just small  elements of it.  These profound
changes have  touched contemporary human history in so far  as  they were  a
consequence of  inexorable global trends. For this reason we have to go back
in  history to look  for more  general processes in order to reinterpret the
dynamics of  modern life. It is time  to  look beyond  than  the ideological
euphoria  of the changes caused  and  to  attempt  to  define  exactly  what
happened and what we can expect in the future.
     This is not my first book, but it is the first  which I have written in
complete   freedom,  without  censorship  or  self-censorship,  without  the
patronage and supervision of academic councils and  "political  friends". In
this book I have  searched for the truth from  the point of view not only of
the  cultural  environment  which surrounds me but also  of the  world which
revealed  itself to me  in its inimitable diversity  after 1989. The changes
which  have taken place in Bulgaria can not be seen purely in terms of black
and  white. We attempted hastily to overcome the absurdities and limitations
of our past  and  now, five years on we are still at the very beginning. The
task has proven much more difficult than anyone could have imagined. At  the
same time much of the dignity which the Bulgarian people managed to preserve
until 1989 has been sadly lost.
     Today in Bulgaria and the other countries of Eastern Europe not only is
the value system in a state of chaos but there is also chaos surrounding the
interpretations of  what has  happened and what must  happen in the  future.
Many  people  are disappointed  by the changes  and  they  have  rejected by
looking back to the system of social guarantees, voting for the past. I  can
not  say that all the votes cast  for the former Eastern  European communist
parties are  votes for the past, but most of them are. Hundreds of thousands
of people in Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary have said to themselves "Under the
former regime, I managed to  build  a house  and bought a car  (albeit  poor
quality). Now, I haven't the  slightest chance of doing  so." The comparison
of  the benefits to the majority of the population in the  1970's and 1980's
and those of the first five  years of emergent democracy,  does  not  favour
modern  times. In terms  of  concrete facts and figures, this is  indeed the
case. However,  this is far from the truth if  one looks at the situation in
the future  and  tomorrow  in  terms of  the  potential possibilities  which
freedom offers.
     I remember life in 1989 well,  because up until then I had lived for 35
years  in a totalitarian society.  At  first  glance  everything  seemed all
right.  There  was  full  social  security  during childhood and  guaranteed
education. Everyone had a job and a  salary. The population was able to live
in  a  society  without crime. However despite this, in  that  world  called
socialism, we still  asked ourselves many questions: Why  do we produce less
and poorer quality goods than the West?  Why are our shops empty more  often
than not? Why are there chronic shortages of goods? Why do we have money and
nothing to  buy for it? Why are  we forbidden to do  things which seemed  so
natural?
     I  have  often observed my  daughters' parrots  at  home. Just  as in a
totalitarian society, they  have everything  they  could ask for: guaranteed
food, security and  hygiene.  They are "happy", because they have everything
which they  could ever imagine.  But they  do not have freedom and  for this
reason when they are let out of their  cage they cannot fly. Without freedom
progress is impossible. In his cage, man cannot reveal his enormous creative
potential to take the best from the past generations and to give the best of
himself to the future. In the old totalitarian system  we achieved much, but
we  lost  much more.  Sooner or  later  that world had to  change,  not only
because it  was  suffering from  crisis  of its own identity but because the
world itself had changed...
     My first encounter with politics was at the age of 11. I was on holiday
with  my  father in  the Rila  mountains. In a remote  mountain lodge,  2000
metres above sea level, a portrait of Khrushchev was being taken  down. They
were a few months late doing this and were obviously in  a hurry to  get rid
of  it.  I  asked my  father who that  man was and why until  yesterday  his
portrait had hung proudly in  that spot  and  today - it was  gone. I  later
learnt that he  had been a  "revisionist". For  a long time this  was how  I
learnt all truths -  ready-made and without any commentary. I was taught  to
believe that I was living in  a perfect society and, what was more important
was  that any problems existing  today would certainly be  rectified for the
future. The  formula, "any imperfections are due to the fact that  we are as
yet  in the first  stages of communism" must be the most exquisite  piece of
demagogy and  propaganda which I  have ever encountered. We  believed in the
glorious future of communism, just like others believed in life after death.
We  were unable to  compare our daily  lives with  anyone and with  anything
because we all watched  the same television, listened  to the same radio and
read the same newspapers in which the truth was written by other people.
     In the 1960's and 1970's there were many people who did not believe and
who heretically opposed the aggression of the regime. However,  the majority
of the  population  knew nothing of this. In Bulgaria there had been none of
the civil  unrest  of the  Polish  workers,  the Hungarian uprising and  the
Prague spring. It was only late in the 1970's that we began to  realise that
perhaps things were not as they should be and it was possible to  live in  a
different way,  that Eastern  Europe was not  the proponent of supreme human
progress. One reason for this  was the opening up of Bulgaria to the Western
World,  the  appearance  of  new audio-visual media  and  the  expansion  of
scientific  and  technological  exchanges. We were then able to see  another
model and were able to make comparisons. Another reason was the admission by
the  existing regime of  the  need to  improve economic mechanisms and their
recognition of the importance of primary stimuli.
     However, even then in the 1970's  and 1980's, even during  the years of
perestroika  under  Gorbachev,  when the  entire truth about  Stalin  became
public knowledge,  our  notions of  the  future were limited  to the idea of
convergence. What happened in 1989 and especially what happened subsequently
was totally unexpected by everyone,  both in the East and the West. I am not
afraid to admit this because I know very well that even  the best  political
scientists  in the world and the  academic centres specialising  in  Eastern
European studies  had no idea of the impact and the diversity of the changes
which were taking place at the end of the 1980's. Even Gorbachev himself did
not expect  it.  The chain  reactions of turbulent demonstrations which took
place in  the  whole  of  Eastern  Europe after  perestroika  and  the  mass
dellusions  that everythong would be just like Switzerland,  as well  as the
obvious geo-political changes - these are all factors which lead me to write
this book.
     The basic  question, which I have endeavoured  to answer is this:  What
did  really happen at  the end  of  the 1980's and why did the changes which
took  place  in  Eastern  Europe  have  global  ramifications?  Some  of  my
conclusions  I date back to as  early as 1982. In particular this is my view
of the relationship between communalisation (socialisation) and autonomy and
of the  insubstantiality  of statism at  the  end  of  the 20[th]
century.  Other   conclusions   were  formed  in   the  late   1980's  after
participating  in a series of discussions  at  the congresses  of  the World
Federation for Future Studies which  helped me to understand the  situations
in other  countries and to  make comparisons with the situation  in  Eastern
Europe  and other  parts of the world. The  third group  of  conclusions are
based on my own political experience  as Deputy  Prime Minister  in the most
decisive  period  of  reform  processin  Bulgaria  and  as  a member of  the
Bulgarian  parliament from 1990-1994. My meetings with dozens of the world's
leading  politicians  during this period were of enormous influence  in  the
formation  of  the conclusions  in  this  book.  I cannot  express  adequate
gratitude to my colleagues from the  World  Organisation for Future  Studies
and to my  colleagues from the 21[st] Century Foundation in Sofia
- a young and promising group of people who helped me greatly with ideas and
critical commentary as well as the practical work in preparing the  book for
publication.
     At the risk of being paradoxical, there is little  in this  book  which
relates  directly  to Bulgaria, despite the  fact that my main motivation in
writing it  were the problems facing my  own  country. While working  on the
book  I realised that it  is  impossible to understand what is  going on  in
Bulgaria if we do not make an attempt to understand what is happening in the
world,  and what  we want  to  do,  to a  great  extent  depends  on  global
processes. Today,  no-one can develop in isolation. Such  a future  would be
absurd, if  we do not  want to go back  into  our cage. The entire  world is
bound  with  common cords which no-one who  want to move  with  progress can
ignore. For this reasonI have  left my analysis of  Bulgaria  to  a separate
book which will be published later.
     The fourth civilisation is a book about the global transition which  is
taking place in  the world, its  basis  in history,  the consequences of the
collapse of the regimes in Eastern Europe, the danger of global disorder and
chaos in which we are living today and the future and ways in which we might
overcome them There  are three possible directions for the world to develop.
For the greatest  part  of the twentieth century the world  has followed the
path of  division  on the basis of culture,  religion  and political  blocs,
aggression and dramatic  conflict. This  was  the world  of the cold war, of
confrontations between socialism and capitalism. This was the path of social
Utopia, imaginary models and politicalf ormulae. The second path is the path
of liberal  development, victorious capitalism and  the  vested interests of
the richest social strata. This is the path of domination of people by other
people, of countries over other countries and  nations over nations. I would
call this  path, the  "path of the jungle", where the strong  eat  the weak.
What these two models of development have in common is that they both belong
to the  past, they both  complement  each other and cannot exist without the
other.
     There is a third path which will be  discussed in  this book. It is not
on the immediate horizon, it may be a difficult path, even Utopian. However,
it  is, in my opinion, inevitable. My  conviction is based on  the fact that
the  modern  technological  revolution  is  leading  to  the creation  of  a
different world  civilisation. It could  be said  quite confidently that the
end of the twentieth century will mark the end of  an era in the development
of  civilisation.  The  twentieth  century was  an  era  of  nation  states,
aggression and conflict between nations for more living space. It was an era
in which  the  historically dominant countries  imposed  their cultures with
force. The apogee  of this anti-humanitarian absurdity came in  the  form of
theories about the  superiority of one race over another and of the need for
the "lower" races to be destroyed.
     Today, this is all  over, but we  are far from a state of affairs where
there is no longer any danger from new aggression. Although we could in fact
be moving forwards  a  new, free civilisation there is still the possibility
that may just be reproducing recidivists for the next century. We are living
in  a  dangerous world, requiring absolute coordination,  where there is  no
clear order or  established principles. The  question is the choice which we
shall make.  The aim  of  the  "Fourth  Civilisation" is to  be  part of the
discussion surrounding this choice.
     We could possibly change the fate of world development in an improbable
way.  For the first  time  since man has come into existence, we are able to
view our own existence not through  the prism  of individual tribes, classes
or  nations, but from the point of view  of global perspectives.  This is  a
unique chance,  but it  is also the responsibility of  the era in  which  we
live.

     Section one
     The Crisis
     Chapter One
     THE BIRTH OF THE GLOBAL WORLD AND THE CRISIS OF MODERNITY
     1. INTEGRATION AND THE TRANSITIONS OF CIVILISATION

     During  its  centuries-old existence, mankind has  passed  through many
stages. The uncivilised period lasted more than 100,000 years. The civilised
period has lasted for between 5-7 thousand  years. his is a period which has
seen the realisation of the essence of humankind and consists of three major
stages.  They  are  three  epochs  which  are  synonyms for  the  progressof
humanity. Three civilisations  with distinct levels of progress.  At the end
of the 20[th] century we are living through the final days of the
Third civilisation.

     F
     rom the first appearance of human society to  the present day there has
been a constant  growth in the mutual dependence of people,  nations,  their
customs and culture.  The first manifestations of the human race,  of tribes
and inter-tribal links, the first city-states show  that throughout history,
from epoch to epoch mankind  has  become more  and  more  integrated and the
people of the earth have become more and more dependent on each  other. I am
not in a  position to argue with anthropologists about  the exact  date when
human life  began and since there are so many different criteria relating to
the  transition between animals,  humanoids and Homo Sapiens I consider this
discussion to be of little benefit. Evidently during the palaeolithic period
(about 100,000 years ago) man established his domination over the over forms
of life and began methodically to conquer nature.  At  some  time between 70
and  40  thousand years  B.C. man  began to  tend animals,  to create  stone
cutting  implements  and to form  social relations which  were untypical  of
other types of animals.
     In  the  late palaeolithic period human populations  began  to resettle
from Africa  through  Asia  to  the  northern  parts  of  America. I am  not
convinced, however, that civilisation began from  only one root disseminated
by ambulant migrants or primitive forms of  transport. I am more inclined to
believe  that in  the earliest  societies  the spreading  of  the  seeds  of
civilisation  was  of  secondary   significance  to   the  growth  of  local
civilisations in various regions of the world.
     The first manifestations  of  civilisation  or limited social relations
are not only  to be found in  Egypt or in  Greece, nor are they the fruit of
only one root. Between 3000-2000 B.C. not only did the cultures of Egypt and
Mesopotamia begin to develop but also the culture  of  ancient India. During
the same period the cultures of the nations of the Andes, South America were
also   in  their  ascent.  Ancient   Greece   with   its  highly   developed
manufacturing, culture and  philosophy  also flourished at the same  time as
India. These phenomena can only be explained with the overall changes in the
natural environment and very possibly  with  the increased  radioactivity of
the  sun. Such a conclusion is very significant since  it shows  that  human
civilisation appeared in different parts of the world establishing pluralism
and  diversity as a natural law. In other  words,  the human  race developed
from  different natural  and cultural roots  at the same  time and is moving
towards integration without destroying its diversity.
     There is  something else which has  lead  to  the constant expansion of
communities  and  for  people  to seek  answers  to  the problems caused  by
integration.  This something is  the  connection  between  the processes  of
domination of  man  over nature  and the process of integration itself. With
the expansion  and  development  of transport,  culture,  manufacturing  and
trade,  our  forebears  began  to  realise  that  the  fate  of  mankind  is
indivisible  from the processes of its expansion  and integration. Over  the
centuries,  mankind dominated more and more new territories,  populated more
and  more  regions  of the  world  and  subsequently linked  these  expanded
territories into unified systems.
     There  is  a certain  logic  in the development of human life from  its
earliest  manifestations to the present day  - that  progress is indivisible
from the increase in human  communities, from the  growth in the compactness
of  populations and  the mutual dependence of people. Every historical epoch
confirms this conclusion  - from  the  first signs of  early civilisation in
modern Africa and the development of  tribal  communities, to the appearance
of cooperative grain farming in Eastern Asia and the appearance of the first
developed dynasties in Egypt and the Near East  and the expansion  of art in
the ancient world. The  development of human  integration has passed through
many  different forms:  tribal/warrior alliances  and  slave  owning states,
imperial states combining religions and cultures. The overall trend has been
constant, each subsequent form of human  civilisation is either greater than
the previous or more integrated and dependent on the environment in which it
exists.
     There are two phenomena which clearly show this process:
     The first is the population of the world. From its  first appearance to
the present day mankind has been growing constantly: about 6,000,000 in 8000
B.C.; about 255 million in 1 A.D.; 460 million in 1500; 1.6 billion in 1900;
2.0 billion  in 1930; 3.0 billion in 1960;  4.0 billion in 1975; 5.0 billion
in 1987 and over 6 billion in 1994.[(]
     The second important phenomenon is communications. With the  appearance
of human civilisation  sounds and gestures  then language  and fire were the
main forms of communication. As society developed  man began to develop more
intensive forms of communication. All the activities of man are  directly or
indirectly linked  with the development of  new communications -  roads, sea
and airways, all manner of forms  of transport, postal links, telephones and
telegraphs,    computers   and   optical   fibres,   satellite   television.
Communications (transport, information exchange and processing) are the most
accurate bench mark for  the development and progress of civilisation. There
is an obvious logic involved in  this. Over  the centuries  people have been
building bridges between each other and have been using them to exchange the
fruits of their labour and to influence the world in which they live.
     I consider that from the outset I shall have to draw a very obvious and
necessary conclusion: the further human society progresses, the more compact
and  integrated human society  becomes and the more  nations and individuals
become dependent on each other. This is an incontrovertible law which we can
do little  to stop. It is also clear that  this is an element of the overall
development of the Earth and an  accompaniment  to the entire history of the
human race and the overall development of our planet.
     This, perhaps, gives rise  to the question whether economic development
and  the general  development of  human civilisation has definable limits or
whether  there are  limits  to the growth  in world  population. Will  human
progress  lead to the disappearance of the primary differences between races
and nations? Will mutually dependent  human existence lead to new phenomena?
Will states disappear to be replaced by international communities? These are
questions which will have to be answered.
     I believe that notwithstanding the cyclical nature  of its development,
the human  race will  irreversibly  and logically move  towards  a  mutually
dependent and  integrated  existence and  from there to  constant structural
reformation. The  main reason  for this  is that human  progress is becoming
more  and more profoundly dependent on nature and the unity of nature  is in
its  turn influencing the unity  of life on  earth. The  unity of nature has
become transformed into a unity of independent social communities. Producing
and consuming, harvesting the oceans, the seas and the care of the earth and
space, people  are beginning to find themselves  living in a more integrated
community and are becoming dependent  on each other. Individual processes of
production lead to general pollution. The  exploitation of natural resources
has  caused  overall  changes  to  the  environment.   The   development  of
communications  has  created  a  common  environment  for  the  transfer  of
information.
     It can  be  stated  with  confidence that the process of overall  world
integration  is universal.  It includes  manufacturing, culture and religion
and the processes of human thought.  This process is directly connected with
the universal  philosophical problem of the integrity and dialectical nature
of nature.  There is  no doubt that  by  revealing  its diversity  nature is
becoming  more unified. However,  any  claimsof its absolute  unity  are  as
absurd as claims of its extreme fragmentation.
     When historical processes are in their initial stages and civilisations
are still poorly developed, they tend to reflect closely the conditions  and
the specific nature  of the  local  natural  conditions with their climatic,
geographical and other particular features. People are  born different, live
different lives  and believe  in different gods. In Africa  people are  born
black, in Europe - white, in America  "red" and in the East "yellow".  Today
these  differences for  the  most  part are  disappearing. Races,  cultures,
religions  and values  systems  are merging. This  is not because  nature is
being outdone, but that its localisation is being outlived.
     The closer people become to nature the more their  lives, consciousness
and behaviour become dependent  on  the common essence of nature. Individual
and specific elements  disappear to become merged in the common  elements of
life. In my opinion this is the meaning and  the dialectic of  progress.  In
order to defeat  the  lions  and  the wolves, man had to unite  and  to join
forces and  ways of thinking,  to build on what  he  has  so far achieved in
order to make further progress. In this  way, year after year, century after
century  man  conquered  increasing areas  of  nature, reached  its profound
depths, exploited its common natural resources - the earth, the forests, the
air and the water. These resources have been exploited for the same  reasons
-  that in order to make greater use of nature, it is necessary  to use  the
combined efforts of  individual  human resources. The opposite is also true,
the more we use nature, the more we become dependent  (or place other people
in a position of dependence) on it.
     This is the link  between integration and progress, between integration
and  civilisation.  The  entire  existence  of  the human  race  shows  that
integration  is a  constant process.  Moreover,  civilisations  as  forms of
organised social life  are an expression and product of integration. When we
speak of  civilisations, it should be noted that  they do not  coincide with
the  five social  and economic formations  defined by  Karl Marx or with the
three technological waves of A.Toffler. Marx divided  world development into
five large "social structures" according to the forms of ownership. This was
an  undoubted  intellectual contribution  but  an  artificial and unilateral
approach. The exclusive use of  the criteria "forms of ownership" (Marx)  or
"technology" (Toffler) or the criteria of "spiritual development"  (Toynbee)
is misleading. The specific nature of  the  civilisation approach is  in its
complexity, in  the  indivisible connection  between economics, culture  and
politics.  This approach cannot absolutise either technology or property  or
any other sphere of human  activity.  This excludes the possible creation of
artificial formations  and social  constructions  in the aims of  "progress"
being isolated within only one part of human existence. Civilisations cannot
be seen merely as branches which reflect one side  or another of  human life
but as a common cultural process. They  are distinct in terms of  the way of
life of the ancient peoples who lived in that part of the world and secondly
in terms of  the differences  in the historical epochs in the development of
humanity. Further on  I shall return to  the second of these aspects of  the
definition of civilisation. This shall release me from the strictures of the
formational approach and the ideologisation of history. Such a method can be
used to  show the graduality of transitions  and  to explain the general and
individual  elements in  the development of different parts of the world. To
this end I shall define civilisation as: 1. the common  and connected levels
of  human  development;  2. the  character  of  this  development during the
various  epochs  of human existence. Civilisations are not divided  one from
another on the basis of revolutionary acts, a change of monarch or president
or armed conflicts. "Civilisation", according the great historian A.Toynbee,
"is   movement    rather   than    condition;    sailing   and    not    the
harbour."[2]. For this reason, I consider civilisation to  be the
common  essence of human development and its different  forms are the stages
of its development.
     How many civilisations are there at the moment? Is it, indeed,  correct
to    speak     of    a    multitude     of     different     civilisations?
Civilisation[3]  and civilised behaviour are a synonyms  for  the
human essence, something which makes man different from the animal world and
the fundamental  role of man as  a  transformer,  harmoniser and creator  of
nature.  This role  is fundamental  to the  essence of humanity  and  also a
measure of its development. Civilisation springs from more than one source -
in     the     ancient    world     there    were     about    26    initial
civilisations[4],  or seen in another way, 26 sources of the same
civilisation. It is possible that there were  direct links between  them  as
well as exchanges of cultural achievements and information. Even if this was
the case this was not the most typical feature of their development.
     The  ancient  peoples  developed  in  different  ways  since they  were
reflections of their  different natural  environments. They formed the basis
for  the  appearance  of  a  particular  natural  species  and  created  the
preconditions for  a unified  civilisation while programming  its diversity.
The more ancient the civilisation, the greater the differences between them.
Despite this, the  way  in  which they  appeared,  their  primitive economic
relations and their state and political structures speak of common elements.
     This   is  why  I  use  the  term  ancient   civilisations  or  ancient
civilisation.  The Egyptians,  the Assyrians  Shumerians,  Greeks,  Indians,
Chinese,  Romans, American Indians etc.  differ  greatly  in terms of  their
daily life, culture,  the  colour of  their skin but  have much in common in
terms of the  level of their development, their means  of manufacturing  and
their  state-political structures.  The zenith of the ancient  civilisations
was  attained no doubt  by the ancient Greek city states and Rome.  However,
India  at the time of the Mura  dynasty (322-80 BC)  was also very advanced.
Together with the achievements  of the ancient Chinese, Koreans, Mongolians,
Vietnamese  and American Indians,  they made up  the  culture of  the  first
civilisation of the first great epoch of human development.
     To use Marxist criteria, the First civilisation can be divided into two
strata: primitive communities and slave owning. I am not convinced that this
is  useful.  First  of  all  for  reasons  of the  semi-human  (uncivilised)
existence of  the  primitive  community  and  secondly  for reasons  of  the
non-social links within one  "social" structure. The  first civilisation was
replete with a diversity of forms of  ownership,  cultures and mechanisms of
government. These were its specific elements and what made  it distinct from
subsequent civilisations.  In  Europe the first civilisation  was  primarily
slave owning, but this was not the case in Asia. Frequently, slave ownership
was  accompanied by other forms of  administrative and economic  compulsion.
Europe during the first civilisation  was mainly patriarchal,  while ancient
China   was   until  the  second  millennium  B.C.   matriarchal.  Only  the
civilisation approach can serve to explain these differences and at the same
time determine find the common elements in the lives of our forebears.
     What the First Civilisation has in common and makes it distinct is  the
undoubted dependence of the people on primitive production tools, the use of
force  and the enslavement of some  nations  by  others and the formation of
imperial  state  structures  and  the  maintenance of  permanent  aggressive
armies. The peoples of the First  Civilisation left us the first examples of
large-scale  art which  exist today amongsts the ruins of the Cheops pyramid
and Mayan  towns, in ancient Chinese  and ancient Indian architecture. These
decorations of  human  civilisation are at  first  glance different from one
another but they also have a lot in common. The materials, their  dependence
on  the  gods  and  the  supernatural, the  philosophy  of  human life  with
new-found  self confidence can be seen everywhere and show  once  again  the
common elements of the First civilisation.
     The First Civilisation can  be considered  to have begun at  some  time
between  4500  -  3500  B.C.  and  to  have   come  to  an  end  during  the
3[rd]  century  A.D.  It  would not be  wise to place  strict and
absolute  dividing lines  between  the civilisations  or  the era  of  human
development  since  they tend gradually  to merge one into another.  Certain
peoples at certain times  have  tended to  lag  behind  during  the  time of
transition  but  then  somehow  seem  to  manage  to  catch  up. During  the
5[th] or  6[th] century A.D. the  Second  Civilisation
began as a result of the structural,  social and  industrial  changes taking
place  first in  Asia  and  then  in  Europe.  The  Second  Civilisation  is
frequently linked with the Middle Ages. If the First Civilisation lasted for
between 4000 or  5000 years  the  Second lasted  only  1000  years from  the
5[th] to the  14[th]/15[th] centuries. Each
subsequent civilisation as an era in the development  of humanity is shorter
than the  one  which precedes  it. This is a consequence of the  accelerated
rate of progress arising from the accumulated material benefits  of previous
generations. A  very  typical feature of  the  Second Civilisation  was  the
feudal  nature  of  its manufacturing industries.  However,  as  a  defining
feature  this  is neither  adequate nor  sufficiently universal. Another key
feature of the Second Civilisation was the huge mass resettlement of peoples
and  the  inter-mingling of diverse cultures. During the  First Civilisation
the  processes of integration  were manifested in terms of the concentration
of people  and power in the city states and empires. These were destroyed by
the Second  Civilisation which persued a  process of integration of cultures
through the violent intermixing of ethnic groups, traditions and religions.
     Between 400 and 900 A.D. new peoples begin to enter the annals of world
history.  Integration  at this time was a byword for aggression. At one  and
the same time, as if on command, the Ostgoths and Westgoths, Huns and Avars,
Tartars and  Mongols, Proto-Bulgarians  and Slavs, Turks and  Arabs began to
search for new  lands and dominions. Although the  intermingling of cultures
via  war  and aggression leading  to the  resettlement  of peoples it was  a
significant quality  of  the Second Civilisation, I  cannot agree  that  the
Middle   Ages  were  exclusively  a   period  of  destruction,  plague   and
Inquisition.  It was also a time of the powerful integration of cultures and
production, new achievements in learning and art. There are many examples of
this, beginning, perhaps, with the magnificent architectural achievements of
the Byzantines,  e.g.  the  wondrous  cathedral  of  St.Sofia  (532-537)  in
Istanbul. Other examples can be taken from West European art, which has left
us magnificent works from its three most creative periods - pre-Roman, Roman
and  Gothic:  the  court  cathedral of Charlemagne in Aachen  (795-805), the
castle of the Gailleurs on  the River  Seine (12[th] century) and
innumerable Gothic  cathedrals, including  Notre Dame in Paris built between
the   12[th]   and   13[th]   centuries.  The   Second
Civilisation  created  abundant cultural  riches  in  the Near East and  the
Middle East, North Africa and Mauritanian Spain, India, China and Japan.
     The Second Civilisation  was a time of the further rapprochement of the
nations  which had  been  divided  during  the  First  Civilisation.  In the
5[th] century, Samarkand was the  heartland of a powerful culture
and  a bridge between  the  Chinese,  Turks and Arabs.  The masterpieces  of
Chinese  culture and paper  manufacturing  technology reached Europe through
Iran,  Byzantium  and  Arab  dominions.  If  during the period of the  First
Civilisation, the Romans, Macedonians  and  Indian  copied technology,  arms
manufacturing  and methods of animal husbandry from each other,  then in the
Second Civilisation a standard method  of measuring time was established. An
important  event took place in 807  when Charles  the Great received a water
clock  from the  Harun  al Rashid from  Baghdad leading  to  the  subsequent
arrival of Chinese and Arab clocks in Europe. People from all over the world
learnt  to  tell   the  time   simultaneously.  This  lead  to  the  further
standardisation of the criteria of life and history. During  this period the
Chinese  Empire further developed  the  achievements  of the Greeks  and the
Romans while the Arabs and  the Europeans built on  those of the Chinese and
the Japanese.
     During  the Second Civilisation forms of ownership and social relations
began to show greater universality. Feudalism began to establish itself over
the entire world in very specific forms, especially in China and Japan. To a
lesser extent, the Second Civilisation retained definite disparities in  the
level of  the  development of  its nations. A significant part of  the world
continued  to  develop within the parameters of  the First  Civilisation and
even  persisted to exist in pre-civilised forms  for a number of  centuries.
The  Second  Civilisation was  a time of  numerous  conflicts and inevitable
crises for reasons of large-scale structural change - the destruction of the
traditional  city-states  and  cultures  of the  First Civilisation and  the
innumerable  religious conflicts.  This was also a time of large-scale state
and cultural development and the establishment of the pre-conditions for the
expansion  of  nations  and  nation-states.  King  Clovis (401-511)  at  the
beginning  of the  6[th]  century  united  the Franks,  Justinian
(572-565)  raised  the  level of  state  administration,  taxation  and  the
application of law. Enormous progress  was made  in  the fields  of science,
medicine and  mathematics in Baghdad, Cordoba and  Cairo. In the Arab world,
Africa (Ethiopia and Ghana), Japan, China and  America, great empires arose.
The new  level of integration, typical of the Second Civilisation  gradually
lead to  the creation of national states. To be  more precise these were not
single-nation states but the  domination of a  single nation or its symbols.
During  the  latter Middle Ages there  was a  gradual slowing  down  in  the
processes of migration of nations and tribes which lead to the stabilisation
of  populations and  states. The  intermingling of cultures typical  of  the
entire period  of the Second Civilisation was gradually replaced by a period
of  developing  national  cultures,  national  symbols  and  traditions  and
struggles  for the legacy of the cultural riches of the past.  The formation
of national states and  the  gradual  advent  of  the  "modern  age  was the
beginning of the end of the Second Civilisation. It was no accident that the
Renaissance  which  was  the  symbol  of  this  period  of  transition  also
incorporated within itself a return  to Greek and Roman art and the cult  of
beauty and earthly  passions. Civilisations follow the spiral of development
- each new civilisation destroys the previous while at the same time bearing
significant resemblances to it. The Third  Civilisation can also be referred
to as a "Modern  Age" - the age of nations states, factories and  industrial
complexes.   It   began  at   sometime  during  the  13[th]   and
14[th] centuries and will  come to an end at  sometime during the
20[th] century. The entire period of the Third Civilisation was a
period of the integration  of manufacturing and spiritual life. In a similar
way to the First Civilisation, the forces  of  integration came mainly  from
the most-developed states resulting from the  accumulation of  manufacturing
and cultural achievements,  rather than  as a result of the resettlement and
intermingling of nations at different stages of development as it was during
the Second Civilisation. The transport revolution  which began in Europe was
of  enormous  significance during  this period.  An example of this were the
sailing ships with which Magellan circumnavigated the world  and  which took
Christopher Columbus to America and  James Cook to Australia.  The explorers
were  followed  by  the  conquerors  hungry  for  plunder  and easy  riches.
Europeans and Arabs followed  the Silk  Road through Constantinople,  Persia
and  Tibet  to  China. The  world  was once  more  regaining  its  strength,
exploring the limits  of  the  earth.  European states begin to  develop and
consolidate  their  power and expand their domination  over  the rest of the
world.
     During  the  16[th] and 17[th]  centuries Europe,
the most powerful of world cultures, began to exert its power over the other
relatively  less-developed nations. Over a period of three  centuries  as  a
result  of great geographical discoveries and their subsequent  colonisation
European culture managed to exert its influence over half of the world. t is
far from  the  truth,  however,  that  the only  "heroic"  discoverers  were
Europeans, such  as Columbus, Magellan, Vasco da Gama. By allowing ourselves
such  a  subjective  attitude, we, Europeans often find  ourselves guilty of
provincial ignorance. During the same historical period  while the  European
sailors, traders  and soldiers  were  beginning  to make their  geographical
discoveries, a  similar process was  taking place  in the East. Between 1405
and  1433,  admiral Cheng Ho with hundreds of Chinese ships reached Zanzibar
and  Ceylon. In  the 15[th] century the  population of  China was
twice the size of that of Europe:  100-120 million in  comparison with 50-55
million. Chinese civilisation was also comparable with European civilisation
in terms of  its  lustre, organisation and depth  of philosophy. During this
period the great discoveries of  Siberia and Africa were made. At the end of
the 15[th]  century the  conquest of America began. Arab caravans
reached  the  interior of Africa. Like  the First  Civilisation,  the  Third
Civilisation also arose from diverse  and different roots. The difference is
that after the  15[th]  century  and  in  particular  during  the
18[th]  and   19[th]   centuries,   the   process   of
integration had become universal in nature. Nations  and cultures discovered
each other. The more developed  began to impose their domination and culture
with violence. At  the same time, a gradual process of  mutual influence and
enrichment began to develop between the various cultures.
     A typical feature of  the  Third Civilisation has been the significance
of the world integrity. Moreover, in  ancient Greece, Theucidides, Aristotle
and  Plato[5] searched  for the  common dimensions  of  life  and
common rules for state administration  amongst familiar nations. The  Stoics
advocated  the idea of moral and political unity of the human  race. Some of
the  thinkers of ancient  Rome (Cicero and others) saw  the world  as a city
with the dimensions of the entire human race embracing all other nations and
cultures. The Renaissance enrichened this tradition. If the  thinkers of the
First Civilisation were occupied  mainly with the chronicles of warlords and
their  victories,  and  the  Second Civilisation with the  defence  of their
religious  identity,  the  thinkers  of  the Third  Civilisation undoubtedly
rediscovered man and his  essence. Religion was  of great importance  to the
process of integration. K.Kautski referring to statistics states  that in 98
A.D.  there were 42 centres of population containing  Christian communities,
by 180 this  number  had grown to 87 and  by  352 -  there  were  more  than
500[6]. Ten centuries later the  majority of the  civilised world
was united by Christianity. Buddhism and Islam had a similar influence. Over
a period of about 1000 years, the major religions united the greater part of
humanity within large spiritual communities. The zenith  of this process was
undoubtedly  during  the  Third Civilisation.  The  unification of different
nations on the basis of value systems  and spirituality was of was  of great
historical significance. This  lead  to the  building of bridges between the
different parts  of the world at  a  time  when manufacturing and commercial
links and communications were unsustainable.
     By this  time the majority of  the great  geographical  discoveries had
been made. Transport and communications had made great progress and medieval
means of production had been succeeded by the first factories.  Commerce was
no longer a haphazard  accompaniment to  life,  but  an  indivisible part of
civilisation.  Amsterdam had  become a  large scale cultural  and commercial
centre. Venice and Genoa  had become the major cities of  the Mediterranean.
Peter the First and his followers had built Saint Petersburg and a number of
European cities  had  populations  of more  than 100,000  people. The  First
Civilisation was a  time  of the  great empires. The  Second of the fall  of
empire and unstable states and city states. The  Third  Civilisation  was  a
period  a nation  states. The  gravitational centres of progress  during the
First  Civilisation  were empires, during the Middle  Ages city  states  and
during  the Third  - nation states. Nation states are one of the features of
the  modern age distinguishing it from the Middle  Ages and from what we can
now  observe at  the end  of the 20[th]  century.  They  did  not
develop suddenly  but  as a  consequence of a  series of conflicts over many
centuries.  Certain  historians believe that this is  one of the reasons for
the success of Europe, that it  was these conflicts and the liberated spirit
of the Renaissance  which guaranteed its domination. It  is indeed possible.
In  any event between the 15[th] and 17[th]  centuries
France, Spain,  England and  Sweden  and  a  little later  Russia, began  to
increase their power and might to guarantee their strategic advantage  for a
number of centuries in the future.
     According to P.Kennedy, between 1470 and 1650, the armies of  the major
European powers  expanded: Spain  from 20,000 to 100,000; France from 40,000
to 100,00; England from 25,000 to 70,000 and Sweden from a couple of hundred
to  70,000[7].  These  figures  show not  only  the rise  of  the
economic power of the emergent  major European powers, but also their desire
for  the  re-distribution  of  the  newly  discovered  territories  and  the
domination  of some  states by  others.  The  entire  history of  the period
between  the  15[th]  and the  18[th] centuries  is  a
history of war, battles  for inheritance,  colonies and  riches. Armies  and
Navies  were expanded, military alliances were formed. As a result of  wars,
trade  and  new  conquests  the  whole world entered  into  a new  phase  of
integration.  The Third  Civilisation developed greater mass  phenomenons in
all areas of life - transport, manufacturing, international trade and ideas,
the spiritual world and the world of ideas and religions. There is one other
important criterion which  distinguishes the three civilisations - the forms
of production. The First was  the age of agriculture  and  animal husbandry,
the Second saw the advent of manufacturing and crafts while the Third is the
age  of  industry and industrial  giants. I accept A.Toffler's  belief  that
technological  revolutions  stimulated  the  progressionfrom  onea  ge  into
another,  but I do  not  believe  that this  is  an exhaustive  or  adequate
criterion.  There  also  another  difference  between  us  in terms  of  the
periodisation  of  history:  A.Toffler  divides   history  into  two   eras:
agricultural and  industrial,  while I have looked for the differences  in a
wider  and  more  civilisational  spectrum.  Technological   changes  are  a
synthetic expression of the changes  in forms of ownership. Typical features
of  the  three  forms of  civilisation were  slave ownership,  feudalism and
capitalism and it would be wrong to ignore them.
     At  the  same time  I  believe that the transition  between the various
civilisations was not abrupt and cannot be defined on the basis of one event
or another. New civilisations develop within a  country and grow organically
as a number of trends. This usually takes place as  a result of  a change in
the instruments of labour and technology but at the same time as a result of
changes  in social relations and means of government.  This is the case with
the Third Civilisation and the period of its greatest prosperity  during the
industrial revolution of the 19[th] century. Moreover, at the end
of the 19[th] century and especially during the 20[th]
century, there were a  number of processes  in  world development which bore
innovations  of the modern age and which  were entirely different  from  the
first  three civilisations. The  most important characteristics of the Third
Civilisation - industry, nations, nation states began to change intensively.
In practice  this meant the  beginning of  a process of the collapse of  the
modern age and the Third Civilisation.

     2. THE BIRTH OF THE GLOBAL WORLD

     The industrial revolution in Europe at the beginning of the 19thcentury
brought   with   it   a   rapid   process    of   economic   and   political
internationalisation.  The   borders  of  the  nation  states  -   the  most
distinguishing feature of the Third Civilisation become too limiting for the
new manufacturing forces.

     T
     here  is  no doubt that the  19th  century  was  a time of  exceptional
technological revolution.  In the  1850's and  1860's Great Britain, France,
Italy,  Germany and Austria demonstrated significant increases in the growth
of their industrial  output. The  invention of the  steam engine in  1769 by
James Watt  and  the locomotive  by George Stephenson were of  revolutionary
significance  for world economic development and accelerated integration. At
the end of the 19th century the first experimental flights with an aeroplane
were carried out by Langley (1896).  Enormous progress was made between 1885
and  1897  in  the development  of  autmobile construction.  In  1837  Morse
invented  his  communications  code and  in  1864 Edison improved methods of
electronic transmission. In 1876 Bell gave the world its first telephones.
     The second half of the 19th century was a time of important discoveries
in the areas  of  transport and weapons systems.  Revolutionary developments
were made in coal mining, mettalurgy and  energy production resulting in the
increase of iron and steel production between 1890 and 1913: in the USA from
9.3 million  tons to 31.8 million,  in Germany  from 4.1 to 17.6,  in France
from 1.9  to 4.6  and  in  Russia  from  0.95 to  4.6  million tons.  Energy
consumption for the same period rose: in the  USA from  147  million tons of
coal  equivalent to 541 million tons, in Great Britain from 145 million tons
to  195 million, in Germany from 71 to 187 million tons,  in Germany from 71
to  187 million tons, in France from 36 to 62.5  million tons and  in Russia
from  10.9 to  54  million tons.[8]  Energy and metal  became the
major   factors  in   the   rapid  development  of   railways  and   armies,
predetermining the  development  of entirely  new branches  of  industry and
science.
     A common feature  of this process is that the  industrial revolution of
the  19th  century interlinked the interests of the developing  nations in a
completely new manner. If until the 19th century, conflicts between  nations
were of a  purely localised nature and on  mainly  religious  or territorial
grounds  or  for  reasons  of  inheritance,  after the developments  of  the
industrial revolution  the main factors  in the emergence of conflicts  were
disputes  for  continental  or  world  domination,  cheap raw  materials and
colonies.
     These  facts are  perhaps sufficient to support the contention that the
Global  World was born at the end of the 19th  century. I interpret the term
"Global World" as meaning  the level of development at which the majority of
countries and  peoples  become dependent on  each other and, notwithstanding
their own national governments, form a common essence.  If this is the case,
then  the  end  of  the  19th  century  was  just  the  beginning  of  world
globalisation within  the  framework  of  the nation  states  of  the  Third
Civilisation. During the same period the world began an  intensive period of
establishing common economic (export of capital),  technological (transport,
communications, science) and cultural links. At some time towards the end of
the 19th century the great world powers were already unable to resolve their
own conlicts in isolation. Conflicts could no longer be limited to their own
borders but to the  economic and political divisions already existing in the
world. A new world trend began to emerge, that of imperialism.
     The  trend  towards  imperialism  was the  first  manifestation of  the
globalisation of the world, a qualitative new level of world  integration. I
consider imperialism to be a result of the intermingling of two intersecting
phenomena: the strong feelings of  nationalism which existed  everywhere  at
the end of the 19th century and the objective trend towards integration as a
result  of  the  export of  capital  and  aspirations  towards the  economic
division  of the world. In the 19th century, globalisation existed only as a
direct initiative  of the nation state. However, during  the second half  of
the 19th century economic development began to transcend national borders in
the  form  of  ambitions and  aspirations towards  national  dominance. Such
belligerent nationalism within the conditions of  internationalisation  gave
rise    to   what    J.Hobson,   R.Hilferging   and   V.Lenin   defined   as
imperialism.[9]
     Looking  at  the  way  in  which  humanity  greeted  the advent  of the
twentieth  century, one is suprised by  their equanimity of  spirit.  Upon a
cursory examination of the major newspapers of France, Germany  and Bulgaria
published on  the 1st of  January  1900,  I observe a remarkable similarity.
Almost everywhere  countries  greeted  the  new  century  with  fervent  and
malcontent nationalism. The new  century was  seen as a century during which
individual  states  would  satisfy their ambitions  for  new  territory  and
conquer  and  punish  their  opponents.  The   dominant  atmosphere  was  of
nationalism and  imperial  aspirations  and  against  this  background,  the
emergence of socialist ideas. National  borders  had become too limiting for
the expansion of industry. The Germans and the Bulgarians wanted to unite to
castigate their neighbours. The British rejoiced in their colonial dominions
and dreamed of an even greater Britain. The French reminded the Germans that
they  would not stand for any more humiliation like  that suffered in  1870.
Not one  of the European  nations or the USA are an exception. They were all
overcome by  some level of imperialist amnbition. This was like a contagious
disease brought on by a need for raw materials and control over the railways
and the sea routes but it also penetrated political, journalistic and social
thought.
     During this period, Fichte developed his  idea of the exclusive role of
the Prussian  state  in  the  progress of humanity. Fichte was  the greatest
proponent   of   the  way   in   which  nationalism   and   the   need   for
internationalisation becomes transformed into imperialism. But France was no
different. During the decades after the  destruction  of the French army  in
1870, French nationalism  reached  unseen  heights. Charles  Morras  defined
nationalism as the absolute criterion for every political action. In general
at the end of  the 19th century  and at the  beginning of the 20th  European
nationalism  flourished. In the USA at the end of the 19th century, economic
and  demographic growth, albeit slower  than  in Europe also gave  rise to a
similar explosion of  self-confidence  and aspirations for  a new  role  for
America in the world. The idea of an international society, a common feature
of  American  political  thought  during this period,  was  also  frequently
proclaimed as a right to domination and even war.
     It could  also be  said  that at  the  beginning of  the  20th  century
humanity  was  obsessed by  the  political  paradigm  typical  of  all world
empires:  nationalism  combined  with  imperial  ambitions. In other  words,
internationalisation and globalisation stem  from the ambitions  of isolated
nationalism and nation  states.  This was also reflected in the structure of
manufacturing, politics  and life  in  general.  Over a thirty-year  period,
between  1880 and 1910 the standing armies  of  the  world powers  increased
significantly. The Russian army increased from 791,000 to 1,285,000 persons.
The  French  army  increased  from  543,000  to  769,000.  The Germany  army
increased from  426,000  to 694,000 and the  British  army from  246,000  to
531,000. The army of the Austro-Hungarian empire increased from  246,000  to
425,000. The Japanese army  increased from 71,000 to 271,000 and the army of
the  United States grew from 34,000 to 127,000[10]. Stockpiles of
weapons and  huge amounts  of human resources were ammassed in the  event of
war, which was soon to break out.
     The First World War was the first manifestation of an integrated world,
the first major demonstration of world globalisation. It  was proof  of  the
growing interdependence of countries which  did  not allow  them, apart from
rare exceptions, to stay out of the conflict.  Practically the  entire world
was  sucked into the conflicts  of the First  World War. From this moment on
the world began to manifest itself as a mutually dependent system developing
within  a  common  cycle.  I  consider  this  argument  to be of  particular
significance and I would like to develop it further.
     The  First  World War  linked  the  majority of the countries  within a
common conflict but  also formed the beginning of a common economic cycle in
the  development of the industrial nations. What other  explanation  can  be
given  for the fact that in the 1920's all  the major powers witnessed, to a
greater or lesser extent,  advances in industrial progress? Taking 1913 as a
basis (100%) the indices of industrial  output growth between 1921  and 1928
were as follows: in  the  USA from  98 to  154.5%; Germany  - from  74.7% to
118.3; Great Britain from 55.1 to  95.1%; France - from 61.4 to 134.4; Japan
from 167 - 300%; Italy from 98.4 to 175.2 and the Soviet Union from  23.3 to
143.5[11].  All the developed  nations,  as  though bound by some
common  umbilical cord, suffered economic collapse at  the beginning of  the
1930's. Only those nations such as the USSR who had isolated themselves from
the world economy escaped the crisis. In 1937 Germany succumbed. This common
feature of  world  economic development  also manifested  itself  after  the
Second World War in countries with an open market economy.
     Despite certain divergence in terms of the stages of development, it is
clear that  after  the 1920's the most  industrialised nations of the  world
began to develop  in a more mutually  dependent  manner. Today at the end of
the century, this  mutual dependence has attained unseen levels as expressed
in the indices  of the world stock exchanges and in the unconditional mutual
interdependence of exchange rates. During the  period between  the two world
wars  a  new  global essence  began  to  develop entirely  independently  of
national governments. This  began with the increasing in the level of mutual
interdependence  between countries  and gradually gained strength  from  the
growth   in   new   technology,  commerce   and   finance,   transport   and
communications, culture and science and armaments etc.
     Nevertheless, the 20th  century witnessed  only the birth of the global
world. The  global  revolution  still only exists as a possibility.  It will
take many  decades  to  achieve  the gradual and problematic  development of
global  structures  within  the  model  of  the  individual  nation  states.
Globalisation   is   a   level   of   international   integration  at  which
interdependence between  nations and cultures exists  at a  planetary level.
Such  mutual interdependence is not  a matter  for  one or two or a group of
nations but between each  individual state and the world as a whole, between
individual  regions  of   the   world,  between  all  nations  and  cultures
simultaneously.
     If  upon  the  emergence  of  human  civilisation,  the   processes  of
integration affected  only a  number of  individual tribes and was localised
and during  the Middle Ages it took  on regional proportions, then since the
beginning of  the  20th century,  it  has  existed within the  framework  of
mankind  as  a  whole. All countries  and peoples are involved in  a  common
system  which is  governed in a particular way and on  the basis of  certain
principles. This  system arose spontaneously, via struggles for  domination,
wars  and violence.  One should take  into account  the  difficulties people
encounter in attempting to overcome the boundaries of their own environment,
religion and nation. At the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the
20th century people were little occupied by thoughts of the world as a whole
or  the  priorities of universal  human  interests. Of  course, there were a
number of writers and businessmen, Henry Ford was  a prime example, who were
exceptions to this rule. However, this was not the case  for the large  mass
of the active inhabitants  of  our planet,  politicians and the  influential
owners of large amounts of wealth.
     The  culture  of the  Third  Civilisation is  above  all  a  culture of
national  thought  and behaviour and  the 20th century will remain  entirely
within  its  dominion  notwithstanding the  accelerated  processes  of world
integration. Its militant  nationalism and militiary blocs created the first
models  of the  global  world based  on violence  and conflicts  and on  the
familiar  struggle  for  national  domination  which  existed   in  previous
civilisations.

     3. THE SEARCH FOR A MODEL FOR THE GLOBAL WORLD

     The first model of the global world was the colonial  system.  It was a
product of  the combination of 19th century nationalism and the acceleration
of globalisation. In the middle of the 20thcentury  and as a  consequence of
the two world  wars this modelcollapsed to give  way to a two-bloc political
and economic model.

     T
     he first model of the global world was colonialism.  During  the second
half  of the 19th century the larger nation states, motivated by desires for
empire began gradually to conquer andto divide  the  world.  Geo-politically
the world  became integrated through the colonial system for the first  time
into a single unity. By achieving  pre-eminence in the seas  and oceans  and
possessing  the largest fleet in  the world, Great Britain after 1815 turned
its attention to  the rapid conquest of territories from Africa to India and
Hong Kong. Over a period  of between 50  and 70 years the British managed to
create the greatest colonial empire in the world. From 1815-1865, a  further
100,000 square miles was added to the territory of the British Empire.
     During  this  period  France  was the only other country to attempt  to
compete with Great Britain. It was later to be followed by Germany, Belgium,
Italy, Portugal, Spain, Denmark, the USA,  Russia  and Japan. Starting  from
the basis of  the nation  state and  moving towards globalisation, the great
powers of the  time began a process of the domination and re-division of the
entire world into a unified world system linked through imperial centres.
     As  can be seen from table  1, during  the  last  quarter of  the  19th
century, the  largest colonial powers  expanded their territories by  almost
200  million  head of  population  and  2.32  million  square kilometres  of
territory. Between 1900 and the beginning of  the First  World War this rate
decreased as a result of the satiation of the "colonial market"

     Table 1
     Size and population of the colonies
     (1875-1914)

     State
     1875
     1900
     1914


     sq.km.
     pop.
     sq.km.
     pop.
     sq.km.
     pop.

     Great Britain
     France
     Holland
     Belgium
     Germany
     USA
     22.5
     1.0
     2.0
     2.3
     -
     1.5
     250
     6
     25
     15
     -
     [*]
     32.7
     11.0
     2.0
     2.3
     2.6
     1.9
     370
     50
     38
     15
     12
     9
     32.7
     11.0
     2.0
     2.4
     2.9
     1.0
     350
     54
     45
     12
     13
     10


     All  the  most  prestigious,  accessible and wealthy colonies have been
conquered  by  the beginning of  the twentieth  century,  resulting  in  the
establishment of the first model of the emergent global world - the colonial
world.
     The colonial system itself gave rise to the  second  momentous event in
the globalisation  of  the  world.  Hardly  had  the  system  become  firmly
established when it  began to give  rise to a  series of almost irresolvable
world  conflicts:  the irreconcilable struggle  for the  re-division of  the
world and the  First  World  War  in  which  millions  lost their lives. The
resulting radicalisation of public opinion in Russia, Germany and to a large
extent in other parts of the world stimulated the growth in anti-imperialist
attitudes and provided an opportunity for the growth of the radical ideas of
socialist revolution.
     These  events  in  themselves  gave  rise to the  second model  of  the
emergent global world - the model of  the two systems which  began  with the
October  revolution in 1917 and  continued until 1989-91.  Almost the entire
period of the twentieth century passed within conditions of the two opposing
systems and the existence of the bi-polar  global model. During this  period
the existence of  the two systems was explained basically as  the opposition
of two ideologies, the ideologies of the  rich and the  poor, socialism  and
capitalism. This was  also the view  of Marxism-Leninism. After the collapse
of the  Eastern  European political regimes  the existence of the  communist
world  was presented  as  an historical mistake, as the  consequence of  the
profound delusions of huge masses of people and the  tyranny of dictatorship
etc.. This was  of the view put forward by Z.Bzezinski[12], but I
find  these  ideas  be simplistic  and  far too  easy. In  actual  fact  the
processes were much more complex and contradictory.
     During the  period of its  mutually  dependent  development, the  world
began  to subordinate itself  to  a  greater  extent  to  the  principle  of
equilibrium, a principle  which is based on the laws of nature. The lack  of
social  equilibrium leads sooner or later to serious conflicts  and  delayed
development. In the  19th century and the beginning  of the 20th within  the
process of accelerating  industrialisation and rising imperialism two global
imbalances formed:  the first  - between the rich metropolitan countries and
the second - between the rich, ruling classes of the imperialist bourgeoisie
and  the  enormous  masses of the poor proletariate.  These large imbalances
were particularly  developed in  the  poorer countries and the countries who
found themselves  on  the losing side  in  the First  World  War. In general
terms, in  the 19th  century  and  the  first 50-60  years of  the twentieth
century, class differences  became much more  marked  and the ensuing  class
struggle was a direct consequence.
     It was  these  class conflicts  and  international disproportions which
gave rise to the radical revolutions  in  Russia, Germany and Hungary  and a
series of other countries between 1917 and 1923. This also  goes some way to
explaining the development  of dominant political doctrines  such as in  the
USSR, Italy, Germany and a number of other countries. To take the example of
the  USSR, the guiding aim  of  the  Soviet economy  in the  1920's  and  in
particular the  1930's was  to overcome its  backwardness and to undertake a
programme  of rapid,  accelerated  industrialisation and to create  a stable
armaments industry. Its initial ambition to  achieve a balance with the rest
of the  capitalist  world and  subsequently to  overtake it was the dominant
strategy  of  Stalin in the 1930's and  1940's.  This economic policy, while
defensible, can in no way justify the violence and historical  absurdity  of
totalitarianism.  I  am  merely  attempting to  explain  its  roots. All  my
academic research  and  my  direct observations  of  the Soviet totalitarian
system show that millions of people were aware of the violence of the system
but that they accepted  it  as  something inevitable, as a lesser evil  than
poverty and  misery. The illusions  and  the crimes  perpetrated  during the
regimes of Stalin,  Hitler and Mao and the other violent regimes of the 20th
century are indisputable. These  crimes were stimulated  by the vicissitudes
of  history,  by  the  ambition to  create  an  alternative model of  social
progress.  Are  Robespierre  or  Danton  or the  British colonisers, or  the
Russian conquerors of Central Asia any less culpable?
     The deeply rooted reasons for these crimes need to be  explained before
they can  be resolved.  There is no  doubt that  at  the  root  of  Stalin's
violence initially against the rural population and subsequently against the
whole  of Soviet society  after  1929  lay his  ambition  to  achieve  rapid
industrialisation. The strategy of rapid industrialisation and anti-colonial
conflicts in  a number  of less-developed countries should  be viewed  as  a
reaction against emergent global imbalances.  That which was  considered  by
many  to be the struggle of the repressed nations  for the  freedom  of  the
proletariate was actually a  struggle against economic backwardness, against
imperialism and  the monopolies of  most developed nations  and the struggle
for national supremacy. In the 20th century, the poorer nations had no other
option  to defend themselves against colonialism other  than  to concentrate
their force and might through powerful state structures. Slogans such as the
"welfare of the proletariate", "care for people" were always associated with
the power of the state. Poverty  always generates Utopias. Communism was one
of them.
     During the first half of the twentieth century the world had  continued
to develop on  the  basis of  liberal market doctrines  and it persisted  in
being  a world of  rich  and poor  peoples, metropolises  and  colonies  and
profound class differences. When markets are free but imbalanced, the strong
easily swallow up  the  weak. Such  imbalanced historical development allows
those  countries  with more  rapid development to become dominant. Sooner or
later this was bound  to lead to  social  revolutions. This, I feel,  is the
explanation  for the division of the  world  into two opposing  blocs as  an
alternative to the existing colonial model. After the two world wars and the
economic crisis of 1929-33, the liberal  idea underwent a crisis and  opened
the way for the radicalisation of the world and its division.
     By 1925, two countries had yielded to  "state socialism" - the USSR and
Mongolia - with a  total population of over 150 million. 25 years later this
political system  had spread into  more than 20 countries and  accounted for
more  than half the  population of the world. After the victory over Germany
in 1945 the power and  the authority  of the USSR grew immensely. Under  the
auspices of its power the national patriotic forces of a number of countries
threw  off the  colonial domination of  Britain, France,  Belgium, Portugal,
Holland and other countries. At the beginning  of the 1960's,  with  certain
exceptions  the  colonial  model ceased to  exist and  was replaced  by  the
two-polar  model. At the end of the 1950's  the two  world systems  embraced
populations  of  about 1-1.5 billion  people and possessed military  parity.
Without achieving  full economic parity  or high levels of productivity, the
USSR  managed  to  undermine  the monopoly of the USA  in strategic military
areas. Two basic centres of power became  established in the world  - Moscow
and  Washington  accompanied by other satellites  with  varying  degrees  of
power.
     Since the Second  World  War the world has witnessed a number of  local
conflicts.  There  have been armed struggles  in  the  Near East,  North and
Equatorial  Africa, Indo-China, India and Pakistan, Chile, Bolivia, Cuba and
tens of other regions and  countries.  All these countries were directly  or
indirectly linked with  the  two  superpowers  and their  opposition. On the
other hand the achievement of nuclear parity between the USSR and the USA in
the     1950's     brought     an     end    to     the     trend    towards
ultra-imperialism[13] and the  possibility of the  world becoming
subordinated to a single  world power centre. Beneath the  nuclear umbrellas
of the  two  super powers and carefully balanced between them, the countries
of Western Europe,  Japan and  a  number of  other  Asian and Latin American
countries achieved great success.
     I believe the achievement of nuclear parity to be a phenomenon with key
significance  for  world  development.  Napoleon with his ambitions  for  an
empire from "Paris to India" , Hitler with his "World Order" and Stalin with
his  aspirations  for the  "victory of world  communism" all  longed  for  a
unified  world empire.  This  was  also  the  view  of  a  number  of  other
politicians and thinkers who  seeing a trend towards world  integration  and
the expansion of manufacturing came to the  conclusion  that a  future world
would  be a world  of monopolistic unity, a unified  manufactory for workers
and  peasants  (Lenin),  ultra-imperialism  (Kautski), permanent  revolution
(Trotski) and so on. To this extent the bi-polar model is a higher level  of
development  than the model  of  colonial empires.  On the  other hand,  the
bi-polar model is only a  stage in the formation of the global world and the
actual peak of  the crisis of the  Third  Civilisation. I defend  the thesis
that the two bloc system has  to  be seen  as a transitional  stage from the
point of  view of the development  of the global  world and  the  transition
between the Third and the Fourth Civilisation.
     Until the  end of the 19th century, researchers analysed world  changes
through the prism of national  thinking and the nation state. After 1917 and
especially after the Second World War, the main object of  research  was the
two world systems - socialism (communism) and capitalism, their  competition
and the struggle for domination. This was a reflection of the realities in a
world  which  had overpowered the minds of billions  of  people. Henceforth,
however, any analysis of the structural changes  within the world cannot  be
based on the confrontational  bi-polar  model. Only the global, civilisation
approach  is capable of providing  the  correct response to questions and to
reveal the common and, consequently, the local trends of human development.

     4. THE COMMON CRISIS AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE THIRD CIVILISATION

     The  1970's  saw  the  Suez crisis, the increase  in the  price of  oil
(1973-5) and  the  end of  the Brent Woods  system[14].  Everyone
began to speak of  the crisis of world capitalism. At the end of the  1980's
everyone began to  speak  of the crisis of world communism. In  actual fact,
the entire world had been overcome by a profound crisis.

     T
     he ideologues and politicians  of the two superpowers always maintained
that the system of their opponents was in crisis. In the communist countries
students  attended lectures about the "common crisis of capitalism" while in
the  West Kremlinologists  talked of  the  "crisis  of world  communism". In
1960-2 Nikita  Krushchev frequently was heard to say  that the "collapse  of
the  colonial system  is an historical victory over imperialism". In 1989-90
the victory of world capitalims over communism was declared. Was this really
the case? I have come to a  different conclusion. I believe that the problem
cannot be reduced merely to  the collapse of one system  and  the victory of
another. In actual fact during the second half of the twentieth century,  it
was not only  the  communist  system  which was in a state of crisis but the
whole of the two bloc political system in the world, the entire structure of
the Third  Civilisation.  Industrial  technologies, nation states  and their
alliances,  the  culture  of  violence  against the  individual  and  nature
suffered serious repercussions.
     What was the world like before the 1980's? There  were two giant groups
of  nations  within which 99% of the weapons of mass destruction and 80%  of
manufacturing industry were  concentrated.  Each group was closely connected
with military, political and economic alliances (NATO and the EU, the Warsaw
Pact  and COMECON) with common military  and economic  infrastructures, with
joint institutions and  education  of personnel.  All  other  countries  and
peoples were dependent  in some  way or another  on these  groups. It  is no
accident that hundreds of local conflicts during this period were waged with
the  weapons  of  one  or other  of the  military blocs  and regarded as the
continuation of their undeclared war. On the other hand, the two bloc system
existed  in  the  conditions  of  continuing  integration  and  the  growing
dependence  of countries  on each other. This  was the  main  reason for the
general trends  of  world  development to  enter into contradiction with its
existing  structures. The  extent of these contradictions was so  great that
there are justifiable grounds  to speak of the common crisis of the two bloc
system and, in broader terms, the crisis of the entire modern age.
     The  first  cause which  lead  to this  crisis  was  the  character and
structure of world economic growth.
     After the Second World War,  the global  economic product of the  Earth
increased four-fold.  The  total manufactured  output of  the period between
1950 and 1990  is equal  to the growth of production from  the  beginning of
civilisation  to the  present day. There had never  been  such  a  turbulent
period  in  the  development  of  the  manufacturing  powers  of  humankind.
Humankind had  never witnessed such a period of dynamic processes reliant on
mutual cooperation, discoveries, the multiplication of discoveries and their
by-products. The other side of the coin  was  that such economic growth gave
rise to enormous deformations. The competition  between the two super powers
and  their allies assisted in  the acceleration of progress but also lead to
previously unknown  levels of unbalanced growth. In  the  1980's the average
national product per head of population in the industrialised countries  was
more than 11,000  dollars. In  the majority of African countries this figure
was between 250-300 dollars.
     While in the most developed countries of the world post-war development
had   lead  to  an  enormous  abundance  of  goods  and  the  domination  of
consumerism, in the Third World more than 1.9 billion  people were suffering
from malnutrition and disease.  The level  of consumerism  in  the developed
industrial countries  rose to  a  level 40 to  100 times greater than in the
developing countries. This process  of  world  development  gave rise to the
most  unexpected paradoxes. The  money spent by today by  the  French on pet
food would  be  sufficient to feed  the  starving children of  Ethiopia  and
Somalia.
     The  iniquities in world development have  increased  during  the  last
couple of decades.  Under colonialism, capital was re-directed  towards  the
poorer countries. After  the war, however,  it began to move in the opposite
direction. Large investments began to be made in the USA, Western Europe and
Japan. In the 1980's alone, direct  investments in the  developing countries
fell  by  about  one  hundred percent  - from 25 billion  USD in 1982  to 13
billion  in 1987. As a result  of this the  poorer  nations began to rely on
large amounts of credit  in order to be able to feed their people, resulting
in the crippling debt burden which exists today. At present the countries of
Latin America  owe international creditor banks  and a number of governments
more than 400  billion dollars. Over  100 billion  are  owed by  the Eastern
European  countries.  These  statistics  are  proof  not  only  of  enormous
deformations but  of the profound crisis  which is affecting the foundations
of  the  world  financial  system.  While  the  processes  of  international
integration  do not permit the development of a monocentric world, the seven
richest nations of  the world and the 300-400  wealthiest banks control  the
lives of the majority of humanity via debt management.
     On the other  hand, the disproportionate economic development resulting
from the mad  rush to purchase  armaments and conflicts led to  the economic
overloading of the  two superpowers. As a  direct  result  of the  exisiting
two-bloc geo-political structure the USA  managed (or some  say was obliged)
to amass huge internal debts of more than 4 trillion dollars.  In the 1970's
and  1980's the  debts of the USSR increase enormously and delayed the rates
of its development.
     A second characteristic problem of the two-bloc model of develoment was
the increase in environmental  problems. For  the entire  period of post-war
development, as  a result of uncontrolled  industrialisation  and  the blind
faith in political  and ideological ambitions the world lost practically one
fifth  of its cultivable land, one fifth of its tropical forests and tens of
thousands of species of animal and plant life.  During this same period  the
level of carbon-monoxide in the atmosphere increased more than ten-fold. The
level of ozone in the stratoshpere has diminished and humanity is faced with
the threat  of global warming.  Talk  is now of a global ecological tragedy.
Even today despite the growth in ecological awareness and "green" movements,
the  world  environmental  crisis  is  seen   as   something  of   secondary
significance  as something  less  important than the  struggle for  economic
growth, military strategic stability or  national domination. Global warming
as  a  result  of  the  industrial boom  has  already had serious,  possibly
catastrophic, consequences.  The reduction  of  irrigated agricultural land,
the increase in the levels of the oceans, the  dessication of entire regions
which produce the majority  of the  world's  grain  - these are just a small
part of the possible consequences.
     Despite the potential serious consequences for the world the leaders of
the  two systems did not want,  nor  were  they  able to  take  any decisive
measures to allocate more funds for the  conservation of the environment and
to  reduce military expenditure or  to pass common  legislation to guarantee
the priorities of human needs.
     The  third and no less important  cause  of  the crisis of the two-bloc
system  was  the  fact  that  in  the 1950's mankind  surpassed  all logical
extremes of military  growth. The  cold war  and the opposition  of the  two
world  systems  lead  the  two  super  powers  into  a  ceaseless  race  for
domination.  This  contest reached such  a level that in  the mid 1980's the
USSR and the USA possessed  enough nuclear and strategic warheads to destroy
life  on  earth  several  times over. The  eight  most economically powerful
nations on the earth  - the  USA, USSR, China, the UK, France, West Germany,
Italy and  Japan  continually  and  deliberately  increased  their  military
budgets during the entire post-war period.
     In 1984, world arms export reached record levels of 75 billion dollars,
several times  greater  than  the amount of money necessary to  buy food and
medicines for  the  hungry and sick in the  world and for  investment in the
poorer  countries. As  a result of the  opposition of  the  two blocs in the
1980's between 13 and 15  million people were employed in the arms industry.
In 1987, the global military budget of the world was more than 1 trillion US
dollars. This extreme overarmament lead to the overall deformation of entire
world development  and distorted the structure of industrial  production. It
caused enourmous deficits  in the budgets of  the industrialised nations and
created  serious  pre-conditions  for the  future of  world finance. No less
important  was the  fact that as a  result of the constant increase in  arms
production and nuclear weapons  in particular, the level of nuclear security
fell to  very low levels. The danger  of  a  nuclear Third World War  loomed
greater than ever. At the end of  the 1980's the two super powers - the USSR
and the USA had over 12 thousand units of nuclear arms - which from the view
point of common humanity was beyond the realms of common sense.
     Thus, the deformation of  economic development, the world environmental
crisis,  the  wealth of the North and  the poverty and disease of the South,
the demographic booms, overarming - all these factors are the clear symptoms
of a profound crisis. It is true that all these critical phenomena have been
frequently discussed  before  and that  some of  the  problems which I  have
mentioned here have been the subjects of  international summit meetings  and
research  groups but  it  is  also  true that  they  have  been  looking for
explanations to these phenomena in the wrong places.
     In  my  opinion  the  most  profound  reason  for  the  crises  in  the
environment, manufacturing and population growth can be found in the growing
inadequacy  of the entire two-bloc structure  of the world. On the one hand,
during  this  period,  following the logic of confrontation and the struggle
for domination, the  two super powers, their  allies and all  the  remaining
smaller countries established structures oriented towards the development of
the economic  and military power  of the bloc to which they belonged. On the
other   hand,  the  inter-bloc  and  inter-state  power-struggle  created  a
manufacturing capacity  which lead  to the internationalisation of the world
and caused world problems which until then had been unknown.
     The contradiction is manifest. Institutions,  politics, propaganda, the
training  of  personnel, the  links  between manufacture  and  defence  were
directly dependent on the  profound  ideologisation of  thinking, while  the
globalisation  of  humanity lead to the destruction of  the  confrontational
structures of the  two blocs. In  the 1970's  and  1980's the bi-polar world
could no longer cope with global and  world trends. This contradiction still
exists  today  notwithstanding  the  collapse of the  two world systems. The
reason was the impossibility of bringing a sudden halt to the inertia of the
past  based  in  the  instutitions,  upbringing,  education  and thinking of
people.
     There is  no  doubt  that in the West, and in  particular  in the East,
humanity has taken  too long to come to terms with these problems. Moreover,
subsequent  generations  will bear the  consequences and  will discover  new
disasters  particularly in the  environment  and as a result of the abnormal
military competition between  the two world systems.  A number of  academics
and  politicians  issued  warnings  in   the  middle  of  the  century.  The
scientists' rebellion against  atomic weapons  in the 1950's, the courage of
Sakharov in  the USSR, and  the actions of Albert  Einstein, Bertrand Russel
and Jacques  Cousteau are  just  a few  examples. However, the conditions of
political opposition continue  to exert an enormous  power  of inertia. This
inertia  comes   from  the  cultures  of  the   existing  civilisation,  the
nationalism of the modern age and the world conflicts of the 20th century.
     One  of  the main  reasons for  the acceleration in the crisis  of  the
two-bloc system and the collapse of the iron curtain was the growth in world
communications. In simple terms, the  growth of radio, television, computers
and  satellite dishes destroyed  the iron curtain, pierced the armour of the
tanks and  lead to the  formation of  a common culture of  integration.  The
revolution in communications  which began  at  the  beginning  of the 1960's
brought about  incredible  political and  spiritual  changes  throughout the
entire world. The Beatles and  the Rolling Stones became  a world phenomenon
not only as a result of their musical talent but also due to the new methods
of  information transfer. In 1971  I went abroad for the first time, to  the
German Democratic  Republic. I asked my hosts why all  the television ariels
faced west  and  he  answered  "It  makes  the German  people feel  united."
Television had begun to erode the Berlin wall even then.
     After the 1960's and the  1970's people felt a  new wave of integration
and  discovered  their  common  humanity.  This  was,  however,   in   sharp
contradiction to  the collapse  of  the  world  and the  structures  of  the
political regimes. The new  generations began to grow  up  in  an atmosphere
which was no longer  dominated by the  dogma  of ideology but by  music  and
spirituality and  the thirst  for contact with  progressive cultural images.
Clearly this was  in  contradiction with the two-bloc division  of the world
and the division between capitalism and socialism.
     On  the other hand, computers, communications and new world media began
to exert a  direct  influence  on the  human  conscience and  to create  the
beginnings of a  new previously  unknown  global  culture. Together with the
globalisation of commerce and financial markets, this raised questions about
the basic structures of the third civilisation -  nations and nation states.
There is no doubt that their borders had begun to change giving  rise to the
problem of the formation of another world structure and of another political
and economic order.
     In  the 1960's when the  cold  war emerged  from the  ice  age and  the
peoples from the two sides began to get know  each other, the first barriers
in  their  consciousness  came  down.  In  the  Eastern  bloc,  intellectual
movements and  calls for more freedom  caught the leaders quite unawares. In
Czechoslovakia the Prague Spring blossomed, Hungary began a process of brave
economic reforms and  in Poland the workers began to fight for their rights.
This  period  produced the indefatiguable spirits of Vladimir  Visotskiy  in
Russia, the "Shturtsi" in Bulgaria and Ceslav Niemen in Poland.
     Many  people in  the  West also  realised that military,  political and
cultural  confrontation was of little benefit. In  the 1960's  and 1970's in
the  USA  and  in  particular in Western  Europe  movements  for  peace  and
understanding  gained  momentum.  The  demonstrations  against  the  war  in
Vietnam, the youth movements in 1968, the hippy peace movements and a number
of other phenomena were manifestations  not only of the political status quo
but also of a new emergent culture. The bearers of  the  new spirituality in
the West in the 1960's were born not so much in the academic environments of
Eaton and Harvard but in the fields of Woodstock and amongst the millions of
fans of John Lennon, Mick Jagger and Ian Gillan.
     At the beginning of the 1960's the president of the USA, John F.Kennedy
was the first  American statesman to  evaluate the  Eastern European nations
not merely  as  the  incorporation of evil  but  recognised  that  they  had
attained  certain social achievements  from which much could be learned.  Of
particular significance  was his attempt to build intellectual  bridges with
the  East  and to break  the  ice of  the  cold  war.  Without accepting the
violence of the  totalitarian regimes, many intellectuals  in the West began
to  perceive  more  clearly not  only  the mistakes and errors  but also the
successes of  the Eastern European countries and to propose  the application
of certain  of the  benefits of state socialism,  particularly in the social
field.
     Year after year the means of  global integration - transport, commerce,
radio and  television lead to to growth  in international contact and slowly
lead  to the blurring  of the  iron curtain between East  and West. With the
appearance of the computer and satellite television  in daily  life and with
the intensity of world  radio television and cultural  exchange the barriers
between  the two systems  became more  illusory. New means  of communication
made the policies  of isolation,  concealment of  truth and  global division
absurd.  The  monopoly of information  collapsed as a  direct  result of the
revolution in  communications which in  turn lead to the  undermining of the
two-polar model.
     Despite everything which  I have mentioned until  now, is it still  not
overstated  to speak  of the collapse of the  Third  Civilisation?  Am I not
attempting  to  impose  original  thought  in an  aggressive  way  onto  the
evolution  of human  development? I  am  conviced that this  is not  so.  My
arguments for speaking of a general change in civilisation will be developed
in the  subsequent chapters.  They involve  technological  and geo-political
structures,  ownership and  the transition from traditional  capitalist  and
socialist  societies and the blurring of  the concept  of the  nation state.
Everything  which symbolised  and represented  the modern age  -  industrial
technology, nation states, capitalism and socialism and the bi-polar world -
has  undergone change. As a result of  the explosion of world communications
the process of  cultural  globalisation  has  begun to  accelerate and  what
emerged has taken on new sharper  features. This trend has gradually created
more and more adherents of a new world and a new civilisation. Sooner rather
than later the two-bloc system of world civilisation was going to  collapse.
The question was "when?" and "in what way?"

     Chapter two
     COLLAPSE I: THE EXPLOSION IN EASTERN EUROPE
     1. DECAY AND DEATH

     Between  1960  and  1990 a noticeable  gap began to open up  betweenthe
socialist
     countries of Eastern Europe  and the industrialisedcountries of Western
Europe.
     At the beginning of the 1980's there was a growing danger that this gap
was going
     to become insurmountable...

     A
     lthough the two-bloc  structure of the  world  was entering a period of
common crisis its disintegration began not in the West but in the East.  The
changes in Eastern  Europe were revolutionary" while in  the West  they were
seen as "evolutionary". Why?
     In my  opinion  the  reasons  for  this can  be  seen  in  the  greater
inadequacies  of the Eastern European totalitarian regimes  to adapt to  the
new trends  in  world  development  and  to  adapt  themselves  to  the  new
technological  and economic  conditions which  appeared  in  the 1970's  and
1980's. The Eastern European totalitarian bloc was  the weakest link  in the
world of the Third Civilisation.
     As early  as  the 1950's  the Americans, the Japanese  and  the Western
Europeans  had begun  to look  for completely new  approaches to the way  in
which their lives were structured. On the one  hand, under pressure from the
new  external and internal realities which had  to be taken into account and
on the other hand as a result of competition with the Soviet Union and other
countries of the Eastern Bloc,  the most  developed industrial nations began
to improve  their systems. Today the economies of the  USA, Japan and France
have little in common with what they were in the 1920's and 1930's.
     By  preserving  free  initiative, the  industrialised Western countries
managed  to overcome the  danger of  monopolism within  their  economies and
extreme  social  stratification.   In  this  way  they  did  not  allow  the
predictions  of  Lenin  that  "imperialism   cannot  be  reformed  and  will
disintegrate under the blows from its  own contradictions"[15] to
come true. In fact the opposite was true, after the Great Depression of 1929
and during the post-war period  the largest Western European states and  the
USA undertook a series of measures aimed at overcoming the danger of further
monopolisation and  achieving greater social equality  and harmony. Economic
and  political  power  were  balanced  through  moderate  state  regulation,
anti-monopoly legislation  and  the  stimulation  of  medium and small-scale
business.
     The most significant changes undertaken  in the USA  and Western Europe
were in  the structure  of ownership. After the passing Legislation allowing
the transferring of share ownership to employees in 1974 in the USA hundreds
of thousands  of employees began  to acquire stock in the companies in which
they  worked. Similar trends can be seen  in Great  Britain, Germany, France
and a  number  of  other  Wester  European  countries.  They  also undertook
programmes  to  stimulate the  development  of  small  and  medium business.
Millions of small  companies  sprang up in the areas  of  services, tourism,
trade,  electrical goods and a number  of other branches of the  economy. By
some  accounts  these  small  enterprises account for up to half the working
population of Western European countries.
     At the same  time the large family properties in Western Europe and the
USA  have lost the position of monopoly and importance which they had at the
beginning of  the century.  Today neither Rothschild,  nor  Dupont,  neither
Morgan nor Rockerfeller  can exert direct influence on questions of national
importance as they could have done  a  hundred  years ago. This  has allowed
Western European  societies to  halt their  deterioration  and  to  stop the
growth of class contradictions and gradually to wipe out the gap between the
different social groups. Thirty  years after the end of the Second World War
the  nature  of  employed labour  had  changed beyond  recognition  and  the
proletariate described by Marx dissolved within  a entirely new  social  and
technological environment. If now at the end of the  20th  century one is to
visit  the factories  of,  for  example,  Zussler  near  Zurich  or American
Standard New York,  one  will  see a completely new type of work  force with
different  interests  and  a  different mentality and, more  importantly,  a
workforce which  is integrated  within the decision  making processes. These
are no  longer the same workers which lead Karl Marx to write "Capital"  and
who gave rise to mass political and trade union protests at the beginning of
the 20th century.
     In  the  post-war  period and particularly in  the  1970's and 1980's a
process of change  in the nature of property ownership began which continues
to  the  present.  This in  its turn has  had direct ramifications upon  the
nature  of  power. This revolution  has allowed  the  USA, Japan and another
twenty or  so  countries to adapt  much more quickly and effectively  to the
needs of  the modern  scientific  and technological revolution and to become
global leaders.
     At the same  time the  development of the  USSR and Eastern Europe  has
been halted as a result of the totalitarian nature  of  their regimes. It is
true  that  when it was formed  in 1922, the Soviet Union inherited a poorly
developed industrial base and a poorly educated population  but  it  is also
true  that the totalitarian regime established by  Stalin  at the end of the
1920's had destructive and devastating consequences upon all areas of life.
     Tens of million of people lost their lives as a result of violence  and
repression  - this was as a dramatic  feature of the Stalinist regime as the
complete   repression   of   free   creativity   and   private   initiative.
Centralisation in the decision  making  process could only provide temporary
benefits  in military  and  defence issues but in all other cases it  halted
intellectual,  technical  and  economic  development. From the  very  outset
Stalinism contained within itself the thesis of forced, coercive growth. The
initial  results  did  not  hide  the  truth  that,   given  time,  coercive
development was  to  become transformed into stagnation and  regression. The
destruction  of private enterprise, the total and coercive  collectivisation
of  agriculture in December 1922,  the  substitution  of market  forces with
party and subjective criteria and the repression of the intelligentsia could
not do anything but leave a profound scar and cause serious consequences for
human development.
     During  the  period between 1950  and 1960 total  nationalisation could
still  be explained using complex and serious  internal reasons, the general
radicalisation of  European  regimes  (especially  in  the  1930's) and  the
necessity to achieve military parity. However, during subsequent decades the
totalitarian regimes became totally  bankrupt. Many people in Eastern Europe
still believe that the collapse in the Eastern European systems was  due  to
the mistakes made by  Mikhail Gorbachev and his programmes of "perestroika".
I, personally, believe  that  the historical role of  Gorbachev was a direct
result of the overall negative  trends in the development  of Eastern Europe
and the universal economic and political  crisis which had gripped this part
of the world.
     This  crisis  above all  manifested  itself  in  terms  of the dramatic
technological backwardness which began to become  apparent  as early  as the
late 1960's and became  most  marked during the 1980's. Eastern Europe began
to lag behind in electronics, bio-technology, communications,  environmental
facilities and many other fields. Because all these technological fields are
so  closely  linked  Eastern Europe  began  to fall  behind  in  every other
possible field from the production of  nails to complex aviation technology.
The technological advantages of the West affected daily life, the  workplace
and  management. The  rate at which the  East began  to fall  behind in  the
1980's  was so dramatic  that  certain  experts began to speak of a possible
"global technological gorge" opening up between the East and the West, or in
other words a "self-perpetuating backwardness".
     With the appearance of micro-electronics,  new communications and space
technology, the Soviet military, who had up until now played a  key role  in
the political life of the totalitarian state, began to realise more and more
clearly that their economic backwardness would sooner or later affect  their
military  and  strategic  position.   This  was  also  understood  by  those
politicians with greater awareness unencumbered by political dogma. Although
the  USSR had achieved  nuclear  parity and, in certain  areas, superiority,
with  the  USA,  its backwardness  in  the  field  of  micro-electronics and
communications at the beginning of the  1980's  began to change this  trend.
The  enormous amounts of  money  expended on  military causes undermined the
Soviet economy and doomed it to universal inefficiency.
     In a  comparison of figures, it can be seen  that while in 1960 the GNP
of the USSR  was only about $5000 USD  less than in the  USA, in  1980  this
difference  had  reached  $10,000  and  in  1990  -  $20,000.  In  1960  the
manufacturing output of the USSR was $1000 per head of population  more than
in Japan.  Only  20 years  later Japan was producing goods to the  value  of
$11,864 per head of population in comparison with $6,863 in the USSR. At the
beginning of the 1990's the gap had widened to $30,000.[16]
     A  similar process  was taking place  in  comparable  smaller  European
countries.  The German  Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland
and Bulgaria were experiencing growing difficulties reflected in the drastic
increases in their external debt in the 1980's. Without the need for further
statistics, I  believe,  that the  most  obvious example was the  difference
between the type of automobiles produced in East and  West  Germany. Whether
we  compare Wartburgs with Mercedes or Trabants with Volkswagens it is quite
clear  that  we  are dealing with two distinct generations of  manufacturing
cultures.  My  example is based  on  motor  vehicles  since they reflect the
general level of industry as a whole: metallurgy, chemical production, heavy
machinery construction,  electronics, textiles and so on.. While industry in
Western Europe was already using a new  generation of production technology,
Eastern Europe  was still dominated by  a generation of production machinery
which was physically and morally at least twenty five years out of date.
     The  majority  of  Eastern   Europeans  lived  in  the   conditions  of
information  deprivation. They were fed propaganda of  constant progress and
achievement, the collapse of world  capitalism  and the greater and  greater
victories of  world socialism.  In  actual fact the reality  was exactly the
opposite. Of course, many progressive leaders in Eastern  Europe during this
period  were aware of the problems but none  of  them  were able to  release
themselves from the common bonds of Eastern  European imperialism.  This was
made clear by the  fate of  the Hungarian uprising  in  1956 and the  Prague
Spring  of 1968, as well  as  the unrest  amongst the Polish workers and the
timid attempts  at  reform made in Bulgaria in  1986[17].  It was
quite clear  that  changes could  only take  place in the  context of global
reforms affecting the USSR as well.
     The   negative   consequences  of   technological   backwardness   were
exacerbated by the changes  in  the  world  economic  situation in  the  mid
1980's. The collapse  in the prices  of  oil  and  a  number  of  other  raw
materials lead to a sharp decline in the ability of the USSR  and its allies
to function  efficiently  and  to  improve the standards  of living  of  its
peoples.  In the 1980's the member  countries of COMECON  experienced  their
greatest difficulties in foreign  trade and were  obliged to increase  their
external debts. From the  mid  1980's the Soviet Union and its  allies  lost
their most  important comparative  economic advantages  and  were obliged to
cover  their current  account deficits with large external loans which  even
then came to more than 100 billion dollars.
     The  nature of the technological changes of the 1970's  and 1980's also
raised  doubts about economic centralisation.  In the  1930's  and after the
Second World War technological innovation  relied heavily on the centralised
accumulation and management of funds. Energy production,  nuclear technology
and chemical production,  large irrigation projects, heavy industry and arms
production were very strong arguments  in favour of the need for centralised
planning and the active participation of the state in the economy.
     On the other hand the technological wave of the 1970's pre-supposed the
decentralisation of the decision making process.  The production of software
and personal  computer applications, the appearance of tens of thousands  of
different types  of services and  the progress  in bio-technology stimulated
and continue to stimulate individual creativity. This  was  in contradiction
to the very essence of the Soviet type of system.
     Consequently the  backwardness of  Eastern  Europe  in  the  1970's and
1980's was not  only a consequence of political and economic conjuncture but
had a  long-term and objective character. It was connected with the inherent
backwardness  not  only of individual areas  of  manufacturing  but  of  the
primary governmental and economic  structures. As  a result of the influence
of new technologies on the life of  societies, the crisis soon spread to the
personal lives of the individual Eastern Europeans. In the 1970's and 1980's
personal  consumption  per  head  of  population  in  Eastern  Europe  began
progressively to fall  behind the  average  consumption figures  for Western
Europe, the USA and Japan.
     According  to UN statistics for 1960, for every 1000 West Germans there
were 78 motor vehicles in comparison with 20 in Czechoslovakia and 17 in the
German Democratic Republic. In  1985 this  figure had  risen to 400  in West
Germany in  comparison to 180  in East Germany and 163 in Czechoslovakia. In
1960 in the USSR there were 1.6 telephones per hundred people and in Japan -
5.8.   In  1984   this   figure   was  9.8  for   the  USSR   and  53.5   in
Japan[18].
     In the late 1960's the economic backwardness of the USSR and its allies
began to spread to non-manufacturing environments. In  1960 infant mortality
per 1000 newly born  infants was 26  in the USA, 31 in Japan  and 35 in  the
USSR. In 1985 this figure had changed to 10.4  per  thousand in the USA, 5.7
in Japan and 25.1 in the  USSR. Similar comparisons can be  made in the area
of science, education, culture  and cultural life in  general. It would,  of
course, be  naive and  imprudent to  ignore the successes which the USSR and
its  allies achieved  in the area of space research, physics, chemistry  and
molecular  biology  and in certain  other areas  of technology.  These were,
however, rather  oases within the  overall  system rather than its essential
features.  They did not change  the  overall picture of  backwardness or its
deepening character.
     Clearly, against  a background  of increasing  internationalisation and
more and more intensive exchange of information, the backwardness of Eastern
Europe  began  to  become transformed into a universal moral  and  political
crisis.  In the  context  of the  boom  of world  communications, radio  and
television,  satellite  communications and  information  transfer, the truth
could not be hidden for long. The attempts of the USSR and the other Eastern
European  countries to propagate lies reached  absurd extents to prove  that
they were at  the head of technological and economic progress. For  more and
more people in Eastern Europe it was becoming clear that the backwardness of
their countries in manufacturing and consumerism was a direct result of  the
vices of the system itself.
     It should be noted, on the other hand, that right up until their demise
the  Eastern  European  regimes  retained  certain  benefits  such  as  full
employment, a low crime rate, universal social guarantees and  a  number  of
other features.  The  price of  these  benefits  from  the  1960's  onwards,
however, had begun to manifest itself in the form  of  empty shops, the lack
of  basic  products, the  low standard of  living and  the lack  of personal
freedom  etc.. Given such a situation,  it  was  more and  more difficult to
speak of the successes of the Soviet style system against the background not
only  of a worsening economic situation but also of the moral and  political
climate. The Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia, the  uprisings and protests of
the Polish workers,  the  reforms in Hungary, the  dissident movement in the
USSR,  the  mass  movement  in  favour  of  emigration to  the  West  was  a
manifestation  of the growing  level  of dissatisfaction or unhappiness with
the existing system.
     In the 1970's the  USA and its Western allies managed  to impose a  new
leading ideology:  the issue of human rights  and the rights and freedoms of
all  citizens of  the world. A  number of  "capitalist"  countries  such  as
Sweden,  Austria  and  others  guaranteed  more  social benefits,  including
pensions, unemployment benefit for young persons etc.. In  general,  in  the
USA, Japan, Western Europe and a number  of other  smaller countries  with a
market economy,  life  become more  attractive  and  more in  tune  with the
growing diversity  and increase  in human needs. In contrast  with  this  in
Eastern  Europe  and  the  USSR,  there  was  a  sharp  increase  in  crime,
drunkenness, apathy and scepticism.
     This lead to  major geo-political  consequences. After the  collapse of
the colonial model, the Soviet  Union, despite its concentrated efforts, was
unable to impose  its system  on the newly liberated countries. The majority
of  them adopted systems  and models closer  to those  of Western countries.
Attempts  at  "socialist  revolutions"  in  Algeria,  Egypt,  Syria,  Ghana,
Somalia,  Ethiopia and  a  number of  other countries did  not  produce  the
expected results. Poverty remained a problem. The promise  of a  rapid  leap
into the "paradise of socialism" also remained an illusion.
     While the USA and Western Europe and later Japan were keen on expanding
their  influence  in  the  world  via investments,  cultural  influence  and
education, the Soviet Union  in order to expand its geo-political influences
concentrated  on the support of "revolutionary" regimes,  expending colossal
amountsof state money in the process. They maintained the point of view that
in  states   with  poor  economies  progress  could  only  be  achieved  via
nationalisation and centralised planning. Life,  however, shows that this is
not the case.
     The  upshot was that  in the 1970's and in particular in the 1980's the
Eastern  European  regimes  were in the  grips of  a  universal  structural,
economic,  political and spiritual crisis,  both internally  and externally.
Geo-politically  this  crisis was  expressed in  terms of  the widening  gap
between the role of  the USSR as a  world  super power and its real economic
abilities. During the entire post-war period the military expenditure of the
USSR exceeded all permissible  economic levels.  Military budgets undermined
national  development  and seriously threatened the future of the system. On
the  other  hand,  despite the  economic  crisis  and evident  technological
backwardness the Eastern  European governments  continued  their policies of
universal social guarantees of employment  and wages which  in the 1980's in
particular  lead to  chronic  increases  in  foreign  debt.  Consumption was
greater  than  production.  Financial  commitments  to the  military,  price
subsidies and excessive state investments lead to  the creation  of enormous
budget deficits.
     Essentially  the system was consuming itself from within. While Western
countries were reforming and adapting to  global technological problems, the
crisis  in  Eastern Europe was worsening. It  was  becoming more clear  that
without radical reforms, backwardness would lead to death.

     2. REFORMS AND ILLUSIONS

     Attempts by  the Eastern European totalitarian regimes to reformwithout
damage
     to  the foundations  of their systems were illusory. These  were merely
attempts to prolong the life of a civilisation on the wane.

     T
     he  collapse  of  the  Third  civilisation,  or  if  you  prefer,   its
"reconstruction"  could have  been an evolutionary process as it was  in the
West,  through  economic   reforms  and  the  political   evolution  of  the
totalitarian states.  Since the creation of Soviet  Russia in 1917 and  most
notably during the last decades of its existence numerous attempts at reform
had been made. These reforms  merit a general examination and can be divided
into five periods within the history of the Soviet model system.
     The  first  of these  was the period  between 1917-1929 which I like to
refer  to  as a  time  of consolidation  and  the  search  for  a  model  of
development.  Notwithstanding the  civil  war  and widespread  violence  the
possibility of returning to some form of democracy still remained. A certain
amount of private property, paricularly in  agriculture, had been preserved.
The NEP programme (New Economic Policy) introduced by Lenin in 1921 provided
the opportunity for the use of foreign capital and private initiative.
     The second stage  of "pure  socialism"  began at  the end of the 1930's
with the  destruction  of the  remains of the  NEP and  a total  assault  on
economic,  political  and  cultural  life.  The  coercive  formation of  the
collective farms, the creation  of an enormous army of labour  camp  slaves,
forced economic growth based on administrative and political methods and the
extermination   of  millions  of  political   opponents  -  these  were  the
foundations of the  Soviet  Stalinist regime. During this period the  Soviet
system  developed as a monolithic  hierarchical  organisation  in which  the
violence of the  party  elite and  its  subordinated  security organisations
dominated. From 1930 to 1953  every manifestation of  private initiative and
free thought was punished with prison or death.[19]
     The third period in the development of the Soviet system began with the
death of Stalin  in 1953 and the "thaw"  of Nikita  Khrushchev. Although  to
some extent contradictory,  the  policies  implemented by Khrushchev  during
this  period were to leave a lasting mark on the further development of  the
world.  For  the first time the truth about Stalin's crimes was revealed and
both Stalin himself and his system lost their authority as the proponents of
social justice and world progress.
     The  fourth  period  began  in 1964 and  ended at  the beginning of the
1980's.  It was justly  named by Mikhail Gorbachev as the period of "zastoi"
(stagnation). During these  years Leonid Brezhnev  brought  a  halt  to  the
"thaw"  begun  by  Khrushchev  and  began  his attempt  to  immortalise  the
totalitarian  system through  a  series  of  internal and external  cosmetic
changes. It  was  during  this  period that the USSR and its allies began to
fall  behind  their  Western  opponents  in  the  areas  of  technology  and
economics.
     The fifth and final stage was the period of "perestroika" introduced by
Mikhail  Gorbachev (1985-1991) which was eventually  to lead to the collapse
of the Eastern European regimes and the USSR itself.
     My reason for this periodisation is that from  the beginning to the end
of the Soviet system there were two  contradictory political trends:  one of
which saw  totalitarianism as the essence of the utopian communist dream and
a second which aspired to more flexible, economic and political models.
     The  second  trend appeared directly  after  the February revolution of
1917 in the ideas of local self-government by workers, the implementation of
the  NEP by Lenin in 1921 and 1927, the "thaw" of Khrushchev and  finally in
the policy of "perestroika" of Mikhail Gorbachov. The essence of this second
trend was the combination of party and political  centralism with relatively
greater freedom for the private sector (especially in trade and agriculture)
and in the area of art and culture. Its origin can be seen in the traditions
of European socialism and social democracy.
     In the 1920's  the proponents of  a more flexible and dynamic political
line  - N.Bukharin,  G.Zinoviev,  S.Kamenev, A.Rikov  and others  lost their
battle for power, allowing the party bureaucracy  to dominate all structures
of  society. This was the decisive moment for the development of the essence
of the Soviet model. The  victory of Stalinism transformed the USSR  - and a
number of other countries after the Second  World  War  -  into bureaucratic
command societies.
     During  the  period between 1954-1956  when  N.Khrushchev was  fiercely
critical  of  the  Stalinist  era, he found  himself  in  conflict with  the
Stalinist system in all sectors of life. As a child of the very same system,
Khrushchev  was  condemning not  the  system but  the style  and  leadership
methods employed  by  Stalin  and the  cult of  personality.  He  proposed a
reevaluation of the  system and  mechanisms  of its leadership. Khrushchev's
illusion  was that  by changing the leadership and functioning of the system
he would make it more effective and resolve its major problems.
     During  the  Brezhnev  period  (1964-1982)  a  considerable  number  of
"improvements" were made to the leadership. The attempts made to revive  the
economy by giving greater freedom to industry and a timid embracement of the
private  sector  clashed with  the  dominant principles of the  totalitarian
system.  There was talk of  de-centralisation, collective initiative and new
economic mechanisms. However, not a word was said  about the party  monopoly
on power and  finances, banks  and the market. It would, however, have  been
impossible  to have  freedom  or private initiative without major changes to
the banking system, price liberalisation, reform to the system of investment
banking and the removal of large funds from the hands of the party and state
elite. It was quite absurd to make changes to the structures of property and
administration  without  changes to the principles  of  political  power  or
without profound  changes  to  the legislative system and  the  guarantee of
constitutional rights and freedoms of its citizens.
     History frequently  provides  us  with examples  of the combination  of
heroism and  illusion. Frequently the intellect of leaders  and the grandeur
of  their  objectives have been let  down by the naivety of the way in which
they attempted to achieva them. Such was the case with Stalin's opponents in
the 1920's and 30's  and  the policies  of Nikita  Khrushchev in the 1950's.
Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rikov and  Bukharin paid  for their  naivety  with  their
lives since they were up against not only Stalin's will and cruelty but also
the interests and power of the party-state apparatus. Khrushchev  also  paid
for his own  naivety and was removed from power in October 1964. For the ten
years he was in  office, Khrushchev wavered between the desire to put an end
to the  Stalinist  repressions and  the preservation of the system. The same
man who was bold enough to reveal  the  crimes of Stalin  to the whole world
allowed cruel acts of  repression against Soviet  art  and culture. The same
man who had the fortitude to remove the body of Stalin from the mausoleum in
Moscow became a proponent of the super-Utopian idea of the "rapid leap" into
the "paradise of communism".
     The enormous belief  that good could be imposed from above and that the
system could be  revitalised  by  "the  enthusiasm"  and  privileges of  the
nomenclature, were naive. Khrushchev was no less a believer in the system of
state socialism. By throwing Stalin and Beria onto the scrapheap of history,
he  deprived  the Soviet people  of their Divine leader and  was  obliged to
offer  them  a  new  Utopia  - the  rapid  advent  of communism,  industrial
dominance over the USA and a high  standard of living  for the people of the
USSR etc.. After Krushchev's  removal from power it became more difficult to
delude the  people with  promises of new Utopias  and illusions. The myth of
the infallible  leader in Stalin had been shattered.  Khrushchev's programme
for entering  the era of  perfect communism by  1980 had  failed.  The  next
utopia in line was  Brezhnev's off-the-peg theory of  a  developed socialist
society.
     Despite all this the logical question arises of why despite its general
instability  the Soviet totalitarian  system survived for such a long time -
74 years? I believe that there are a number of reasons for this.
     The  Soviet totalitarian  model arose during a period of general crisis
and  the large  scale transformation of world capitalism, during a period of
globalisation  and  a  search  for various  models  of existence  in  a  new
inter-dependent world. The 20th century was a time  of cataclysm, change and
transition and of two  world and hundreds of local wars in  which more  than
150 million people lost their lives. Despite its Utopian nature, the  Soviet
system was a  model  for potential progress which emphasised absolute social
protection,  guaranteed  the  interests  of workers  andpeasants  and  total
nationalisation  as  a condition for concentrating  resources and  directing
them towards new construction.  The belief that  universal social guarantees
were the basis  for progress provided temporary historical justification for
the centralised type of society.
     The continuing  existence  of  the  Soviet  totalitarian system can  be
explained with the desire  and the  ambitions  of many  nations  rapidly  to
overcome poverty  and to avoid  their  possible  colonisation by the  larger
colonial  metropolises. For many countries  during the 1950's and the 1960's
the Soviet Union was a guarantee of protection against colonisation by other
countries, despite the fact  that "fraternity"  with the USSR meant  another
type of dependence.
     Was  it not the case, however,  that  the crisis of liberalism and  the
return  to the ideas of nationalisation was also taking place in other parts
of the world? Practically everywhere in the world before and after the First
World War and especially at the end of the  1920's societes  were undergoing
radical  changes  and centralisation.  The  victory  of Hitler  in  Germany,
Mussolini  in  Italy,  the  Left in France and Spain was proof of  this. The
crisis of world capitalism brought about by colonialism, monopolisation, the
First World War and the economic crisis of 1929-33 was sufficient motivation
and justification  for the actions of Stalin as "necessary policies"  in the
context  of forthcoming world conflict.  For millions  of people the  Soviet
Union was not so  much a country  of  violent  political aggression in which
millions of innocent people lost  their  lives  but rather the  power  which
defeated  Hitler,  saved humanity from the death camps of fascism and gave a
chance to many peoples to live their lives in freedom and independence.
     In 1932 in the introduction to  his criticism of  socialism, Ludwig von
Mizes  wrote, "In Europe  to  the  East of  the  Rhine  there  are  very few
non-Marxists  and even  in Western Europe  and the  United States his (Marx)
supporters  are  greater in  number  than his opponents"[20].  If
today at the end  of the 20th century, socialism is perceived as  "something
bad in the past", for over half a century - from the 1920's to the 1970's it
was seen as the hope for the majority of mankind.
     This is due to  the not insignificant achievements of socialism in  the
areas  of  industrialisation, science and technology,  culture and art  and,
most significantly,  the social guarantees of labour, wages, a place to live
and so on. To disregard or to conceal these achievements would be imprudent,
and,  indeed, impossible from an  historical point of view. Each  historical
period notwithstanding  the  nature  of  political  power  leaves behind  it
something  positive,  guaranteeing  the  furtherance  of  human   life.  The
successes  of the USSR in industrialisation, transforming it from a  country
surviving on the  remnants  of a system of feudal agriculture  into a  world
super-power, guaranteed  wages, work and income for the vast  masses of  its
population  were  for many people sufficient  grounds  for  maintaining  the
system.
     I, therefore,  do not  consider  the model of state socialism to be the
ravings  of  a  group of  mad  politicians.  Its  appearance,  existence and
dissemination over the whole world from the second half of the 19th  century
to  the end of the 20th was a consequence of huge world  transformations and
reactions  against the  imperialist colonial  world with  its injustices and
wars. Despite its illusions and  errors it was  a conscious attempt to offer
protection  to  the  interests  of  the  oppressed and  division  and  class
struggles to be replaced with unification and social unity.
     I realise how difficult it is only  a few  years  after the collapse of
the totalitarian  regimes in  Eastern Europe for  these words to be uttered.
However,  we should not be too hasty in our evaluation of history  from  the
point  of view  of  a  specific  political  moment  in  time.  The continued
existence of the Soviet type  of system and the popularity of the  communist
idea during the greater  part of  the 20th century  was a consequence of the
objective and global processes of  transition of  the modern world. It was a
part of the processes of world integration, but also a part of the crisis of
the Third Civilisation. The same factors which provided the opportunities to
state  socialism also dug its grave. Continuing global  integration could no
longer tolerate  isolationism. Social guarantees led to the  demotivation of
labour. The growth in personal and group self-confidence were limited by the
lack  of basic human rights. The reason for  the collapse of this system was
its tendency to consume more than it produced and  to maintain "balance" via
the methodical use of aggression upon the personal freedoms of its citizens.
The  very idea  of  achieving  universal  justice  and material  plenty  via
coercion and "forced awareness" were Utopian and inhumane.
     The contradictions arose from the economic essence of the  system, from
the type of ownership, and not from the style and  methods of leadership, as
Khrushchev  considered.  Khrushchev did not  attempt  to  change  the system
which,  in  its turn, killed him  politically.  His illusions were inherited
from Bukharin and in the end the system was doomed to failure. However, that
which  was  planted  by Khrushchev, the desire for  change, eventually  gave
fruit. On the one  hand because the reformers within  the  Soviet party  and
state leadership were able to learn from its lessons and on  the other since
they  were all aware that partial and  cosmetic  changes would  not lead  to
success.
     Twenty years and four months  had  passed since Khrushchev was  removed
from office when on the 11th  of March 1985 Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev was
elected to  the  post  of  General Secretary of  the Communist Party of  the
Soviet Union.

     3. THE TWO OPTIONS AND THE MISTAKE OF GORBACHEV

     Gorbachev had two options - to change the system either by liberalising
the economy
     or  by  changing the  political  system.  The  first option  would have
guaranteed stability
     and a gradual transition, the second - conflict and chaos. In any event
neither he nor his successors had a plan for global action.

     A
     t the beginning of 1985 the majority of the Soviet population was ready
for change.  It  was  tired of the  drawn-out death  throes of  the Brezhnev
leadership, filled with hope  when Yuri Andropov came  to power, crushed  by
his  death  soon after that  and  his replacement with the aging Brezhnevite
Konstantin  Chernenko.  Soviet society and in particular the  intelligentsia
during this period were  tired  of the endless speeches and demagogy, of the
discrepancies  between  words and  reality, of  the  empty shelves  and  the
universal lack of everything which  the ordinary member  of the public might
require. Mikhail Gorbachev found not only fertile  ground for change but  he
indeed became the natural mouthpiece for the expression of all the ambitions
and hopes of the majority of Soviet society.
     During his first year of  office Gorbachev made significant changes  to
the  politburo,  the government,  the  leadership  of the armed  forces  and
foreign ministry. It  was during this period that Edward Shevernadze came to
the fore in  the Soviet  leadership as foreign minister and  member  of  the
politburo. A.Yakovlev  became the leader of  the propaganda  section of  the
Central Committee of the CPSU. Boris Yeltsin became the leader of the Moscow
party  committee of  the CPSU. In  practice these  were the three  political
figures  who most  radically  and  faithfully  supported  the  political and
economic reforms.
     In 1985  Gorbachev opened up the way  for  improvements in  Soviet  and
American relations  in  the areas of  arms  control  policy  and the radical
reduction  in first-strike nuclear weapons. The  summit meeting held between
Gorbachev  and the  American president  Ronald  Reagan in  November 1985  in
Geneva was the beginning of a  turn-around  in world nuclear arms policy. In
1986  Gorbachev  accelerated  personnel changes in  the  leadership  of  the
communist party and the Soviet state as well as in the mass media  and local
party apparatus.
     I  believe that these first  two years  were  decisive  for Gorbachev's
choice  of strategy. Undoubtedly,  the change which he began were on a  much
larger  scale than those  of  Khrushchev and  affected all  areas  of  life.
Despite  this in  1985  and  1986 Gorbachev  continued to pursue the idea of
revitalising  the  system in the aims of "more socialism".  In  June 1986 in
Habarovsk he  formulated the essence of "perestroika" and  the need for  its
advancement. During this period  the  people  of the  USSR were allowed much
greater spiritual freedom and learnt many truths about their history and the
outrages of Stalinism.
     Now, looking back on the documents and facts of  this period, it can be
seen  that Gorbachev  did  not  have  a plan for global action. He  had  not
imagined  that  perestroika  would  cause  such  global transformations. The
General  Secretary of  the  CPSU was motivated by the  idea of strengthening
Soviet  society  and  socialism,  rather  than overthrowing the culture  and
system of a waning civilisation. This "provinciality"  in his attitude  to a
global power, such  as  the USSR was, is quite evident in his  thousands  of
speeches and  articles of the time, however, it is also proof of the lack of
the global responsibility necessary for the  leader of one  of the two super
powers.[21]
     Gorbachev had two options.  The first  of these was to give priority to
economic reforms (similar to Hungary and China) with simultaneous guarantees
of centralised power followed  by the gradual  implementation  of  political
reforms. The second  option  was  to introduce political reforms followed by
economic  reforms. If he  had opted for the first option  he would  have had
further opportunities  for global  influence, but he did not and plunged the
USSR into a network of internal conflicts.
     From  the speeches  made by Gorbachev between  1985 and 1986 it can  be
seen that he  did not underestimate economic reform and wanted to find a way
of implementing reform both in  the economy and in politics. It is, however,
clear  that Gorbachev and his allies  were  thinking on their feet  and that
they did not have a clear action plan suitable for universal, global change.
The political campaigns began to take a hold  but economic reforms tended to
falter in  their  tracks. The simultaneous  implementation  of economic  and
political  reforms in actual fact gave  weight  to the  latter. As Gorbachev
announced the policy of Glasnost and began  to  reveal the  truth about  the
past, he put the  authority of the party apparatus under threat and accepted
the enormous challenge  of political  reforms  and  the divisive inner-party
conflicts.  The beginning of "perestroika" through the policy  of "glasnost"
in essence meant the priority of political reform over economic reform. This
fact was  of decisive  significance  for  the fate of the  USSR and  Eastern
Europe  and the whole world. If  Gorbachev had delayed  political reform and
had placed the accent on the economy, this would not have lead so rapidly to
the chaotic collapse of the  Eastern European systems and  the  USSR. Such a
transition would not have lead to the explosion of nationalism and dozens of
local wars and conflicts. The Eastern European nations would not have become
a burden for the developed Western European nations and there would not have
been the need for billions of dollars in financial aid.
     Gorbachev's  choice was not the result of  a  deliberately  thought-out
plan  but rather the  result of circumstances.  However, having opted  for a
model of change,  sooner rather than  later local conflicts and the collapse
of Eastern European structures were inevitable.  Of  the reasons  for such a
denouement, one is of particular significance. The integrated nature of  the
totalitarian system was totally reliant  on the centralised nature of power.
In contrast to  market  economies  where people are linked  by  an  enormous
number  of  horizontal  connections independent  of the central power,  in a
totalitarian  economy social  integration  is maintained  via central  state
institutions. This applies  not only to economic entities but also to ethnic
groups and the structures of information exchange and culture.
     Rapid  reforms to the system  of  political authority  without economic
foundations within a  totalitarian society by  definition pose a risk of the
entire system collapsing in chaos. Imagine factories which are accustomed to
receiving materials allocated  to them by the central planning institutions.
The  destruction  of  this institution  or change  within the  political  or
administrative system allows the factories to sell to whom they  want and to
ignore whom  they  want.  The  result  of  this  is that  at one  fell swoop
thousands and millions of economic  bonds are severed  and the chaos becomes
unimaginable.
     This was also the  case in the area  of international relations.  Under
totalitarianism many national groups were able to co-exist peacefully within
the  order  imposed   from  above   and  any  conflicts  between  them  were
cosmetically  concealed. However, these peoples  peoples  lacked  sufficient
horizontal economic and cultural bonds as for example  is the case  with the
various nationalities inhabiting  Switzerland.  After the  collapse  of  the
central power, nations which had until the previous day been good neighbours
began to divide up territories, power, money and in many cases opened up the
way for armed conflict with tanks and weapons.
     Whether  Gorbachev understood the  scale  of the emerging crisis  is  a
question of  some doubt. What is clear,  however, is that during this period
economic reforms made no progress,  whereas political  reforms began to give
rise to greater and greater conflicts. In January 1987, a little more than a
month after the release of Sakharov from  internal exile,  Mikhail Gorbachev
laid before the Central Committee of the CPSU a series of measures aimed  at
political reform. These included secret ballots with multiple candidates and
the  election  of  non-communists  to senior  state posts, participation  of
employees in the election of directors at their place of work, the reduction
of state ownership in favour of cooperative  ownership and  so on. This  was
not only a  direct and decisive blow  to  the party apparatus and its vested
interests,  but  also  to  the  power  structure  itself. After  this plenum
feelings  of opposition  to  perestroika  began to make themselves felt. The
indignation of the  party apparatus was total and  reactions became more and
more overt.  However, the inertia of  change was too great to be stopped. In
1987  a  process of political rehabilitation of  intellectuals repressed  by
Stalin began and the  first timid steps were being made  towards the opening
of private cooperative shops.
     In the same year, which  I consider the zenith  of  the  perestroika, a
number of serious problems began to manifest themselves. Most significant of
these  was the  fact  that  "perestroika" had given practically no  positive
economic  results and had not  alleviated the  problems  faced  by  ordinary
people. The successes  which were being achieved  in the medium  range  arms
negotiations were  having  less and  less influence  on  the public opinion.
People were more concerned with the  lack of goods in  the shops. In October
1987 the first  nationalist conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaidjan flared
up.  This  was the beginning of the  general  crisis in  national  relations
within the USSR. At the same  time a  number of diverse, but well organised,
opposition groups began to appear within the Soviet leadership.  On  the one
hand, both  within the Central Committee of  the  CPSU  and outside  it  the
opposition  to Gorbachev's reforms was becoming  more vocal and aimed at the
preservation of  the  status quo of single party power and the  totalitarian
system. On the other hand, in October  1987,  Boris  Yeltsin  made  official
accusations  against  Gorbachev and Ligachev,  marking  the  beginning of  a
political movement aimed at more radical and liberal reforms.
     From  this moment on Gorbachev was obliged to strike a  balance between
these two groups  which limited his flexibility and making his action  seems
more contradictory. The  General  Secretary was  neither able  to turn back,
which would have  marked the end of his career and  perestroika,  nor was he
free  enough  to  make sufficient  intensive progress. Gorbachev had already
surpassed Khrushchev but was not safe from the same fate.
     In November 1988,  Estonia declared its independence and  the right  of
the Supreme Council of Estonia to veto laws passed by the Soviet parliament.
Mass  independence  movements  began  in  Lithuania  and Latvia.  The ethnic
tension between Armenia and Azerbaidjan continued. In this situation, on the
7th of  December  1988, Gorbachev announced  to the UN that the Soviet  army
would be  reduced by half a million and the  pull-out  of Soviet troops from
Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany began. The Soviet leader called for
a new  world order. This was his biggest  tactical mistake. He realised  his
global  responsibility  too late.  When  Gorbachev  finally  understood  his
decisive significance in international reform and in general, as well as the
fate of perestroika,he had already lost his power.

     4. THE COLLAPSE OF PERESTROIKA

     The  collapse of perestroika  in 1991 had been foreseen as early as the
end of 1988.
     With  the  conflicts  which  ensued,  it  will  be evaluated  by modern
historians  as a process  filled with contradictions. On the other hand,  it
opened the floodgates to  new opportunities for progress  and history in the
long-term will appreciate as the catalyst for the advent
     of the new civilisation.

     I
     shall  take a more detailed look  at  the  changes which  took place in
Eastern  Europe not only because since I  lived through  them personally but
because I am convinced of the fact that the events of 1986--1991 will affect
our fate  for many years to  come. 1989 and 1990  were  years of the gradual
"fiasco"  of  perestroika  as  a line  of  evolutionary  change  within  the
totalitarian  system.  Its  collapse  took  several forms.  Firstly  --  the
complete failure of  economic reforms and, consequently, the reduced support
for perestroika  on the part of the Soviet  people. Secondly -- allowing the
local inter-ethnic conflicts to get out of hand and the consequent explosion
of  ethnic  self-confidence and demands.  Thirdly  --  the  collapse  of the
Eastern European political and military alliances and the severance of  ties
between the Eastern European nations and Moscow.
     As  early  as the  beginning of  January  1989  the majority  of Soviet
republics  began  to  pass  a  series  of  new  laws  establishing their own
languages  as the official language  of the republic. In  March  of the same
year in the  first free elections for the Congress of the  People's Deputies
the nationalist movements in the Baltic Republics won the absolute majority.
In May, Lithuania  and Estonia  and in  July Latvia, in  spite  of  Moscow's
displeasure, passed a law, declaring their independence.  The question arose
of  the fate of the  USSR, its  integrity and unity  and the future  of  the
central  leadership.  This  was, indeed, Gorbachev's most serious ordeal and
the precursor of  the final  collapse of perestroika. The opposition  of the
neo-communists  within the Soviet leadership was a powerful  force in favour
of preserving the unity of the Soviet Union and hard-line policies.
     The potential collapse  of  the Soviet Union  was  unacceptable for the
Moscow elite, mainly for ideological reasons. It is not to be underestimated
that  for 70  years millions  of  people in  the former USSR were absolutely
convinced of the need for its existence and  of the idea and  meaning of the
Soviet system. No less important is  the fact that the  collapse of the USSR
was  de  facto to signify the demise of all the higher leadership posts.  In
1990 and  1991  such a  possibility instilled  feelings of insecurity in the
Soviet  elite.  Tens  of thousands of  senior civil  servants,  amongst them
leading figures in the Moscow government, were threatened with  losing their
jobs.
     There is another side to the question which has to  be considered.  The
majority  of the world political elite considered the  potential collapse of
the USSR as a complex and possibly dangerous issue. From my direct  personal
conversations  with  senior  politicians in  the  USA,  France, Germany  and
Austria and other countries and from indirect political analyses, I have the
impression that in 1990 and 1991 only the minority of them were in favour of
a collapse of the USSR. The world was concerned about the appearance  of new
nuclear  powers such  as the  Ukraine and Kazakhstan and  the  potential  of
large-scale  military conflict with the possible  use  of nuclear  arms. The
insecurity  of  this  super power  was a matter  of  concern  for  all. This
insecurity  could also  be  felt  in  Moscow.  It coincided  with  increased
criticism of  the economic and social  policies of the CPSU.  The leaders of
the other Eastern European states, members of the Warsaw Pact, were  amongst
those who were becoming vocal in their criticism.
     The most significant  factor  which was  to sound the  death knell  for
perestroika was the  explosion of ethnic and  nationalist tension within the
USSR  itself. IN January  1990, thousands of  Azeris  protested near  to the
Soviet  border with Iran. A  few  days later the Lithuanian  communist party
ratified Lithuania's independence. On the 11th of January, Armenia exercised
its right  to veto Soviet  legislation, following the example  of the Baltic
states. The conflict  between Armenia and Azerbaidjan over  Nagorni Karabakh
continues to escalate. Protests and tension began to make themselves felt in
Moldova and Tadzhikistan.  These  were clearly  not individual phenomena but
symptoms of the general collapse of the USSR.
     On the 7th of February 1990, the Central Committee of the CPSU accepted
in essence the  idea of a multi-party political  system as the basis for the
creation of  democratic  socialism.  In  February and March during the local
government elections the established nomenclature lost many senior positions
in  favour of independent and  largely unknown new leaders.  A little later,
V.Landsbergis was  elected as the first non-communist president of a  Soviet
republic. From  this moment on the process  of collapse began to accelerate.
Gorbachev  had clearly begun to  lose control of events. After 1989 the rate
of change was no longer being dictated by Gorbachev or his entourage. On the
other hand it must  be  appreciated that  Gorbachev  did not give in to  the
temptations or the suggestions to halt the  reform process with the  help of
the army.[22]
     By the  middle of 1990  it was  already evident  that  the three Baltic
republics would achieve  full  independence.  The next  great challenge came
from  Kiev  where  the  Ukraine, on  the 16th  February,  also declared  its
independence. In August another group  of  Soviet  republics declared  their
independence. Gorbachev was left the with the  only alternative of proposing
a  new union  of  independent  republics.  His suggestion to  reorganise his
cabinet to include the leaders of all 15  republics showed that even as late
as November 1990 the central Soviet leadership was unaware of  the real pace
of the  reform  processes  and  their  real  scale and  power.  In  December
Kirgizia, the last remaining 15th republic declared its independence.
     During  the  period  (November--December 1990) the  opposition  against
Gorbachev had  begun to increase and he was  forced to  make compromises. In
December 1990  he was forced  to dismiss some of his most loyal  allies  and
supporters of the reform process. On the 2nd of December the Minister of the
Interior was replaced  by  Boris  Pugo and on the 26th of December Gorbachev
put forward Genadiy Yanaev for the post of Vice-President of the Union. I do
not believe that  it  would be a contravention of political ethics I if were
to share my personal impressions from the meeting I had with  Genadiy Yanaev
the day after he  was elected to the post of the Vice-President of the USSR.
From  my conversation with him it  soon  became  clear that  the election of
Yanaev was a return of those  forces which desired  the stabilisation of the
situation,  the  preservation  of the USSR,  more hard-line politics  and  a
desire to use the position of Gorbachev to achieve these aims.
     In  the same month, December  1990, the  head  of the  KGB, V.Kriuchkov
began to become more vocal and to increase the  authority of his position by
officially proclaiming the time-worn slogans of  the danger posed by the CIA
and that the KGB was prepared to fight against any anti-communist forces. On
the other hand, one must not forget the exceptional foresight and shrewdness
of the foreign minister of the time, Edward Shevardnadze, who warned of  the
imminent possibility  of  dictatorship.  During  the entire  period of  1991
Gorbachev  was forced  to manoeuvre  between  these  influences,  hoping  to
preserve the  Soviet Union and to continue  his line of  paced reform within
the ideology of perestroika, albeit in an new form.
     When I  look back and  analyse  the  events  of those days,  I find  it
impossible not to  believe that the conflict which took place at the end  of
1990 was  impossible  for  two major factors: on the one hand, the increased
rate of  the  disintegration  of  the  Soviet state  via  the development of
democratic and completely independent  movements in  all  the  former Soviet
republics while on the other -- the threats to  the interests  of the ruling
elite and the  increased  activity of the majority of the Soviet  leadership
aimed at the preservation of the status quo.
     And so we arrive at  the attempted coup of the 19th of August 1991. One
question  begs  to  be  answered:  Did  Gorbachev  and  other  proponents of
perestroika know of the imminent coup and its scale? I do not believe so, at
least  in terms of specifics. They  could not have failed  to  have seen the
storm on the horizon or have felt the potential danger, but nothing more. On
the  16th of  August A.Yakovliev warned that a  coup  was being prepared  in
Russia,  but this was more of a political conclusion than  information based
on  specific facts. A month  later,  on the 15[th] of September I
had a  long  conversation  in  Moscow  with  Yakovliev  and Shevernadze.  My
profound conviction from these talks is that they had both had  a foreboding
of  the events but had not believed that  it  could take place so quickly. I
feel that Gorbachev  was of the  same  opinion. They  had not  believed  for
example that the minister of defence,  D. Yazov, could be involved in such a
plot. They had not believed that the entire council of ministers of the USSR
would be so willing to reject the new Treaty of Union to replace to the USSR
with a Confederation  of  Independent  States. Of  course, there  were  many
inexplicable  occurrences during the course of the  attempted coup, but that
is  the way of  politics. Large-scale  change is often  connected with  many
inexplicable events when the momentary psychological or  physical conditions
of an individual or group of individuals can be of decisive significance for
events.
     The intention of the leaders of the coup was to carry replace Gorbachev
quietly, or  at  least  to  put  him  out  of  the  way  in reserve. Yanaev,
Kriuchkov, Pavlov[23] and others had evidently  been in favour of
the maximum flexibility in  the change  of  power  with the eventual gradual
restoration of the Soviet regime. Gorbachev had to be convinced to  withdraw
for reasons of illness or nervous  exhaustion or to  come into line with the
leaders of the coup and to "cure" himself of his illusions. There were clear
analogies  with the coup of August  1991 and the removal of Khrushchev  from
power in October 1964 -- a statement  regarding  the illness of  the leader,
putting the troops on alert along with  a declaration that they would not be
used  as an elementary  attempted to  pacify  the  people  and international
society.
     There  were,  however,  enormous  differences  between  1991  and 1964.
Underestimating  these  differences  was  one  of the  biggest mistakes  the
leaders of  the  coup  made.  In  August 1991  the  Russian  nation  and  in
particular the Russian  intelligentsia were  of a completely different state
of  mind. Their thirst for  and  their experiences of  freedom were stronger
than  any   more   primitive  feelings  for  preserving   the  status   quo.
Notwithstanding  economic  difficulties,  masses of the  Soviet  people  had
experienced  the  taste  of  free  life. Although  perestroika  in terms  of
strategy and tactics was already  bankrupt, it had lead to  profound changes
in the way of thinking of wide ranging social groups. The 19th of August was
the litmus test which in reality showed what had been achieved by Gorbachev.
Perestroika had not only unleashed the will of the people but had also given
it the self-confidence not to heed what was said to them "from above".
     Shortly  after the  attempted  coup  the rock  group,  "The  Scorpions"
released  their  hit  "The Winds  of Change",  dedicated to  those  who  had
thwarted the  coup.  Indeed, this wind came from the  heart of the  reformed
Soviet society, from the new spirit cultivated by perestroika.
     On  the  day after  the  coup,  on  the 20th of August, several hundred
thousand  demonstrators  protested  against  it in St.Petersburg,  thousands
surrounded the White House. Huge demonstrations were organised in the larger
towns of Russia. Major sections of the Russian army refused to carry out the
orders of leaders of  the coup or take any decisive actions. On  the evening
of  the  20th  of  August   it  was  already  becoming   apparent  that  the
self-proclaimed  "Committee  of  salvation"   had  lost  control  over   the
situation. At that moment the leaders of the coup had two choices: either to
declare  a bloody civil war with no  predictable  outcome  or  to  sound the
retreat.
     In the final outcome,  the coup was thwarted by the decisive actions of
Boris  Yeltsin  and  his supporters,  but  also by the millions  of ordinary
Russian  people   who   were  unwilling  to  make   compromises  with  their
consciences, the generals and  officers whose  thoughts and  deeds  were not
limited  by party interests and  remained loyal  to their exalted mission. I
will  never  forget  my  telephone conversation  at  that time  with  Edward
Shevernadze. At the time of the conversation the outcome of the conflict was
far from  clear.  Despite  this I felt in  him not  only his decisiveness to
engage in the struggle, but also a clear  feeling of responsibility to avoid
the unthinkable -- to avoid a civil war or a large-scale thermo-nuclear war.
I feel tempted to write that not only  in the USSR but in other countries as
well the  driving forces of change were the standard bearers of the emergent
new civilisation. Many of them, perhaps still unconsciously, other, thinking
with the criteria of world progress, and yet others since  they had just had
enough of thinking the way other people wanted them to think.
     The 19th of August 1991 was the real date of the end of perestroika and
the start of new beginnings in the process of economic and political reforms
in the  USSR. The collapse of the coup  meant, in  practice, the collapse of
the  major  forces which were  holding  up  the  reform  process.  It  meant
something else as well: together  with the ban on the Communist Party of the
Soviet  Union and the dismissal  of the Council of Ministers,  the arrest of
the  conspirators  the  main  it   resulted  in  the  removal  of  the  main
institutions of power which until  that moment had  held  the USSR together.
Making the most of  this moment, in the days following the failed coup,  the
former  Soviet republics confirmed their  announcements of independence. The
new union treaty of which the leaders of the coup had been so frightened and
which  would have saved the Union was forgotten.  The new  directly  elected
president of Russia, Boris  Yeltsin, began a series  of direct contacts with
the  leaders  of the  former Soviet  republics  and with  only a few  months
withdrew  the  prerogatives of the  centralised  Soviet ministries. This  in
reality meant the collapse of  the USSR and  the passing of its basic rights
and obligations into the domain of the Russian republic.
     After coming to terms with the huge public  support for the  actions of
Boris Yeltsin, Mikhail Gorbachev resigned  in 1991.[24] This  was
the end of a significant period  in the history of the nations of the former
USSR. As paradoxical as  it may seem, this period also marked the  beginning
of a new era in the development of the world. The collapse of one of the two
superpowers  meant  in  practice  the collapse  of  the  bi-polar world  and
together  with  this  the   structures  which  were  typical  of  the  Third
Civilisation.

     5. THE EXPLOSION IN EASTERN EUROPE

     The  radical  changes  within Eastern Europe during the  period between
1989 and 1990 were the  first part of the universal  political restructuring
of the world order.
     These changes began as a huge emotional outpouring soon to be  followed
by enormous problems and disappointments.

     A
     number  of  experts on  the  subject  believe that  the changes in  the
Eastern  Europe were the result of  understandings reached by  Gorbachev and
Reagan at  their  numerous  meetings, in particular  in  Malta. My  personal
opinion is that these processes could not have come about as  the result  of
any agreement. The changes were a result of the growth in self-confidence of
the  Eastern European  peoples  as  a  consequence  of perestroika,  of  the
confidence in the influence of the democratic movements and the feeling that
Gorbachev and his entourage were losing control over power.
     The extent of the influence of the reforms which took place in the USSR
after 1985 on the countries in Eastern Europe was enormous. In Bulgaria, for
example,  whose  language  is  very  close  to  Russian,  the  most  popular
newspapers between 1986 and 1989  were not Bulgarian but  Soviet. The spirit
of  perestroika,  the revelations  of truths  about the  past,  the constant
reminders that the Utopias of the totalitarian regimes were bankrupt lead to
enormous  changes in  people's  attitudes  and  prepared  the  way  for  the
beginning of the explosion.  Despite differences  in scale  and methods, all
the "socialist" countries of Eastern Europe began to give birth to new civil
movements and  the  growth in free  expression  and  the desire for profound
reforms.
     On  the 6th of March  1989 the speaker of  the Soviet foreign ministry,
Gerasimov, announced that the  future  of every Eastern European country lay
in its own hands. In this  way he officially dismissed the Brezhnev doctrine
which  guaranteed  the  control  of  Moscow over  all its  Eastern  European
satellites. There is no doubt that Gorbachev had  given prior notice of this
announcement to his Western partners.  From  this moment on, events unfolded
at an unbelievable pace.
     In May 1989 the Hungarian government dominated by  reformist communists
opened  its border with Austria and allowed thousands  of citizens from  the
former German Democratic Republic to travel to  West Germany. A little later
the  Polish trade union  "Solidarity"  achieved  a decisive  victory in  the
elections to the  Senate and part of the lower chamber  of the  Polish Sejm.
Moscow  accepted  these  events  calmly,  thus  proving that it  had  indeed
accepted a new policy towards Eastern Europe. On the 7th of July at a summit
meeting of the  Warsaw  pact countries in Bucharest, Gorbachev declared that
all the members of the pact were at liberty to chose their own paths.
     What was the objective  of  the Soviet leadership  in  relation to  its
former allies?
     Analysing  the experience of  Bulgaria,  Hungary, Czechoslovakia  and a
number of  other Eastern European countries  of this  period, I believe that
between the spring and  summer of 1989 Gorbachev had begun to apply a policy
based on  two main theses: first  of all  --  the rejection of the "Brezhnev
doctrine" on the limitation  of  sovereignty and allowing greater freedom to
the  governments  of the relevant countries; secondly  -- the replacement of
the old leaderships with new, more pragmatic leaders and the preservation of
the  Soviet zone  of influence on the  basis on  new alliances and treaties.
This, however, involved the same theoretical and practical problem as in the
Soviet Union. On the one hand, Gorbachev wanted to give greater  freedom and
to  support the reform  processes  within  the  Eastern  European  communist
parties. On  the  other hand, he  could or would not comprehend the scale of
the  explosion,  the  fuse  of  which  he  had lighted  himself.  The reform
processes  resembled  an  uncorked  bottle  of  champagne  rather   than   a
well-thought out scheme. After liberation of their spirits, the people would
no longer  accept leaders imposed upon them from  above and pouring out onto
the streets and squares they demonstrated new power and self-confidence.
     After the summit meeting in Bucharest in July 1989 events unfolded like
a  chain reaction. On  the 7th  of October Gorbachev directly influenced the
beginning of reforms in the DDR and on the 18th of October Erik Honneker was
replaced by Egon Krenz. A  few days  later the Berlin wall came down. On the
10th of November the Bulgarian communist leader, Todor Zhivkov, was replaced
by Petar Mladenov, who  was favoured by the Soviet leadership. At the end of
November  and the beginning  of December after mass unrest in  Prague, a new
government was formed consisting mainly of non-communists and on the 29th of
December  Vaclav Havel became the  first  non-communist  president from more
that  40 years.  During the last  few days of December the Rumanian dictator
and  his wife were  killed after  a  military coup and a hastily  improvised
trial.
     From  the point of view of  the history of the Eastern European nations
these  changes had  enormous  significance. They followed the  logic of  the
analogous changes which  were taking place  within  the  USSR,  but  rapidly
overtook them in terms of  their  speed and depth. Apart from the  universal
elements of the crisis within the USSR there  were the additional factors of
the struggle and  aspirations of the  smaller  Eastern European  nations for
complete  sovereignty and independence. This also  helps to explain the more
radical nature of the changes which took place within them.
     From  a global point  of view the explosion in  Eastern Europe  was the
first  phase of the larger geo-political changes and  the creation  of a new
world  order. The changes in  Moscow, Berlin, Sofia,  Prague,  Budapest  and
Bucharest, together with the collapse  of the USSR can be determined as  the
beginning  of  the collapse  of  the  Third  Civilisation. The military  and
political  alliances of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON were rendered pointless.
The political map of Europe had changed beyond recognition.
     The  democratic changes in Eastern Europe could have taken  place  in a
different  way  but  they could not have been avoided. The  changes  were  a
consequence  of the crisis of the  totalitarian regimes,  their inability to
adapt to the large technological and political changes in the  world and the
requirements of  the new age.  The administrative  coercion of the one-party
system  and the repression  of  private economic initiative were shown to be
historical mistakes.
     Only history will decide  what would  have been  best for the world  --
either the "Chinese" model of reform by placing priority on economic reform,
or the  "velvet  revolutions"  which in reality  took place.  I have  to say
personally,  that not  only  in  Bulgaria but in  most of  the other Eastern
European countries very few people believed in the rapid demise  of the USSR
before 1989. No-one  could believe that a super power such as the USSR could
allow itself to  reject its global privileges  or  that the leader of such a
super power  would  voluntarily "concede" his  "conquests"  without  wanting
anything in return.
     And now, looking back to the facts  of  5--6  years  ago, I can see for
myself yet again, that the changes  in  Eastern Europe were not  thought out
beforehand, not  were they carried out effectively from a regional or global
point of view. The West was carried away with the "ideological" ecstasy that
communism was on its way out. In  the Eastern European countries  themselves
the  nature of the changes was motivated  mainly  by internal  conflicts and
clashes. In some  Eastern European countries restorationalists got the upper
hand, with aspirations to restore to themselves the pre-war  rights they had
lost. Radical change from strong state regulation  to radical liberalism had
its destructive consequences.  It was clear  that in  this  way the  Eastern
European countries  would undergo a  long period of  instability and  a slow
adaptation to the European Community.
     From  a positive point of view, the  most important consequences of the
changes in Eastern Europe were  the destruction of  internal obstructions to
world integration and  the  creation of  the new  structures  of  the global
world. At  the  same time  the  discovery of new virgin territory for  world
globalisation was far from promising world  harmony. Realisation was soon to
come in  the West that the  belief in  the final victory of world capitalism
was wrong. In the East internal conflicts continued. New solutions had to be
found while the common crisis persisted...

     6. RETURN TO A DIFFICULT FUTURE

     Was  the  return  to  power of  the  former  Eastern European socialist
parties a logical
     stage in  development?  There is a  common  reason for this.  It was  a
confirmation
     of  the  thesis  that  the  political  process  is  not   a  series  of
happenstances but is rather
     governed by a definite logical process.

     A
     fter the series  of mainly "gentle"  revolutions in  Eastern  Europe in
1989 and 1990 and the changes which took place later in the USSR, the period
between 1993 and  1995 was  marked by  a  series  of  elections in which the
former communist  parties  (or their  political successors) were returned to
power. In  Lithuania, Hungary,  Poland, Bulgaria  and  Slovakia  the  former
communists  won  categorical victories at  the polls. In  December this  was
repeated in Russia by the communist party  lead by G.Zuganov. In Rumania and
Yugoslavia  the former communists never actually left power. This  gave rise
to the  question which is not uppermost in  the minds of modern thinkers and
politicians: was this return to power  of the ex-communist parties a logical
stage in development?
     I have to admit that during the five or six years of the reform process
many of these parties did undergo profound changes. They accepted the values
of democracy  and pluralism  and changed their platforms. In contrast to the
newly-formed parties  of  anti-communists, democrats and liberals  they  had
well organised  party structures and  people faithful to them in all sectors
of economic power. Some of these parties together with the structures of the
former  state  security  organisations  had  been  preparing themselves  for
pluralism  and opposition politics  as early as  the period  of perestroika.
Economic  domination,  the  creation  of  their own  "loyal"  dissident  and
political circles, the infiltration of trusted members into the newly-formed
anti-communist parties  - all  this was undoubtedly well planned  and  had a
strong influence on the political situation.
     The most important reason for the return of the ex-communist parties to
power, in my  opinion, can be found in the nature of the totalitarian system
and  the logical  stages in its change.  What  I referred  to earlier as the
"mistake"  of Gorbachev was also decisive here.  The new democratic, radical
and  liberal  forces  came to  the  forefront  riding  high  on  the wave of
political  reform. E.Gaidar and A.Chubais in  Russia, L.Balzerovic in Polish
and  Y.Antal in Hungary all became symbols of the reform. All the reformers,
however, were faced with the same problem - while political changes could be
carried out  radically and quickly, economic  reform  required time, trained
specialists  and techniques  specifically designed for  the  transition from
extreme  centralism to a market economy.  The "phased" discrepancies between
economic  and  political  changes  caused  economic  difficulties,   serious
political clashes and crime.
     The explosion of emotions and anti-communism of the autumn of  1989 and
during  the period  between  1990-1991  succeeded in  alienating the  former
administrative and economic elite from the new democrats. Their more or less
forced  removal from  ministries and  state  factories  provided  them  with
significant opportunities in the private  sector  where they  acted in close
cooperation with tens of thousands of well-trained experts  from  the former
state security organisations. The only way for the  new democratic forces to
control the  economic forces  was to get them on their side, as happened  in
the Czech  republic. Elsewhere  where pragmatism was  replaced with virulent
anti-communism, the new political forces were unable to control the economic
sector sufficiently to carry out large-scale reforms. The  economic  forces,
banks, factories and the private sector, in general remained in the hands of
people trained by the former totalitarian regime.
     The  second important reason was the disappointment of  the population.
One  group  of  the  population  had  benefitted  from  a series  of  social
privileges and guarantees under  the totalitarian regime. By  supporting the
reforms between 1989 and 1990 many of these people expected a rapid solution
to  the problems  which they were experiencing and not the chaos,  crime and
fall   in  living   standards  and  production  which  in   reality  ensued.
Unfortunately,  as a result of  the delays in  economic  reform  during  the
period of perestroika  and the  clashes  with the harsh reality of  the open
world  economy these hopes  remain unfulfilled. Bulgaria  did not  become  a
Balkan Switzerland, as some of its leaders promised,  nor did Rumania become
France.  Quite  the  contrary,  the  populations  of  the  Eastern  European
countries had  to come to terms with the unwelcome news  that they  produced
little, consumed much more and had to reverse this ratio by 180 percent.
     For these reasons in 1992  almost all  the  Eastern European  countries
experienced a profound change in social attitudes. The political  elite  who
had been in power from 1989-1990 were forced to realise in terror that their
sleepless nights, the  titanic  struggle and  reforms were now considered by
many as  mistaken.  Of  course,  it should  be  added  that  many of the new
democrats did in fact make many mistakes. In the long run the radical nature
of the economic reforms in the period between 1989 and 1990 and the delay in
implementing economic reforms led to the political equilibrium being  upset.
Sooner or later it had to  be restored.  A  significant  percentage  of  the
population in Eastern Europe  had become impoverished and disappointed. They
preferred to vote for the former communist parties  seeing in them  hope for
the restoration of the social benefits which they had lost.
     However, can the reformed communists live up to these expectations? The
answer is a conditional "no", or a partial "no". The condition is  that they
undertake  a flexible policy of  reform aimed at  the widest possible social
strata  of  society.  Due  to   the  legislative  changes  which  have  been
undertaken, any return to the past is unlikely, although to a certain extent
still  possible, mainly in Russia. There still remains the difficult path of
peaceful  reforms needed  to achieve successful economic  policies. For this
reason  the  return of the ex-communist parties is a  return to a  difficult
future. It will not halt the  global processes of  integration, nor will  it
delay the processes of moving towards new, civilising social relations.
     After the battle  of Waterloo at the beginning of the 19th century, the
processes of restoration  in France looked inexorable  and many  believed in
it.  However, it was  to be seen that once  the seeds of revolutionary ideas
had been sown, it was to be  very  difficult to  destroy  them, the freedoms
that had been won could not be taken away. Such is  the case with the return
of the ex-communist parties to power. They will either have  to adapt to the
new civilising realities or they  will thrown onto the scrapheap of history.
For the ex-communist parties of Hungary  and  Poland  this will  be  easier,
their ideological  reformation began a long  time  before they came back  to
power. For the Bulgarian Socialist Party or the Party of Social Democracy in
Rumania this will be more difficult.
     Whatever the outcome, the reflected processes of global  transition  in
Eastern  Europe  will  not  be smooth.  As a reaction to the  errors and the
collapse of perestroika politics  went too far to the right  and then turned
sharply  to  the left.  The realities of life will  put the former socialist
parties to the test. Some  of them will rise to the  challenge and some will
fall victim  to the  contradiction  of their own ideological contradictions,
while  still others will collapse under  the pressure  of vested  interests.
Whether the  New Civilisation will accept them  is a matter that the  future
will show us.

     Chapter Three
     COLLAPSE II: GLOBAL DISORDER
     1. THE DANGER OF CHAOS

     Ever  change  of  epoch  takes place  in  the context  of  conflict and
disorder.
     The crisis  in the East is just the first phase  of the changes  in the
present global political order. The second phase will take place in the West
and Far East...

     T
     he universal processes of globalisation and the collapse of the Eastern
European regimes have given rise to a whole series of unfamiliar  phenomena.
Humanity has  entered  a new phase of  development  marked by  the  huge and
growing  level  of  mutual  interdependence   between  people,  nations  and
cultures.  The global order  based on the  principles of  bi-polarism of two
super powers  and  which had  dominated since the Second  World War has been
destroyed. To  a large extent  the way in which the Eastern European regimes
collapsed  lead to  this state of chaos firstly  in  their own countries and
later in international economic and political relations. I define chaos as a
universal  crisis  of  the spiritual  and value  systems, the  rejection  of
certain standards of global intercourse and the  instability of others, as a
period of relative disorder leading to change in the world order.
     The first phase of this chaos began  in 1989--1900 with the collapse of
the Eastern European regimes and  the economic and military organisations in
this part of  the  world. The dissolution  of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact in
the space of a few months led to chaos in economic relations within  Eastern
Europe.  The mutual export  of  goods between  the  former members  of these
organisations fell sharply. Almost all  the countries  in  the  region  lost
their  markets and  the stability of their industrial structures was all but
destroyed. Later this was followed by the collapse of Yugoslavia, the Soviet
Union and  Czechoslovakia. A  number of ethnic conflicts  flared up, some of
which developed into full-scale wars. For the three years between 1990--1993
the region was in absolute chaos.
     I  believe that this first stage will  be  followed by  a second,  very
important stage of  changes. This second stage,  which  has already begun is
affecting  the larger  Western  powers and  their mutual relations, with new
roles and positions being assumed by the Asian  states and the acceptance of
new  principles in international economic and  cultural  relations  and with
formation of new institutions for the regulations of global  processes etc..
Some of them will want  to  preserve the status  quo and  their  position of
dominance, while others will want to prove old  theories. However,  there is
only one  truth: the  post-war global order  has  lost a number of its  main
foundations. Humanity has entered a  transitionary  period from the bi-polar
model  to  a  new,  unfamiliar global structure. The universal crisis of the
post-war political  model had caused  and continues  to  cause  the  general
collapse  of contacts and relations wwhich will be of great significance for
further development.
     There  are two interrelated  factors  which  are of  influence  on  the
processes  which  are  taking  place:  globalisation as  a  fundamental  and
continuous phenomenon and the crisis in Eastern Europe which was provoked by
globalisation and  which  at  the  same time has  accelerated its pace.  The
problem,  however,  is that no-one, or almost no-one was  prepared  for what
happened - neither the collapse of the iron curtain, nor the consequences of
the new drive towards globalisation and its side effects.
     I  want  to speak of  the dangers posed  by  chaos and general disorder
mainly because after the collapse of the Eastern European regimes not one of
the factors which caused  the universal crisis of contemporary  civilisation
has  dissappeared entirely.The  deformations of  economic growth  remain and
global  ecological  problems  have  yet  to be solved. After the  renewal of
nuclear  tests, albeit tactical,  by France in  September  1995  no-one  any
longer believes that disarmament is irreversible.
     In  the context of the bi-polar  model the world  was  governed  by two
super  powers and  a group of  nations dependent on them. Today the level of
direct government  has sharply  declined.  After the  collapse of the USSR a
number of new pretenders  to world leadership have  appeared  and before our
very  eyes the roles and relations  of former allies have changed radically.
Politics  is  no  longer  two-dimensional but  an equation  with hundreds of
unknowns. A clear example of the ontradictions between the great  powers can
be seen in the war in the former Yugoslavia. The vested interests of certain
states, in assisting various leaders and arming different armies demonstrate
that the  old political tradition,  the tradition of  the bi-polar world has
long since passed away.
     Or  let us take  Europe. The unification  of  the two Germanies did not
only impose a series of new responsibilities on West Germany but has created
complex problems for pan-European processes. Germany transferred part of the
burden  of  unification on to its European  partners  via the  mechanisms of
international  financial relations. The integration of the two German states
has changed the structure of Europe and the relations  of  the states within
it.  The  granting  ofassociate membership status to  the  Eastern  European
countries  within the  structures of the EU seemed in 1989-1991 a relatively
easy task but was soon delayed  almost  indefinitely. This  was to a certain
extent  because  of  the  unwillingness  of  Russia  to  allow itself  to be
encircled by a new  "iron" or other type of curtain.  The  place and role of
Russia itself in the global community are still unclear.
     In the  global  aspect the collapse of the Eastern European regimes has
had even greater consequences.  The  collapse  of the Soviet Union  and  its
economic potential to  all intents and purposes removed one of the  two main
super powers from the geo-political map. Only  the USA  remains. A number of
years have passed and there are already voices which proclaim that the super
powers  are  no longer necessary. France has  offered to extend its  nuclear
umbrella over Germany. Germany and Japan have  demonstrated their desires to
become  permanent members  of  the Security  Council.Russia  has  officially
requested membership of the group of the most developed nations.
     The collapse  of the Eastern European economic and political structures
has  opened up a hole in  world economic relations with consequences for the
world  economic order. A not insignificant number of investments have flowed
into  Eastern Europe.  West Germany's great commitments to its  new  Eastern
provinces have resulted in a deterioration in  the condition of the European
exchange  rate system. Without  the  burdens of  such problems,  Japan and a
number  of other countries in the Far  East have  continued to develop their
potential  and  to  exert  more  and  more  influence on the world  economic
processes.  China  has  demonstrated high levels of growth and a flourishing
economy. The changes in South Africa and  the forthcoming transition in Hong
Kong have encouraged high levels of investment and movement of funds.
     In 1992 and 1993 while delivering lectures in Switzerland and the USA I
emphasised  on several  occasions that  geo-political turbulence will affect
the world financial  systems.  Even  today few people really believe in this
although the  facts are there  for all to  see. In the  winter and spring of
1995 the American dollar began to tumble against the Japanese yen. The world
financial  markets  became  very  worried and the  most prominent  financial
experts explained  it away with the American  budget deficit,  the crisis of
the  Mexican  peso or  ambitions  to  increase American export.  What really
happened demonstrates the reduced abilities of governments and central banks
to exercise effective control over international economic relations. Certain
"invisible" private  forces are already in control of the  world economy and
are rarely affected by governmental influence.
     Moreover, the  first symptoms  of  uncotrollability  appeared  directly
after the  collapse of the  Brenton Woods  system at  the  beginning of  the
1970's when in  March 1973 Richard Nixon allowed  the  dollar to  float. For
almost a quarter of a century the dollar has been trying to  find its levels
via floating exchange rates and now we  are on the eve of a new governmental
vacuum. The reason for  this is the  constant increase  in the  role of  the
private  banks  and  unidentified financial funds in global  economics,  the
growth in the role of centrifugal effects in the world financial systems. In
the  spring  of  1995  the  director  of the  International  Monetary  Fund,
M.Cammedessu,  declared  that in  the  near  future  and  with  its  present
structures  the IMF would  not  be able to continue to fulfil its functions.
"We  are living in a dangerous  world"  were  the words of  Cammedessu.  His
trepidations were emphasised by the  constant growth in unregulated funds of
money as well as by  the growing mountain of  state and private debts  etc..
Neither  the present  international  financial  system nor the  entire world
economic and political order will be able to prevent any possible crises.
     The  chaos  has  affected the  spiritual  relations, thinking and value
systems of people. The world communist movement underwent a catastrophe with
negative  repercussion for a number of other socialist and social democratic
movements. On the other hand, the unpreparedness of  the West to act quickly
and the clear inadequacy of liberal doctrines to stop the crisis showed that
they are unable  to offer  a miracle treatment. Many politicians in attempts
to  avoid  divergence between reality and ideas have  stated  that it  is no
longer political programmes  or ideologies which are important but pragmatic
action. As in  other similar historical transitional periods a large  number
of people are confused  and prefer  to  take refuge in  local pragmatism and
finding solutions only to current problems. The lack of a common  view about
how   one  should  approach  the  new  situation  has  opened  the  door  to
nationalism, ethnic ambitions  and xenophobia. A significant number of world
politicians have been  compelled to turn their  attention to current problem
solving and to ignore global and regional problems. It  is becoming more and
more evident  that there is a need for a global analysis  on  what is taking
place, its  consequences and a  search for a  solution to the chaos which is
ensuing. Today there is no doctrine or common theory about the future of the
world,  or how to solve  our common problems: the global economic order, the
environment, poverty,  religious tolerance, stabilisation  of  growth  etc..
This is one  of the reasons why nationalism often comes  to the fore in  the
search for solutions to global problems.
     The attitudes of the younger generations is a very important indication
of the spiritual crisis. I often speak to my colleagues who are lecturers in
various institutions of higher education in the  industrialised countries of
the world. In the less developed countries  the situation is less clear. The
young people in these  countries want to achieve the  material prosperity of
the richest nations which is in itself strong motivation. In the USA, Japan,
France, Great Britain, Canada  and Germany, however, for  quite  a long time
now, students and young people have  no overall idea about their future. The
ambition of achieving  a certain level of  material prosperity, a large bank
account, one's  own  business,  to  travel  abroad and  so on,  are  largely
manifestations of tradition rather than anything else.
     But what  does this mean? Healthy interests  and the stability  of  the
system?  Or, rather, a  spiritual crisis  in  a vacuum expressed by  the new
generations in the most developed countries drowning in luxury and spiritual
consumerism.
     World history has  witnessed other periods  of  chaos  and disorder  of
global structures: some longer some shorter. The problem is that the changes
which are taking place today are not  as  the  result of  wars in  which the
victor imposes his will with force. The  globalisation of  the world has led
to a universal crisis  of the  current world order. This  is a crisis of the
entire world  system,  of  national and  regional thinking  and consequently
everything  else  which  typifies  the  Third  Civilisation.  Within  global
relations there  is a new spiritual, economic and political vacuum. If these
vacuums are not filled with adequate changes  to world structures, there may
be indescribable consequences.  Why  has  there  been such  an  explosion of
religious  sects in recent years? Why has terrorism become a global  problem
and is more and more uncompromising and violent in its forms? Why are people
becoming more alienated from  politics?  Why  has fundamentalism spread into
new territories? Why has international crime grown so much?
     The reason is that the current world order  is not adequate to  respond
to the new realities. NATO  and  the USA  alone are not capable of resolving
world conflicts. This may  even lead to  a reaction from Russia or China and
new divisions within the world. The  UN does not have the strength  to  stop
conflicts. It is becoming apparent that  many elements of the current  world
system  are  outdated  and  its major  mechanisms  have  to be  changed  and
repaired.
     The manifold lack of clarity  in international  political  and economic
relations are  an  expression  of  an  inadequately  low level of  agreement
between countries and  the expectation  that everything will resolve itself.
The  disorder is on such a large scale that it requires common action on the
basis of universally accepted principles. Of course, the world today is much
more  integrated. This  should not  be seen so much as an advantage but as a
condition for overcoming the chaos more rapidly and for allowing integration
to  develop.  This will also require  some  form  of  world coordination, of
mutually acceptable decisions and the growth  in  the role  of organisations
such as the UN. It would, however, be imprudent to suppose that the problems
with which we are faced will be resolved quickly and conclusively. This will
require  a  relatively  longer period. The  new  world  order  will  develop
gradually,  based on mutually  agreeable action .This conclusion is based on
the fact that the real world  powers are still acting from their position as
nation states and their national responsibilities  and will  only change the
international rules of  the game within that context. This is logical but it
also carries a  risk. Given  a  variety of events and varying conditions any
one country with a more dominant  global role by changing its internal order
runs the risk of causing a universal cataclysm.
     Globalisation and its progeny - the global world, will lead to a crisis
not only of traditional international relations  but  also  of the political
systems of national societies. The interests of more and more people stretch
beyond  the  bounds of a  single  state  and  depend  less  and  less on the
decisions of a single government. Everywhere in the developed world there is
a  decline in  trust for traditional political systems  and  a need for  new
decisions. Thus:
     1. The  lack  of a mechanism  for reliable international, economic  and
political regulations;
     2.  The  contradiction  between  the unlimited  global power  of  world
corporations and the limited power of governmental decisions;
     3. The  reactions of 2.5-3  billion poor people in  the unification  of
humanity into a single mutually dependent whole;
     4.  The danger  of new nationalism and the  restoration the division of
the world into blocs;
     5.  The  possibility  of  the  bi-polar model  being  exchanged  for  a
mono-centric  world structure and the domination  of one  or a group of rich
states;
     6.  The  destruction  of small  cultures  and  the dilution of national
traditions and values;
     7. The limitation  of the  private  life  of  the  individual  and  his
transformation into a "manipulated animal" by the new media;
     8. The crisis of traditional political systems;
     9. Terrorism and international crime;
     All this factors are  expressions of the disorder and danger of chaos -
an expression of the crisis of the borders between the two epochs.

     2. GEOPOLITICAL COLLAPSE

     One  of the most important consequences of the  collapse of the Eastern
European
     totalitarian regimes  was the  change in  geo-political structures. The
bi-polar
     world seems to have collapsed irreversibly.

     T
     he "modern"  age  which  has occupied  the last  five  centuries in the
development of humanity has been a time of the creation and consolidation of
nation  states, of  the formation of alliances and opposing political blocs.
After  the collapse of the Berlin wall  a series  of  global processes began
which  were to  lead  to  gradual  but  irreversible  changes  in the  world
political order.  Directly after  the  fall of  the"totalitarian  regimes in
Eastern  Europe  the  majority  of  political commentators  and  researchers
considered that the problem would be limited to the collapse of the USSR and
a number of smaller Eastern  European states and thereafter their  inclusion
in  the  structures  of  the  developed nations of  NATO  and the  EU.  Such
one-sided views continue to predominate  today, despite the fact  that  most
people  are aware  of their  inadequacies.  The problem is  that  after  the
explosion in  Eastern  Europe  a  slow but unstoppable process of  universal
geopolitical  change  began.  I  refer  to this  process  as  "geo-political
collapse", since it affected the political structures  typical of the entire
twentieth century and in a broader context, the entire Third Civilisation.
     What is clear is that the map of Europe is being reshaped. However, let
us look at the rest of the world. Despite the strong influence of Russia  in
Central Asia there is a growing  conflict of interests between  a  number of
Islamic  states  and  China.  The  unification  of Germany  has changed  the
proportionality  of power in central Europe.  There is  no need for detailed
forecasts  in  this area although there  are  certain  clear trends emerging
which seem to herald the end of the old world order.
     The  first  wave  of the  geo-political  collapse clearly took place in
Eastern  Europe  and  most  significantly in  the USSR.  The second  will be
connected with the increase in the political importance of Europe (above all
Germany) and Japan. he role of the USA, the only remaining super power, will
be to provide  a balance with all  the consequences which that entails.  The
third wave  will be a consequence of the  increase in the  economic and  the
political importance of  a number  of  smaller  countries  in  South Eastern
Europe, Asia and Latin America.
     At  the  beginning  of the  1990's we  were witnesses  not only  to the
collapse  of  the Eastern  European  political structures but  also  to  the
potential of profound  changes within the  West. There is no doubt  that the
borders of the European community will move towards  the East  and  that the
role of Germany in this process will be extremely significant.
     The consolidation  of  the European Union  and the creation of a single
European    currency    which    appears    to   have    strong    political
support[25] presuppose  a  number of  changes  in  trans-Atlantic
cooperation. I do not believe that trans-Atlantic ties  will weaken but I do
believe that  the creation of a common  European currency will  bring  about
many changes in their nature, scale and direction.
     It is true that a large number of lesser developed states still  do not
have the self-confidence  and strength  to undertake independent activities.
Even if this were  to happen, such ideas would develop in  isolation  rather
than as a part  of a logical process.  For  the moment the countries outside
the  Group of 25  are  strongly  dependent  on the  most developed  nations.
Amongst them, however, there are a number of nations with  growing ambitions
for  more  economic  and  political  influence.   Which  will  be  stronger?
Integration  or an eruption of ambitions and the struggle for new influence?
The  question  is whether  the  struggle  for  free  economic  and political
relations will begin in Asia,  Africa or  Latin  America? Will  this not  be
stronger than the processes of global integration?
     In  any event  one thing is clear - the old world order created between
the 18th and 19th centuries by a  group  of advanced European states and the
two super  powers  which  emerged in  the 20th century is now a thing of the
past. The old geo-political world is collapsing before our eyes and not only
as a consequence of the  collapse of the  USSR. In  the autumn of  1995  the
voters in Quebec very nearly  voted for  secession  from Canada which  could
have lead  to the  real  collapse  of  the  Canadian  state.  Almost  daily,
politicians and civil servants in the European capital of Brussels reiterate
the view that  the USA should no longer  play the  role of a super power. In
Paris the  views are even more categorical. The state of chaos is due to the
fact  that the world is undergoing transition.  There are many processes and
situations within this transition as well as many unpredictable deviations.

     3. ECONOMIC TURBULENCE

     Colossal  disproportions  have accumulated within the financial systems
of the world. Until  now they have not lead  to any great crises  because of
the regulatory role played by the world political order. However, after  its
total collapse are we not  bound to feel the cold embrace of instability and
chaos?

     O
     n  the  1st of  September  1995  the  world news agencies  reported  an
emerging  financial  crisis  in  the most prosperous of post-war economies -
Japan.  Thousands of investors withdrew their deposits from the Kisu  Credit
Union  in Osaka and the  Hiogo bank  in  Kobe which were then closed  to all
kinds of banking operations. Their clients wanted to withdraw over 3 billion
US  dollars  or  almost  1/4  of  the  total  deposits  of  the  union.  The
bankruptcies of  a number of Japanese credit  unions  and  the unprecedented
problems they caused for  a number of large banks cast huge doubts about the
stability of the banking system in Japan. The reason for such shocks is  the
huge amount of  debt  accumulated  in the 1980's  when stock exchange prices
were very high and suddenly fell as a result of the global recession.
     The  problem,  however,  is more complex.  More  and  more  people  are
becoming  aware of  the fact  that the debts accumulated by  governments and
individual financial structures will not be repaid. The enormous debt of the
American government  and  the  increased  indebtedness  of  other  developed
countries pose a question about the  efficacy of the world financial system.
It is true  that in contrast to the Great Depression of the  1939, the banks
and national  governments now  have much greater reserves  and experience in
avoiding financial crises. However, it is also true that such colossal debts
are possible in the  conditions  of guaranteed political economic regulation
and a clear and stable political order. The trust in the major currencies is
based not only on their real condition but on their  established monopoly of
the world markets.
     It  is   not  difficult   to  comprehend   that  if  the  geo-political
restructuring does take place then political and military factors  will lose
their influence and the problem with debt will  prove catastrophic. There is
a direct  link  between  the  changes  in  world  political  structures  and
stability of the existing financial systems. Neither  of  them  are adequate
for the conditions of the epoch which we are now entering.
     Of course, the world economy will continue for a certain length of time
to develop positively. The reasons for this are  the newly opened markets of
Eastern Europe, Russia and South East Asia in  particular.  Countries  which
had until now been culturally and politically isolated are now attractive to
foreign investors. Care will have to be taken that this growth does not give
rise to further  "economic turbulence".  For reasons of  cheap labour in the
East many manufacturers  in Western  Europe and America are  turning towards
Asia.  In 1995 this  caused much unrest amongst the German trade unions  and
was one of the  main factors for concern voiced at  the  congress of  German
Social Democrats in Manheim in autumn of the same year.
     There is no doubt that with the democratic development of China and the
smaller dragons  within  South  Eastern  Asia  and with the  opening  of the
Eastern European and  Russian markets world economic structures will undergo
significant changes.  I  am  almost convinced  that  many  governmental  and
private structures will not be able to resist the temptation and will answer
the  primitive instincts  of  competition  and  profit. This  will  have two
consequences with  serious  repercussions in the near future.  The  first is
that the world economic structures which have existed up to now will have to
undergo significant  changes. Secondly, there will be an increased danger of
uncontrollable economic shocks.
     Jacques Atalie in his marvellous book "The Millennium" recalls that the
Dutch cities  which  contributed so much to modern civilisation in the  15th
and  16th  centuries declined  because of the temptation to spend more  than
they earned and to accumulate more debts than they could bear. Is  this not,
however, the illness  of  all modern  governments,  from the USA to  Europe,
Russia and Japan and the horrific  debt  problems of Brasil,  Argentina  and
Mexico?  Is  this  not  a warning  of the potential  collapse of  the entire
financial system or at least  of its entire lack of correspondence to modern
day needs?
     Of  course,  these debts  and  the  mountains  of  bad  debts  are  not
distributed  evenly  between  all  states.  The  USA  and  France face  huge
problems,  Germany and  Japan much less  and  least of all,  and practically
non-existent - such  countries as China,  Indonesia and Southern Korea whose
economies are at the beginning of  an undoubted period  of  ascendency. This
divergence  in the  positions  of countries and nations  in  the context  of
global economic transformations will alter their place and their role in the
world  economy. The  whole  of the 21st century  will be a time  of economic
levelling if,  of course, the world  turns  its back  on the  old order  and
successfully enters the new civilisation. This process of levelling-out will
at  the same time  be in conflict  with cultural and  industrial traditions,
differences in social welfare, macro-economic criteria and standards etc..
     The fundamental  elements of  the plan put  forward by the French Prime
Minister, Alain Jupe, in the autumn of 1995 were targetted at France joining
the European Monetary  Union and  reaching a position  level with the  other
European states.  We can all remember the huge  reaction and the large-scale
protests in responce to the threat of losing social benefits and privileges.
Such shocks will be  caused with every  integration and  this is  one of the
most fundamental elements of global economic reform.  Large scale structural
reforms  will  take place  with the implementation  of the  common  European
currency. The difficulties related to the integration into the EU of Eastern
European countries  will be even more  difficult.  The integration of Russia
will be  slow  and painful  and  even  more  so in the  case  of  the poorly
developed Asian and African states.
     However,   there  is  no  reasonable  alternative.   The  processes  of
integration  will  continue to  developed  and  will lead  eventually  to  a
large-scale global renewal. For  this reason, in my opinion,  the change  in
the economic roles  of the various countries and nations, the  globalisation
of  financial  and commodities  markets,  the opening of millions  of  niche
markets in  Eastern Europe and Asia, the  inadequacy of  the world financial
system, the mountain of debts and the re-solution of economic imbalance must
be considered  as the  collapse  of  the old  and the  beginning of  the new
economic order.  It has taken many nations five hundred  years  to establish
their national economies. Today they are becoming integrated and this in its
wake will  bring  about the enormous  integration of labour,  knowledge  and
abilities.

     4. THE NEW MASTERS OF THE WORLD

     The globalisation of the world has lead to the appearance of new groups
of leaders whose influence and power is many times greater than that of  the
majority of politicians. They are  not always well-known  but they control a
huge portion  of the  world  economy and  finances,  the  global  media  and
communications and their power is not subject to any serious regulation.

     E
     very day billions  of television viewers watch  the  leading world news
stories.  Almost every day somewhere in  the world there  are  elections  or
other important political events. The  politicians  are presented or present
themselves as the most  important decision makers.  This was the case in the
20th century. With the demise of many monarchies politicians have become the
heroes and the  undisputed  leaders  of  the world. Is this still really the
case today?
     Yes, but only superficially. Since with the consolidation of the global
world, the  opening-up of societies and the embracing  of  the international
market there  are new territories  for world domination. Someone had to come
in to take control of international,  economic, cultural and media business.
Someone who would not be limited by  national boundaries and who had to have
enough money. These were the global businessmen.
     At the beginning of the  century,  the trans-national  businessmen were
mainly  colonisers. Today they are legally in control of 80% of world trade,
about the same amount of technology and  about  1/3  of world manufacturing.
The number and the influence of the transnational corporations is constantly
on  the increase. Their  leaders  account for  the  major part  of  the  new
economic  elite of the  world whose power is now unequalled. Who can predict
in  what part of the  world it  is most profitable to manufacture  a certain
type  of item? Who can  invest  enormous sums into science and technology in
the aims  of  breaking into a market?  Who can transfer billions  of dollars
from one end of the world to the other in a matter of hours? Only they can -
the newly emerging leaders of the modern world.
     Almost  no-one stands  above the  international  business leaders. They
control international  technological and information exchange. They  own the
majority of  the satellites used for relaying  television  programmes.  They
also  own the  global  information and  television networks.  What  is  more
important,  the leaders  of  the trans-national corporations  are constantly
expanding their power. Now they want free, open markets, the  removal of all
state limitations and the implementation  of  neo-liberal policies.  On  the
other  hand the world economic leaders want more  dialogue with  each other.
How can they devide their spheres of influence? Where will they direct their
investment resources? Where and what markets and what to aim for? The common
objective uniting these new leaders is the removal of  all state barriers to
their eventual domination  of the  world.  If they persist  at their present
rate  to expand  the international and industrial corporations within  20-30
years they will have succeeded in  dominating practically the entire area of
international  trade,  and they  will  have  achieved  a  monopoly of  world
communications and distribution of technology.
     Ted Turner and CNN, Rupert Murdoch  and his  media empire and even  the
smaller press  magnates  such  as M.Ringer  in  Switzerland today  have much
greater  influence  over  people than  the  presidents  of  the  majority of
countries in the  world.  While in the context of individual national states
it  is possible  to  speak  of  anti-monopoly  legislation, in international
business "everything is permitted". If things  continue  to develop as  they
have  been  doing  up to now,  within 15-20  years we  will  be  faced  with
extremely complex problems.
     The media  are little concerned with the new leaders of the world. Only
a handful of the great financial players find their way  into the television
studios:  owners  of banks and financial companies who control the movements
of tens or hundreds of billions of dollars. Quietly but unerringly they  are
creating a  power, more  powerful than any government  and which creates its
own rules of its own  game. The leaders of the  world financial capital  can
influence  exchange rates and pour in  funds from  all corners of the earth.
Very often  they are so influential in  world economics that they can compel
national  governments, including the great powers, to  play along with  them
and take the relevant decisions.
     This  is so  incongruous! These  new integrational  economic structures
appear  completely  to lack  any form of political regulation or at the best
have  only some  sort of  political  facade. This  is one of the reasons why
global relations have been  so undeviatingly infiltrated by  the  mafia with
enormous sums of money from drugs, prostitution, currency speculation and so
on. This is  also why  the citizens of the world are becoming more  and more
dependent on the transnational economic elite, rather  than  the politicians
they have elected.
     If  rules are not  brought into this international  game, if  the world
does not  establish  institutions  for  their  regulation  and  control,  if
policies  towards  the  poorly developed nations are  not changed, then very
soon the world  financial elite will begin to rule world  development alone.
This  is the greatest contradiction  used  by  the hidden  leaders  -  while
economic  and  cultural life is becoming more and more internationalised and
globalised, governments are remaining nationally limited. People see them as
weak and helpless in the face  of events. I am far from the thought that the
leaders  of the world corporations are bad  people or  that they ought to be
proclaimed enemies and proponents  of imperialism.  The world cannot develop
without them but if things  remain  as they are,  the  positive role of  the
transnational  companies  as  the  driving  force  in  the  world  might  be
undermined.
     When I speak of chaos and disorder and the unsatisfactory regulation of
the world, I mean categorically the inadequacy of the international economic
infrastructure and the  lack of  of  sufficient international political  and
legal regulatory bodies. Such a  situation  hides many dangers for humanity:
unregulated financial operations, unregulated monopolisation,  international
mafia,  the danger of periodical crises. What is more important: the greater
the share of transnational companies in world production the  more countries
will open up to one another, the longer there  is an absence of global rules
to  the game,  the greater  will be  the  danger  of an  increase in serious
crises.

     5 THE MARCH OF THE POOR

     During  the  blazing summer of  the 1985 in Hungary, a tanker lorry was
stopped on a motorway. The  tanker  was  filled  with  the corpses of Asians
travelling secretly to Western Europe. They had died of suffocation and heat
exhaustion in their flight from poverty to salvation. Every year millions of
citizens  from the poorly  developed countries set their  sights on the rich
countries  of the West, using  all  possible legal and  illegal means. Their
march continues...

     T
     he  politicians and their supporters in  the most  developed nations of
the  world  can recline  in  complete,  blissful peace. They  have  complete
information  on the condition of the poor, but they have neither experienced
their problems, not demonstrate any particular desire  to help them.  It  is
difficult,  very difficult,  when  you live in Zurich, Cannes, Barcelona  or
Salzburg to believe that at the moment when  you  are giving a piece of meat
to  your  dog, somewhere in  the world  tens of  thousands of  children  are
suffering from hunger and illnesses connected with hunger.
     One of my friends, a member of the French parliament, told me recently,
"There  has always been  inequality between nations  and humanity is used to
it." I do not agree. Despite the eternal  inequalities between the developed
and underdeveloped, during the past 20 or 30 years something has taken place
which  has  radically  changed  and  will  continually  the  position of the
under-developed nations.
     Thanks  to world media  and, in particular, to television for the first
time they have become aware of how really poor they are. 20 or 30 or even 50
years  ago  the citizens  of India, Bangladesh, Congo or  Ruanda were really
unaware  of  the  huge  difference  in  the  living standards  between their
countries  and  the most  developed nations  of the world. If they did know,
this  was  not common knowledge. The situation  was more or less similar  in
Eastern Europe and Russia where poverty and the reaction  of the poor led to
the  acceptance of social utopias and their  elevation  into official  state
religions.
     Globalisation brings peoples closer but also gives rise to new concerns
about  inequalities.  Via  the  medium  of  television  and  other means  of
communication,  people  around  the  whole  world  have become aware  of the
enormous differences in ways of life and the enormous injustices existing in
the world. This is a new phenomenon and if it persist then it will give rise
to a wave  of reactions from the poorer nations. New means of communications
unite us, make  us look at the world as  a global village, but this openness
runs the risk of creating new conflicts arising from imbalance.
     The  largest and most compact populations of  poor people (according to
the  criteria  of  the UN on poverty)  exist in  Southern Asia  -  about 550
million  people.  130-140 million  poor people live in Eastern Asia  and  no
fewer than  220-230 million in the  Middle  East and North Africa. About 260
million live in sub-Saharan Africa  and about 100 million in Latin  America.
In addition, there are about 200 million poor people  in  the industrialised
countries.
     The gap  between the rich and the poor is dismaying. The twenty richest
nations in the world produce a GNP per head of population  of between 16,600
(Australia) and  33,500  (Switzerland)  USD.  The  twenty  poorest  nations,
according to  the same  criteria, vary between 72 USD  (Mozambique)  and 261
(Ruanda)[26]. This  enormous difference  cannot be resolved using
conventional methods.
     Nevertheless,  if  we  are  to  take   the   market  and  international
corporation as  the  only  means  of  salvation, this would  mean  that  the
technological, financial  and  social  gap  between  the poor  and  the rich
countries  would  become  even  wider. This  has been seen in the last 30-40
years. Even now  the gap  between the poor and the rich countries and people
is self-perpetuating. This is one of the most convincing signs of the crisis
of modern world structures.
     Humanity  undoubtedly  is  to  blame for  such a state  in  Mozambique,
Tanzania,  Bangladesh, Laos,  Vietnam, Ethiopia  and  other  less  developed
countries.  They  were  all  until  recently  former  colonies of  the  most
developed  nations  and many  of  their  priceless  historical  and cultural
artifacts  can be seen in museums and private collections  in Paris, London,
New York  and Geneva. They have all experienced  bitter armed struggles  and
periods  of  instability.   Measures   taken  by  the  UN  and  other  world
organisations to assist the poor have been mainly cosmetic. If  these trends
persist  and if liberal market illusions  are not substituted with something
else, then  the hidden dangers may become apparent  for  all  to see. In the
most general terms I refer to this danger as the march of the poor.
     One  of the  most  significant manifestations of this  condition is the
migration of the  poor to the larger towns. Tens of millions  of  people  in
Asia, Africa and South America have left their places of birth to migrate to
the  cities,   transforming  what  until  were  recently  small  towns  into
megapolises   consisting   of  shanty  towns   and  primitive  suburbs  with
multi-million  populations. Despite the  efforts of the national governments
this  process continues.  It has transformed Mexico  city,  Rio de  Janeiro,
Calcutta,  Bombay and tens of other  cities  into places with  an  enormous,
unmanageable poor population. The poor come to the large cities in search of
food,  work and a chance  for  their  children. Perhaps,  the most important
reason for this is the desire to reap the benefits of the familiar values of
civilisation.  The  images  on  the television  screen and mass  advertising
campaigns are the most powerful of all magnets, compelling  the poor to flee
from their  traditional  way of life. In  all corners  of  the  world  where
poverty is  a typical  phenomenon,  this  process  is  continuing.  This  is
particularly the  case  in those  places  where  there  is  no private  land
ownership or where land ownership  does not bring satisfaction of sufficient
economic results.
     The second logical consequence of  the march of the poor is  emigration
to the most developed countries of the world. In recent decades  the 25 most
developed nations have  been the object of  mass immigration for foreigners.
They enter their "Eldorado"  with  the help  of relatives,  false documents,
locked  in goods containers  and  lorries. The  liberal dream  of  the  open
society will result in the increase of the flow of the poor looking for work
and  peace  of mind  in the rich countries. In  this way  the liberalism  of
openness will backfire.
     Given the present world economic order the richest countries  will have
to create stronger barriers  to emigration  and to build new Iron, Stone and
Wooden  curtains between their countries and the rest of the world. I do not
want to  be a prophet of doom but such divisions  would drag humanity into a
dangerous dimension for human development. Forecasts show that the situation
in the European community will become particulary  complex. At the moment in
Germany  there are about 4.4 million  immigrants, in  France - 2.4, in Great
Britain - 1.2 and in Holland about 0.6. In the EU in total there are over 10
million immigrants. According to some calculations if the flow of immigrants
is not  limited within the next 5-7  years this  number  could double.  This
march  of  the  poor could have  explosive  consequences  in  the  developed
countries and at the same  time result in  a "brain drain" from  the poorer,
limiting their chances of improving the standard  of  living. There is  also
the  danger of the  rich western countries reacting by closing their borders
and  isolating  themselves. According  to  the agreement reached in Schengen
which  limited  the  possibilities of many nations to travel within  Western
Europe there has  been  a  stream of reactions and disappointment  which  is
difficult to  describe. Many Eastern Europeans are convinced  that they have
been deceived by the West and that the Berlin Wall has been reconstructed by
western  politicians.  The  pressure for free access  to the rich  West will
continue and no administrative barriers appear to be able to stop it.
     When speaking  of the march  of  the  poor, I also have  in  mind their
growing  tendency  towards self-protection and resistance. I  am  quite sure
that if  they do not receive the opportunity to make changes the poor of the
world will unite  in  search of a  new universal ideology. The same  reasons
which led to the October revolution in Russia and transformed communism into
the greatest utopia of the 20th century  might also create new  or re-create
old social views.
     Poverty has always  given  birth and  will  continue to  give birth  to
utopian views  and  dreams  of  a  rapid  leap  into wealth. The great  leap
promised  by  Mao Tse  Tung,  the  promises  made  by  Khrushchev  about the
communist paradise and even Hitler's  Third Reich were part  of the illusory
belief in the supernatural force of power, human will and violence. The 20th
century was a time of competing utopias. In the new era it will be much more
difficult to  achieve  similar unity simply because of the  influence of the
mass media and economic dependence. However, these means of indirect control
might  themselves  be powerless. It is unlikely that the poor will look back
to communism.  It  is  more  likely that they  will look  for  salvation  in
nationalism   and  in  particular   in   religious  fundamentalism  and  new
totalitarian doctrines. The great danger for the world in the  post-cold-war
period may come from  the combination  of economic problems and the struggle
for cultural  survival. If the present world economic order is preserved, in
the next 10-15 years we shall undergo a series of strong economic and social
shocks  which  will come from the poorer regions. They may take  the form of
local  wars,  the  political  influence  of fundamentalist  unions,  protest
movements of  immigrants in the industrial countries etc.. The other side of
the coin is a possible xenophobic reaction.
     Xenophobia in the richest  nations and fundamentalism in the poorer are
the  two  extremes, two major products  of the emerging crisis. They are the
catalysts for other conflicts between cultures and religions and between the
ethnic  groups in  search  of a unifying  force.  Many  researchers  believe
xenophobia  a  transitional  stage.  I,   however,  believe   that  it  will
periodically re-occur in  direct  connection  with  the  level  of  cultural
conflicts within the open world.
     Those  who  are  aware of  their poverty  will aspire to overcome their
problems and to identify their own fate with  common ideas, common religions
or  new  idols and leaders. Today the situation  is still  transitional. The
poor are desperate rather than  unified in a common awareness, but this will
change. The reaction of the  poor contributed to the success of  the Islamic
fundamentalists in Algeria, the high level of support for the fundamentalist
party  in  Turkey at  the  local  elections in  1994  and the  parliamentary
elections in 1996 and to the consolidation of the  regime  of the Ayatollahs
in Iran. The march  of the poor  is a  fact and a product  simultaneously of
globalisation and the  world order  which is  still  inadequate to  meet its
demands.
     If we accept  liberal  ideas  as sufficient in modern times,  this will
lead  to  a new division of the  world,  to the appearance of new leaders as
well as Utopias offering  protection  to the  poor of the world. The way  in
which we can avoid such a potential outcome lies  in  world  integration, in
the  establishment  of  a  new world  political  and economic order  and  an
entirely new kind of global society. This is the task which faces  us, which
faces  the new  generation  of  politicians above all in the  industrialised
countries.
     Such a task  cannot  be resolved  at summit meetings, like the  one  in
Copenhagen in March 1995. It is not general  discussion or  promises  of new
charity but profound structural reforms in the world economy which will help
to  resolve  the  problems.  This  includes  specific   programmes  for  the
stimulation  of investments in  the least developed nations, an increase  in
the role of  the UN and the restructuring  of the activities of the IMF  and
the World Bank etc..
     Fundamentalism and terrorism, the danger  of  reestablishing opposition
between political blocs, the appearance of new utopias are all dangers which
express the crisis of the transition to  a new world. No-one will be spared:
not the Europeans bathed in the luxury  of social welfare,  nor  the dynamic
USA, nor the  over-ambitious Japanese. Realisation of poverty is one of  the
most   important  phenomena   which   the  opening  of  the  world  and  new
communications has caused. It may lead  to more and more  violent reactions,
alienation and a hatred for the  rich countries and their elites. Did anyone
believe that we would become  witness to such senseless acts of terrorism as
the  bomb  attack  in Oklahama  city  or the Tokyo  Metro in 1995.  The bomb
attacks in Paris and Lyons carried  out by unknown extremists  caused  grave
concern throughout Europe. These will hardly be the last. This is how it was
in past civilisations when different cultures and different levels of wealth
clashed.  The other possibility  is a  rapid and  coordinated change in  the
world economic order. The most  developed nations and their governments will
have  to make a choice between global concern and responsibility or  growing
instability for all.

     6. A NUMBER OF PESSIMISTIC SCENARIOS

     Periods of  transition in  human development resemble a  tunnel with  a
number of exits.  You can take the most direct route to thelight  or enter a
side tunnel  with a dead-end and fluster around in the dark, turn around and
return to where you started from.

     T
     his  book is not meant to be either optimistic or pessimistic. It  does
not make categorical forecasts but outlines the possibilities. For the world
in  which we are living, this approach is particularly  important. Our world
is in a state of transition between two  epochs and is instable.The question
is which direction will modern humanity take? Summing up the  conclusions to
this  chapter,  I  believe that  the dangers which  I  have mentioned can be
grouped into three pessimistic scenarios.
     I  refer  to  the  first  of  them   as  the  scenario   of  "long-term
indeterminacy", or perhaps the scenario of "continuing chaos". This would be
an extended  20  or 30 year period  (perhaps even longer)  of  geo-political
instability and  attempts  to  expand  the positions of the great  political
powers. France and Germany  would want to establish for themselves a leading
role  in  Europe,  independent  of  the  USA  and  Russia. The Euro-Atlantic
partnership, the  keystone of world  politics in the last 50  years might be
threatened. Russia, threatened  with the possibilities of becoming  isolated
as  a  result  of the  expansion  of  NATO  might look to  the East to  form
alliances. Very soon China  might begin to have  global ambitions  and Japan
will turn its economic power  into political ambitions. Given  this scenario
the  transitional companies will be compelled to  play  a  greater "national
patriotic" role rather than the role of a globalising force.
     Perhaps,  you do not  believe  that  this is possible. Take a  look  at
Bosnia, crippled  children, dead and wounded civilians and  raped women. Why
did  the USA  support the Muslims, Germany the Croats and Russia the  Serbs?
Why  at the  end of the  20th century can we  not  put a stop to a senseless
letting of  blood. Was it differences  between  three ethnic  groups in this
long-suffering  country  which  lead to the differences  between  the  great
powers or was it the other way around?
     There  will be a constant series of conflicts  on  the periphery of the
entire  post-Soviet  system,  in  the  border  regions   between  Islam  and
Christianity and in the regions of great poverty. Let us hope that they will
not be as  bloody.  The  greatest  danger  in this scenario  is  the wave of
national, regional,  cultural  and religious egoism  which it contains.  The
"period  of long-term indeterminacy" will not  end  before the advent of the
21st century.
     This period  might  also be  called a time of "chaotic policentralism".
Where  there  will not be a  single  super  power.  There will  be no  clear
international political or  financial order. We will  be witness to  a slow,
contradictory and conflicting accumulation of aspirations, roles and egoisms
and of the grudging  recognition of the  rights of others. In the 1970's and
1980's a number of American politicians declared almost half of the planet a
zone of  vital  American interests. Today this is being done by a number  of
Russian, Greek, Turkish,  French  and even Japanese politicians. The problem
is  that in the majority  of cases  these zones  coincide  or  overlap.  The
Balkans  is  a  typical example of an  area  which Europeans, Americans  and
Russians consider an important region for their interests.
     Chaotic  policentralism  is a state  in which there are many centres of
power, but the poles of power change as a result of conflict.  This disorder
existed  at  the  beginning of the Second Civilisation  albeit in  different
historical conditions. Unfortunately, global thinking is at such a low level
that  the  danger of conflict  cannot  be  avoided.  This scenario  will  be
dominated by local  conflicts. International crime  will flourish  and there
will be an increase in the wealth of a small group of international rulers.
     My second pessimistic scenario could be  called "Back  to  the bi-polar
world". In actual fact we are still partially in it. Psychologically a large
number of politicians, senior  figures in  the  armies and security  forces,
retired officers and  a number of others still  live in the bi-polar  world.
Older people whose whole lives have been connected with the struggle against
the class enemy (communism or American imperialism) dream of a return to the
period  of  strong-arm politics.  There are those in the East  who  consider
Gorbachev a traitor  or an agent of the CIA and  dream of the restoration of
the Warsaw Pact and the  super power status of Russia. In the West there are
others  who advocate the idea of a  single world super  power in the USA and
the transformation  of NATO into  a dominant  world military  force  and the
casting  out  of  Russia  and China  into  the  back-yard  of  international
relations.
     It  would  be very easy  for  these  people and  their ideas to  become
dominant  in  world politics:  for example, the  conflict in Bosnia and  the
bombing  of  Serbian  targets  in  September  1995; or  the results  of  the
parliamentary elections  in Russia in  the  same year and  the  presidential
elections  in 1996. Despite perestroika and other great changes and  despite
changes  of  attitude   towards  Russia,  the  trust  which  exists  between
politicians in the East and West is still extremely fragile.
     It is quite possible  that the "bi-polar" model  of  the world could be
restored as  a consequence of the conflicts for the  fate of Eastern Europe.
On the one hand, Russia wants to preserve its influence in  this region, not
to be  isolated from Europe and to have  guarantees for  its future.  On the
other hand,  in the West there is an  increase in the influence of those who
desire the expansion of NATO to the borders of Russia. The  Eastern European
countries  themselves,  with  the only possible  exception of the  socialist
government in Bulgaria, want to enter NATO and to guarantee its security and
existence  within  Europe. In this event, every incautious step, each  hasty
move without considering the  global consequences  could turn the clock back
centuries and extend the life of the Third Civilisation artificially.
     It is a complete illusion to consider  Russia a weak country, engrossed
in its own problems. An influential American state department  official told
me in 1994 that "now Russia is weak, this is best time  to teach it where it
belongs".  I replied  that  such an idea was imprudent and  belonged  to the
vocabulary of cold-war talk. Russia possesses a huge military might and huge
resources. And  such a  suggestion would be sufficient  for confrontation to
reassert itself. Whether it is caused by nationalist forces within Russia or
naive politicians  in  Western  Europe, isolation of Russia,  in my opinion,
does not have any long-term prospects and hides great dangers.
     The question of "whither Eastern Europe?": whether  it should enter the
structures of NATO or not, hides a potential  danger for the  restoration of
the  bi-polar  world.  However,  this will  not  resolve  the  matter of the
proportionality of  world forces. I believe that if Russia is alienated from
the European processes and  in particular from mainstream world politics, it
will seek its  revenge in Eastern  Europe, the Balkans in particular, and in
Asia.  The new Eastern bloc may  include Russia, its  former Asian republics
and  China  which very soon will be in  a  position  to increase  its  world
political role.
     The fact  that a new bi-polar world  will be based on a new combination
of states will  not alter its inadequacies. Such a scenario would  only slow
down the processes of  world integration, exacerbate the universal crisis of
the  Third  Civilisation and  cause unhappiness for hundreds of millions  of
people.  It would also result in  a new spiral of armaments,  new ecological
dramas and new even greater poverty for Africans and Asians.
     The  third pessimistic scenario is  the  "revolution scenario". This is
the least likely of the three, but should not be ignored. It is a revolution
of the poor, socially deprived nations and states, who have gained access to
powerful strategic weapons and nuclear weapons.
     Another variation on this scenario is that put forward  by the American
researcher  Samuel Huntington, that  the 21st  century will be a century  of
wars between civilisations. I shall  later reject his theory since I believe
that  he  is mistaken  about  the common future  of  mankind.  However, as a
scenario for the transition from one civilisation to another, as a temporary
or local delay to the processes of  global reform over a  period of about 20
or 30 years, this is entirely possible.
     In  each  of  these  three  "pessimistic"  scenarios   I  can  see  the
possibility of an increase in terrorism and individual or group uprisings of
isolated and deprived peoples. The danger is that these uprisings might find
support and unifying influences within Islam, fundamentalist  regimes or new
utopian  doctrines.  There is  also  the real possibility that  these  three
scenarios might appear in combination. None  of them can contribute anything
positive to mankind. One should not forget that it was the idiotic ambitions
of dictators and global messiahs in  the 20th century  which killed hundreds
of millions of lives. There is a way of avoiding these pessimistic solutions
but it cannot be achieved  by conventional means.  The traditional solutions
with which we are familiar from recent decades will not help.
     The big question is whether we are going back to the Third civilisation
of  forward  to  a  new  civilisation?  Back   to  the  restoration  of  old
contradictions or  forwards to  their resolution  and the  formation of  new
global  structures. It will  in no way be easy to change the  stereotypes of
thought and to break the mould of the bi-polar world, protective nationalism
and all the theories  and doctrines which supported and  continue to support
the  waning Third human civilisation. If the new communication  systems  and
world  corporations are the bridge  to new forms of  imperialism,  this will
undoubtedly create a new wave of  protective nationalism and regional egoism
based on  ethnic or  economic  factors. This will consequently lead  to  the
danger  of new conflicts  and struggles  typical of  the  20th century - the
century of violent, uncomprehended and savage globalisation, the  century of
imperialism and world wars.

     Section two
     The Fourth Civilisation
     Chapter Four
     THEORY IN THE TIME OF CRISIS
     1. FOREWARNING OF THE END OF TWO THEORETICAL CONCEPTS

     Every change  of epoch is  a  change  of views of the world.  The Third
civilisation  not only gave birth to  but  was also served by theories which
are rapidly becoming  a thing of the past. Today it  is clear to all  of  us
that the changes which are taking place in the world can not be explained by
traditional doctrines. The crisis is evident...

     T
     he 19th  and 20th  centuries  were  a time of intellectual supremacy of
certain   theoretical   concepts   and   their   numerous   variations   and
metamorphoses.  One of  them conquered the  minds of  the  activists of  the
French revolution, became enshrined  in the American constitution and filled
the hearts of  several generations of world intellectuals. The  19th century
was  the century of liberalism. Its ideas still  form  the dream of the free
and the wealthy.  The second was the  theoretical  system of  Marxism  which
appeared as the defender of the  deprived and  the poor  and was a chance of
hope for those who had no property or education.
     Or course, the 19th and the 20th centuries  did  not belong  solely  to
these two doctrines.  The  19th century in varying countries and at  varying
times was dominated by restorationism, enlightened  absolutism, conservatism
or  just  reactionary monarchism. On the border between  the two centuries a
period  of  belligerent nationalism  and imperialism  broke  out. The period
between the two world wars  saw the strong development of radical ideologies
-  communism and fascism and a  whole  range  of  statist  and  semi-statist
doctrines. After the Second World War ideas  of the social state (L.Erchard)
and  the  mixed  economy (P.Samuelson)  and  the national  democratic  state
(Khrushchev) became popular.
     At  the same time Marxism as the ideological basis of  communism, state
socialism and liberalism as the banner of individual freedoms and capitalism
became the two most powerful driving forces in  the world and survived right
up to the present day. Even the "softening" of their ideological systems  as
a  result  of  "democratic   socialism"  and  "state  capitalism"  or  their
"hardening" in  the  forms of  communism  or  fascism  did not reduce  their
significance as the fundamental ideologies of the Third Civilisation.
     Perhaps,  I  should mention  here  why  I  have  not  included  another
important  ideological movement - that  of  conservatism. The  conservatives
have  always made a cult  out of their loyalty to the traditional structures
of  life.  The  conservative  values  of  "hierarchy,  order, authority  and
loyalty" have not stood up to the test of  time and new realities. Communism
and fascism  appear to have been conclusively  rejected. Monarchism  is only
viable as a cultural tradition. Radical and revolutionary theories have lost
their power. Of the old political doctrines, only liberalism  and Marxism in
its  totalitarian  version  managed  to retain any of their power, at  least
until the end of the 1980's.
     To  what extent, however, can they benefit from  the transition between
epochs?  Do  they  answer  the  needs  of the  new global realities?  Is  it
sufficient to say, that liberalism  has become a dominant and eternal global
theory, or that Marxism has been reborn in the form of democratic socialism?
     Let us look  at the first of these. The ideas of liberalism have a long
history  going back  to the awakening of civil societies,  private ownership
and the rights  of man.  This is  its huge  historical significance.  Hobbs,
Spinosa and Locke in  different ways contributed  to the creation of liberal
ideas. The  geniuses of the Enlightenment gave it a more systematic form and
value  system.  However,  the   driving  force  behind  the  development  of
liberalism was Adam  Smith. He saw the state and  state control as the  main
obstacles  to the development of the society in  which  we  live. He was  in
favour of the free movement of the work force,  the abolition of semi-feudal
remnants and the regulation of industry  and foreign trade. He was in favour
of the complete  removal of  all  limitations on trade with land and  goods.
A.Smith, D.Riccardo and A.Ferguson  as well as all their followers advocated
the  limitation  of the role  of the  state  to  the  functions of  a "night
watchman" whose job it is to safeguard the freedom of the owners of property
and  the  means  of  production.  "Anarchy  plus a constable,  freedom  with
security" was the  ambition of  the first major liberals. At the end of  the
18th  century  and  the  19th  century,  liberalism was  already  playing  a
progressive anti-feudal role, destroying the feudal remnants and opening the
way to civil rights.
     For the  liberals  freedom alone  was the  basis  of social  stability.
Following  the  traditions of  A.Smith  and  considering  himself  a  devout
follower, Jean Battiste Sei  idealised the system of free enterprise  in the
conviction that the market  alone  was sufficient to form balance. According
to Sei's  well-known  law the  crises of over-production  are  temporary and
economic  balance is equivalent to the existence of  free market  relations.
All  classical  economic  doctrines  were developed  on  the basis  of  such
fundamental conclusions.  A century  after the  appearance  of the  economic
views of Adam Smith (1776), the basis of the liberal idea - the very idea of
free  competition - was consigned to the  graveyard. At the end of  the 19th
century with the appearance of large monopolies and the worsening crisis  of
capitalism, liberal  doctrines began to lose  their prestige and  influence.
Two world wars  in the  20th century  and  the  success of more  radical and
totalitarian regimes further limited their influence.
     Of course,  during  the first  half of the 20th  century, liberal ideas
were still exerting influence on many thinkers and politicians. Some of them
followed in the footsteps of William Jevens explaining  all phenomena on the
basis of the laws  of subjective logic.  Others by default became elementary
apologists of the dominant bourgeois  views and yet others became  advocates
of the views of Menger and Von  Viser. All of them, however, were obliged to
recognise that ideas of the automatic self-regulating and stabilising nature
of the  free  market  were  mistaken.  The world  wars,  colonial conflicts,
imperialistic conflicts  and  totalitarianism dealt heavy body blows to  the
ideas of liberalism which lost much of its influence for a long time.
     Limited, reduced in influence and almost underground,  the tradition of
liberal thought continued into the 20th century. This was  mainly due to the
hard  work of  two "long-distance runners" of theoretical liberalism: Ludwig
von  Mizes and  Friedrich  von  Haiek. Von Mizes  in  his "Human Activities"
offers a series  of ideas  which contribute to the consolidation of the idea
of individualism and individual freedoms. For Mizes the freedom of choice is
at  the basis of social development. He believes  that economic  theory  and
structure  are entirely  subjective. Every expansion of the structure of the
state was regarded by Mizes and Hajek as an anomaly. In the opinion of Mizes
the  protection of the  rights of hired labour  limits freedom  and  in  the
long-term -  the  natural  development of society.  He was very  critical of
communism  and in his work "Socialism" he brilliantly predicted  many of the
imperfections of the "socialist experiment".
     In the 19th century Liberalism  was a strongly progressive  science. It
destroyed  the foundations  of  absolutism and  opened the way  to civil and
political freedoms. It  was the theoretical crown of laurels  of the  modern
age and an expression of the Third Civilisation. Liberalism was the hope  of
the  ordinary citizen, the  bourgeois, the craftsman,  the  small and medium
scale  land  owner.  It  was  the  ideology  of  the  struggle  against  the
"unjustified  privileges" of  the aristocrats and monarchs,  the ideology of
those who guarantee  the power  of the bourgeois  above the other members of
society. There is  no doubt that in the 19th century one particular rule was
valid  -  the  more widespread the  ideas  of liberalism,  the  greater  the
authority of the bourgeois class.
     Liberalism was a victim of its  own  success and gave birth  to its own
antipathy - Marxism. Someone had  to  defend the  interests of hired labour.
Someone had to bring attention to the  plight  of a new repressed class with
its own role and  problems  in society. The  freedom of some had turned into
the lack of freedom of others.  This was the law of  the Third Civilisation,
of  the  level  of  progress that had  been reached at  that  moment  in the
development of mankind. The collapse of the feudal societies had given birth
to  the bourgeoisie and the proletariate and the ideological doctrines which
corresponded to their interests.
     Marxism developed as a new wave of intellectual thought but soon turned
into  a class  doctrine. It was based on the idea of the value manufacturing
output and the  capitalist accumulation of wealth which arises from it. Marx
was an undisputed theoretician and thinker.  He not only developed the ideas
of Smith but turned them in a completely  new direction. While J.B. Sei  and
John Stuart Mill absolutised the idea of free enterprise and "Laissez Faire"
economics,  Marx  took  things  in  a  new  direction.  He  looked  for  the
contradictions inherent in the free market and "proved" that sooner or later
they  would  lead  to   monopolism,  class   conflicts   and  the  objective
transformation of private ownership into public ownership. While Sei and his
followers promoted  the capitalism of the 19th century  and considered it as
an eternal and balanced system, Marx, on the other hand, described its vices
and called for the replacement of this society with a more just system.
     At the  root of  the  theory of the value of labour, he emphasised that
one part of society unjustly exploited  the other part in contradiction with
the natural rights of man.  The struggle for added value,  in the opinion of
Marx, was at the  root of class division  between  the bourgeoisie  and  the
proletariate.  Here Marx  is in his  role  as  a theoretician  and political
revolutionary. He undoubtedly  believed that at some time during the process
of capitalist accumulation, the "Laissez Faire" formula would collapse since
competition  would lead to  centralisation,  monopolisation  and eventually,
political and class conflicts. Marx, and later Lenin,  frequently reiterated
that   monopolisation  was  a  logical  consequence  of  competition.  These
conclusions  by  Marx  were  indisputedy  true  of the  19th century  and  a
significant part of the 20th.
     In Chapter 23 of  the first volume of "Das Kapital", Marx comes  to his
most significant theoretical conclusion. For years to  come it was  to serve
the  interests  of  Lenin  and  later  Stalin  as  the  keystone  of  "state
socialism".  He  believed that  the  processes  of  natural accumulation  of
industrial  capital would  not only lead to high levels of concentration but
also objective and inevitable centralisation which would kill  the  ideas of
"Laissez  Faire"  and  would set preconditions for  the transfer of  private
ownership to the state. "In a given area", writes Marx, "centralisation will
attain its  extreme limit when all the  capital  invested in it merge into a
single capital. In a  given society, this limit  will be attained  only when
the entire social capital is  united  in  the hands  of a single, individual
capitalist or a  single group of capitalists."[27] This leads  to
the basis  thesis  which was to  be further developed by Lenin  - historical
development  and  progress gradually  lead to the  increase in the level  of
socialisation, in the concentration and centralisation of production.
     This  conclusion  and  the  conclusion on the historical  role  of  the
working  class and its rights  to  added  value  (logically - to the sum  of
social wealth) are the keystones of Marxist theory. The main  conclusion was
that private ownership  would be destroyed in order to  concede its place to
public ownership. Later on the followers of Marx were to become divided over
this issue. Kaustski considered that  the priority of  Marxist  thought  was
that  the  capitalist society  would  reform  itself and  that parliamentary
democracy would stimulate such a process. At the other extreme Lenin and his
followers, motivated by the dramatic situation in semi-feudal Russia were to
raise the flag of the  revolutionary  struggle for the rights of the poor in
the belief that before capitalism could  be transformed into anything  else,
inter-imperialistic conflicts  would  lead  to its death  and the inevitable
world victory of the proletariate.
     This was the main  reason why  the  Marxist tradition  divided  at  the
beginning of  the 20th century into  two major movements -  social democracy
and  communism.  In both  cases,  however,  they share  the  same  political
doctrines  and  common  theoretical views. Both communism  and world  social
democracy in the  20th century placed the emphasis on the protection of  the
rights of the workers and the socially weak strata of the population and  at
the same time the strong  regulatory role of the state. Under  communism the
role  was  taken  to  absurd   extreme  via  the  total  nationalisation  of
production.  In social-democracy  the role of the  state was reduced to  its
"natural" dimensions defined by the need for  it to protect the interests of
the socially weak.
     In 1989-1991 with  the  collapse of the  Eastern  European totalitarian
structures  Marxism suffered  a  terrible  blow. Of  course,  it  is  hardly
possible to identify Eastern European totalitarianism with  Marxism, Marxism
with Stalinism, Maoism or  Potism. Marx  was complex  and  occasionally even
contradictory but  his name will remain forever in the annals of the history
of economic and social disciplines. His conclusions canbe disputed, and only
some of them  are valid for the period in which he lived. Others  arouse our
admiration even today.  Amongst the  latter, I would cite  his philosophical
ideas of dialecticism and analyses of market prices and competition. Toffler
is  correct  when  he says that  to ignore  the  writings  of  Marx today is
tantamount  to  being semi-literate. In my book, I do  not reject  Marx as a
thinker, but I do reject the practical implementation of his ideas and their
politicisation and transformation into dogma.
     The  globalisation of the  world, the universal  crisis of the two bloc
system  and  the appearance  of  new  technology  struck  Marxist  political
practice a blow to the heart. The total nationalisation  of society  was  in
fact in divergence with the realities of world development.  The  idea  that
capitalist  accumulation would lead to a unified, centralised  society, to a
single  system  of production  for all workers  and to  a global proletarian
state were mistaken. The first reason for this was because the consolidation
of  the proletarian  state as a rule was achieved via violence and secondly,
because such  views lead to the repression of individual rights and freedoms
and the limitation of human creativity.
     The  Marxist  intellectual   tradition   lost  its   influence  to  new
technologies and social developments  in the 1970's and 1980's which were at
odds with the structures of state property. The West  had begun to  overcome
class  contradictions  and  they  had reached entirely new  levels of social
development. Modern generations are now  witnessing the disappearance of the
traditional working  class,  the appearance of  new social  groups  and  new
social structures. In actual fact both the politically charged "intellectual
discoveries" of Karl Marx - the theory of added value  and the universal law
on  capitalist accumulation -  have  been overtaken by history.  Neither his
views on  expropriation  by expropriators,  nor the struggles  of the  world
proletariate correspond to what is happening in the world at the moment.
     This does not mean  that  the  Marxist intellectual tradition has to be
forgotten or rejected. It has played an essential role in the development of
the world  during a long period of its development. Marx correctly predicted
that the period of free  competition would not last long and  that  it would
lead to imperialism and the increase in inter-imperialist conflicts. Marxism
became a powerful gravitational force for many people during the second half
of the  19th century and the first  half of the 20th since it offered a true
reflection of the tragic position of workers during this period and defended
their interests. "State socialism"  as  it was  called was the  transitional
type  of  social  progress  combined with exalted utopian views  and violent
methods  for  attaining them. On the other hand  state  socialism guaranteed
social security (work, wages and a basic standard of living) for millions of
people. There is no other reasonable way to describe the popularity of these
teachings  and  its  influence  throughout  a  large  part  of  the  world's
populations in the 19th and 20th century.
     The Western European social democratic version of Marxism played a role
as  a balancing force,  a  bridge between the different classes.  In Eastern
Europe,  Asia  and  Africa  it  was  a  series  of   generally  unsuccessful
experiments. The total nationalisation of Stalin  in the 1930's, reformed by
Khrushchev and  supported by  Brezhnev, the "great leap forward" of Mao  Tse
Tung at the end  of  the 1950's and the senseless purges of Pol Pot were all
justified under  the  banner of Marxist ideas and  the struggle for a global
communist future.
     The historical  fate of  Marxism  reveals one  important  truth. When a
teaching imposes itself mechanically on different cultures and traditions or
when it used simply as a banner,  it automatically  turns into dogma.  Every
attempt at reform in the 1970's and  1980's in Eastern  Europe was justified
with quotes from Marx and Lenin and supporting quotations  from the works of
the great  leaders could always be  found  even  in  the most  contradictory
situation. This was  absurd. We were obliged at  every turn to refer  to the
classic works. Marxism lost its authority and was turned  into an compulsory
state religion.
     At  first  glance  with the collapse  of the  totalitarian  regimes  in
Eastern Europe liberalism seemed  to remain the only gravitational force for
the  development  of mankind,  with no recognition of gratitude to  Marx  or
Lenin.  The semi-statism  of  the  world's  social democrats is  in  crisis,
neo-Keynesianism is under pressure from market expansion in the  open  world
and modern communications seem to  be  whispering, "less state intervention,
more freedom".  The followers of Mizes and Von Hajek  hastily declared after
the death  of  Marxism  that  there  is nothing left  but  liberalism.  This
illusory triumph  found its  fullest  expression in  the work of F.Fukoyama,
"The End  of  History".  In  the  style  of Sei's  eternal  doctrines of the
"eternal"  market  balancing  force,   Fukoyama  declared  the  intransigent
superiority of liberal  ideas and  subsequently the end of history. He seems
to believe that the market, individualism and  the  private entrepreneur are
the only quantifiable categories.
     For  Hegel and  now  Fukoyama, the "end of history" is the fear of  the
unfathomable great future, something which needs to be  defined now, despite
the  fact  that   by  rights  it  belongs  to  future  generations.  Hegel's
long-dreamed-of modern  world will appear at the end of history in  the same
way as  Fukoyama asserts that the most  perfect system is  liberal democracy
and that it will bring with it the "last man" and the "end of history".
     What  I  cannot  accept  in these  concepts is  that  history  and  its
philosophy have a perceivable end and  that social schemes and doctrines can
be written in  stone for  eternity.  I  prefer  to  believe that history  is
cyclical and that its follows the  laws of the great natural  systems of the
universe. We still know too little, to be able to give an adequate answer to
this question. We know so little about our own planet and about the galaxies
which surround it and especially the connection between this and the history
of mankind. Despite the poverty of human knowledge it is clear that there is
no proof of the inevitable end of mankind and earthly nature.
     The  explanation seems to suggest  that  the  end  of  history will  be
accompanied  by the universal domination  of liberalism. The modern world is
colourful  and diverse enough  to  support  the belief  that  a  traditional
ideology can  transform itself in a dominant philosophy. Even the elementary
claims that after the  collapse of  Eastern European totalitarianism  and "a
short, sharp  shock" liberal doctrines would  win the  hearts  and minds  of
Russians,  Bulgarians, Poles or Slovaks were hasty.  This did not take place
and because of the inherited  economic  and cultural  realities clearly will
not.  However, are  the Eastern countries of Japan,  South  Korea  or  China
symbols  of liberal democracies? Will the countries of  Latin  America, Asia
and Africa  be  able to develop  in this way? The  trends  prevalent at  the
moment  in Western Europe and  the  USA give  no  grounds for such "liberal"
optimism. Modern liberal doctrines do not correspond to the most significant
modern  processes of  globalisation,  socialisation  or  the  opening-up  of
countries and the mutual interaction of different  cultures. The very nature
of private property has changed. It is  more  socialised and integrated than
at any other time. Humanity is faced with completely new problems which fall
outside the domain of liberalism.
     Today's  global  world is disproportionately  developed and traditional
liberalism will hardly be  able to change this. If  we apply its traditional
ideology  universally,  the  world  economy  will mutate  even  further. The
wealthy  countries will become even  more  wealthy and the poor even poorer.
The  God of wealth for some will be at the same time the God  of poverty for
others, leading to a renewal of liberalism and  a revitalisation of some new
form of Marxism and defender of the socially weak.
     Today practically no-one has any doubts  that classical liberal thought
is  part  of the glorious past. There  is,  however, another hypothesis that
after the  collapse of totalitarian socialism liberalism will be born again.
Some  modern liberals assert that  Ronald Reagan and  Margaret Thatcher with
their   typically  liberal   policies   brought  about   the   collapse   of
communism.[28]  Others  consider  that  neo-liberalism is  but  a
rationalist deviation  in  the  era  of  violence,  typical of this century.
"However,  if there is  any  kind of hope for the future of freedom",  wrote
John Grey in 1986, " then it is hidden in  the fact that towards the  end of
century of political insanity, we are  becoming witnesses of a return to the
wisdom of the great theorists of liberalism."[29]
     With respect for these views, I would, all the same, like to express my
view that  history never  repeats itself.  We must accept  the market, human
rights, individual freedom and so on, but will this alone solve the problems
of  the modern world  or provide a solution to the challenges with  which we
are faced?  On their own  these  liberal  doctrines  are inadequate  for the
processes of globalisation. They will as  a  matter  of course lead  to  the
development of  a number of  social conflicts  for a relatively long time to
come.  They  will  lead  to  a   deformation  of  world  development  and  a
consolidation of the division of humanity  into the rich  and the poor. This
will create a new reaction in the poorer countries and the appearance of new
utopias and local wars. A century ago liberalism very rapidly changed from a
doctrine  of  spiritual  freedom into a  doctrine of  the rich. Today  it is
hardly able to return freedom to the poor, or the freedom taken  away by the
electronic  media. In the context of the global world liberal  doctrines are
rather a refuge for those who want to expand their historical advantages and
the historical lead they have over the others and to dominate the world.
     The greatest  danger  in  the  context  of  the  global  world is  that
liberalism will be transformed into  a bridge for the domination of cultures
leading  to the disappearance of national  traditions and entire peoples. In
combination  with  globalisation market  liberalism might easily mutate into
cultural elitism. If we follow the ideological  concept of liberalism in the
context of the  global world we will be faced with the dangers  mentioned in
the previous chapter - chaos  and  disorder, nationalist and  ethnic crises,
the reactions of the poor and all the manifestations of the universal crisis
of  the Third  Civilisation.  Both  historically and currently the  idea  of
liberalism is different from the present state of the world. The worst thing
is that with  such ideas  we  will primitivise world development and we will
turn  globalisation  into a bridge  for  the  mechanical  imposition of  one
culture onto  another. In practice this means the Americanisation of Russia,
the  Germanisation of  the Czech Republic  and Hungary  and  China and India
simultaneously to imitate the  United States and  the United Kingdom  and so
on. Least  of all we want to resemble ourselves. The world can only lose out
and become ashamed of itself.
     Of course,  it would be absurd and superfluous to ignore  the strengths
of liberal theories. Freedom, human rights,  private initiative and property
are things  which we have  inherited through the centuries and which we will
take with  us into the  future. The problem is,  however, that in the modern
world  this is far  from enough. Neither liberalism nor Marxism-Leninism can
explain the modern processes of world integration, the reduction of the role
of national states, the appearance and the principles of the  global  world,
mutual interaction of cultures in the context of internationalisation.
     These  two  doctrines  appeared  during  the  industrial  era,  in  the
conditions of strong class division and inequality. They served the needs of
the Third Civilisation with  their  inherent structures - nations and nation
states. Their basic laws and categories were connected to the problems faced
by mankind during the  19th and 20th century. Today,  however, all  this has
changed as a result of modern technological processes, as a result of modern
social structures and the evolution of ownership.
     Marx's working  class  does  not exist,  there  is no  class  hegemony,
proletarian  revolutions  are senseless.  At the same time the ideal private
owner  in  the  conditions  of  the  intermingling  of  millions of  private
activities and  the increase in  the dependence of each individual  does not
exist. Just like the new technologies  did  not find their  place within the
shell of state  bureaucratic "socialist"  governments, in  the same  way the
socialisation of private  property  and the globalisation of the  world have
destroyed the basic values of liberalism.
     It is true that each of these doctrines can adapt and take on board new
ideas. However, this would be a perpetration ofviolence against history  and
academic morals. Such attempts are  being carried out at the moment stemming
from the political ambitions and inherited from the past but as a rule  they
serve  only  to  delay the reform  process. Their hypocrycy  will be quickly
perceived. In the early period of my academic research I also allowed myself
to indulge  in  such  illusions  attempting to imagine the ideas of sweeping
reform in  Eastern Europe as the  revitalisation  of socialism. At that time
this  was  about  as  far as we were  allowed  to  go.  Today,  when  we are
relatively  free it  would  much  more honest  to confess  that  the time of
ready-made ideas has  long  since passed. New generations have  the right to
their  own  ideas  and the  logical progress of  history does  not mean  the
acceptance  of  old  cliches. Neither  Marxism-Leninism  can be successfully
adapted  to  individualism,  the  market  or  private  enterprise,  nor  can
liberalism  accept  within  its own systems the  international  and internal
associations created  by new communications. It is equally absurd to believe
that ideological  doctrines can be based on a priori class status - theories
about  capitalists, theories  about workers and peasants. This approach  was
suitable in the 19th  and 20th centuries when the integration of society was
at  a  much lower  level and social stratification was  much more  acute and
significant.
     I expect political liberals and "socialist" movements to begin to adapt
to the new realities. It is sometimes amusing that those who call themselves
socialist  may carry  out anti-socialist  politics  in support of the  major
monopolies. There may even be liberals and conservatives who preach politics
in the name of the people and social  economic ideas. The comedy of  make-up
and disguise will continue for  another  10-15 years and maybe more. We will
hear more and more frequently that the changes  have only  served to confirm
the ideas of Karl  Marx  and L.Von Mizes. This is,  however, to insult these
two great thinkers.
     This is why I cannot announce the end of Marxism or liberalism, but can
only give  forewarning that the end will come  - about  that there can be no
doubt. History teaches us that  new eras give rise to new ideas. We are  now
entering such an era.

     2 A RETURN TO THE ROOTS OR THE MAIN THESIS

     The theory and  the practice of  liberalism stresses  the absolutism of
the individual and private property and hence  the monopoly of power of  the
strong  over the  weak.  Marxism-Leninism created the  total monopoly of the
state by absolutising socialisation  and state ownership. I have come to the
conclusion that  neither  socialisation not  autonomisation can be  achieved
individually or absolutely...

     I
     n 1982 when I was writing my doctoral dissertation, I wanted to find an
answer to the  question, "Does state socialism justifiably  exist?" Why were
its ideas dominant at that time in a number of countries including Bulgaria?
According  to  Lenin, "State  socialism is  based  on the  socialisation  of
capitalist production."[30] By  the  world "socialisation"  Marx,
Engels and Lenin meant the development of the social character of autonomous
social  processes.  In their opinion humanity was progressing logically from
individual to larger mass forms of production, passing through the stages of
primitive labour to slave owning  and feudal  manufacturing  processes,  the
development  of the factory eventually to reach the large scale  monopolies.
Subsequently  Marxism-Leninism states that the  next  step  in socialisation
after monopolies is the creation of social ownership  or property controlled
by the state itself.
     At  first  glance, this might  appear logical: in  the  stages  of  its
progress, humanity passes from primitive individual  production to  enormous
factories and  eventually state control  within the  framework of the entire
society.  Marx  and  Lenin frequently  come  back  to this  emphasising that
private property is too limiting for the new productive forces and  that  it
gives rise to wars and violence subsequently conceding its position to state
control.  There  is no  difference in principle  here  between Marx,  Lenin,
Stalin,  Trotski or  Mao  Tse Tung.  They all saw socialisation  as a global
process,  the  basis and pre-condition  for  the  establishment of  a  world
communist  society, of a  "single  factory for  all  workers  and  peasants"
(Lenin).  Taking  this as  the basis and putting to one side  (briefly)  the
Marxist thesis of  the decay of the state, the  pioneer politicians of state
socialism unified life and put up barriers to motivation and the progress of
people.
     In order to analyse this process, we can take the most simple example -
the example of  natural organisms. Organic cells do not  only grow when they
develop  (unless  they are  cancerous)  but divide and become autonomous. If
they separate from  the  main body of  cells  they  die.  If  larger natural
systems  attack  their independent development, the  cells  die or cease  to
exist in the same form. All growth of organisms in nature is associated with
autonomous development. The other option is decay and inevitable death.
     Similarly,   if  socialisation  and  centralisation  are  viewed  as  a
unilateral process, they (like cancer  cells) will automatically lead to the
mutation  of  the  system.  It  is true that  each subsequent stage of human
development leads to the greater homogeneity of human civilisation. However,
if  this  thesis  is not further  developed,  it  become transformed into  a
rejection of its own self. For Stalin and his followers, for Mao and Pol Pot
progress meant socialisation, equal to unification,  military discipline and
universal obedience to superiors.
     This was the  very basis  for  the doctrine of  state socialism and the
gradual unification of society. In the 1920's and 1930's the USSR and in the
1950's the countries  of Eastern Europe  underwent the total nationalisation
of their industry and agriculture. There was a belief in the theory that via
state  regulated  homogeneity  the  differences  between  village  and town,
intellectual and  physical  work and  classes would disappear and that  this
would   be   the    basis    for   subsequent   "social   homogeneity"   and
"nationalisation".  This  was the  model for state socialism. It meant death
for individual activities, creativity and motivation. To a lesser  extent it
suffocated the diversity of social  life.  Naturally it also delayed  and in
certain circumstances halted social development.
     The most  important element in my understanding of  this matter is that
integration (socialisation) and autonomation  are not mutually exclusive but
a pair of categories which develop in parallel and are mutually conditioned.
The same can also be said of other pairs  of processes such as globalisation
and  localisation,  integration  and  disintegration,  collectivisation  and
individualisation,   massification   and   demassification   etc..   However
paradoxical this might appear at first glance, I believe that these pairs of
processes  have  developed  in  parallel  and  not to the detriment  of  one
another.  Of  course,  the  phases  of   socialisation   and   autonomation,
unification and collapse cannot appear simultaneously.
     At each stage in the  development of human history the socialisation of
production replaces a particular level of autonomy and in its turn gives way
to another. The  slave owning  state socialised the  labour of  thousands of
slaves  and  gradually within the very heart  of  the system new centres  of
autonomy began  to  appear setting the preconditions for  the appearances of
colonies  and the early stages of feudalism. Capitalism destroyed the feudal
divisions but in  its place a new type of autonomy appeared. However hard it
tried to  suppress autonomy, the totalitarian  regimes could not destroy the
autonomy of social groups  and individual people were  eventually to destroy
the monopoly of power.
     Let us take  the elementary example of the single  division of  labour.
The  idea  of  the socialisation of  labour is based  on  the fact that  the
individual units of labour complement each other within the processes of the
creation  of a final product. Craftsmen are  divided from  the  agricultural
worker, the trader  from the craftsman etc.. On  the  one hand they  all are
dependent on each other but on the other (and this is particulary important)
they achieve greater professional  autonomy and  greater freedom  of action.
Similar  processes  develop in relation  to the  forms  of unified  labour -
certain economic  units are absorbed up by others while at the  same time in
the process of capital accumulation yet others become more powerful and more
independent. At  a  certain  stage  in  their  development  they divide into
individual  autonomous  structures.  Large  companies as General  Motors for
example  transfer  a  number  of  their  activities to  smaller  independent
companies. Each larger  production  unit  is then obliged to autonomise  its
internal departments. Moreover,  the more developed and bigger the  unit is,
the greater the autonomy  of its  component parts. This process is confirmed
by the decentralisation  of management  in  transnational  corporations.  In
general the  growth of the whole cannot help but bring with it the growth of
its individual parts. The increased process of integration will at a certain
stage  in  its  development  lead  to   division  and  a  certain  level  of
autonomisation.
     Thus,  the  growth in socialisation  does  not  lead to  the  death  of
autonomisation  but to its reproduction and  change in its forms. The growth
in integration leads  to another  type of disintegration,  globalisation and
another type  of  localisation  etc..  Each  human  activity  is  a form  of
accumulation. On the one hand the process of accumulation as both a material
and  spiritual process leads  simultaneously  to  two  effects: firstly,  it
concentrates the material and social forces in one area making them socially
and naturally more  independent and autonomous,  secondly, this accumulation
leads to  millions of new types  of manufacturing, economic and social links
between human communities, countries and continents.
     If we take the level of autonomy of individual structural  units,  then
in certain  cases  their levels  of  autonomy  increase, others decrease and
disappear while yet  others appear and continue to develop. In general terms
the socialisation  and autonomisation of structures are linked by a  complex
series of relations which  complement  each other at the same time. The main
element  is  that  during  the  development of the historical processes they
follow a  common line of development and growth. Moreover,  it is clear that
neither individualism nor collectivism can of their own accounts express the
richness  of  human  interdependence.  Separated  from  one  another,  these
categories  create  deformation. Pure individualism without any idea of  the
community  is antipathetical  to the  idea of  the  objective  integrational
processes  while forced  collectivism kills diversity and initiative. By the
same logic, the state socialist collective societies limit individualism and
creativity and delay progress.
     I  am convinced that  history  will  lead  us to a combination  of  the
elements  of  the  individual  and  the  social:  the  integration of  human
activities unify a series of autonomous  production processes, countries and
peoples  making the world more united and  more  mutually dependent. At  the
same  time  there  will  be growth  in the  social role of  the  individual,
autonomous groups  and  ethnic communities. Material  accumulation  and  the
growth  in  wealth  available to  civilisations makes  man wealthier  better
informed and  consequently  freer and more independent.  The  more  humanity
develops  the more this  trend will continue. It will be more  difficult  to
"entrap"  such  a  person  within the  monopolistic  structures  of  managed
societies.
     I,  therefore, believe that in global terms it  is possible to speak of
the  disintegration of historical distances between the  individual (private
relations) and the  collective (public relations).  History has indisputedly
shown  that objective integrational  processes are  ineffective without some
form of administrative  compulsion.  The  higher the  level of  civilisation
within society the greater the harmony between the individual and society.

     3 MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND A MESSAGE TO A.TOFFLER

     Since the  1960's  the  technological basis of world manufacturing  has
changed out of all recognition. So much new technology has entered every day
life  that  social  relations have  also changed.  One  of the  best  modern
philosophers,  A.Toffler,   maintains  that  new  technology  leads  to  the
emassification of  production. My belief is  that  the  effect  is  somewhat
different.
     I believe that  it gives rise to the parallel processes of  integration
and disintegration,
     massification and demassification and that it is this dual effect which
has influenced the world in this extraordinary way.

     T
     he existence of a dialectic link between integration anddisintegration,
globalisation and localisation can be summed upin three basic conclusions.
     The first conclusion is  that these  pairs of  categories of historical
development  are  not antipathies  but develop in  parallel and are mutually
conditioned. This concept is equivalent to  the rejection of utopian liberal
theories  of  absolute independence  and the  "purity" of private ownership.
However, this is  also a rejection of the notions of a future society  as  a
world without  individualism, internal  autonomy,  local characteristics and
without economic, political and cultural diversity.
     The second  conclusion is that socialisation, or integration is not the
same is nationalisation or centralisation. If this was a unilateral  process
(the  persistent  unification of  autonomous units) then this  concentration
would  lead   to   centralisation  and   would  lead   to   the   growth  in
nationalisation.  The  view  that  autonomisation goes  hand  in  hand  with
socialisation  means that  socialisation is above all a "horizontal" process
based on man, the  market and  private property. Consequently centralisation
has certain  permissible limits beyond which it is  ineffective and provokes
reactionary processes. The theoretical conception of the state in the modern
world has changed  significantly. It is  clear that in modern conditions the
borders of the  state  have undergone considerable  changes. The greater the
level of development  on the one  hand,  the  more  civic  society  will  be
absorbed up by the state - and vice versa.
     My third conclusion[31] is that from an  international point
of view, socialisation  (integration) gives rise to new phenomena  connected
firstly with globalisation and  secondly with  the  appearance of  increased
local autonomy and localisation. On the  one hand, new communications  unite
humanity, on the other hand they  create national and ethnic self-confidence
leading to  the  struggle  for the  survival of nations  and  cultures  as a
reaction to cultural imperialism.
     Liberalism  and Marxism-Leninism are unable to provide explanations for
the  new  realities.  Liberal  doctrines  emphasise  individualism, personal
freedom, while Marxism places the emphasis on  class and collectivism.  When
liberalism   and  Marxism  appeared  on  the  historical  stage,  their  one
dimensional nature was  to a  certain extent  entirely  understandable.  The
liberals  defended  the  rights  of free,  private entrepreneurs  while  the
Marxists   defended   the  working  class  and  the   poor.   The  level  of
stratification within civilised societies was so clear and so developed that
such doctrines  were inevitable. They were a historical  necessity and their
mark in history.
     It  will  be  interesting  to  see  whether  these conclusions  will be
confirmed by the modern  technological revolution which is apparently taking
shape  at  the moment and which will continue to shape the face of the world
for some time to come.
     In   a  number  of  his  books  the  famous  American  philosopher  and
futurologist,  A.Toffler,  concludes  that  new  technologies  lead  to  the
demassification of  production. "At  the present moment", he writes, "We are
passing from an economy of mass production and  mass consumption  to what  I
would  call  "the  demassed economy".[32]" In the opinion of  the
great American futurologist, large scale mass production will be replaced by
individualised  or  small  scale  production. Identical  components  will be
assembled in more and more individualised end products.
     I  wanted to draw attention to  this thesis not because  it is original
but  rather  that it has lead to the revival of the illusion that liberalism
and free trade will  triumph. The basic idea of Toffler is that  the  modern
technological  revolution  will return the demassification of  production as
the leading form of economic relations which will  in turn mean the collapse
of the large trans-nationals corporations or at least the reduction of their
role, the domination of the small and medium scale sector and the rebirth of
free competition. This thesis  refutes my own, or to look at it from another
point of view,  my theory  refutes his.  If  what  I  believe  is true, that
integration  and disintegration  and  related categories  are developing  in
parallel, this means that demassification will not replace mass  production.
It will  simply lead  to  new types  of  mass production  and  new types  of
demassed activities.
     There  is  no  doubt that new computer  technology has created work for
hundreds of thousands of people  in their homes. The computer revolution had
individualised a huge number of social activities and  has elevated the role
of the intellect. However,  these technologies have also created millions of
new, direct links which stimulate mass production. At the end of  the 1970's
and 1980's many specialists believed that small and medium enterprises would
eventually become the keystone of world manufacturing. The basis  for such a
presumption was  the  growth in  their  relative share  of the market.  "The
entire economy", writes Toffler,  "is  becoming demassed."[33] He
gives examples of the thousands of  small and  medium enterprises  in Kiusu,
Southern Japan and in Quebec, Canada.
     Only one thing is true in these statements: that with the advent of the
computer   age  and   biotechnology   and  their  practical  and   universal
applications a  large number of  small and medium independent companies have
been created. With the use  of a computer it has become  possible  for  many
activities to  be carried out individually.  The same reasons, however, have
provided stimuli  for the  large scale  manufacturers.  Over the past  10-15
years,  the mass  bankruptcies and collapses  of trusts and  companies which
many people expected, have not  taken place. On the contrary, as can be seen
from  the annual  American  rank  listings in  the  magazine  "Fortune", the
leading  companies  in  the  world  have  increased  their  sales  and  have
strengthened their positions in  the  world economy. Over the past ten years
they  have  increased  their position  in  world  trade,  manufacturing  and
particularly in the area of new technology.[34]
     Without doubt the majority  of  them  have changed their structures  by
diversifying  and  delegating  their activities to subsidiary companies  and
internally  autonomous  systems.  Nevertheless,   mass  production  has  not
disappeared. It has  simply  changed  its  form.  One  reason  for  this  is
globalisation  and  the  opening up  of  new markets  for the  leading world
companies.  Another  reason  is  the  production  of  myriad  new  forms  of
communication  -  mobile  telephones,  telephone exchanges, satellites,  new
audio  and  video technology, cable systems  etc.. This  new technology  has
reached unsuspected  levels with made enormous  profits for their  owners. A
similar boom has been experienced by transport manufacturers and providers -
cars, aeroplanes, ships and helicopters etc.. People  have  begun  to travel
more.  Together  with  the  construction  of  the necessary  infrastructure,
transport  and communications will be the most  dynamic  growth sectors over
the next 10-20 years.
     Who  can  produce  such goods? The small or  the medium companies,  the
"demassed" producer?  On  the contrary. This is only within the power of the
large  companies, capable of allocating large  amounts of money for science,
research  and development and personnel  training. The globalisation of  the
world economy has allowed these companies to maximalise their profits and to
spread  their experience and influence to many countries in the world.  Even
in  the  cases, when a large company subcontracts  to thousands and  tens of
thousands smaller companies, their labour is united in a single end product.
     It is difficult to accept the statement that the  mass production  line
will disappear and that  the world is  entering into  a period of industrial
manufacturing  and  individualised  products.  Indeed,  modern  machinery  -
computers,  cars, planes, trains, ships requires the use of non-standard and
individualised  creativity. However,  they all  use  more  and more standard
products  -  microchips, microcircuits, electronic and  mechanical  elements
whose manufacturing requires unified labour and unified means of production.
The  greatest  developments  in the  last  20 years  have  not lead  to  the
demassification of production  but have autonomised  and  socialised  it. In
other  words, from  an  organisational point  of  view,  these manufacturing
processes have become more autonomous but  in social terms  they have linked
many more  people within new national  and international  communities.  Even
when  they  are juridically independent, small and medium  scale enterprises
have become incorporated into larger  companies  via a  system of industrial
cooperation. While  the  technology of the Third Civilisation  lead  to mass
production  and   large  open  workshops,  new  technology  has  produced  a
completely different  type of mass production. The integrating effect  comes
from  the  use  of  goods or  services,  from  the  repeated  application of
identical manufacturing or financial operations over the entire world.
     Let us  take  for  example  the  fast-food  chain  of  "MacDonalds"  or
"Kentucky Fried Chicken" or the American software company "Microsoft", these
are  symbols  of  success.  The  majority  of their  products  are  produced
individually or by a small groups of highly  qualified specialists. There is
hardly  a more  individualised profession in the world than  the creation of
software programmes. On the other hand, look at  the enormous "mass" effect.
For  the past  ten years the profits of Microsoft have increased annually by
62%.  In the USA alone more  than 50 million  people use Microsoft products.
Today the  company has sales offices in 31 countries around the world and is
essentially a global company.[35]
     New  technology  allows  for  more autonomy for  the individual  worker
requiring more individualism and intellect. At the same time, labour becomes
more  socialised, more integrated  into  a  more  general  and  large  scale
national  and,  frequently,  global society. To this extent,  more  and more
people are  becoming dependent  on the  labour of  the individual person and
company  but  at the same time  the level  of  national  and  social  labour
integration is also developing rapidly.
     Whatever example  we  look  at -  the  manufacture of modern transport,
communications, packaging, commerce,  banking, the effect  is  the same. The
modernisation   of  these   branches   requires   the   parallel  growth  of
individualism  and  socialisation.  My general conclusion is that the modern
technological revolution has demonstrated the  parallel action of both these
processes:  autonomisation  and  integration (socialisation). One  of  these
processes leads to the demassification of certain  types  of  human activity
and  their  individualisation,  while the other links  the manufacturers  of
different  countries  within  new  types  of  relations,  making  them  more
"massive" and more international.
     Demassification  appears through the growth in the  role  of individual
creative activity,  regional and  ethnic economic communities, the growth in
the number of small and medium companies and the application of individually
produced and consumed products and services etc..  Massification takes place
through new communication and transport infrastructures, mass consumption of
standardised products, the interdependence  of common energy and ecosystems,
through the use of common resources,  banks, funds and stock exchanges,  the
mutual interaction of currencies, fashion and culture.
     My message to A.Toffler is not intended to show that modernity does not
provide us with a  limitless number of examples of demassification,  but  to
show that this phenomenon is only a part of  the process. It is not isolated
from the  globalisation  and massification  of world production, or the mass
participation of millions of new producers in mutual economic and ecological
dependence.    Massification   and   demassification,    globalisation   and
localisation,  integration  and  disintegration are paired  concepts.  Their
modern interdependence is one of the most important pre-conditions for us to
recognise the character  of the  emerging new civilisation and its political
and economic structures.

     4. A SIMILAR MESSAGE TO S.HUNTINGTON

     If Toffler believes that  the  new era will lead to the demassification
of production, then another American - Samuel Huntington, has predicted that
the new era  will cause conflicts  between civilisations. Are the pogroms of
Sarajevo or the wars in the
     Caucuses proof of his conclusion?

     T
     he  processes of integration and autonomisation are taking  place on an
international  scale. Moreover,  international and  internal integration are
indivisibly  linked  processes. The  major question is what is the nature of
the world which  we are about  to  enter?  Will it  be dominated  by Western
Cultures, divided into new cultural communities or something else? What will
triumph?  Integration or autonomisation, modernisation  or specific national
values?
     In  response  to  these   problems,  S.Huntington  in  1993,  laid  the
foundations  for  a  new, rather  pretentious  line  of discussion.  In  his
opinion, the  "major foundations  of conflict in the modern world are not in
the  main   ideological  or  economic."  They  are  based  on   culture  and
civilisation. "The clash of civilisations",  in the  opinion of Huntington,"
will   be    the    last    phase    in    the    development    of    world
conflicts"[36]. Although  these ideas are controversial  and many
writers have rejected them, they should not be ignored completely.  In  1995
the East-West Research Group organised a discussion on the theme, "Europe in
the  21st  Century"  at  which  the  former  Prime Minister  of Poland,  Yan
Belietski defended  just such a thesis.  Many politicians, intellectuals and
journalists throughout the world have similar views.
     S.Huntington believes that the conflicts of the future will result from
the  divisions   between   Islam,   Eastern   Orthodoxy,  Western   culture,
Confucianism,  Japanese,  Hindu,  Latin  American  and  a  number  of  other
cultures. In Russia,  Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece there a  number of leaders
who are  determined to  struggle for the  authority of Orthodoxy. Europe  is
divided  between  Catholicism  and Orthodoxy.  The  East-West  border of the
united Europe  separates  Croatia,  Slovenia,  Hungary, the Czech  Republic,
Slovakia,  Poland  and  the three  Baltic states from the Orthodox  nations.
Similar borders divide Islam and Christianity and  Confucianism and Hinduism
etc..
     If we recall the theoretical approach which was mentioned earlier, then
we shall have to reject the view of Huntington and his followers. In general
terms,  modern  academic research  after the  end  of the cold war has  been
dominated  by  two  common approaches,  each  of  which  either  absolutises
integration or autonomy and separatism.
     1. Immediately after  the collapse  of  the  communist  regime, it  was
generally  accepted that  Western culture had triumphed.  Western,  or to be
more  precise, American  culture, in the opinion of the  editor of the  Wall
Street Journal,  R.L.Bartley,  for better  or  worse is spreading  over  the
entire world.[37] The integration of the world, in the opinion of
many  researchers  is  based  on Western culture. They believe that  it will
assume dominance  of the  world  and  provide  as  proof the  popularity  of
football in Japan, Madonna and Michael Jackson in Thailand and the fact that
the  crowned heads of state from the East are  being educated in Harvard and
Berkley.
     2.  The  second  point  of   view  belongs  to   S.Huntington  himself.
Integration  in his opinion  is of  no value  when  faced  with the boom  of
civilisations. The  disappearance of the violence of  the bi-polar model led
to a revival of primal cultural identity.  Cultural differences and cultural
autonomy  instead  of  ideology  became  the  basis  for   conflicts.  Thus,
Huntington provides explanations for the collapse of Yugoslavia and the USSR
and predicts a similar future for the rest of the world.
     By following  the logic  of the entire book and of my basic theoretical
approach, I believe that both these views are extreme and belong to types of
thought  which  were  typical  of  the  period  between the  17th  and  20th
centuries.  In my opinion  neither Western Culture  will be able to dominate
the world categorically, nor will the world become divided  into a number of
indigenous cultural  civilisations.  There is  little  doubt that after  the
collapse of the  Berlin  wall the old  ideologies lost much of their  former
significance. Here Huntington is right, although this will hardly revive the
threat  of  new cold  wars, a  return  to the former  state is  not entirely
impossible and the world agenda will have new geo-political structures.
     Directly  after  the removal of ideological interdependency, and taking
the lid off  long-suppressed accumulated national energy, the explosion  was
inevitable. In  certain cases this was  a  manifestation of crushed national
pride,  in others this  was  a struggle  for cultural survival, while in yet
other cases  this was  simply  the search  for  a  spiritual foundation  for
something to replace  totalitarian  ideology. How,  for  example,  could the
communists  have  remained  influential  after  1989,  except by  exploiting
nationalism  and  the  struggle  against  Western  influence?   Was  it  not
completely natural  for the Tadzhiks, Armenians, Azeris or the  Slovaks  and
Slovenes  to  engage  in  emotional  expressions  of  their  long-suppressed
national identities? To  this extent all the  conflicts along the borders of
the former  Eastern Bloc were reactions against the limitations, insults and
repression  of cultural identity. It  is  also  the same  with the insoluble
problems  of  ethnic and religious  self-identification in Northern Ireland,
Kurdistan  (Turkey and Iraq)  and Quebec as well as many other places in the
world.  Nevertheless,  Huntington is not  correct  in his  view  that modern
ethnic   conflicts  are  the   seeds   of  large-scale   conflicts   between
civilisations. He absolutises  autonomy  and ignores the global processes of
integration. The parallel action of integrational and autonomising processes
mean that such conflicts are rather a feature of immaturity and backwardness
rather than of the future. If we accept the thesis of S.Huntington,  then we
have to accept that during the entire 21st century we will continue to  find
ourselves in a situation of transition between old and new civilisations, in
a state of chaos and disorder. I tend to believe that the enormous bodies of
governments and peoples will choose progress, new technology and open market
societies to  seek  confirmation  of  their cultural identity. On  the other
hand,  what  will  happen   with   the  transnational  corporations,  global
electronic media and world financial markets? The dividing lines between the
civilisations predicted by  Huntington  mean the  collapse,  no  more and no
less,  of the world  economy, the  establishment of  new walls in  place  of
international  highways, barriers to communications, the  flow of transport,
goods and millions of people. This was possible in the 19th and 20th century
but it is absurd for the future.
     I believe that the  conflicts in  Bosnia, Nagorni Karabakh, Georgia and
Tadzhikistan are  temporary and will  fade  with the  integration  of  these
countries  into the  world economy. In a  similar way,  the  pretensions and
extremism  of the catholics and the  French-speaking minority in Quebec will
also fade. Their origins are not in the collapse of the totalitarian regimes
but in the reduction of the role of the nation state  and in  their struggle
for identity. When I  say that cultural contradictions will "fade", I do not
mean that they will disappear. When I reject the "autonomist", Huntington, I
also  reject  the  "Western  integrationalist", R.Bartley.  The  world  will
neither  disintegrate  into  separate civilisations, since this would be  to
deny 6000 years  of integration, nor  will it  be dominated by mass American
culture which  would  be to reject the self-perpetuating nature of  cultural
autonomy.  If  immediately  after the collapse  of the Berlin  wall American
cultural  influence did  indeed grow in leaps  and  bounds, then, I believe,
this  process  will  soon be compensated by the cultural progress of  Japan,
Europe,  Russia  and  other  countries.  American culture  itself  has  been
subjected to the  serious influence of Latin  American,  African, Asian  and
European cultural products  and has become  pluralistic  rather  than purely
American.  The cultural identity  of each  people and  ethnic  group can  be
defended in  two  ways  in  the  modern world: the  first  of these  is  via
isolation from the world -- the second is via the processes of modernisation
and the "forced" promotion of cultural identity. The experience of countries
which  have  isolated themselves from  the world  is lamentable.  In  modern
conditions this is impermissible. The only positive experience which remains
is that of those nations who are the standard bearers of progress.
     I believe that the future will  be  defined by three parallel processes
directly linked to the mutual relationship between integration and autonomy.
     The  first  of  these  is  the  globalisation  of  world   culture  the
constituent elements of which will be  defined not by  a  single or group of
larger nations but by a more universal process.
     The second is self-identification  and  the rebirth of a large  number,
about  50--60,  of local cultures which will become part  of the process  of
global  change. They  will  find  their  niches  and will  complement global
cultural intergration.
     The third process is perhaps most important  --  that of  the  hitherto
unseen intensive  processes  of cultural mixing between revitalised national
cultures and global culture as a whole.
     Some  of these concepts will be examined in  greater detail at a  later
stage  and I  will provide further evidence. What, however,  remains  of the
newly reborn "civilisations" of Huntington? Nothing. They will  be subjected
to  the same structural changes (integrational and  autonomising)  to  which
them  entire modern  civilisation has  been subjected.  Some  of  these will
flourish in  global relations, others will  complement the  existing  global
culture.
     Is it really possible to compare  two Islamic countries such as Morocco
or Iran and would they  possible cooperate in the event of a future cultural
conflict? Hardly. I am  also convinced  that the Eastern  Orthodox countries
will become integrated into  Europe  rather than form their own  independent
cultural  and  political  community.  All  the  civilisations  described  by
Huntington are in actual fact cultural and religious communities involved in
common integrational processes. Integration is no stronger than autonomy but
is  no  weaker  either.  It  is  stronger,  however, than  isolationism  and
confrontational cultures  and religions. Of the  cultural characteristics of
Huntington's civilisations  the  only thing which will  remain will be  that
which can adapt itself to the global processes of integration. It will be an
addition and  continuation of a  new global culture which I predict  will be
the spiritual conduit of the new civilisation.

     5. THE NEED FOR A NEW THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS

     Liberalism  is  based  on   private  property.   Marxism  rejects   its
significance and  absolutises  collectivism and  integration  based on state
coercion.
     The main conclusions of these great teachings have not stood  up to the
test  of time and there is now a need for a new  ideological and theoretical
synthesis.

     M
     arxism-Leninism,   Maoism,  Trotskiyism,   albeit   in  different  ways
emphasised the  abolition of private ownership and coercive nationalism. The
experiment was  unsuccessful and retrospectively is  seen in negative terms.
On  the  other hand,  however, liberalism  supported  private  property  but
underestimated  the  role  of  socialisation  and  integration. Despite  its
attempts  to triumph over the corpse of Marxism, the liberal idea  is unable
to  provide  adequate explinations  for  the  modern  era.  For  almost  two
centuries, humanity  has vacillated between these two  approaches to  social
thought.  Neither  Marxism,  however,   nor   Liberalism  were  sufficiently
convincing.  Marxism-Leninism  aimed  to  give social guarantees to  all but
destroyed and limited in the process all freedom  of private  initiative and
progress.  Liberalism  and  capitalism  were  based  on  the  absolutism  of
"private" ownership which  did not bring harmony or equilibrium  but divided
the world into the eternally poor and the eternally rich.
     No-one today denies  the need for the protection of human rights or the
right of all to  organise private production: Neither the Chinese communists
who have lead  the reform  process in  China  guaranting  long-term economic
growth, nor the  Russian  communists now in senior management  positions  in
private  banks  and  companies.  No-one  would  dispute  the  need  for  the
opening-up   of  societies  and  free  competition  between  companies  from
different countries. Who, on the other hand,  would oppose the  idea  of the
social  state, the struggles of the poor and the deprived for a better  life
or  the   battles  of  the  enviromentalists   to  halt  the  production  of
environmental pollutants?
     When 120 years ago the representatives of the classical bourgeoisie and
Marxist  political economics first crossed  swords, the English  cotton mill
workers  and  Silesian  miners  were  working  16  hours  a day while  their
employers  lived  in  resplendent  luxury.  The  profound social  gaps,  the
inter-imperialist  wars and conflicts not  only divided  people but also the
theoreticians and  politicians who defended their interests.  What  were the
reasons for the divisions between liberal and conservative doctrines and the
social democrat and  communists? Above all  this was the question of private
ownership, the exploitation of hired labour, the  origin of value and market
equilibrium etc.. The gap  between ideological views was widened  further by
the ambitions of leaders and politicians  and reaching its height during the
fifty  years  of the 20th century  when political radicalism  appeared on  a
hitherto unknown  scale.  Communism and fascism  became the extreme forms of
class  opposition  and world  wars -  the bloody  result  of radicalism  and
totalitarianism.
     After the Second World War, perhaps,  frightened  by the extent  of the
destruction, politicians  began to  search for ways to  mitigate  extremism.
Despite  the  cold war,  a process  of  gradual and sometimes  contradictory
rapprochement  began  to  take  place. Khrushchev  accepted the principle of
peaceful  co-existence  and  began  to  speak  of  the  replacement  of  the
dictatorship of the proletariate with the national-democratic state. In 1948
Tito and  in 1968  Kadar in  Hungary breathed life  into  the  processes  of
"socialist"  private property while retaining  the single-party system.  All
the Eastern European  countries  began to search  for  the possibilities  of
change.  In  the West, first of all L.Erchard and  then a  number  of  other
leaders accepted the idea of the  social state  and  guaranteed  significant
benefits for their workers and  employers.  The anti-monopoly legislation in
the USA and Western Europe allowed millions of small and medium producers to
prosper. One of  the  most effective areas of new legislation was that which
allowed for the participation of workers in  the management and ownership of
the  factories in  which  they worked.  The West began to speak of "peoples'
capitalism" and the East  spoke of "socialist self-management": ideas  which
were much more close to each other than the class and political  foundations
from which they  originated. This gradual  rapprochement  came not only from
the insight of a  number of politicians  and  researchers but above all  the
changes in the technological base of production and the mutual  influence of
the two blocs. Of course, as I mentioned a little  earlier the adaptation to
the new  realities  was much stronger and effective in the West than in  the
East where  it was  more cosmetic and superficial. The slow rapprochement of
ideological concepts was also  an expression  of the common crisis engulfing
the world and which was a crisis of the values and ideas which had dominated
over the past two centuries.
     If one looks at  the evolution  of  the parties  within  the  Socialist
International, one loses  all  concept of the traditional  left. The Italian
party of the Democratic Left (the former Communist Party of Italy)  declared
itself  in 1995 in favour of  a  movement towards liberalism.  The  Japanese
Socialist  Party  made  a  similar   declaration.  The  Spanish  and  French
Socialists underwent  a  similar  ideological evolution as  did  the British
Labour Party. Similarly  the wave of new programmes and declarations made by
the conservative and liberal politicians calling for more social  guarantees
and assistance for the  poor is also  deceptive. It is no secret that during
the last 20 or  30 years both the  left and the right have begun to resemble
one another.  In 1995 Jacques Chirac lead  his  presidential  campaign  with
promises  of social  involvement  while at the same time  the leader  of the
British  Labour Party,  Tony Blair, called  for a rejection of the  ideas of
nationalisation. After a painful  rapprochement of the basic ideas over  the
past 30 years and "great compromises", there is a clear need today for a new
theoretical synthesis.
     With  the large-scale economic and geopolitical changes of recent years
the  world  has entered  a new era  which  offers  not  only new ideological
concepts but a new synthesis of academic thought. When I speak of synthesis,
I mean the mechanical fusion of existing doctrines which has been already in
progress over the past 2 or 3 decades, leading to a new basis from which new
doctrines on the social and political development of the world will be born.
     The  synthesis which  will produce new political ideas does not require
the rejection or the  justification of either the  qualities  of  liberal or
socialist ideas.  Human rights, private property, the civic  society, market
economics -  these  are  the  undisputed achievements of  liberalism. Social
harmony  and  justice,  solidarity,  the   dialectics  of  development,  the
aspirations for social balance on the other hand are rooted in the different
variations of Marxism. These are all forms of our modern existence which are
of major significance for  the  future  of mankind. This should also include
the more specific issues of social benefits, for example.
     Such  an ideological synthesis, however,  should  in  no  way  mean the
unification of socialist and liberal ideas. In my opinion it is incorrect to
speak of  social-liberal theory, or of some  mechanical unification of parts
of Marxism  and other parts of liberalism.  The synthesis I am  speaking  of
does not come from  the unification of political and academic views but from
the objective processes which affect humanity as a whole. They relate to new
realities  which  are  formed  on  the  basis of  new social  phenomena  and
processes.
     Above all, this raises to the question of the character of  the present
transition, the  crisis  of the Third  Civilisation and its historical fate.
There is no doubt that modern mankind  is faced with an entirely new  set of
problems essentially different  from those of  the doctrines of the 19th and
20th centuries. The entire basis upon which  we have to formulate our views,
notions  and ideas  has  changed.  The  new  world  economic  order,  global
ecological problems, the intermingling of cultures, changes in the role  and
the  position  of the nation  state, new  social  and  professional  groups,
require another type of thinking and other types of ideological  connections
and systems. In  what way will the globalisation of the  world take  place -
via new forms of imperialism or via a new  world order? What will this order
be?  Neither liberalism  nor  Marxism, nor  any other theory  can provide an
exhaustive answer  to  these questions. Firstly, because these theories were
constructed on the social problems of the 19th century and secondly, because
all  theories which have attempted to explain  the world over  the  past 300
years began their life based on the culture of individual  nation states and
individual classes.
     The new theoretical synthesis of which I am speaking will have a global
character. It will have be  based not only on those liberal and social ideas
of the 19th and 20th centuries which have stood the test of time but also on
those which have come from other  ideological influences. It  is  no  longer
possible to ignore the achievements of Japan, South Korea or Thailand in the
organisation of labour.  We cannot ignore the historical legacy and economic
and philosophical achievements  of these countries  as  well as  a number of
countries in Asia and Latin America.
     Thus, this new  theoretical synthesis cannot be  purely  social-liberal
nor  purely Marxist or  Euro-Atlantic. It will be global,  multicultural and
will appear  gradually in the coming decades. Today, a number of avant-garde
researchers  are looking  for projections  of  this synthesis.  Some of them
involuntarily fall under  its  influence while  others have simply  realised
that  all  the  traditional  notions of man and  society are  inadequate and
outdated. Any  interpretation of contemporary life requires new methodology,
concepts and categories.
     The  new theoretical  synthesis is far from  being a  formulation  of a
unified global theory for  the future of the  world and  much  less is it  a
single doctrine of a social model which will lead to  the "glowing future of
communism"  or the even more "glowing future of the capitalist future". This
is to look back to the situation of the 17th-19th century when the advent of
the modern age and the renaissance of  the  human  spirit raised about 25-30
cardinal questions and stimulated the development of social theory.
     At  that  time  a  number of generalisations  were made, firstly  at  a
philosophical level and then on an economic and political level which led to
a principle change in the evaluation of history and world development. After
Kant,  Hegel,  Hobbs  and Smith  came  Marx,  Sei, Mill,  Bernstein,  Lenin,
Trotskiy, Von Mizes,  Stalin  and many others. Despite  their  arguments and
mutual  refutation  they  were  all  theories from  the  era  of  the  Third
Civilisation.  They  followed   the   laws  of  the  emerging  processes  of
industrialisation  and the domination of  the  world  by a  small  number of
states.  The  theoretical  synthesis  of  this period  was  limited to  "the
domestic  problems  of individual  countries  and  regions" which  were then
related to the  common  geo-political regions. The problems  of  freedom and
private property, exploitation and the rights of the proletariate, value and
market  price were  resolved in  the  context of groups,  national  or class
interests. Today such an approach would resolve nothing. For the first  time
it  is clear that without  a global view, without  a  global  approach,  the
questions of the modern era will remain unanswered.
     The next few years will see the gradual formation of a  new theoretical
foundation  as  a  result  of  the  world  entering  a  new  period  of  its
development. This synthesis  is closely linked with the new  problems  which
the  world is facing today and attempts to find  new solutions for  existing
and emerging problems. When I mention  the global approach, I mean  problems
such as global warming and the condition of the oceans and the  seas etc.. I
also mean the way in which  global life is organised, the general principles
of its  formation  at a  moment when  no  single  country  or people  can be
isolated from on another.
     The  new  theoretical synthesis  will  pose the  question of  the world
economic  order  in  a new way and will  re-examine the concept of  "private
ownership"  and its place in  the system of  human  relations. It  will also
raise the question of an  entirely  new notion of the  limits of  the nation
state and its relationship with  local and global  power  structures and new
approaches to the problem of  the rights  of man  and the  protection of his
privacy. In  other words, the new  theoretical synthesis will at one and the
same  time  raise new problems  and new views.  This will not  mean severing
links with the past, nor separation from the theoretical  legacy of the 19th
and 20th centuries. However, this will mean the renewal and restructuring of
systems of academic  categories  and the laws  which provide explanations to
the further processes of human development.
     A number of  new theories will appear out  of these new theories. There
will  be those who  will  want  to protect  different national, regional and
cultural interests. There will no doubt be those who will want to defend the
interests of  the new world elites  and those parts of  the world population
which  are in crisis. It would be wonderful if the new theoretical synthesis
could  lead  to the establishment of general principles of human development
while at the same time avoiding mass ideologisation.
     At the  end of the  18th century the French bourgeois revolution thrust
Europe  along the path of liberalism. At the end of  the 19th  century  free
competition  was replaced by militant imperialism and  opposed by socialism.
At the end of the 20th century we are witnessing the end of an entirely  new
era and the aspirations of humanity to take a decisive step in the direction
of something  new  and better.  We  are living  in  a time  of new movements
towards  a  renewal which requires new theories. New ideas are born at times
of crisis and change  such as  the industrial  revolution in England at  the
beginning of  the  19th century, or  immediately after the First World  War.
Each social and world crisis stimulates the birth of new ideas.
     During the plague in the Middle Ages there was an increased interest in
music. Perhaps this was an attempt to prove the triumph of life over  death.
Today at a time of cataclysm and economic chaos, of cruel pragmatism and the
murderous processes  of  consumerism,  new ideas might be  the equivalent of
spiritual rebirth. These ideas will not appear out of the blue and  from one
single source. It is important, however, that they are able to interpret the
new realities, to predict the risks and the dangers with  which we are faced
and to continue the traditions of renewal of the human spirit.
     Let us then look at the dimensions of the new theoretical synthesis and
apply it in an examination of the most important contemporary phenomena.

     Chapter Five
     THE FOURTH CIVILISATION
     1. WHY A NEW CIVILISATION?

     "If  we begin now, we  and our children  will be able to participate in
the exciting reconstruction not  only  of out-dated politicalstructures  but
also of civilisation itself."
     Alvin Toffler

     T
     here is no doubt that  the changes in Eastern Europe and the subsequent
geopolitical  crisis are the  greatest  historical events at the  end of the
20th  century.  Some  academics  have  even  compared  these  events  with a
re-examination of the results of the Second World War. Indeed the end of the
cold war overturned the results of  Yalta and Potsdam. Even  so, I feel that
such an evaluation is insufficient.  I believe that the collapse  of Eastern
European state socialism was an  essential sign of  the beginning of the end
of one era  and the beginning of another in the development of civilisation.
Of course, these two eras cannot be defined on  the basis of one  particular
event.  These two  eras  are  not divided  by revolutions  but  a  series of
qualitative changes.
     Am I exaggerating? Have I succumbed  to the influence of  A.Toffler and
his  technological waves or  J.Lukac who maintains that after five centuries
of democratic aspirations we  are  experiencing the end of the modern age? I
want to be careful not to allow my  imagination  to run wild  with facts and
events. I  have examined them  and re-examined time  after  time  and  I  am
convinced  that  the  changes  which  we have witnessed  are not  local  but
historical. This is not  only  the  end  of  the cold  war  and  not only  a
technological revolution, it is something more.
     Could  we  have  avoided  these changes? If Gorbachev had not begun the
reform  processes of perestroika,  the changes in the  USSR might  have been
delayed a little longer. If Gorbachev had used a different tactic, the world
might have followed the path of reasonable convergence rather then chaos and
local  wars.  Nevertheless  the  replacement  of  the  two-bloc  system  was
inevitable and sooner  or later it would have  happened.  The changes at the
end of  this century are not only  industrial, political or spiritual  but a
combination of  factors affecting  not only one or another  state. They  are
universal.
     Let  us look are technology. A.Toffler, albeit  extreme  in a number of
cases,  is correct here. He was the first to describe  the comprehensive and
epoch-making consequences of the emergence of new electronic  communications
and bio-technology. In the same way as the industrial revolution  in England
in the 17th and 18th centuries led to a chain reaction throughout the entire
world,  today  this  is  being done  by  the  microchip  and  the robot, the
satellite  dish and  cable television.  As  a consequence  of  computers and
avant-garde  communications  technology not only  have  production processes
changed  radically, but  also  the nature of labour  itself.  Knowledge  and
information are undoubtedly substituting physical labour and revolutionising
all social relations.
     The processes of technological renewal have lead to profound changes in
the social and class structure of society. It has reduced and  is continuing
to reduce the number  of  traditional  workers throughout the world. We have
become witnesses  to a  combination of changes in the  social  structure not
only of Europe and America but also such countries as South Korea, Thailand,
Brazil,  Australia  and New  Zealand.  The changes in the  social and  class
structure have  been  caused by evolutions in  the type  of  ownership. This
series of related  processes:  new  technologies, property, social and class
structures has revolutionised  all  social relations  and  has prepared  the
transition from the Third Civilisation to the New Era.
     The  geo-political renewal  is profound and universal. In the  space of
just  a few  years one of the  two world systems has  ceased  to exist.  The
flagship of this system, the USSR has broken up, followed by the collapse of
Yugoslavia  and  Czechoslovakia.  A  series  of  local  wars   erupted.  The
unification of Germany put  an end to the sad years of  post-war reality and
turned it into the largest European economy. Both Germany and Japan now find
themselves in new situations  with much greater opportunities  than  before.
All the most  significant  political  and  economic  alliances of the world,
including the  USA, Canada,  the  EU,  China  and India are  faced  with new
realities.
     Perhaps some people regard these changes as a temporary phenomenon with
perhaps a dulation of perhaps 2 or 3 years and that the processes ended with
the  collapse of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact. These  are mere illusions.  In
1989-1991, we experienced only the beginning of the reform processes arising
from  the  common  crisis  of the two-bloc system. After the first phase  of
rapid  reform, 1989-1991 the  world will experience  to a  greater or lesser
extent a period of global disorder, tormented  "equilibrium" and  only after
this -  the  complex  process of the formation of a  new  world order  as an
alternative to the two-bloc  model. At the end of  the 20th century humanity
has not only destroyed the iron  curtain  but has also built new  bridges in
order to live on the basis  of  new principles and  standards. At  the  same
time, humanity  has rejected Utopias and the theoretical dogma upon which it
has been developing for more than a century.
     After the  collapse of the  Berlin wall,  politicians, philosophers and
economists  found  themselves  in  a  theoretical  vacuum.  Concepts  became
confused, traditional  doctrines  were beginning to lose their  grasp of the
new  realities.  In some cases extreme pragmatism  limited the possibilities
for development  allowing only momentary personal benefits  and  egoism.  In
other cases all manner of religious and semi-religious sects tried to fulfil
the  vacuum. We have clearly  consigned to the past not only the era  of the
traditional industrial  technologies  and  related  lifestyles but also  the
two-bloc world  dominated  by  state  socialism and  traditional capitalism.
After  technology,   social  class  and  geopolitical  factors,  the  modern
spiritual  and ideological crisis is the third  main reason  for us to claim
that at the end of the 20th century an entire civilisation is disappearing.
     Perhaps  the  most significant new reality is the globalisation  of the
world and the birth of an entire series of new world phenomena: from changes
in the role  of the national  state to  the internationalisation of culture,
sport and daily life. The entire Third Civilisation after the 16th  and 17th
centuries has been a  time of war and violence. The period of  international
integration  and later globalisation in the 19th  and  20th  centuries  took
place  as  a  result of the violent imposition  of  particular cultures  and
authority over others. For  a century and  a  half the  struggle between the
classes has been the uppermost. Today,  however, this is at an end.  Because
of the nature of arms and the senselessness  of  wars,  violence is becoming
ineffective. At the same time the imposition  of specific cultures, nations,
races  and  power  over others  will  give  way  to entirely  new  types  of
relations.
     Many people find it hard  to believe that the changes will be on such a
large  scale  and universal.  Toffler calls  this  fear  "the  shock of  the
future"[38] Such people should take a look at the consequences of
new technologies  in  factories, around them, in their homes and the  way in
which their  lives have changed as well as the information  which  surrounds
them. These epoch-making  changes which have taken place in the  short space
of  a few  years are affecting, above  all, the countries who are  the  main
proponents of progress, but with the globalisation of markets they will soon
spread throughout the entire world. Thus:
     -  The end of the era of nation states and the appearance of the global
world;
     - The end of the two-bloc system and the end  of centuries of violence,
international and inter-imperialist conflicts;
     -  The  end of the domination  of the major ideological  and  political
doctrines which characterised the political and social  life of the 19th and
20th centuries;
     - The end of the traditional industrial manufacturing processes and the
advent of new technology;
     - The end of the class divisions  of labour typical of the past 200-300
years;
     - The end of traditional private property and its socialisation;
     - The end of the  domination of certain  cultures and the appearance of
global culture and multicultural formations
     All this does indeed  mark  the end of one and the beginning of another
civilisation within human  development.  These processes affect the whole of
human development as a consequence of the hitherto  unseen  levels of mutual
interdependence  of countries  and peoples  and  the  overall  processes  of
forthcoming change.
     But why a New Civilisation?
     Why  after the era  of  huge  slave-owning states,  medieval  wars  and
migration,  after the crisis  and collapse  of the  modern age is the  world
entering a period of change in  technology and  manufacturing, economic  and
political  order,  culture and  education.  The  main  feature of  the Third
Civilisation  - national  self-awareness and the appearance of nation states
is  changing. After  the  three major periods in human development, a fourth
period is  now beginning whose characteristics are still  to be revealed and
examined.

     2. SOME THOUGHTS ON THE TRANSITIONS OF CIVILISATIONS

     From an historical point of  view  civilisations cannot be separated by
revolutionary dates and events. They  tend to merge with  one  another as an
embodiment of the character
     of human progress. The process is smooth rather than rapid,
     humanist and natural rather than subjective and coercive.

     T
     o a large extent the existing processes of  human development have been
interpreted as  the transition from one  system to another, from one  social
structure to  another.  History  has been  "divided" into various  types  of
social  and political structures, models and formations. William  Rostow  in
his  search  for an  alternative  defined  the various  stages  of  economic
development. Alvin Toffler  in a more moderate form expressed the changes in
world development on the  basis of three large scale technological waves and
the relevant social relations.
     Up to now the dominant aspect of world social and political thought has
been the division of societies into separate models and systems. Capitalist,
communist,  fascist, socialist and  other  models have been the vehicles for
the expression of the passions of  nations,  parties  and politicians for  a
particular type of social development. To a  large extent this tradition was
conditioned by the imbalanced nature of world development  and the fact that
the great  thinkers  of  the  18th century to the present have  based  their
conclusions only on European culture.
     For a long time, world development was interpreted only on the basis of
the  traditions  of one small part  of the globe. European civilisation paid
little  attention to the achievements of the Asian peoples  and in the  rare
cases  when   their  achievements  were  recognised  their  assesments  were
permeated  with  European  provincialism.  The  accepted  feeling  was  that
civilisation  included  only  Europe  and the European way of life. Over the
last  two centuries  more attention has been  paid to the  Asian methods  of
manufacturing but European writers still viewed them as inferior to European
methods. I am not extolling the virtues  of the Chinese or the Japanese, nor
am I  exaggerating the  achievements  of  the Indians, Persians or  American
Indians.  I  just consider  that  globalisation requires  us  to  change our
approach  to  research  and  to look  at  the  world  through  the prism  of
universality and the mutual dependence of the various world cultures.
     In  modern  times  the  tradition  of  dividing  society  into separate
formations and models  is becoming  less  and less  adequate.  It  restricts
thinking  and ideologises life. It presupposes the  coercive implantation of
ideologies and  idols.  Such violent forms were used to impose  catholicism,
Islam, capitalism  and state socialism. One king, one idea,  one leader, one
formation, one  belief  - this is the beginning  of  coercion and  spiritual
debilitation. The  unconditional belief  in  ideological systems  has always
evolved into a type of slavery and overt or covert violence.
     When in accordance  with Marxist doctrine many nations were called upon
to  build  communism, this  in practice meant the coercion  of  millions  of
people and  subsequent  generations  to follow one idea. As the rejection of
the injustices of  capitalism, these ideas inspired many people. Later, when
these ideas  became state  policy  and a  compulsory  credo, they  gradually
became transformed into  a yoke placed upon free  thought and the freedom of
the individual. The Bulgarian people have a marvellous saying, "Who does not
work, shall  not eat!"  I shall  never  forget at the  end of  the  1970's a
Bulgarian communist leader paraphrasing this saying,  "Who does not believe,
shall  not eat!" Belief and convictions had  been converted into a  monopoly
and condition for existence.
     Those who advocate the system of capitalism and who consider  the  fall
of  the  Eastern European  regimes  to  be a  conclusive triumph  for  world
capitalism are in a similar situation. They are also slaves to tradition, to
redundant  systems  and  the  belief  that  Eastern  Europe has  undergone a
revolution from socialism to capitalism. This is just not the case. What has
happened is something completely  different: the releasing of the  forces of
the new civilisation, the new world order and new relations between nations.
     During periods of transition in world development only the civilisation
approach can save us from new illusions, the inventions of artificial social
models and their forced imposition. In  practice  this  means a gradual  and
evolutionary approach to reform and  the slow coalescence of the future with
the present.  No-one can deny the role of revolutions in history but  at the
same time one must take into account the sad  experience of the violence and
destruction which they bring with  them. The more radical the revolution the
greater the  probability that it  will lead to  "restorationism" or that  it
will consume itself. The extremes and the  violence of  the French Jacobites
allowed Napoleon  to become  Emperor, dictator and  aggressor. The extremes,
violence and Civil War in  Russia  after the  October Revolution transformed
Stalin into the most loved leader and teacher of the world proletariate.
     For  a number  of reasons revolutions have  become  anachronistic:  the
rising level of integration of peoples and societies at the  end of the 20th
century, the  colossal  opportunities  for  the ideological  enslavement  of
people via  the  media  and  for reasons of complex technological and market
relations.  Rapid change, revolutionary  leaps  and  sudden  U-turns in  the
modern  world are inevitably destructive in nature. This has  happened in  a
number of Eastern European countries which have thrown  themselves headfirst
into attempts to restore capitalism and  the  total rejection of their past.
All they succeeded in doing was to destroy half of their economies.
     Today we are witnessing huge levels of dynamic social change which have
been hitherto unknown. Given the dynamic nature of these  changes,  each new
forced imposition of the civilisation approach to change leads to a usurping
and constriction of ideas, renders social  relations inadequate and deprives
emerging new generations of  freedom of choice. Hitler's unified world Reich
and the  single  world  factory for workers  and peasants promised by Stalin
lead  to the  loss of enormous human potential and tens of millions of human
lives.  Today  we  are  constantly  barraged  with ideas  about eternal  and
unchanging  models  with  standard  views  of  the  "glorious   future",  of
capitalist and socialist ideals as the only salvation for the world.
     These  ideas  seek  to provide  coming  generations with  outlines  and
definitions of what  they will  have to do, what their truth will have to be
and  what their  faith  will  have  to  be.  Such  advocacy  of a  model  of
development denies the right of the  free  creativity of coming generations.
This is not only undemocratic but dangerous. It means that the new stages of
human progress  will have been  set out  beforehand  and  that our sons  and
daughters will have  to follow us and mindlessly carry out the will of their
forebears. I entirely support the  proposal of  the  World Federation of the
Future Studies (I believe it was proposed by B. de Juvenal) to talk  not  of
the "future" but of "futures". No-one has the right to impose a single model
for  tomorrow or  to delineate  a  categorical  one-dimensional future. Each
subsequent  generation  shall  be  entitled to its  own present and  future,
changes  and  solutions  and  how  to  overcome  the  problems  of  its  own
time.[39]
     The downfall of standard theoretical models  and  social formations  is
also  inevitable.  The  new  era  will  not  consist  of  attempts  to  find
substitutes for  socialism, capitalism and  liberalism  but to find humanist
principles  upon which  the  existing models, ideas  and  cultures  can give
meaning to new life styles.  If we accept  the opposite idea  and follow the
line  of  division of the world into  social and political formations, if we
define some of them as  leaders and the  others as insignificant,  this will
lead inevitably to the restoration of confrontation and will open the way to
denial  and  the  transformation  of  differences  not  into   stimuli   for
development  but into destructive forces.  The advocacy  of the division and
models  of  the 19th  and 20th  centuries or the division of the  world into
capitalism and socialism, liberalism or social democracy will turn the clock
back and reject the opportunity for the creation of a better world.
     Does this mean that development needs to  its own devices  like a  free
flowing  river  or a chaotic melee of currents? Such an extreme thesis is as
dangerous and inadequate for the new era as the theory of previously defined
social and  economic formations. If the division of the  world into  systems
and models gives rise to confrontation and kills freedom and continuity then
the lack of  ideology  and  the absence of  rules  will  cause chaos and the
widening of  the gap between the  rich and the poor. In  both  cases we will
remain  within  the embrace  of the  Third Civilisation  instead of creating
solutions  for  tomorrow.  Evidently,  humanity  cannot  accept  either  the
coercive,  cabinet  models  of  society or chaos  and  chaotic  development.
History  has  frequently shown  that periods of great chaos sooner or  later
give rise to dictatorships and vice versa.
     The 20th century was a century of systems, of the gaps between them, of
confrontation  and a  century of war and violence. It  is time that all this
was  replaced with principles and laws which would  embrace the universality
of the  world and guarantee  the processes of globalisation  and reject  the
interdependence of imperialism. We could overcome the  contradiction between
the globalisation of the world and the evident  need to  preserve the wealth
of national and local cultures by combining the differences and transforming
them  into  a  mutually  complementary  system  rather  than repressing  and
destroying them. This would  be the main distinguishing feature  between the
outgoing civilisation and the emergent Fourth Civilisation.
     Modern humanity does not need to invent artificial models and to impose
them on individual countries, but it does clearly  have to sustain universal
principles,  standards  and  laws  which   are  adequate  to  the  level  of
globalisation.  This  requires the  provision of conditions within which the
different cultures can combine and  mutually complement each other  in order
to achieve the reconciliation of cultural and civilisational contradictions.
My conclusion  entails  the rejection of the divisions of  world development
into models, formations and social strata  etc.. The  more correct principle
is  to  replace such opposition with the acceptance of the common principles
of  human  life  and with the relevant legislation to  define  the standards
required for all countries and peoples.
     International  law already contains a  whole series  of such principles
and legislation and it is gradually  becoming an ineluctable part of  global
awareness. Human rights are one example. This includes the rights of private
initiative, personal  choice  in life, labour  and  a  dignified  existence.
Another group of  principles are connected with the  free exchange of goods,
people, services and information and with  the opening-up of  countries  and
peoples to  each  other.  Another entire group of principles has arisen from
the common recognition of borders and  their inviolability, the  unification
of  border  and  customs regimes  and  the  joint  efforts  in  dealing with
international crime.  In practice this means the rapprochement  of  national
legislations,  the  mutual  recognition  of  the  rights  of   citizens  and
organisations.  I  am  not  convinced  that  the concept of  "democracy"  is
sufficient  to explain what needs to  be done.  Parliamentary  democracy and
pluralism have existed for  a number  of years and they have been unable  to
stop the  processes of  violence, poverty, wars,  over-armament and all  the
other chronic  problems  of  the Third  Civilisation.  Democracy clearly  is
merely a starting point from which development needs to be continued.
     I am  convinced that the new civilisation will be integrated slowly and
gradually into the heart of the old  one.  This will take place first of all
in the  most developed countries  and subsequently in those  countries which
until recently resembled the Third World.  This will be not be a  socialist,
capitalist,  liberal or  conservative model but this  will be  a process  of
development  from  differinent  starting  points  to  common principles  and
trends,  a  development which resolves certain  difference  in order to give
rise to  others.  To  this  end the Fourth  Civilisation may base itself  on
universal  principles  and  legislation  and  the combination  of  different
cultures and traditions.
     It is unlikely that these principles  will develop all  of  a sudden or
that they will be accepted by all. Together with human rights and  the  laws
of world economic and cultural relations  there is a need for  many more new
solutions.  The  arsenal  of  conventional methods  available  to the  Third
Civilisation is inadequate  to  give a chance to the  poor  and  we will  be
unable to resolve the contradictions between the rich. Moreover, we  will be
unable  to  create  new,  just  principles  of  international  economic  and
political  competition.  The  chaos  and the  conflicts  will  continue  and
together with this,  the danger of the restoration of confrontation and  the
bloc  model,  and  consequently  the  artificial  continuation  of the Third
Civilisation.
     There  is  no  doubt that mankind is  aware of the  end  of  the  Third
Civilisation and  can  feel the buds of the  new era. The sounds of  the new
millennium  are  coming  from the  signals  of space  ships,  the  countless
satellite  dishes,  from  the  electronic pulses of hundreds  of millions of
computers and the global awareness which is opening up a path into the minds
of the people of the world every minute of every day.

     3. THE DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF THE FOURTH CIVILISATION

     The most significant distinguishing feature of  the Fourth Civilisation
is linked to the processes of  globalisation. For several millennia, tribes,
ethnic groups, cultures and nations have reflected the specific features  of
their natural environment. The  Fourth Civilisation not only combines  these
features but also unifies the diversity in order to recreate it...

     E
     ach era  in human  development has  its own  features. The civilisation
approach allows for the characteristic features of the new not to be severed
abruptly from the past but to be appreciated as constant and gradual factors
of influence.  Just as  during  periods of transition in  the  past  the new
appears within the old era and spreads gradually to become  the  predominant
essence of the new civilisation.
     When we  speak  of  the  characteristics of the Fourth  Civilisation it
should  be born  in  mind  also that  they are  not  only political, or only
technological or only cultural. Changes in  technology, culture and politics
exert  mutual  influences  and  the influence of new civilisation frequently
appears on the borders which separates them. Such is the case now at the end
of the 20th century when an  enormous intermingling of cultures,  economics,
traditions, habits and customs is  taking  place. This is the most important
characteristic of the Fourth Civilisation.
     A.Toynbee is an opponent of the unity of civilisations. In his analysis
of the life of  the Assyrians and the  Egyptians, he is undoubtedly correct.
However, this  cannot be said  about the end  of the  20th century when  the
mutual  interdependence of  nations has reached  a hitherto  unknown  level.
During the  first three civilisations we observed the slow  consolidation of
autonomous cultural civilisations. The three great eras in  human  existence
showed a growth in homogeneity and almost universal coordination. During the
first cultural civilisations (from the 5th millennium BC to  the 4th and 5th
AD),  the   first  great  migration  of  nations  (4th-9th  centuries),  the
appearance and  domination of nations  and nation  states (15-10th centuries
A.D.) humanity has been ruled by  one constant logical requirement - to live
in the conditions of growing economic, cultural and political dependence.

















     Table 2
     The Distinguishing Features of the Fourth Civilisation


     First Civilization
     (5000 BC-4[th]/5[th] AD)
     Second Civilisation
     (300-1400 AD)
     Third Civilisation
     (1400-1900 AD)
     Fourth Civilization (2000...)

     Technology
     Agricultural instruments and irrigation.
     Crafts and Agriculture
     Industrial technology
     Information technology and communication

     Manufacturing Structures
     Slave ownership
     Colonies Feudal structures Manufactories
     Factories and Concerns
     Internally autonomated technologies and communications

     Major forms of ownership
     Slave ownership
     Feudal
     Private, Private monopolies
     Socialised multi-sector

     State forms of government
     Empires
     Migration, collapse of empires, city states
     Nation states
     Global world, local regional societies

     Geo-political structure
     Autonomous forms
     -
     Colonial system
     bi-polar world
     Polycentrism, global regulation

     Culture
     Autonomous civilisations
     Cultural mixing via violence
     National cultures
     Multicultural society and global culture.


     Table 2 shows that the common content  is the  result of new technology
but  that  it  also  affects  the  manufacturing structures,  the  forms  of
ownership, political systems, culture and spiritual life. This also leads to
profound  changes   in   the  methods  and   forms  of   human  interaction:
manufacturing forms, the means of exchange of the product of  labour and the
definition  of   human  consumption.  A  typical   feature  of  the   Fourth
Civilisation will  be the  trans-national corporations but not those of  the
20th  century.  They  will  have  a  strongly  decentralised  and  localised
structure.  There may  also  be  a  boom  of  small and medium  scale  local
business. Another feature of the new era will be the  parallel globalisation
of one part of manufacturing processes  and localisation of other processes.
The entire analysis of the collapse of the old civilisation shows that  this
process will  be combined  with  the  further development  of  international
cooperation of labour of the transnational  and multi-national corporations.
Moreover,  there  is  an emerging tendency for  technological monopolies  to
disappear  and  the decision  making processes and  profit  allocation to be
decentralised. If this trend develops, the interdependence of the world will
not  lead  to  a growth in  international  economic  monopolism  but  to the
combination  of  globalisation  and  the   development  of  local   economic
structures.
     I  believe  that  the  main  feature which  has  undermined  the  Third
Civilisation  and   which  will  embody  the  Fourth  is   the   growth   in
communication. While  the First  Civilisation was characterised by primitive
agricultural  technology, the Second  Civilisation  introduced  a  number of
crafts   and  the   Third  introduced  industrial   technologies,  the  main
determining feature of the new civilisation is  the  appearance of new forms
of  communication and modern information and computer technology which  have
revolutionised  life.  It   is  modern  communications  which  have  led  to
globalisation  and  the  gradual  disappearance  of  the  geo-political  and
economic structures which were typical of the outgoing civilisation.
     The Second half of the 20th century was a time of  colossal development
in international  transport,  radio and telephone. During the last couple of
decades  the most  powerful  new  technologies  of  the new  civilisation  -
television and  satellite communications, have  begun to dominate the entire
world. Today there are over 1 billion televisions and 2.5 billions radios in
the  world which are constantly  bombarding  us with information.  Satellite
links have connected almost all the countries and peoples of the  world in a
single flow of information. This phenomenon has also played an enormous role
in  the  areas of  manufacturing and culture as  well  as in the  social and
political life of almost every country in the world. There is practically no
area of life in  which  global  communications have not  exerted a  renewing
influence. The environment in which the people of  the  Fourth  civilisation
shall live is thousands  of times more satiated with information than at any
time before and will lead to a qualitative change in the entire life of man,
his opportunities for work and participation  within the cultural process of
life.
     There   is  little   doubt   that  the   Fourth  Civilisation  will  be
distinguished by  a series  of  profound  changes  in the form  of  property
ownership.  The  typical  type  of  ownership in the First Civilisation  was
slavery.  The Second  Civilisation was  dominated  by  Feudal  Relations and
peasant  farmers tied  to the land. The Third Civilisation opened the way to
private ownership and  monopolism  and the exploitation of hired labour. The
key element of the new civilisation will be cooperative socialised ownership
and the integration of hundreds of millions and billions of people in common
forms of ownership and the simultaneous reduction in economic monopolism.
     The  key distinguishing  feature  of  the Fourth  Civilisation  is  the
emerging new world political order. During the First Civilisation  the  most
advanced ethnic  groups and nations formed or established their own empires.
To this extent the First Civilisation was a time of great empires, permanent
wars and colonisation. Babylon and Greece,  India  and  China, Macedonia and
Rome were  typical examples of this. The collapse of empires was a result of
the crisis of the slave  owning era. The entire Second Civilisation was  the
time of the great  migration  of peoples, the destruction of certain  states
and the appearance of  new. During the period of the Third Civilisation, the
migration slowed down and stopped and the world population became stabilised
within the borders of nation  states. It was  at this historical moment that
the  spiral  of  history  once  again  began to  revolve  demonstrating that
rejection gives rise to further rejection and that epochs tend  to reproduce
many of their qualities time after time at higher levels.
     The end  of  the  Third  Civilisation is  connected  with  a much large
migration of people than has hitherto been seen.  This is  the result of the
new forms of communication,  transport, the opening up  of countries and the
needs  of world business. This trend has led to  a reduction  in the role of
the nation states and has made their borders more formal. After a process in
which  the nation states united  the  whole  of  the world population within
their borders  and  after the  stronger  nation  states established a  world
colonial  system  based  on  expansionism,  the   opposite  process  is  now
beginning. This process will  lead to  the gradual optimisation of the super
powers and the creation of more and more states which will  play the role of
regional  centres.  I  believe that political polycentrism will  replace the
bi-polar world and will give rise to the need for global and mutually agreed
political and economic regulation.
     Finally, I believe that there is another essential feature of  the  new
civilisation  which  deserves attention: the  intensive cultural  mixing and
formation of  a  global  culture for the  first time  in the history of  the
world. Together with this unique product of globalisation we will be obliged
to accept the principle of multi-cultural  societies. This will  lead to end
to  violence and the  imposition of certain cultures  over  others  and  the
creation  of conditions for the mutual interaction of different cultures and
traditions. For the  first time,  today, but even more so  in the future, we
shall be witnesses to the appearance of cultural  and  economic values which
will not belong  to any one  country. These  will be phenomena which both in
terms of their origin and consequences will have a global character.

     4. INEVITABILITY AND WHEN IT WILL HAPPEN.

     I do  not believe in the absolute determination  of events. People have
not yet come to grips with the strength of their common  creation. They  are
still too weak in the face of nature. Nevertheless there are processes which
no-one can avoid...

     I
     t is quite clear that the Fourth Civilisation will not appear overnight
nor is it possible to specify a date when it will. It will appear gradually,
reshaping  our daily lives, political  and economic systems and geopolitical
and  cultural processes. It would be frivolous to specify a deadline for the
advent of the new  era. None of the  civilisations which have  existed until
now have  appeared suddenly despite  the dates  and  events which historians
like to use for their convenience.
     There  is also no doubt that the entire  21st century will be a time of
restructuring  of  the  economic  and  political  structures  of  the  Third
Civilisation and of the narrowing of their influence and the increase in the
influence  of the  new civilisation. It is  true  that  the nature of social
processes today  is incomparably  more  dynamic than at  any other  time  in
history.  One  of  the  main  reasons  for  this  is  the  fact that  global
communications are much more rapid  and  widespread  than ever before.  This
facilitates  the  processes  of  globalisation and  the restructuring of the
world economic and political life.
     At the same  time these dynamic  processes could  be  stopped  in their
tracks or rejected by a whole series delaying  factors. I do not support the
idea of a priori optimism about  the  future  and even less so  the illusion
that the emerging new phenomena will impose themselves automatically without
direct  human  involvement.  The  inevitability  of  the  advent of the  new
civilisation comes from the complex  character  of its  driving forces, from
its incessable expansion,  its avant-garde technology  and  the irreversible
nature of the social  and political reforms which began this century.  Is it
not already clear that the Third Civilisation is collapsing in  front of our
very  eyes?  Is  it  not evident  that  the  dictatorial regimes  and closed
national  states are  vaingloriously dying?  Economic prosperity is possible
only when peoples are open to one another and the combined manufacturing and
cultural processes in the presence of new structures of ownership.
     Almost  the entire  modern  population  of the  world  will  experience
several decades of transition.  In the most industrialised nations this will
last for 30  or  40 years.  For the rest of  the world about twice  as long.
No-one can say exactly, since the rate of change  depends exclusively on the
human  factor and  the  level  of our  common awareness.  These transitional
decades will be exciting but  very difficult.  There will be people who will
greet the  changes with triumph,  others will see only  the difficulties and
will predict the end  of the world. In reality the period oftransition  will
be at the same time both progressive and difficult, dark and light, exciting
and dramatic. It is very important whether mankind  will become aware of the
new  direction  or  whether  the modern intellectual elite of humanity  will
understand  the  nature of change and will  unite around it to recognise its
own responsibility.
     If humanity and the world political and  intellectual  elite understand
the need for common activities and the  coordination of efforts and  if this
understanding is on a global rather than provincial and national  level then
the laws of the  Fourth Civilisation will be consolidated relatively quickly
and probably by  the beginning of the 21st century we will be  able to speak
of new  geo-political and economic structures  and specific dimension of the
new civilisation. There is another possible direction  for world development
- for the changes to be disputed and halted, for us to continue to live with
the mentality of violence and the  instincts of national domination. In this
event we will experience a multitude  of  conflicts, disputes  and larger or
smaller wars. Each collapse of geopolitical structures  creates not only the
powers of progress but also the conservative powers which delay and halt the
processes. This is also  the  case  with the Third Civilisation. There is no
doubt that at the end  of the 20th century and during the final years of the
second  millennium,  humanity is entering  a  new age. The main question  is
whether we  will  be  worthy of this new age -  this interesting and complex
time in which we are living.

     Chapter 6
     THE PARAMETERS OF THE NEW SYNTHESIS
     1. THE SOCIALISATION AND DEREGULATION OF OWNERSHIP

     Private  ownership  will be  a  characteristic  element  of  the  Third
Civilisation. All attempts at the nationalisation of private  ownership have
been purely illusory. Despite this the nature of property, including private
property, is changing.

     W
     hen I speak of  the new synthesis as the methodology of analysis of the
modern world, I mean above all the changes in the way of thinking which were
typical of the  19th and  20th centuries. The new theoretical synthesis is a
result  of the real processes  taking place in society in  the 20th century,
the consequence of technology and ownership. Here  I  support  entirely  the
theory of  Karl  Marx who  was  the first to  prove beyond a doubt  the link
between  technology  (manufacturing  powers)  and  ownership  (manufacturing
relations). There is  no doubt  that  this methodological connection is also
supported by modern social phenomena  and  processes. Changes in  technology
render certain  forms of management ineffective and replace certain forms of
ownership  with  others. The  mass of  small scale producers of goods in the
19th century were  connected with factory production. The large  investments
in  rail transport, the  production of steel and  electrical  energy at  the
beginning of the 20th century stimulated the development of trusts and large
scale enterprises  leading to  the domination of monopolistic ownership.  At
the end of the 20th century new computer and  communications technology gave
rise to integrated and  decentralised production. In this way  ownership has
been a driving force in the development of social systems.
     The authors of the theory of  the management revolution believe that in
the  modern  world  the significance  of  ownership has  declined  and  that
authority is now only linked with  direct management. In other words, it  is
not the class of property owners but the class of managers which governs the
economic  life of society. George Galbraith saw ownership only as one of the
sources  of  power. "Ownership  today,"  he  wrote,  "does not have the same
universal significance as a source of power, but this does  not mean that it
has  lost all  its significance."[40] A.Toffler went further.  In
his  book  "Forecasts  and   preconditions"[41]  he  reached  the
conclusion that ownership is just a left-wing mania  and that in the society
of new  technology the main  thing  is not property but information. I  find
such notions inadequate  In  an analogous  way  the ideologues of  communism
believed,  and many of them  today persist  in  believing, that  during  the
processes of economic development ownership would disappear and take with it
the class  divisions  of society.  In  the communist  meaning of  the  word,
ownership disappears  completely  because  the "entire ownership of property
shall become public" and the products of labour are allocated "from everyone
according to his  possibilities and  to everyone according to his needs".  I
believe that there is no point in criticising a  viewpoint which  was  never
sustained by the realities of life.
     In  place of the  determining role of ownership in power Alvin  Toffler
substitutes  the  role  of information.  This idea indeed  deserves  further
attention. He  who considers himself the source of information is the bearer
of power  rather than  he  who is the owner of the  means of production.  It
should, however, be  noted  that  this  approach  is  still  concerned  with
ownership as  something  which  guarantees  power.  Therefore,  we  are  not
speaking of the removal of ownership  (property) but  a change in the object
of this ownership. In the  First  Civilisation,  people owned the  primitive
instruments of  labour, in  the  Second Civilisation ownership  attained the
level of manufactories and in the  Third Civilisation ownership to the level
of large scale industrial complexes.In the Fourth Civilisation, however, the
question of ownership will relate to the means  of information gathering and
provision  and  the  means  for  the   conservation  and  transfer  of  this
information. But is this not  once again some form of ownership or some form
of  property?  Managers of modern  corporations  exercise  their  rights  of
ownership  upon thousands  and  quite  frequently,  hundreds of thousands of
other owners.  They  are  the combined expression of  these rights not  only
because  they  own management information but also  because this property by
being divided between  many people is  integrated  by the owners themselves.
Consequently  ownership has not disappeared but has taken on new forms which
will lead to new social consequences.
     While  people and society exist  there will always be forms of property
and ownership. While production and  consumption exist there will  always be
relationships of possession, use and disposal, or in other words, ownership.
It is no accident that such  categories have been preserved from Roman times
to our days. Ownership is and remains the foundation for the construction of
social  structures, including the structures of power, the structure and the
nature of human  society. For  this reason, when we  speak of the transition
from  one civilisation  to  another and a  new  ideological and  theoretical
synthesis  this is also inevitable in ownership relations. Thus, just as  in
ancient  Rome where the  ownership of large numbers of  slaves meant greater
power  and  in the  19th  century the ownership  of machinery and  factories
equated to greater social authority, then today  the ownership  of new forms
of technology  guarantees  new forms  of authority  within  society  itself.
Therefore, when  speaking of  the dimensions  of  the new  synthesis then we
ought also to speak of the trends and changes in the ownership relations.
     Modern  changes  in   ownership  can  be  examined  both  globally  and
nationally,  micro-economically  and  macro-economically.  Moreover,   these
changes should be examined historically as trends which were born during the
Third Civilisation and will come  to fruition with the advent  of the Fourth
Civilisation.
     Why should the evolution of ownership give  us grounds to speak of such
fusions  and synthesis?  As early as  the middle  of  the 19th century  when
private ownership was already established as the dominant force, a series of
theoreticians  were aware that  private ownership was undergoing change. The
greater  the  accumulated material  benefits of ownership  the  greater  the
integration of large numbers of property owners which eventually lead to the
concentration  and centralisation of property in the  hands of fewer people.
This  trend   persisted  throughout  the  whole  of  the  19th  century  and
undoubtedly lead to the transition from the stage of free competition to the
stage  of  monopolisation  of  the  market  and  its  division  amongst  the
wealthiest owners.
     The  conclusion which the  followers of Marx arrived at in response  to
this issue  was  for  the  specific  period  logical.  They  concluded  that
monopolisation  destroys free competition, mutates development and opens the
way for the socialist revolution.  For  Lenin, Trotskiy  and, in particular,
for Stalin the socialisation of ownership was tantamount to nationalisation,
for all private property to come under  the control of the authority  of the
workers peasants.  It  is now  clear  that  this  approach led to  the  real
desocialisation  of ownership  and its  alienation from  people. In  Western
Europe and the United States the ownership development trends  moved in  the
opposite  direction.  Anti-monopoly   legislation  was  introduced  and  the
practice of stimulating small and medium scale  business was developed along
wtih the expansion small shareholder.
     I find  this  process  a  brilliant  confirmation of  the thesis of the
dialectics of socialisation and autonomation as well as the unity of the two
categories of globalisation and localisation. However, there is also another
possible  conclusion   which   is  equally  important   -  the  process   of
socialisation can and must  develop not  by  means of nationalisation but by
means  of  market forces. Lenin's prediction that the  over-concentration of
capital would increase the contradictions of capitalism which would collapse
of its own accord did not come true. The concentration and centralisation of
capital have a definite limit beyond which  the process  of autonomation and
deregulation begins anew. The whole of the history of mankind is filled with
such waves of concentration and then autonomation of social structures.
     Let  us take a look at  a number  of major trends in the development of
property during the last three  or four decades.  The first of these is  the
change of environment in which the private property owner  finds himself. At
the  end  of  the 20th century  the  private  owner in Scandinavia, Germany,
France or the USA has nothing in common with  the private owner of  the 19th
century. A whole series  of social laws oblige  the private  entrepreneur to
observe the  laws  of a  minimum wage,  health and safety, social  security,
environmental requirements, training  and re-training  of staff etc.. Small,
medium and large-scale property owners have found themselves  in an entirely
new  market and social context. Their  activities are influenced by consumer
councils, quality control, trade unions, independent media etc..
     The totalitarian regime persisted  in  maintaining a  distance  between
"national ownership" and "the ownership of all workers and peasants" and its
citizens.  The  industrialised nations of the West, however,  shortened  the
distance between  ownership and the  mass of  the people.  The change in the
environment,  control  via   market  forces  and  anti-monopoly  legislation
increased the unilateral nature  of  private  and social interests.  In  the
1980's  the owner of small shop  in  Bordeaux, Boston or Gutheburg  was much
more socialised and integrated within  society  than the director of a state
shop in socialist Bulgaria or Czechoslovakia. The "private" owner is subject
to more social rules than his counterpart in a state shop. The private owner
cannot change prices at a whim, he has to observe very strict rules relating
to discipline,  hygiene, the police and, most importantly, competition which
requires him to aspire to the highest possible  levels. On the contrary, the
director  of  a state shop  is dependent  only on senior management  and  is
little interested in the consumers or local public opinion.
     I remember a shop  in the suburb  of Sofia where I lived in the  1970's
and 1980's. It was dirty and inconvenient. The staff were impolite and rude.
Everyone  in the area  was dissatisfied  but  they were obliged to  do their
shopping there. There  was  no other  choice and little  possibility  of the
staff being replaced.  Similar examples can be given  in all  areas of state
owned bureaucracies.  The  conclusion is obvious:  nationalisation does  not
mean  socialisation.  Administrative  and  bureaucratic  control  is  not  a
guarantee for citizens to assume ownership responsibility.
     This alienation  was the specific basis for the collapse of the Eastern
European  totalitarian  regimes but  emphasises the general  trend  which is
taking  place in the West as well. This is a trend towards the socialisation
of ownership or, in other  words, the more  complete integration  of private
owners into civil society. This process manifests itself via the increase in
horizontal  control  upon   free  private  activity:   through  competition;
international integration of millions of owners and, what is by far and away
the most important element, the direct involvement  of millions and millions
of citizens as owners and co-owners of the means of production.
     In  the East powerful  state  ownership isolated  the  majority  of its
citizens from the ownership of  the means  of production, in the West, as  a
result of the opposite  process, people felt more involved in the system and
in  society. Albeit  to  varying  extents, citizens'  involvement in private
ownership  was  the  most  common  feature  of  all  the  developed  Western
countries. Initially,  this  was a faltering  process,  resembling "peoples'
capitalism", but with time this trend became more and more tangible and grew
in strength. In 1929, there were a little over 1 million shareholders in the
USA with a share value of about 1.5 billion dollars. By the mid 1980's there
were 42 million individual share owners[42]. Although they mainly
represent small  share packages, the trend is indicative. On the other hand,
through their involvement  in pension funds, the citizens of  the  USA own a
significant part of the  share  capital of the country.  It is a  relatively
well-known  fact that the  pension funds of  the USA own  about  25% of  the
shares of all the major companies traded on the major world stock exchanges.
     We  might take  a look  at  the  shareholders in the  large  industrial
companies  in Germany (see table 3). Although as  in  the USA, France or the
UK, the  majority of shareholders are small and their votes exert hardly any
influence on  company  management, these figures  are very  indicative. They
show a stable trend affecting all sides of life.
     Table 3

     The  number  of  individual  shareholders  in  the ten  largest  German
companies.[43]

     Branch
     Company
     No.Shareholders
     Share of ind.shareholders
     Other major owners

     Automobile, aviation, electronics
     Daimler Benz
     470,000
     62.7%
     Deutsche Bank (24.4%) The Government of Kuwait (12.9)

     Electronics, telecommu-nications
     Simenz
     607,000
     over 90%
     The Simenz family (7%)

     Automobiles
     Volkswagen
     none
     over 80%
     The government of Lower Saxony (16%)

     Energy production, Transport
     Bebe Holding
     405,000
     none
     Allianz Holding (12%)

     Energy production, petrol
     RWE AG
     210,000
     none
     Local governments

     Chemical industry
     BASF
     370,000
     over 85%
     Allianz Gruppe (14.4%)

     Chemical industry
     Bayer AG
     295,000
     over 60%
     Banks and Insurance companies (38%)

     Mettalurgy, commerce
     Tissen AG
     240,000
     64.9%
     Foundations and families (35%)

     Machine production, telecommu-nications
     Manesman AG
     200,000
     Over 95%
     -

     Energy Production
     Chemical Production
     Transport
     WIAG AG
     100,000
     45-50%
     Government of Bavaria, banks

     Although differing in some specific details, the situation in Japan  is
somewhat similar. The anti-monopoly  measures  introduced in  Japan directly
after the Second World War changed the economic structure of the country and
deprived  the most powerful Japanese  families (Mizui,  Mitsubishi, Sumimoto
etc.)  of direct control  over management. Over  the past  30-40  years  the
Japanese directors have used their joint efforts to  create a number of very
powerful conglomerates combining  the concentration of resources with strong
decentralisation  in  the decision-making processes. Moreover, from a formal
point of view, private ownership has been  separated from  management via  a
tiered  system of share-holding involvement.  I would like here to mention a
Japanese study carried  out  in the 1970's  but which  is  still  applicable
today. In  a classification of 189 large Japanese enterprises carried out on
the basis of  type  of ownership, 90%  of them  were  controlled  by  senior
management on the basis of long-term empowerment rights entrusted to them by
the  shareholders  (table  4).  Of  course,  here  as  everywhere   in   the
industrialised world, the  "ownership" was distributed  amongst hundreds  of
thousands and  millions  of people making it expedient for it to be conceded
to management. I  relate  these trends  in the development of the  world  in
general  to  the  changes  in  what  we refer to  as democracy and technical
progress. The new  trends in ownership on a world scale have been stimulated
throughout  the  20th  century  by  the  clear  impossibility  of  guarantee
uncontroversial development without the  need for bridging the enormous  gap
between the poor and the rich and the exploitation  trap. On the other hand,
changes  in ownership  have  been stimulated also by the  need  for  greater
efficiency and also the technological changes of the past 20-30 years.

     Table 4

     Classification of 189  major Japanese corporations according to type of
ownership

     Type of ownership and control
     Number of companies
     % of the total

     Private ownership
     0
     0

     Ownership of the majority of the capital
     3
     2

     Ownership by shareholders owning up to 10-50% of the capital
     17
     8

     Control by senior management
     169
     90

     Total
     189
     100


     Source: T.Kono. Strategy and Structure of Japanese Enterprises
     McMillan, 1987, p.51.

     On  the basis of an analysis of the experience  of the most developed 7
or 8 countries the following generalisations can be made:
     First.  The  world  is   undergoing  a   slow  but  steady  process  of
socialisation of  private ownership or  the transition of private  ownership
into  a new  social  framework  as  a result of  the  development of  labour
legislation,  competition,  market  structures, financial  capital  and  the
intermixing  of  millions  of enterprises and their finances. To this extent
the  socialisation  of  ownership  is inseparable  from the progress and the
development of history in general.
     Second. If private  ownership  is subjected  to  constant socialisation
this is due to the involvement of a  growing number of people  as owners and
co-owners of the means of production. Through  the involvement  of a growing
number  of  shareholders  the  ownership of  the large  economic  structures
becomes diffused and the significance of the large family properties becomes
reduced.
     Third. The management  of  ownership is subjected simultaneously to two
trends  -  socialisation  or the combination of millions of owners in common
systems (or common regulations) and deregulation caused by the impossibility
of large socialised ownership to be centrally managed. Ownership  is divided
between  more  and  more  people in  the  world.  It  is managed  in a  more
decentralised  manner but  it  is  also  socialised  through  the  voluntary
combination of millions of individual properties.
     Fourth. The technological and social processes  came into conflict with
the  alienated  form  of ownership  which existed in  the  Eastern  European
countries until 1989. Inequality amongst the people living in the conditions
of totalitarian socialism led not only  to a  lack  of stability  and social
guarantees  but also  to  alienation  from  authority and ownership. From  a
purely formal point of  view,  all the citizens of these countries  were the
owners of  the means of production but in reality ownership was exercised by
a minority.
     Fifth. The opening up of the world and globalisation have  provided the
stimulus to international forms of ownership, to the intermixing of more and
more private, share-holding and mixed forms of capital.
     These five irreversible trends are  a direct expression of what I would
call a  new synthesis. Private ownership in the  manner in which the classic
proponents of political economics of the 19[th] century portrayed
it is  dead. Social ownership or the "ownership of the people" as  advocated
by Lenin, Stalin and Brezhnev no longer  exists. It is practically absurd to
make contrasts between social systems divided on the basis of private versus
socialised ownership.  Other forms of ownership which typify the  genesis of
the  Fourth Civilisation are coming  onto the agenda. It is easiest to refer
to this  type  of  ownership  as  "mixed".  When  in the  1950's and  1960's
P.Samuelson  first used this term, it appeared at the time to be correct. At
that time the level of socialisation and autonomisation of  ownership was at
such a level that  the processes of "mixing" had indeed begun. However, this
was rather a fusion of state and private property (Western Europe and Japan)
and the large family enterprises and millions of private owners in the USA.
     In  the 1970's,  1980's  and 1990's  the process  of  deregulation  and
socialisation of ownership entered a new phase caused by the acceleration of
globalisation,  the  appearance  of  new integrating  technologies  and  the
related  social  processes.  For  this  reason,   to  continue  to  use  the
intermediate  term "mixed ownership", in my opinion  is inappropriate. There
is little  doubt that today and in  coming decades we shall  have many, many
types of "mixed ownership". Mixed ownership is a  recurrent theme during the
entire duration of the transition from the Third to the Fourth Civilisation.
Nevertheless  it  is  a  remnant  of the  past,  a  combination of  the  two
predominant forms of ownership which existed in the 19th and 20th centuries.
     A  typical feature of  the  Third Civilisation  was  private individual
ownership. For  the duration of the transition between  the Third and Fourth
Civilisations,  the typical  features will  be  the differing forms of mixed
ownership. A  typical feature  of the Fourth Civilisation will be integrated
(socialised) and multi-sector ownership.
     By the term "integrated  ownership"  I do not mean  corporate ownership
but the completion of the processes of corporatisation. Integrated ownership
is   maximally   individualised   and   maximally   socialised    ownership.
Individualised  - with  individualised  rights  (decision  making,  control,
profit sharing). Socialised - as a system of juridical, economic, social and
moral standards which  each  owner  is  obliged  to observe and which places
individual, group, national and global interests in a common dimension.
     Today the  thousands  of computerised companies involved in management,
software, legal services provide  a prototype  for the future. Their success
is due to the horizontal structures of management, share-holding involvement
in  ownership, mutuality  and the realisation of a commonality of interests.
These have been the dominant  trends within the majority of modern companies
since the 1980's. They no longer have a single distinct owner as a result of
the appearance of a multitude of new industrial and institutional ownerships
in the industrial and financial corporations. Modern  corporations, however,
are not only losing their single  family owner, they  are at the  same  time
restoring many  of  the rights  of the professional  shareholders  and, most
significantly, control over management and allocation of profit.
     To give an illustration of this I will use the well structured approach
of the American researcher D.Margota (table 5). While during the period from
the 1930's  to  the 1980's responsibility (management) and control gradually
passed into  the hands of  the managers,  after  the  1980's the predominant
trend  has  been  for  control to pass into the  hands of the  shareholders.
Computer  technology and  modern  management schemes have allowed for  these
developments.  In  general  terms,  modern  corporations  have  been obliged
constantly  to  increase  their  capital.  One result of this  has  been the
closure  and  disintegration  of family  ownership, the  decentralisation of
management  and  control  and the  impositon  of  more  and  more rules from
"without".  In the 1930's -  1980's we  underwent a  management  revolution.
After  the 1980's the  revolution developed into two parallel revolutions  -
globalisation and the blue collar revolution. The role of the highly skilled
worker has become more prevalent in ownership  and control and will continue
to increase in significance in the coming decades.

     Table 5
     The development of control and responsibility in modern corporations.


     Corporations pre 1930
     Corporations 1930-1980
     Corporations post 1980

     Owner/Manager
     Ownership, control, responsibility, (management)

     -

     -

     Managers (non-owners)
     -
     Control
     Responsibility (management)
     Responsibility (management)

     Owners of shares, employed in corporations
     Ownership
     Ownership
     Ownership, control

     Individual external owners
     Ownership
     Ownership
     Ownership


     Source: D. Margotta, The Separation of Ownership  and Responsibility in
the Modern Corporation.
     Business Horizons, Jan-Feb, 1989

     What  is happening  in  the millions of  small  and  medium juridically
independent companies? In Western Europe, Japan  and  the USA they have been
appearing  as spin-offs  from  the  larger  companies or  entering  into the
periphery  of large-scale  production  processes  within  the  distribution,
commercial or  financial systems.  The ideal private owner died at some time
between 1950 and 1970.  The  era of the old Grandee or  other Balsacian hero
who spent every evening counted out his profits has passed.  The time of the
standardised  and integrated  owner has  come. He buys  his  franchise  from
"Pizza Hut" or makes plastic mouldings  for  "General Motors" or sells pears
to "Kaufman". Everything and everyone is already  involved in integrated and
intermixed forms of ownership. All are already socialised to some extent. If
anyone remains unintegrated, he will  either die or become  a member  of the
group of social outsiders who are of use to no-one.
     I have been  speaking here of the determining trends which have come to
us from the industrialised nations and about what  drives the transition and
defines tomorrow.  Why do I believe that despite the enormous differences in
the  economic  levels  of  different  countries  these  trends  will  impose
themselves?  The  reason is that these are  trends  which have appeared as a
result of modern technology,  from the  character of globalisation and which
have been valid for  four fifths  of world manufacturing history. Of course,
different  societies  will  approach  the  common  features  of  the  Fourth
Civilisation  gradually from  different  starting  points  and  on different
paths. There is no doubt, however, about their common fate. This is the fate
of progress...

     2. POST-CAPITALISM

     In November 1989 when the Berlin Wall came down everyone proclaimed the
victory  of capitalism. In actual fact,  capitalism  was itself beginning to
draw its last breath - slowly and quietly dying like a victorious warrior.

     T
     here are no frozen social systems, or eternal mechanisms of government.
The  most dynamic element is technology  and the  least  dynamic -  economic
relations. The most  lasting  and  conservative elements are  the  political
systems. However, there is no such thing  as an  eternal system.  Capitalism
passed  through  an  early  feudal  stage,  reached  its  height  when  free
competition dynamised the whole system and then fell victim to the struggles
between empires, two world wars and hundreds of colonial wars.
     Daniel  Bell quotes a quite  remarkable thought by the Arab philosopher
Ibn Haldun, "Societies  pass through  specific phases whose  transformations
are  a  symptom of  their own fall[44].  This  is true  of  every
society. They develop, they achieve a certain  level of  progress  and reach
their own heights of development. Then all .  societies  destroy themselves.
This does not always happen through revolutions, turbulence and violence but
through reforms and reformation of the roots and culture of life. Capitalism
in Western Europe and  North America was different  from capitalism in Japan
and  probably  more distinct from the forms of capitalism  in Latin America.
Today there are similar processes taking place everywhere.  They are perhaps
more rapid  and  remarkable in the USA,  Europe and  Japan, more anaemic  in
Brazil and Argentina and more accelerated in South Korea etc..
     What  were the  typical  characteristics  of capitalism?  In  the  19th
century and  up  until  to the  middle of  the 20th  century  they  were the
division  of  society into the  bourgeoisie and  proletariate:  the  growing
differentiation between the poor and the  rich;  the domination  of economic
and political life by a group of monopolists and nationalism and colonialism
aimed  at the  economic and political division  of the  world. There are  no
doubt many other features of capitalism which could be added. However, these
are the main features of what remains of classical capitalism.
     The transformations  of ownership mentioned  above  demonstrate clearly
that  the bourgeoisie which  existed 40-50 or even 100 years ago practically
no  longer  exists.  It is not a homogenous  class  with a dominant place in
society  or a single, unified  attitude to the means of production, as Lenin
might have called it. The class of the rich  has not disappeared in the USA,
Japan or in Germany. However, it is different in essence and character. Most
importantly, the  traditional owners of the means of production are of  much
less  significance and have been replaced  by managers, associated groups of
small and  medium owners,  media  magnates, the  stars of show  business and
innovators. The division, diffusion and socialisation of ownership  has lead
to the decay of  the bourgeoisie. It has disintegrated into different groups
sometimes with conflicting interests. Significantly, the origin of ownership
is no longer  based solely  on inheritance.  Indeed,  the  majority  of  the
wealthiest people mentioned in "Forbes" have  not inherited their wealth but
have  accumulated it as a result  of their own  enterprise. The most  famous
example of this  is Bill Gates, the creator  and owner of MicroSoft. The old
bourgeoisie has its successors in the same way as the feudal aristocracy has
its own exotic  representatives.  None of these, however, fall  within these
categories. One group of the former  bourgeoisie  which has  not managed  to
adapt to  the requirements  of modern competition has  begun to resemble the
middle class in terms of income and way of life.
     There have been more  serious changes in what Marx and  Engels referred
to in  the 19th century as the "proletariate". In the  1930's and 1940's the
proletariate  in  the  USA and  Europe was still an homogenous group  with a
clear place in society. Today, this class and  even such a social group does
not  exist.  Technological  progress has  led to the  disappearance  of  the
proletariate and divided it into different social  groups. A large number of
former proletarians are now involved in the growing services  sector. Today,
the  number of traditional factory  workers  has declined to 20-25%  of  the
active population  in the  majority  of  the  industrialised countries.  The
workers themselves are more diversified and many of them are now employed in
intellectual  rather than physical labour.  "Intellectual  workers and those
employed in the services sector",  wrote P.Drucker with justification,  "are
not classes in the  traditional meaning of the word".[45] Neither
are they  the  proletariate  in the  Marxist meaning of the word. It  is  no
accident  that the  movements  of employees  and trade unions  in  the  most
developed industrialised countries during the  last 15-20 years have reduced
significantly.
     In the most developed 24 countries of the world  there is a large group
of citizens,  in  some  cases  more  than  50-60%  of  the  population  with
relatively stable middle-incomes which  permit a high standard of living. On
the other hand the ratio  in income between the richest and the poorest  has
begun gradually  to reduce. 60 or 70 years ago  the  incomes of the  richest
families were ten  or  more,  even  hundred  time greater  than the  average
incomes of  the poor. According  to the statistics  of the World Bank at the
end of the 1980's, the ratio  of income between the richest  and the poorest
20%  of the population was  as  follows: USA 7.5; Japan  4.3;  Germany  5.0;
Belgium 4.6; France  7.7 and Italy 7.1. The number  of the extremely wealthy
and the  extremely  poor has begun to reduce significantly. There have  been
changes in  the social  conditions  of the  unemployed. Social benefits  for
pensioners and young people in  Austria, for example,  have  reached  levels
unheard of in Eastern Europe.
     I am far from  convinced that  the  developed nations  of the West  and
Japan have resolved all  their social problems or that they  have created an
harmonious society.  I can, however,  state clearly  that the foundations of
capitalism  have been destroyed and that the Western European countries have
outgrown capitalism. They are now in the process of transition to  something
different, something new  and clearly demonstrated by  the evolution  of the
market and  market  relations.  The  liberal  market of  the  19th and  20th
centuries was the  basis of mature capitalism. Its zenith  was symbolised by
the boom of electricity, internal combustion engines and the  charm of Paris
by night. The main feature of the market was the free exchange of goods, the
formation  of  market values and,  consequently, the  stimulation  of one or
other type of production.  Monopolisation  of  production has  modified  the
basic  categories  of the market but has  not abolished its role as the main
regulator of economic life.  The  major question  is the development of  the
market  after the boom  of  small and medium scale business, demonoplisation
and the computer revolution. I believe that  we are at  the  beginning  of a
process  of transition  from  post-monopolistic market  to  a  situation  of
horizontal market relations. I believe that J. K. Galbraith was the first to
turn  his attention to such an idea. Many people who clearly seem to be used
to the concept  of  the market find it difficult to  believe that this great
invention of the Third Civilisation might be replaced by something else.
     Indeed,  the market will not  be  replaced  by  any  form of ready-made
committee-designed model. The market will  simply be  revolutionised by  new
technology  and  the  replacement of  traditional supply and demand  by  the
super-organised planning of  consumption,  its  stimulation and satisfaction
with a perfect system of organised manufacturing. In the developed countries
entire  sectors of  the markets  are already being traded as  futures; stock
exchanges react to the smallest of changes, managers act within the tightest
of limits and if  they get it wrong they simply leave the game. This is true
of the automobile and plane building industries, space technology, computers
and practically types of high technology as well as many other sectors.
     Credit cards, smart cards,  cash dispensing machines and all methods of
electronic payment have been extremely  influential on the transformation of
the  market. They may by some be  considered as  merely  new forms of market
mechanisms. However,  in my  opinion  these  technological  innovations have
outlined a trend towards a transition  from the basic  market mechanisms  to
principally  new social relations and a  new  state of  the  market. For the
moment these are still only trends in the most developed parts of the world.
However, the improvement in efficiency  which they offer  will lead to their
inevitable expansion  to  other  parts  of the  world  in the  same  way  as
electricity or the radio and television.
     New  computers and communication technologies have a multiplying effect
on  all countries and markets. They are the basis of the fundamental changes
in the way in which business in done. This has led to a change in the nature
of supply and demand  and the  transition from the "trade in  goods"  to the
"trade in ideas". It will not be too far into the  future  when new computer
networks will allow consumers to place their orders even before a particular
article is produced, at the stage of its inception and design.
     Consumers will become the managers of production. They will reject what
they consider unnecessary and predetermine the type, quantity and quality of
goods.  In  California there  is  already  a computer  trade  network  where
consumers can order  goods in this  way.The  stage of exchange  will  become
strongly modified and  the market will become  a  bridge between demand  and
manufacture.
     At  the  beginning  of  the  1950's  Joseph  Stalin  in  one  his  most
"remarkable"  works[46]  predicted   the  disappearance  of   the
relationship  between  goods and  money. His approach  of  destroying  money
through  total  nationalisation  inflicted  heavy  damage  to  many  Eastern
European nations  and  Asian peoples. By  destroying  the  market and  money
through bureaucracy, Stalin and his followers also destroyed freedom and man
himself.  In  1986 in  one  of my  early  works  I  wrote  that "money-goods
relations will disappear only when they reach the peak of their development,
when  the market  itself  reaches  a  stage of perfection and  not by moving
against the current of development."  I believe  that  a  similar process is
taking  place  today.  With  our  new  computer networks  we  now  have  the
exceptional opportunity  of changing  the  nature  of exchange  and removing
inequality and monopolistic  profits.  I do not doubt that the  new computer
networks (such as  the Internet) will create  a revolution in the market and
will  transform  us into  an  amazingly  well organised environment for  the
exchange of needs, ideas, opportunities  and goods. Such  possibilities  are
being  predicted for the financial  markets and  relations between banks and
between banks and their customers.  At the beginning of 1996 the founder  of
MicroSoft, Bill  Gates outlined in one of  his articles  some  exciting  new
ideas  which would  revolutionise  banking.  No-one,  not the bankers or the
corporations or small  and medium business,  not even show  business  or the
individual can ignore these changes.
     What  is happening to the capitalist society?  Gradually, slowly, it is
become  uprooted  and  changing  its basic  nature.  P.Drucker came  to  the
conclusion  that  capitalist  society  is  being  re-born into a  society of
knowledge and  a society of organisations. I agree entirely with  his use of
the term "the post-capitalist society".[47]
     The question whether the most  developed societies  in Europe,  America
and Japan have  turned into societies of  organisations is clearly much more
complex. Undoubtedly the process of globalisation  which is taking  place at
the  moment  via  the transnational corporations  (organisations) limits the
nation state while  increasing their own role. However, I feel  that this is
an inadequate description of post-capitalist societies under change.
     I would make the  following generalisation: there four  major processes
which  have  changed  and  will  further  change  the  nature of  capitalist
societies. The first  of them is  the socialisation and  re-distribution  of
ownership. The  second is  the profound nature of the changes in  the social
and  class  structures,  the disappearance  of traditional  classes  and the
appearance of new social strata. The third is the integration of  the market
economy and the replacement of the  typical capitalist market with a  highly
organised  system of exchange and distribution of goods.  The fourth  is the
limitation of the role of  the nation state and the globalisation and growth
in the role of organisations (manufacturing and non-manufacturing).
     All these processes have  progressed so  far  at the  end of  the  20th
century that it is possible already to speak of the evolutionary renaissance
of the capitalist society and the existence of  post-capitalist relations in
all the industrialised countries (with the exception  of the  ex-communist).
Of course, there are slight structural  exceptions, e.g.  the management and
structural models  of the USA and  Japan. I  also  accept the distinguishing
features of  the  American  and  the Rhine  model  (Germany, France, Austria
etc.). There is, however, no doubt that all four processes are taking  place
in the industrialised countries and  a consequence  of the global market  is
that the differences  between  them are  constantly  reducing. They will not
disappear completely,  in fact some of  them  may produce other differences.
Nevertheless, the common movement towards a new civilisation will continue.
     Capitalism  is  indeed  dying.  Proudly  and quietly, like a victorious
warrior in a pyrric victory.

     3. POST-COMMUNISM

     The  post-communist   countries  had  three  possible   directions   of
development: backwards to the ashen illusions  of neo-communism; forwards to
primitive capitalism; or towards the challenges of the Fourth Civilisation.

     D
     uring  the  first  years  after the collapse  of  the Eastern  European
totalitarian  regimes, certain more avid  supporters of the former communist
parties began to state  publicly their beliefs that communist ideology after
all was not such  a bad thing and that in reality communism  had  not really
been implemented  properly. The systems which had existed in Russia  and the
other  smaller  Eastern  European  countries  had  been  a  mutated  form of
socialist  ideas.  They developed  their  beliefs  that at some time  in the
future communism might reappear. These are not only the ideas of demagogues,
but hypocrites. It is true  that the society which existed in Eastern Europe
was, according to official  doctrines, not "communist" but  "socialist", and
that this  was the "first stage of communism",  the "first,  lowest stage of
communism". All  of  us who lived  at  that  time  in Eastern Europe  had to
believe that sooner or  later the "glorious future" would arrive. I  mention
this at the beginning since  I have met critics who categorically reject the
term "post-communism".  Nevertheless,  the  term post-communist  means  that
communism has been overcome  and that it will never return. It is not only a
rejection of a doctrine but also a specific way of thinking.
     The post-communist period for  the whole  of Eastern Europe, Russia and
to a large extent such countries  as China and Cuba is indeed unique. Not to
understand this uniqueness is one of the greatest errors of the 20th century
which  has caused and will  continue  to  cause  much damage  to the Eastern
European nations. When I  speak of uniqueness, I mean that at the end of the
1980's the  countries of Central and  Eastern Europe and Russia possessed an
integrated material and  technological infrastructure. At that time  the GDP
per head  of population  in  Eastern  Europe  was between  2 and 6  thousand
dollars, i.e. at the level of the medium developed countries. At the time of
the changes these countries had a well-educated population, highly developed
culture and significant social benefits.
     Should  the post-communist  countries  have  accepted the ideology  and
forms of development more typical of primitive  capitalism? Everything which
I have said until now  is a  clear indication that the global changes at the
end of the 20th  century  have  a common, civilising approach  not  merely a
change of  regime in Eastern Europe. There  were  two  main choices for  the
post-communist countries  after the failure of perestroika: either to reject
their past and  begin afresh with the development  of capitalism or to  join
the common movement towards a new civilisation. The first of these paths was
more attractive in terms of ideology but much more short-sighted. The second
meant  to accept  the  forms  of development of  post-capitalism and on this
basis  to  begin  the  conscious  reconstruction  of  the  former  socialist
societies.
     In practice the  revolutionaries of  1989 did not stop  to  ponder this
dilemma.  The collapse of perestroika threw  the  Eastern European countries
into  political  battles,  conflicts  and  the  collapse  not  only  of  the
totalitarian structures  but  also of the major  management, industrial  and
social   mechanisms.  This   collapse  in  practice  led  to  the  universal
predomination of emotions and political conflicts over rational and sensible
economic changes. In the first few months after the fall of the Berlin wall,
in  Prague, Sofia and in Bucharest  nothing  was sacred.  Their entire  past
history was rejected - decades during  which  several hundred million people
had  lived  were  rejected.  The old  nomenclature  was purged  in the  most
impulsive manner and replaced by  new,  inexperienced  leaders. It took some
time for emotions to settle and for  the stress of the  "gentle revolutions"
to subside.
     On  the whole  1989--1991 in Eastern  Europe was the  beginning  of  an
abrupt, impulsive process of  capital accumulation. For a  certain  period a
number of  extreme anti-communist movements gained popularity.  Some  wanted
revenge, other wanted radical revolutionary reforms. The movements copied to
greater  or lesser extents the  solutions and  models  of  the  beginning of
capitalist  development. As  a  result, all  the Eastern  European countries
found  themselves  facing  similar  phenomena  -  falling  production,   the
destruction of regional economic links, widespread crime  and corruption and
the  indiscriminate   re-distribution  of  capital.  These   phenomena  were
particularly marked  in Russia, Bulgaria, Albania and to a certain extent in
Rumania.  The  countries  of  the  Visegrad  group  and  Slovenia  were less
affected.
     The  greatest  contradiction  of the "liberal" anti-communist model was
the  re-distribution of ownership.  For  half a century (in Russia 70 years)
the citizens of Eastern Europe had lived in conditions of uniformity and the
domination of egalitarian ideas. To a large extent the gentle revolutions of
the end of the 1980's were based economically on the fact that the communist
elite had  accrued vast privileges for themselves and had become transformed
into  an  economically  dominant social stratum. This  was the  pre-dominant
propaganda which was used in the majority of the Eastern  European countries
in 1989-1990.
     For the same reasons the populations  of these countries did not accept
the rapid  disintegration of society into rich and  poor and the usurping of
former  "socialist" property  by  a  small  group of  the  nouveaux  riches.
Legislation guaranteeing the restitution of  property  in Bulgaria, Rumania,
Hungary  and elsewhere created in many people a sense of revenge. Even after
the processes  of  mass privatisation  in the Czech Republic and Russia  the
majority  of  the  population  felt  deceived and did not receive any direct
economic dividends  from the economic  changes.  It  was  not  so  much  the
absolute scale of poverty but the  nature of social differentiation and  the
collapse  of   social  guarantees   which  led  to  a  tangible   level   of
dissatisfaction amongst the populations  and a move towards the left.  After
the return to  power of  the former communist  parties in  Poland,  Hungary,
Slovakia and Bulgaria, however, the  processes of social division continued.
The new capital accumulated at the beginning of the 1990's attempted to play
the  leading role in  the processes of privatisation  and to accrue more and
more  wealth. Mass privatisation, most significantly  in Russia, led to  the
concentration of  privatisation vouchers in  the hands of a  small  group of
extremely wealthy owners who  acquired the ownership of enormous  production
potential for  a fraction  of its real  value. To a  lesser extent the  same
thing happened in Czechoslovakia  and a similar  picture of  social division
can be expected in Bulgaria after mass privatisation.
     The post-communist  countries  are  experiencing  a  common  crisis  of
identity  and   profound  political  contradictions.  If  they   lead  to  a
stratification of  society into a small group of wealthy people (5-7%) and a
large group of people deprived of any ownership of the means of  production,
this  will be a backwards step. In reality these  countries will return to a
state from which the industrialised countries have already progressed and to
outdated  social models.  If  the  division of  ownership in  Eastern Europe
creates class divisions then  it is extremely  possible for this to create a
chain  reaction  with  exceptionally adverse consequences for the process of
reform and the  transition to a Fourth Civilisation. Clearly the collapse of
the Eastern European societies  into classes will not send them into the New
Civilisation but will hold them back in the grips of the old. The peoples of
these countries will have to  experience its  contradictions and to struggle
with the problems which  the Western countries  have already  overcome. This
will cause  difficulties  for the socialisation of ownership and will render
the  reconstruction  of  the  market  impossible  leading  to a  revival  of
bureaucracy and the bureaucratic state. We should not be surprised that such
a transition will not  only return the former communist parties to power but
also the "strong hand" governments of  corrupt  politicians and combinations
of the  two.  This will be extremely unfavourable for the development of the
Eastern European states and at the same time  it will  be a retarding factor
for the whole of world development, especially if such processes are allowed
to take place in Russia, China and other larger countries.
     The  question arises  whether it  is  at  all possible  for  the former
totalitarian  states   to  make  the  transition  directly  to  the   Fourth
Civilisation. My response is entirely positive. The relatively good material
infrastructure  of  the  Eastern  European  countries,  the  high  level  of
education  and  culture  of  the population  as  well as  the experience  of
communism as one  type of social development are all factors  which create a
basis for the transition to new types of relations  without  passing through
the phase  of  initial  capital  accumulation.  The  technology  of  such  a
transition has been inadequately  researched but it is absolutely applicable
on the basis ofthe results of the period between 1990-1995.
     Above all, in order to accomplish such a process of development and  to
approach the  level of the industrialised  countries and  the trends  of the
Fourth  Civilisation it  will be necessary  to  achieve some sort of minimal
political  consensus. If confrontations  and instability  continue,  and  if
behind  the  facade  of  the  "political  struggle" corruption  and crime is
allowed  to flourish,  the  post-communist countries will  regress  at least
30-50 years into the past. Only common will and the consolidation of society
will redirect their material and cultural heritage towards the  framework of
the emerging new civilisation.
     The second great problem is the redistribution of  ownership. As I have
already mentioned, this process has begun with restitution, or the return of
property nationalised  at the end  of the 1940's. This process,  if it takes
place within real  limits, will throw the post-communist states into serious
conflicts which are unnecessary at the end of the 20th century.  The example
of the Bulgaria is particularly indicative. However,  even if  privatisation
is carried  out without restitution, as  in Russia  and if it is carried out
with  the out-dated methods of the time  of "wild capitalism", this will not
lead  to any positive results.  The main aim of privatisation is to dynamise
the  post-communist societies, to form  civil societies and for the majority
of the  citizens  to  receive  some  form  of  ownership  of  the  means  of
production. A society of voluntarily associated owners is the alternative to
totalitarianism, the class society  and  primitive capitalism.  In  order to
achieve this a number of specialised privatisation methods will be required.
The most successful  experience has been demonstrated in  the Czech Republic
and  Slovenia  and, albeit under  different  conditions, in  the former East
Germany. The main aim of these methods in my opinion  should  be: firstly to
demonopolise  the large-scale enterprises inherited from totalitarian times,
to preserve those with  the greatest  potential  and to  transform them into
trans-national corporations;  secondly, a  reliable  stock  exchange  system
should be developed wherein a significant part  of these enterprises can  be
sold by means of mass privatisation, market methods  and the substitution of
debt against ownership;  thirdly, the necessary legislative  framework needs
to  be  developed to allow for privatisation by management teams  as well as
the possibility  for as many small and medium enterprises as possible to  be
established  for  the  use and gradual purchase by citizens;  fourthly,  the
possibility for workers' collectives to receive without payment ownership in
the enterprises in which they are employed.
     The  eventual  aim  of such policies will be  for the majority  of  the
population  within  5-10  years  to  integrated  within  the  structures  of
ownership  in  the  aims  of  establishing the economic  basis  for a  civil
society.
     The third major problem of the  post-communist countries will  be their
integration within the world  economy. As can be seen  from table 6, between
1985-1993 and 1989-1993 five  Eastern European  states which  were  analysed
achieved an increase in their trade with the EU. Although slowly, the market
share  of  these  countries  in  the  European  market  began  to  increase.
Nevertheless  the processes  of  rapprochement analysed using the Maastricht
criteria are extremely contradictory and  slow (table 7). This shows that on
the whole the process  of  the integration of the Eastern European countries
into  the EU will  be delayed.  The initial predictions  of  10-15  years to
integration have been revised to the years 2005-2010 at the earliest.

     Table 6
     Trade in industrial goods between the EU and the countries of
     Central and Eastern Europe.

     (millions of ECU at current prices, market share in % of the
     entire trade of the EU with other countries).


     CEE
     Bulgaria
     Czechoslovakia
     Hungary
     Poland
     Rumania


     Volume
     Market share
     Volume
     Market share
     Volume
     Market share
     Volume
     Market share
     Volume
     Market share
     Volume
     Market share

     Import EU

     1980
     1985
     1988
     1989
     1990
     1991
     1992
     1993*
     5146
     7532
     8222
     9303
     10525
     13598
     16736
     12674
     3,56
     3,23
     2,80
     2,76
     3,06
     3,63
     4,43
     4,55
     242
     362
     350
     398
     441
     600
     762
     572
     0,17
     0,16
     0,12
     0,12
     0,13
     0,16
     0,20
     0,21
     1139
     1875
     1950
     2228
     2401
     3678
     5102
     3840
     0,79
     0,80
     0,66
     0,66
     0,70
     0,98
     1,35
     1,38
     1131
     1616
     1816
     2182
     2547
     3138
     3554
     2468
     0,78
     0,69
     0,62
     0,65
     0,74
     0,84
     0,94
     0,89
     1709
     2149
     2552
     2842
     3962
     4973
     5984
     4662
     1,18
     0,92
     0,87
     0,85
     1,15
     1,33
     1,58
     1,67
     924
     1530
     1555
     1654
     1174
     1209
     1334
     1132
     0,64
     0,66
     0,53
     0,49
     0,34
     0,32
     0,35
     0,41

     Export EU

     1980
     1985
     1988
     1989
     1990
     1991
     1992
     1993**
     6808
     8648
     8412
     10079
     10522
     15213
     18875
     15914
     3,53
     2,63
     2,58
     2,73
     2,84
     3,99
     4,79
     5,27
     681
     1378
     1300
     1323
     818
     895
     977
     777
     0,35
     0,42
     0,40
     0,36
     0,22
     0,24
     0,25
     0,26
     1126
     1730
     1969
     2142
     2343
     3428
     5628
     4582
     0,58
     0,53
     0,60
     0,58
     0,63
     0,90
     1,43
     1,52
     1424
     2254
     2123
     2673
     2624
     3136
     3745
     3173
     0,74
     0,69
     0,65
     0,72
     0,71
     0,82
     0,95
     1,05
     2206
     2324
     2460
     3299
     3717
     6663
     6967
     6051
     1,14
     0,71
     0,75
     0,89
     1,00
     1,75
     1,77
     2,00
     1371
     963
     559
     642
     1021
     1091
     1557
     1332
     0,71
     0,29
     0,17
     0,17
     0,28
     0,29
     0,40
     0,44


     Eurostat and European Commission Services
     (see Transforming Economies and European Integration, UK, 1995, p. 63).
     * January--September
     ** January--September

     Table 7
     Do the countries of Central and Eastern Europe fulfil the criteria
     for membership of the EU as set out in Maastricht?

     Criteria
     Bulgari
     Czech Rep.
     Hungary
     Poland
     Rumania
     Slovakia

     Complete convertibility
     Strong Central Bank
     Low inflation
     Low public debt
     Low budget deficit
     Low interest rate
     Convertible currency
     no
     yes
     no
     no
     no
     no
     no
     no
     yes
     no
     yes
     yes
     no
     yes
     no
     yes
     no
     no
     no
     no
     no
     no
     yes
     no
     no
     no
     no
     no
     no
     yes
     no
     yes
     no
     no
     no
     no
     yes
     no
     yes
     no
     no
     no


     National  sources; OECD -- estimates and  projections,  Qvigstad, 1992;
(see Transforming Economies and European Integration, UK, 1995, p. 39).
     The  fourth  problem is the integration of the technology of the Fourth
Civilisation and the reconstruction of their  own industries. The opening-up
of  the markets  of  the Eastern European  countries  and  the  invasion  of
competitors from all  four corners of the  world  has created  a danger that
some  of  the  more  progressive  sectors of the  economy will collapse.  In
certain  countries, Bulgaria for example, there is evidence of  a process of
detechnologisation  or  the  reduction  of  high-technology  production   in
comparison  with  the  1980's.  The  high  level  of  outdated  and worn-out
industrial machinery  in Slovakia and  Bulgaria  has delayed progress.  This
criterion is  proof  of  how important  it is to have  a correct policy  for
foreign investment and skilfully to combine the  pre--1989 achievements with
world markets and technological structures.
     The  fifth  problem  is the  development  of  a  market  infrastructure
adequate for  the New Civilisation.  To this  extent  the countries  of  the
Visegrad group and Slovenia are undoubtedly in  a position of  advantage  in
comparison with the other former socialist countries. There is no doubt that
after the  fall  of  the  Berlin Wall the  Eastern European peoples began  a
process  of  rapprochement  and  integration  with  the  world economy.  The
universal  processes   of  globalisation  and  the   spirit  of  the  Fourth
Civilisation have not left the post-communist countries untouched. The great
choice with which they were faced between 1989 and  1990 was totalitarianism
or  democracy  and a market economy. The great choice between 1993-6 and the
end of the century will be primitive capitalism or new civilisation.
     An  analysis  of  the economic and political  situation shows that  the
former members of COMECON are no  longer an homogenous regional  group. This
is due not only to the collapse  of the  common Eastern  European market but
also  to  the different policies which  the different governments have  been
pursuing. In the mid-1990's the division between Central and Eastern  Europe
was an artificially imposed  concept. Now, however, it seems more realistic.
The Central European countries, sometimes  referred to as the Visegrad Group
and  Slovenia, are integrating significantly more rapidly than the remaining
countries and economically are becoming quite distinct. The second group has
a slightly different fate  - the three small former Baltic  republics of the
USSR  who are  seeking a channel  into Europe  by means of developing closer
ties with the Scandinavian countries, Germany and the U.K. Finally, there is
the  third  group  of  the  Balkan  states  - Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia,
Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia  where internal disputes  and  conflicts  have
delayed their development significantly. The division of the former  members
of  COMECON  into separate  regional groups could  lead to  delays in  their
integration the European Union and increase in the internal disputes.
     After the post-communist countries,  Russia and China are of particular
significance.  With their size and  resources  they have an  independent and
significant geo-political  role.  In Russia the problems of  transition  are
many time more  complex than those of  the  smaller countries of Central and
Eastern   Europe.  Political   stability,   the  expansion  of   the  market
infrastructure and the redistribution  of ownership are, in my  opinion, the
strategic  problems of  this great power.  It  is  very  likely that  as  we
approach the  beginning of the Fourth  Civilisation  Russia will for  a long
time  remain in  the  orbit  of state, corporative capitalism. Arguments  in
support of this are the concentration of privatised giant  state industry in
the hands  of a very small group of the population and the close connections
between this  group and  the state bureaucracy. China without any doubt will
increase its role in the world which in its turn will increase its political
stability and the continued awesome development  of  its massive economy.  A
open question for China will be the choice between a single party system and
political pluralism with the  preservation of the stability and integrity of
the country.
     As  can  be  seen,  the  post-communist countries  are  divided  not by
criteria  of  democracy-communism  but  by  types  of  democracy  and  their
closeness to  the Fourth  Civilisation. Some of them will  become integrated
quite quickly into the directions of  progress, others will turn back to the
era  of  corporate,  semi-state  capitalism.  There  is  no  doubt that  the
transition will be complex and drawn-out and will take place  in  stages and
with  the deepening differentiation  between the Eastern European countries.
The  direction  of this transition in the long-run will  lead to integration
with the  economic and political systems of the most developed countries  in
the world.

     4. THE APPROACH AND THE END OF THE "THIRD WORLD"

     Integration leads either to imperialist violence  or  the rapprochement
of social systems and the improved conditions of life.

     U
     ntil the  end of the 1980's politicians and academics divided the world
into three parts:  capitalist, socialist and the Third World - the world  of
the  economically backwards countries. Ideologues  on  the two sides of  the
Berlin Wall divided the  Third  World into those  countries  with capitalist
systems and  those with  socialist orientation. Today,  this "structure" has
entirely lost any meaning. The socialist world has evaporated and capitalism
has become  transformed into  something  else. The "Third World" has changed
and   no  longer  represents   a   community   of  countries  with   similar
charasteristics.
     Until  6  or 7 years  ago  the  Third  World was defined  as  something
unspecific which would eventually merge with the first or the second. Today,
however,  one  has to use  different criteria  in evaluating any  particular
country. In my opinion these criteria are based on the outlines of  the new,
Fourth Civilisation, from those processes and phenomena which symbolise  the
leading trends of modern progress. I would place the accent on three of them
in particular:  1.  the share  of high-technology production and  activities
within the GDP; 2. the structure of ownership and social groups;3. the level
of  socialisation  of ownership  and the  integration  of  the market;4. the
openness of countries and the stability of their national  manufacturing and
culture; 5. the GDP per head of population.
     By using these  criteria  quantitively  and qualitively we  can propose
another global structure to the  countries of the world. The first  group is
of those  countries which are symbols  of human progress  and which  are  in
transition from the Third Civilisation and to  a large extent are  the basis
for the Fourth Civilisation. For them the advent of the new  civilisation is
already irreversible. I would include here the members of the European group
with  the exception  of  Greece  and  Portugal,  the USA  and Canada, Japan,
Australia, New Zealand, the Czech  Republic, Switzerland, Iceland, Malta and
a  number of other states. The  second group is of those  countries which on
the  basis of certain factors  are on the edge of the Fourth Civilisation or
remain within the traditions  of the 20th century. They are on the threshold
of the new civilisation but are essentially at a different level of progress
from  those countries within the first group. I could include  here the  new
Asian  Dragons  -  Hong Kong,  Singapore, Malaysia,  Thailand,  South Korea,
Taiwan  as well  as  countries like  Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Costa  Rica,
Greece, Portugal  and Cyprus.  The third  group would include such countries
which have  an industrial or semi-industrial structure and state  capitalist
or some form of oligarchical or monarchist social structure.: Russia, China,
Rumania, Yugoslavia,  Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Saudi  Arabia, Turkey, the
UAE,  Pakistan,  the majority  of  Latin American countries, Tunisia, Egypt,
Morocco, the Philippines,  South Africa, Indonesia, Mexico  and a  number of
others.  These  countries  have not  yet achieved  political  stability  and
economic  balance.  The  fourth  and  last group  includes  countries  whose
manufacturing  and  social  relations are partially  within  the  third  and
partially within earlier structures  of civlisation. These  are the majority
of the  African, some Asian nations and  a number  of countries  of the Near
East. These countries are sometimes referred  to as the  "forgotten" nations
and need special help and programmes to link  them to the  rest of the world
and to overcome problems of poverty and illness.
     Is it possible to speak of  a common transition of civilisation when no
more than one fifth of the world's population lives in conditions similar to
those which we refer  to as the transition to the  Fourth  Civilisation  and
more than one third in  conditions typical of the transition from the Second
to  the Third?  The  basis  for  a  positive  answer  to  this  question  is
integration,  the  speed  at  which  countries are  coming together  in  the
conditions  of globalisation. As a consequence of the  openness of the large
majority of  countries and the expansion of the world market the transfer of
new technologies and the management model is much easier  and faster than at
any other time in the history of mankind.
     The example  with the countries of South East Asia shows  that  given a
suitable political climate countries can penetrate world markets and achieve
significant results. The rate of development in South Korea over the past 30
years  has allowed  it to overtake many  of  the Eastern European  countries
which  in   the  first  half  of   the   1960's   were   significantly  more
advanced.[48]  The example of the Asian  Dragons will be followed
by a number  of individual states in Northern Africa and the Near East. Thus
we can speak of the collapse and the  restructuring of the countries of  the
"Third World". The  Eastern Europeans have great potential.  Other countries
such as Mexico, Brazil, Argentina,  Chile and South Africa also have  strong
possibilities. They and a dozen or so smaller countries will gradually begin
to approach the highly developed countries - the  leading figures in the new
civilisation.
     For  more than half a century, many  of the leaders of the Third  World
have been looking for their  own direction in the struggle to combat poverty
and  make progress. Ghandi  and Neru in  India, Mao and Dun Saopin in China,
Castro in Cuba, Sengor, Tutu and Kenyatta in Africa have conducted their own
experiments with varying degrees of success. The main  question  for all the
poorly  developed nations  is  not to  demonstrate their  uniqueness but  to
become  incorporated into the trends of progress and the post-industrialised
Fourth Civilisation. The fear that foreign investments, progress in the West
and the open commodity and financial markets will undermine  national  pride
and  specific  cultural  features is not  always justified. Such  dependence
exists only in the  most corrupt regimes and where  an imperialistic type of
dependence has been allowed to develop.
     Technological and  social progress even in the conditions  of the  open
market  does  not  inevitably  lead  to the death of  national cultures  and
identity. In fact the opposite  is often the  case. The experience of China,
South Korea  and  Singapore has shown that only against the  background of a
well developed economy can national and ethnic culture  be preserved for the
future.
     In the global  world national identity and specific  cultural  features
will manifest  themselves only  at a  certain level  of economic development
when poverty and backwardness  has  been overcome.  Nevertheless it will  be
difficult for the dreams  of the apostles of  Black Africa or Che Guevara to
come true. The closed nature  of the societies, corrupt regimes, the lack of
law and order and ethnic calm will continue to maintain the countries of the
"Third World" in the orbit of the past.
     When  I  refute the  division of the countries of the world into  three
groups within  the bi-polar  model  of the world, I,  naturally, realise how
important it is to adopt a clear position in support of an  alternative  for
future  development.  The  current  lack  of order  and chaos  has made many
proponents  of  change  wait to  see what  direction change  will  take.  My
understanding of this  question is that for the next few years we shall live
in  a multi-sector world with  an enormous diversity of  economic and social
conditions with enormous differences in economic levels. When I speak of the
multiplicity  of  sectors, I mean a multiplicity  of political and  economic
forms, political systems and specific governmental decisions.
     At the same time I can see no other prospect for development apart from
growing integration  and the gradual reduction of differences conditioned by
the integration of world financial markets.  To this extent the multiplicity
of  sectors  is a transitional state  despite  the relative stability of the
world.  The  differences  inherent in  the  form of  ownership and political
systems will gradually disappear. On the other hand economic  advances  will
allow  for the  protection  of  the  cultural  diversity  of the  world  and
spiritual identity.

     5. BALANCED DEVELOPMENT

     Post-capitalism  and  post-communism  are  stages inthe process of  the
collapse of the Third Civilisation. The major question  is what will replace
it?  I  believe  that  it  will  replaced by  the  societies  of  the Fourth
Civilisation -- societies of balanced development.

     R
     epresentatives of individual historical eras are bound to the limits of
their  own time and are unable to see the world  as  a whole.  All the major
ideological doctrines of the last few centuries have been linked to the need
for  the resolution  of  group, regional  or  class  contradictions.  Global
thought was and continues  to have little  attraction for  philosophers  and
politicians. Even in the 20th century when world  globalisation is gradually
on  the  increase,  ideological  and political  doctrines have  developed in
accordance with the conditions in one or a  group of countries  and specific
ideological models have imposed themselves through force.
     Marxism-Leninism claimed to be a  teaching for the  whole  of humanity.
However, despite Marx's attempt to  evaluate the Asian methods of production
his  doctrine  did  not  take  into  account  the  cultural  and  historical
development  of  China  and  India.  The  imposition  of Marxist  or western
bourgeois models upon completely different cultural and historical roots was
a manifestation  of philosophical and  ideological monopolism. The 20th  has
century  provided us with many  forms of Marxism and Liberalism but with the
increase in democracy  more  local cultural  features have begun to dominate
over ideologies.
     Today, while the Third Civilisation is in  a  process of disintegration
many things have not  yet changed. The global approach has made its mark and
is no  longer  considered absurd or abstract challenge. The UN  has taken on
more responsibility  and  increased  its role in the  world. A number of new
formations involved in global  issues have arisen.  One major result of such
processes was  the  summit meeting  in  Rio  de  Janeiro  in  1992  at which
politicians from all  over the world gathered in the name of the survival of
humanity. However, up to now these efforts have not yet produced any serious
results.  Despite the conflicts  evident in the world, despite the  complete
irrationality   of   manufacturing  structures,   despite   the   continuing
destruction of forests  and cultivable land,  humanity continues to exist in
the condition of nationalist  thinking or class,  social  and other types of
doctrines.
     While global  reseach  is  mainly directed  towards  environmental  and
philosophical  problems, there  are still  those who  aspire  to  defend one
system,  one model  or  one culture. In  the  risk  of  repeating  myself, I
consider  such attempts  absurd. Neither socialism,  nor capitalism, not the
political models of  the countries of  the  Third  World  can serve today as
universal models for life on earth. There is little doubt that globalisation
and global  culture will continue to  penetrate  the  common  principles and
standards  of  life.  However,  this  process   will   take   place  through
manifestations  of local culture, as well as specific national, regional and
ethnic features.
     The modern  world will no longer accept unified  "military"  models  of
development. The dialectics of globalisation and localisation, the advent of
the  new  civilisation can  offer a new model. If it  is  democratic and not
imperialistic  as  in the  20th  century.  There is  no longer any  room for
universal doctrines in the new era. Universal principles and legal standards
-- yes,  universal  ideologies and  models  --  no.  "Yes"  because  of  the
inevitable integration  and mutual dependence of countries, "No"  because of
the resolute and growing diversity of human life.
     The 20th century was a century of imperialism and forced globalisation.
The 21st century will be a century of intermixing and synthesis of different
cultures  and  ideas.  I  am convinced that the  time has come  to pose  the
question of the type and the direction of  general world development  and of
the main principles and trends of the  Fourth Civilisation. In this  way the
danger of  global  chaos and the resolution of global contradictions through
myriad local wars, tension and never-ending disputes may be avoided.
     At the end  of the 20th century,  humanity has  reached  a stage in its
development  wherein no single nation  can impose  itself on  others  and no
single country can exist in isolation from the others. This is the effect of
globalisation and  the  constant increase in mutual dependence while on  the
other hand there is a marked growth in the role of local cultures. After the
fall of the Berlin Wall three quarters of  the population of  the world  now
live  in  conditions  of free economic initiative and more than  90% of  the
countries of  the world have multi-party democracies. Human rights, the free
movement of information and people are becoming more  and  more  an integral
part  of life.  Communism,  fascism,  Moaism  and Polpotism  have collapsed.
Liberal  capitalism  is  being  gradually   eroded  by  the  growth  in  new
technology,  the  growing role of  small and medium business and  anti-trust
legislation.  Socialism  as it was once  known by so  many nations has  been
consigned to the past.
     What then will be the typical features of global development n the 21st
century? Over the past few years many of the industrial nations of the world
have  begun to  speak of  "sustainable development". This  was  initially an
environmental concept,  a combination of the models of the developed Western
societies and the desire to preserve life on Earth. A number of writers have
attempted to  use this concept  to  make more comprehensive  evaluations  of
future economic growth,  types of  manufacturing and  the  challenges facing
future generations.[49]
     However, the concept  of "sustainable development" is still unclear and
unnecessarily  generalised.  It  is  useful  in that  it links  many  varied
national models to the common  problems of humanity. Its  inadequacy is that
it does not analyse such fundamental questions such as  global political and
economic  structures, the  re-distribution of ownership  and  authority  and
control over the media etc.. However, the concept of sustainable development
does not  provide  an  answer  to  the major  question  --  what comes after
post-capitalism and post-communism? What will be the result of their fusion?
     I would link the answer to this question  with the concept of  balanced
development. From a micro-economic and regional point of view it is not new.
The new aspect which I  have added is to link it with the  global transition
to the new, Fourth Civilisation.
     The  first general  theory of  economic balance was created by L.Walras
and  V.Pareto, (the  Losanne school of  political economy). Their aim was to
create abstract  mathematical models which provided  a ratio between  supply
and  demand.  In the 19th century and the first half  of the  20th  A.Kurno,
W.Jevans and A.Marshall made significant  contributions to the formation  of
the  classical views of  market balance. During the second half of  the 20th
century, G.Hicks and P.Samuelson formed a "political synthesis" based on the
studies by the great Swiss  economists  nd  the classic writers on bourgeois
political economy. The  Hicks-Allan model  is perhaps the best expression of
market balance.[50]  It  combines the process of the maximum  use
for each consumer within  the  limitations  of  his  income and the  maximum
profit for  each  entrepreneur  within  the limitations  of  his  produce to
produce a balance between supply and demand.
     L.Walras come to some particularly valuable conclusions on the role  of
the state in the establishment of balance and his advocacy of the principle,
"balance   of   opportunity   against   imbalance   of   the   the   factual
situation"[51].  Walras considered  the  liberal "Laissez  Faire"
doctrine as a pure illusion and included the regulating role of the state in
his  balanced system.  He supports the  cooperative movement and is the only
one of many like-minded thinkers to tackle  the question of ownership. To be
unaware  of  the  work  of L.Walras  is  to  be unaware of  one  of the most
brilliant writers on economic and political science.
     The balanced economic  theory of the  Lauzanne  school and to a  lesser
extent the  school of the neo-classicists is  an  initial pre-condition  for
what I refer to as balanced development. At a theoretical and methodological
level a  number of Marx's  conclusions on ownership and  the state  are also
useful.[52] This can  also be said  of  the ideas of "cooperative
socialism". In  contrast to  L.Walras, however, I do not see  balance as  an
ineluctable state  or a description of the market but as part of the general
reforms of civilisation. The difference is that I approach balance  not from
the  point of view of  the  conditionally limited market  but from  a global
point of  view. In my opinion, balance is not  an ideal model but  a  trend.
There  is no eternal  balance, there  is  politics  and specific  historical
conditions within which it can be achieved. Moreover, I believe that balance
is  not  only  an  economic  category  but a tangential  point for economic,
political and cultural processes.
     The  great  modern  significance of balanced development comes from the
bankruptcy  of  "communist nationalisation"  and the  inadequacy of  liberal
doctrines. During  the entire  period of the 20th century these two concepts
did not contribute either  balance of harmony. In fact the opposite --  they
caused  innumberable contradictions  and hundreds  of  wars. Pure liberalism
divided the world into the rich and the poor and will clearly continue to do
so as long as it is predominant in the  world. Communism, in its  very first
stage, brought about  the total  nationalisation of life and killed  freedom
and civil societies. The  idea  of balanced development  is an expression of
the new theoretical synthesis and the  link between it and the globalisation
of the world.
     From a national domestic point of view balanced development is a trend,
as  well as  a  supporting policy, towards the  redistribution  of ownership
amongst the largest possible number  of citizens and the gradual  limitation
of the monopolistic role of  families  and individuals. Balanced development
is  not a  revolutionary but  a reformist  concept -- an expression  of  the
post-capitalist and post-communist development of  the world. To this extent
it is a generalised expression not only of  the division and  redistribution
of ownership  but also its socialisation. Integration  and mutual dependence
within the manufacturing processes and financial operations, the  transition
from  a  chaotic to  an  organised and  computerised market  presuppose  the
interweaving of  interests of the traditional and the new  social groups and
strata. The gradual, logical and deliberate balancing of the market provides
above  all  for general  economic balance. It is here  that  the Hicks-Allen
equation needs  significant enhancement  to  take into account the increased
consumption of services and the role of new art forms in the  industrialised
states.
     At high levels of economic balance  the objective role of the state  in
the redistribution of ownership  is reduced  and vice versa.  In a  balanced
society the state fulfils a supportive and  regulative role up to the moment
of the establishment  of  self-regulation and the horizontal balance of  the
system. Neither the state, nor the civil  society  has  permanent limits but
gradually  during  the processes of  its  maturation society overwhelms  the
state,  not  the  other  way around.  Of course,  this  does  not mean  that
centralised  regulation  will die or  that the  nation state will  disappear
tomorrow.
     Balanced  development  presupposes "balanced" human rights for all. The
basic pre-condition for the consolidation of balance is the provision of the
individual rights of citizens, their freedom to choose, to associate and  to
be protected from  the hindrances of bureaucracy. For this reason the corner
stones  of  democracy --  the freedom  of  speech and  the  press, the  free
movement of people, goods and capital are the fundamental basis for balanced
development.  This also requires the involvement of the state in the economy
and other areas  on the principle of minimal  sufficiency, as a guarantor of
civil rights and a  factor in the formation of a dynamic social environment.
In contrast  to liberalism,  however, balanced development  is possible only
with  the  redistribution  of  ownership  amongst the  growing  part of  the
population  and   its  socialisation  and  integration.  There   are   clear
differences between balanced development  and  the  traditional  (until  the
1970's)  concepts  of  social  democracy. While  the foundations  of  social
democracy defined  a  priori  the  role  of  the  state within  society  and
presupposes nationalisation and greater or lesser levels of  state  control,
balanced development presupposes the minimalisation of the role of the state
with simultaneous horizontal socialisation. This  excludes  monopolism  by a
small  group of the extremely rich and  the state bureaucracy. Only in  this
context can there be  any "balance"  of difference social groups or relative
"balance of opportunity" (L.Walras) and social justice.
     Balanced development  presupposes  the association of different  ethnic
groups  and  cultures  within  the framework  of the national state and  the
global  world. In general this concept is an expression of the  expansion of
the relations within a civil society and the current notion of human rights.
Balanced development is  inseparable  from the  legislative  resolution of a
series  of social rights (life, health, work, education, maternity, pensions
etc..) not only as the responsibility of the  executive  authorities but  as
the responsibility of  civil  society. This takes the form of social  funds,
companies, charitable organisations etc. which are independent of the state.
This  also leads to the need for  the  protection of the private life of the
individual. There  can be no balanced development if the  social security of
citizens is not guaranteed in a new way. This concerns the protection of the
family,  women  and children,  pregnancy  and maternity, personal,  genetic,
ethnic and behavioural information.
     Balanced development presupposes the existence of  any specific feature
which does not negate any another, the combination and mutual harmony of all
the features of mankind and social and ethnic  groups. The political regimes
and the cultures of the Third Civilisation imposed their models and cultures
through  violence. The Fourth Civilisation and its main features -- balanced
development means the rejection  of such practices. Most significantly, this
doctrine  could become a  common reality  only  if applied globally.  It  is
already  clear that any further increase  in  the gap  of  imbalance between
indivual  nations stimulates  chaos in the world and will cause even greater
damage  within the most developed countries. I recently heard someone say in
a small Bulgarian town,  "How can  I live peacefully, when there is  poverty
all around me and rising crime?" These were the words of a well-off man  who
was aware of  the simple economic truth that if you  are richer than others,
you become the object of their dissatisfaction. This is something which will
have  to be understood  in the  industrialised western countries. Otherwise,
sooner or later they will be obliged to isolate themselves and to experience
the hatred of the poor.
     The outcome  is clear: gradually and inexorably, in accordance with the
norms of the global world, economic levels will balance out. In other words,
balanced  development  is only possible  and  necessary in the international
aspect, both as a consequence of and a precondition for  the global  market.
This  requires  changes  in  the  international  economic  order and  global
regulation which  I  will mention  at  a later  stage. Balanced  development
presupposes the creation of an environment for intermixing, cohabitation and
development  within  the  universal  market  and legislative  frameworks  of
different  cultures.  Instead  of  cultural  imperialism  there  will  be  a
muliticultural society, instead of enmity  between countries with  different
political  and economic regimes, there will be rapprochement and a reduction
of the multiplicity of economic  sectors. There will also be an new trend in
geo-politics: instead of imperialism and the domination of one or a group of
states there will be a gradual process of policentrism.
     In  the  next chapters I will attempt to prove that the trends emerging
at the beginning of the Fourth  Civilisation and its  main outlining feature
-- balanced development --  are irreversible. At the same time I realise the
strength of the inertia inherited from the  past and  the  strength of other
factors which  want  to delay  global  change. When I set out  my  views  on
balanced  development  before  a  mixed  Bulgarian  political  auditorium  I
received two profoundly  different  reactions. The  representatives  of  the
former communist party said, "You've gone  too far to the right." The  other
half  of the  auditorium  occupied by members  of the anti-communist  groups
commented, "This is left-wing babble".
     In reality balanced development is neither one nor the other. It is not
me  who has  gone to the right  or to the  left but time and  human progress
which have gone forward.

     Chapter Seven
     OBSTRUCTIONS
     1. THE DEFENDERS OF THE THIRD CIVILISATION

     During  the entire period of the 20th century, the  representatives  of
different classes,  nations and blocs  have  battled  with each other.  They
created the industry of confrontation and the belief in its eternity.  Today
these same people are the defenders of the Third Civilisation.

     E
     very historical  phenomenon  has its own  driving forces as well as its
own obstacles. The advent of any phenomenon on the historical scene does not
come as an  overnight victory -- this is the illusion  of revolutionaries --
but  as the result of the gradual propulsion  of the driving forces  against
the obstacles  which always  exist  to  the new.  This is also true  for the
Fourth  Civilisation.  The  Fourth  Civilisation  could  be  accelerated  or
hindered by a series of political, economic  and  moral factors. Although we
are living  through the last years of the Third Civilisation, it  still  has
many  adherents.  The  inertia  of  the  past  is  alive  and  its advocates
constantly  refer back to the old formulae, "How good  it used to be in  the
past." I once discussed this issue with one of the initiators of the process
of perestroika in the USSR, A.Yakovliev.[53] I asked him what was
the reason for  the conservatism of the older population  in Eastern Europe.
He joked in response, "Well, their wives were younger then!"
     There  is  perhaps  something  a  element  of  truth  in   this   joke.
Conservatives in  principle support the  regimes and systems  for which they
have  struggled  all  their lives.  They always tend  to over-dramatise  the
difficulties of the transition and consider any changes a deviation from the
true  belief. Moreover, conservatives are  not only divided according to age
or to party  membership. There are pensioners  who support the coming of the
new and young conservatives with opinions set in concrete. In Eastern Europe
the conservatives are concentrated mainly amongst the former communists, the
former  security  forces but also amongst many members  of the old bourgeois
class  who  are  involved  in  the  struggle  for political revenge and  the
re-establishment of the political status quo from the time before the Second
World War. In the West the defenders of the  old civilisation recognise only
the collapse  of communism as a symbol of change  and their own thoughts  do
not go beyond their own privileges and global domination.
     This is an historical paradox. The  defenders of the Third Civilisation
are not  divided into countries and ideologies. They are all enamoured to  a
greater or lesser  extent of the structures  of  the  bi-polar model and the
cold  war.  Masses  of  anticommunists  and  anticapitalists,  Liberals  and
Marxists,  capitalists and party  bureaucrats, generals  and  spies  piously
believe in their correctness and their  way of life. Of  course, it would be
improper  to  reject their  past, or  the struggles they waged, not the fact
that each one of them in his own way may have been an honourable defender of
his native land. However, this is not the  most important element. The  most
signicant  thing is that they are defending models  and attitudes which have
crippled the 20th century and transformed it into the most bloody century in
the history of mankind.
     The 20th  century will be the last  century of belligerent nationalism,
imperialism and the domination of  one  nation over another. However, albeit
with weakened authority, those political forces who advocated such phenomena
have  not  disappeared.  There   are  still   insufficient  guarantees  that
globalisation will not give rise to imperialism or that the reaction to this
will  not provide  more opportunities  to  nationalism and  autarchy.  While
thought and  ideological criteria remain within the framework  of egoistical
national  iterests,  while  global  awareness  is   still  undeveloped,  the
conflicts of the passing century are still possible.
     The question is whether we are for or against the structures of the old
civilisation  --  for or against the emerging  structures  of  the new time.
Those  who dream of  the renewed domination  of one nation  over another, of
imbalanced  international  economic  conditions,  of party  and nomenclature
leaders, of media monopolism, of the eternalisation of differences in living
standards are on one side of the  barricade. Yesterday the party bureaucrats
and the capitalists  were opponents. Today they  might even become allies in
the struggle for survival and the survival of the structures  of  the  Third
Civilisation.  Still prisoners to  their  old  ideologies and  international
confrontations they  maintain those ideas and structures which  could  still
return  us to  the time of the Cold War or grant us a period  of Cold Peace.
Fighting with each other, the proponents  of the Third Civilisation can only
renew  fears, thoughts and  activities which  leave  us in the grips of  the
past.
     In Spain  there is  a monument to the memory  of both the supporters of
Franco and  the  Republicans. In one  and the same place, under  one and the
same cross are gathered the honour and the  debt, the  errors and  mistakes,
the greatness and the perdition of people who  killed one another. The names
of the  killers are illumiated by those of the  victims, whatever  side they
may have fought for, whatever side of the barrier they may have belonged to.
In  Spain the reconciliation of history is already a  fact. In Bulgaria, the
former  Yugoslavia and partially in Poland there are still  many  people who
believed that Gorbachev was a CIA agent while in the USA there are those who
consider Clinton an American communist.
     The sooner such thinking disappears, the sooner we  shall become awards
of  the  problems and the  greatness  of  the new civilisation. In  order to
understand the new,  we must forget the old language, the old categories  of
division, the old enmities and prejudices. The Cold War is over but the Cold
Peace and mistrust  could unknowingly lead us back to it. Unfortunately this
is not all.  The life of  the Third  Civilisation could be prolonged via the
maintainance of the economic and political  structures which were typical of
the 20th century. In most general terms, these structures can be united into
two mutually conditional phenomena,  which albeit  in  different forms  have
supported the current world conflicts. These are imperialism and nationalism
and their modern manifestations. As paradoxical as it might seem, these  two
satellites of the 20th century are  supported by one common culture --  that
of violence and confrontation. The alternative to violence and confrontation
is tolerance -- the recognition  of differences, respect for the problems of
others, responsibility to  help those who  are  worse  off.  Perhaps, it  is
indeed  tolerance as an alternative to violence which is the most  important
feature of the political culture of the Fourth Civilisation.

     2. THE GREAT THREAT -- MEDIA IMPERIALISM

     With the passing of the Third Civilisation it is also possible that the
imperialist dependencies between  nations  will  disappear.  However  if the
abstract liberal trends of the past continue to develop this may lead to new
forms of  imperialist  domination -- less overt  but  with equally dangerous
consequences.

     T
     he first manifestations  of the global  world  were inseparably  linked
with  the  ambitions of empire  and the growing power of  the most developed
countries of  the  time.  The  colonial  system,  international  trusts  and
cartels, the  redistribution  of the world into  zones of influence and  two
world wars was an expression of imperialist  domination. The division of the
world into  two  systems and the  cold war was also a form of  international
imperialism.
     The  main slogan  used by Lenin, Stalin  and  their  followers  was the
"struggle  against  imperialism".  They, however, created  a system  closely
based  on  imperial  allegiance.  If Gorbachev with his  power had  begun  a
process of the gradual reconstruction  of  Eastern  Europe  and  the  world,
imperialism could  have been replaced by the agreed  establishment of  a new
world economic,  informational  and  legislative order.  I am convinced that
such a policy would have found support amongst the majority of the political
and intellectual circles in the West.
     Gorbachev's  failure  was  to  allow the  Eastern  European  regimes to
collapse without any dignity  opening  the way  for the globalisation of the
world without  removing the danger  of new imperialism.  The gap between the
poor and the rich remained as wide as ever. The differences in political and
military  power were so different that the danger  of imperialist domination
remained. Of course, it would be imprudent to suppose that imperialism might
return in its old  colonial forms  or to  the time of the Cold War. Although
the  wealth  of the world is divided as  unequally  as  150 years ago,  many
things  have changed. The  colonial  model  has  been  rejected by  history.
Anti-monopoly legislation has put down deep roots, major changes have  taken
place in peoples' awareness and the infrastructure of the UN and other world
non-governmental organisations have expanded guaranteeing the rights  of all
the citizens of  the  earth.  Thus the  old  type  of  coercive, belligerent
imperialism has for ever been consigned to the past.
     I ask myself, however, whether imperialism as a method of domination of
certain nations over  others  has finally  died. I do not think so. In fact,
the opposite may even be true. Together with the  globalisation of the world
there  are now new  pre-conditions  for a new type of  imperialism, of a new
type of  domination by  one people over another. This, without doubt, is one
of  the  greatest dangers facing world development  and the establishment of
new  relations  within  civilisation.  The most  powerful modern  force  for
globalisation is  the  trans-national  corporations. Their  roles can  be as
positive  for development as  they  can lead  to  its  deformation.  At  the
beginning  of  the 1980's the trans-national  corporations accounted for one
third of the  world's industrial production.  Their appearance in Russia and
China after the democratisation of their regimes made  them, especially in a
number of specialised branches, the absolute  rulers of world production. As
a  rule  the  trans-national  corporations  take national  legislation  into
account  but in global terms they  are uncontrollable.  This allows them  to
redistribute enormous funds and to exert  influence in all spheres of social
life.  In  recent  years  the  trans-national  corporations  have  tended to
decentralise  their  activities  and  adapt  them to the  conditions of  the
countries in  which they are operating. A typical  example  of  this are the
European operations of Ford and a number of Japanese corporations.
     This,  however,   is  insufficient.  If   the  present   state  of  the
distribution  of global production  and  products is allowed to persist then
the imbalances in  world development will worsen. If the  status quo remains
without significant  changes in the world economic order then  the rich will
become richer and the poor even poorer. International imperial power in this
case will  not  be  guaranteed by  armies  and  conquests but via  financial
operations,  technology   and   the   structures   of   the   trans-national
corporations. The finances and management structures will remain in the most
developed countries of the world. The countries which provide  cheap  labour
(predominantly  in  Asia)  will  manufacture  products  without  seeing  any
significant  improvement in  their life while  a  groups of other  countries
(equatorial  Africa)  will  remain  for  some  time to come  in the grips of
poverty.
     It  seems  as  though  the  imperialism  of  the  20th century  and the
domination of the super powers is on its way out. Or does it only "seem" so?
If the structures of the old civilisation are preserved for any longer  this
will  not  only serve to delay the reform processes but it may  also lead to
serious new local and world conflicts. Imperialism  which was the main cause
of  the  crisis  of  the  Third  Civilisation might simply mutate its  form.
Imagine a world in which  80% of the news, 70% of the technology, 60% of the
films and 50% of all profits are created  in two or three countries. Imagine
that all other countries are dependent on those news broadcasts and that the
awareness of their peoples  is modelled by a  group of media magnates.  Does
this  not  closely resemble  some of the predictions made  by George Orwell?
Will it  not lead  in  the  long  term  to reactions  from the  majority  of
countries and peoples?
     I would call this phenomenon electronic or media imperialism. By this I
mean the  monopolisation  of the  world's media and  culture  by  individual
nations and trans-national groups. The  danger  of such  a system dominating
the world is evident. If globalisation proceeds in  this  way, if the global
world  does  not  turn  into  a  world  of   mono-truths  and  mono-cultures
disseminated by one or a number of centres than this will lead to a mutation
of human development and will render us dependent on new empires.  Today the
ambitions of empire are not  manifested through wars of conquest and battles
for resources  but in the endeavour to dominate as many sectors of  markets,
cultures and media regions as possible.  There are  only a few countries and
corporations in the world  which  can afford  the development  of world-wide
television  networks.  Only  few  can  survive  in   the  sphere   of  super
investments. National legislation is powerless. This allows for unbelievable
global power.  It can  make people  accept standards,  buy goods  and accept
truths  broadcast  from the  screen by  a group of media magnates. I do  not
think  I am oversimplifying  the situation. I am convinced that the majority
of the owners of the world media are conscious of  their responsibilities to
the citizens  of the world. I believe that Ted Turner the founder of  CNN is
one  of  these. His company  promotes respect  for  the  culture of all  the
countries of the world. However,  despite  the  efforts  of such  people the
consequences of  media  imperialism can be dramatic.  The danger is that the
television  and  radio  channels  of   the  world  are  monopolised  by  the
representatives  of  those countries who have the historical advantage  over
the rest of the  world. The USA, Europe and  Japan are the leading countries
in  this  respect.  Russia,  China  and  a  number  of other  countries  are
relatively well protected because of their scale and their capabilities. But
what about the rest?  What will happen to the culture of the smaller and the
poorer nations, their culture and their identity?
     If  the trend of  the 1980's and early 1990's  continues and if  global
media continue to express the positions  and the cultural policies of but  a
handful of countries this will strike a serious blow to many other countries
and peoples and will have a general delaying effect on the processes leading
to the advent of the new civilisation.
     To begin with a large  number of small  cultures will  disappear taking
with them the identity  of  many  peoples. As can  be  seen  in  a number of
countries  this  will cause  defensive  reactions  and  lead  to  protective
nationalism. In the end this will cause complex political conflicts and will
turn the world into a world of a small group of dominant nations. Electronic
or media imperialism is the remnants of  the Third Civilisation, reborn into
its final possible form of the domination of one people over another.
     I see the solution  to media imperialism  in  pluralism and the gradual
construction  of  national electronic media  in the poorer countries  and in
multicultural policies of the world  television media. For at least the next
20--30 years cultural and media production will be concentrated in the hands
of a small group of countries. During this period  it will be  necessary  to
form a  new attitude which  takes into account the  interests of the smaller
and poorer nations and  cultures.  The problem  does not  end  here. It also
concerns  the  cinema,  video,  cable  television  networks  and   satellite
television. Clearly the new media technology can be  used to stimulate world
development,  but at the  same time it could lead to the destruction  of the
traditions of many peoples.  A major  question, especially in the conditions
of the transition, is how will we use the new  technologies and what will be
the consequences for world development.

     3. POST-MODERN NATIONALISM

     Nationalism as we knew it in the 20th  century is the  antipathe of the
new civilisation, the global world,  the  intermixing of national  cultures.
Its chances of survival depend on it changing its limits and forms.

     T
     he Fourth Civilisation will be a time of openness hiterto unseen in the
world.  However,  it  will  also  involve  a  difficult,  sometimes  painful
combination of different cultures  and  economics.  We  would be  completely
naive,  however  to  believe  that   this   "intermixing"  will  come  about
automatically simply  because culture and economies are becoming globalised.
If the processes  are left to blind chance, the world will find itself beset
with many local  and regional conflicts, local  wars between  ethnic groups,
religions and cultures.
     In  practice this means  the artificial  blocking of globalisation, new
contradictions and in the long  run,  the restoration of confrontationalism.
Although such  a danger is also posed by the "march of the poor" and by  the
reaction against media  imperialism,  the major resource  of such  a  gloomy
prospect  is undoubtedly nationalism. John Lukac defined  nationalism as the
greatest political  force  on  the  planet. Although  I doubt  whether  this
conclusion is absolutely precise, I find myself  concurring that nationalism
is still very stubborn and persistent especially when one takes into account
the inertia of the political thinking of the past. For the whole of the 20th
century nationalism has been the driving force, notwithstanding the official
"domination"  and  propaganda of  communist,  liberal,  socialist  and other
ideologies.  Very  frequently  these ideologies have been  but a facade  for
nationalism. Stalinism and Nazism are perhaps the best examples of this.
     Can globalisation and  nationalism be reconciled? This appears possible
only if we equate nationalism with something new, if it changes from what it
was in  the  20th century and does not  stand  in  the way of globalisation.
Otherwise  nationalism  will  find  itself in  very  serious  conflict  with
objective trends in the development of the modern world. On the other  hand,
globalisation will either  be  a  bridge leading to  the resolution of total
poverty of billions of people or it will stimulate the most mutated forms of
nationalism.  Let us  think  for a moment about  this  important  mutuality.
Globalisation  which  unifies  the  world  by  destroying local  customs and
traditions  and by  killing small cultures cannot avoid causing mutation and
reaction. Consequently, only globalisation based on and stimulates diversity
can  be  an  alternative  to reactionary  nationalism and  stimulus  for the
structures of the Fourth Civilisation. At  the end of the 20th century after
the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the dominant factor of world development is
openness. There is  now only a  small groups of  states (e.g.  North  Korea)
which  maintain  policies of  isolation  and  the absolutism  of  their  own
traditions.
     At  the end of  the  20th  century, nationalism  might reappear  as  an
ideological  movement  protected  by   culture   and  religion.  Ideological
nationalism is a relatively rare phenomenon in  the modern world although in
a  certain number of poorly-developed countries of Africa and  Asia it might
seen as a  panacea  for the  resolution of  serious  problems. North  Korean
communism,  for example,  is ideological nationalism  wrapped  in  a mask of
dead-end ideology. A  more widespread and typical form of nationalism at the
end of the 20th  century is defensive  nationalism. This  may appear in  any
country which feels under threat,  for the survival of its economy  from the
invasion  of  imported  goods, its culture --  from  the invasion of foreign
information and  cultural products. Defensive nationalism is not necessarily
cultural or religious. It often appears as a result of economic  reasons  or
is linked with historical and  political  aims  of particular  nations.  The
question is not whether this is the "defence" of an individual small culture
from the invasion of foreign media or "protection" against an undisputed and
powerful culture from the presence of foreign immigrants. In both cases this
leads  to  conflicts, isolation, blocks  the  processes of globalisation and
gives  rise  to  chimera  and  xenophobia.  Ethnonationalism is  similar  in
character and is also  widespread. The  explosion in  ethnic self-confidence
and self-determination is a  direct and explicable reaction  in the struggle
for  survival  in  the  conditions  of  globalisation. When,  however,  this
self-awareness has specific historical,  cultural and religious roots it can
give rise to serious conflicts.
     Why is  nationalism on  the rise?  Why has  this happened  despite  the
continuing  intensive processes of  globalisation?  Why in  many  places has
nationalism taken on extreme forms and lead to military conflicts?
     The reason is  that the surge of nationalist  feelings is a reaction to
informational and  cultural imperialism, to the invasion of the  world media
and trans-national coporations. In such conditions is  has become convenient
and  fashionable   for  politicians  and  ordinary  people   to  re-identify
themselves as  the members of a regional family. In the poorer countries the
rise in national self-determination is a result of former  humiliations  and
repressed ethnic  awareness.  Before the  fall of  the  Berlin Wall  the new
nationalism  was  less  important  than the struggle  between the  two world
systems.  Today,  however,  this  is  not  the case.  National  survival and
self-determination has  replaced Marxist and Leninist teaching  in the  East
and  the liberal-conservative doctrines in the West.  They have  filled  the
emotional,  spiritual,  economic   and  political   vacuum   almost  totally
unhindered.  Finally, self-identification  and  its  consequent  nationalism
within modern conditions has  become  possible as  a  result  of the reduced
authority of the nation state as a consquence of globalisation.
     Nationalism is not the only, but undoubtedly the major  reason for  the
possible new  division of the world  into opposing  economic or military and
political  blocs. The regrouping of countries into new economic alliances is
a part of the  geo-political restructuring of the world. Here the danger  is
in  the trend for the divisions to turn into confrontation  and the bi-polar
model to be replaced with a new bi- or tri-polar oppositional structure.
     What will predominate in the future the global prospects for the Fourth
Civilisation or  new regional isolation? Nationalism, combined with regional
autarchy or forms of the new open world society?  I believe that  the answer
to this question will still be unclear for the next few decades. There is an
undisputed trend  towards global  integration  and the  advent  of  the  new
civilisation. It  is inevitable and  it will continue. However, the question
whether  this  process  will  involve  a  new  phase of world conflicts  and
collapses,  whether there is a danger of evil  egoism  dominating the  world
will depend to a very great extent on the means and forms of globalisation.

     4. THE EGOISM OF POLITICIANS

     The  responsibility of politicians  is  not  to incite conflict but  to
resolve them,  not  to serve the  people  of  the  past  but  to open up the
potential for the future.

     T
     he  advent  of  the  New  Civilisation  is  indisputably  irreversible.
However, when it  will come and  what controversies  it  will  bring with it
depends to a large extent on the modern political leaders.  There is grounds
to speak  of  the  possibility  of  the formation  of  new  global elites in
accordance with the great structural  changes on a world scale. They will be
above  all  the  leaders  of  the   trans-national  corporations  and  other
international companies,  international  traders, representatives  from  the
world of show business and intellectuals who identify  their  lives with the
progress of the whole world.
     Would it  be  correct to  say  that  the majority of contemporary world
politicians are the defenders  and  advocates  of  the  Fourth Civilisation?
Hardly. The mass of people seem to  be  conservative defenders  of the Third
Civilisation. There are exceptions,  of  course, such as Jacques Delor, Hans
van  der Bruk, Leo Tindemans and other  architects of  European integration.
Other exceptions  include  those politicians  who have  contributed  much to
world peace such as Bill Clinton, Itsach Rabin, Edward Shevardnadze and many
others whose world view is more global than local.
     Unfortunately, the majority of modern politicians are influenced not by
global  responsibilities but purely local and national interests. This local
egoism is  above  all a product  of  the political structures themselves. In
every  country where there is a  pluralist structure the  party leaders have
the responsibility to their own parties or at best to their countries  while
members of parliament are responsible to  their constituents. Even  when the
level of education and intellect  of the politicians makes them aware of the
interests  of  others their  dependency  on  the national  and local systems
renders  them  powerless before  the challenges  of  the  New  Civilisation.
Minimal efforts are necessary to bring a halt  to  infant mortality all over
the  world and the funds  needed to  finance  this  are less that 1% of  the
budgets of  the industrialised world. Young people at universities  are more
interested  in the resolution  of  environmental problems than  the  elected
representatives  of  the nations.  However, the egoism  of politicians is  a
product of  the  electoral systems and the necessity for  each politician to
defend first and foremost the current interests of his electors. In this way
the richest  countries and peoples of the  world  are  protecting  their own
interests  above  all and  the  problems  of  the  starving  and  childrens'
illnesses remain in the periphery of their thoughts.
     The  political  forces  which  should  work  to  establish  the  Fourth
Civilisation are  not yet clearly identified. They are somewhere amongst the
different  interests  and  competition of  the  trans-national corporations,
amongst the group of leaders of the major nations and the representatives of
the intellectual  community and environmental  movements etc..  Despite  the
successes of the  New  Civilisation, despite  the  growing global awareness,
these forces are insufficient. Clearly, for an indefinite period of time the
majority of politicians will play  a conservative, rather than a progressive
role  in the  furtherment of global relations. Today the political awareness
of  the  majority  of people involved  in such  activities  goes  as  far as
agreeing  to  inter-state  positions  almost exclusively  on  the  basis  of
national interests. The expansion  of  global problems is  still in no-man's
land.
     There is a  clear need for changes in  the culture and the awareness of
the political elite as well as changes to the political systems. One  has to
admire the majority of modern  European politicians for their  constancy and
stubborn resilience with which they have built the European Union. It is not
customs mechanisms  nor  the  development of a prototype European parliament
which should  serve as  shining  examples to the  rest of  the world but the
gradual development over a period of forty years of the dynamic processes of
the European idea. However,  even  here there are a number of examples where
the European idea has  been compromised by national ambitions and prejudices
or  has  been  used  demagogically  for  local political interests. British,
French and German members of the EU parliament  acknowledge the interests of
those  who do  not  want  to  give up its privileges  and  to  accept  their
challenges of  economic and political integration. Analyses have  shown that
these are people who put priority on the interests of  the  manufacturers in
their constituencies or a simply victims of limited political thought.
     The main reason for the egoism of politicians is inherent the nature of
the  political  systems, in  the  national  limitations  of  the  concept of
political responsibility, in  the weakness of the link between the electoral
mechanisms and the concern for future generations.

     5. MILITANT RELIGIONS

     When a shell exploded in the market place in Sarajevo and killed dozens
of people, a young woman cried out, "Allah, have revenge for me..." A friend
of mine  from Serbia told me how a detachment of  Muslims in Bosnia raped  a
group of  women  and  them  murdered them... The hatred  which  he spoke was
enough to last him for the rest of his life.

     T
     he  ethnic  war and  cleansing  in  Bosnia,  the religious  attacks  in
Algeria,  the fundamentalist attacks in  Egypt,  the  victory of the Islamic
party  in  Turkey,  ethnic and religious problems  in  Iran,  Iraq, Northern
Ireland, Israel and Palestine, India and dozens of other places all over the
world are all  steeped  in the blood of continuing religious conflicts. They
are  sometimes  referred  to  as  the  militant religions.  Perhaps this  is
correct.  Religion  and  faith  is  the  greatest  unifying  principle,  the
strongest mass  feeling  overwhelming  emotions, traditions, indignation and
interests and unites  them under  a common will.  Whoever captures this will
shall be victorious.  It is true that there is no life without faith just as
there  is  no  matter  without  spirit.  No-one  can  deny  that  the  major
traditional  religions have  survived for many thousands on this  earth  and
they will clearly survive for many more. Religions have learnt  how to adapt
to  new  processes   and  phenomena,  to  demonstrate  flexibility  and   to
acknowledge the needs of the people. Some call  this pragmatism, others call
it hypocrisy.
     The great challenge  of the modern  day which faces all world religions
is should  they adapt to the global world or should they continue  to  fight
over their  old  conquests. The dilemma  is either to adapt  to the open and
modern world or to defend the life and traditions of the past,  to integrate
religious symbols into a modern, open  economy  or isolation  and  a  war of
cultures. Another great challenge is tolerance  between religions. Will they
continue to fight with each other or will they allow co-existence with other
faiths and the free choice of people?
     The  militant isolationist and totalitarian religions are in opposition
to  the New  Civilisation. They  and their  representatives form part of the
obstacles to the advent of the new. There is little doubt that the conflicts
arising from the conflict of  open societies and cultures will frequently be
based on  religious  principles. I and inclined to think, however, that  the
role of  the militant religions  will  grow  only  if this is allowed for by
certain preconditions  such as poverty and nationalism and the spread of new
utopian ideas.
     When in  1991 President George Bush and his aides  unexpectedly  halted
the American invading force en route to Basra  and Baghdad many people could
not understand why  he did this.  Five years later it  is now clear that the
Americans had to choose between the  consequences of  religious conflicts or
the preservation  of the  regime of Saddam Hussein.  Militant religions  can
take  power, as they  did  in  Iran  or  they  can  halt  the  processes  of
modernisation of entire regions. However, they  can do little more since for
the same  reasons for which  I reject  the thesis of S.Huntington  I believe
that religious modernism will prevail over fundamentalism.

     6. A CUP OF COFFEE IN APENZEL

     The  defenders of  the Third Civilisation do  not only live in the poor
countries. A large number of them live in resplendent luxury and comfort  or
in conditions of social harmony  alien to four  fifths  of  the world. These
people live in the West and do not want global change...

     H
     ave  you ever been to Apenzel?  It is a Swiss  Canton with a capital of
the same name on the road from the lake of Boden to Liechtenstein. It is the
smallest,  best  ordered  and  quietest  of  all  the cantons  in  the Swiss
confederation. There  are no large factories  as there are  in  Basel or the
vanity of  the  financial  centre  of  Zurich. There are  none  of  the bank
employees forever in a  hurry or the limousines of the major  banks. Apenzel
has  the the  cleanest  cows in the world,  the  most beautiful green fields
merging  in the distance into the majesty of the Alpine peaks.  It is a land
of peaceful, almost invisible work where everyone  knows what to do and when
to do it. If you get the  chance to go to the  capital of the canton, take a
walk  across  the bridge  and a stroll through the little town and  you will
feel as though you  are in a fairy  story.  The flowers in the windows,  the
decorated roofs of the houses and the hidden little backstreets.
     My reason for  writing about this  is because Apenzel  is not  only the
smallest  and most  comfortable  canton  in Switzerland  but  also  the most
conservative. Here the  majority  of the people  do  not want  any  form  of
change.  For  them Switzerland's  membership  of  the  European  Union is  a
dangerous event with unforeseeable consequences. I stopped  in Apenzel for a
cup  of coffee and a cake  in the summer of  1993 and  my contacts with  the
local people made a  strong impression on me. This was not only because they
had voted  against Swiss membership of the EU but for the reasons which they
explained to me.
     The people passionately and convincingly did not want to become part of
the united  Europe since they were afraid that  the underdeveloped  European
countries  would  hold back  their  development  and  their  towns "would be
invaded by immigrants" and that they were "getting on very well without  the
Common Market" etc.. I would not have bothered to mention this event if this
attitude  was not  repeated  in other wealthy parts of the world. One of the
main  sources  for the  rising  xenophobia in Germany, France and Austria is
this unwillingness to share their wealth  with others and to  experience the
risk of cultural intermixing.
     In contrast to the  supporters of  Zhirinovski in Russia who admire his
defence of traditional Russian values or Erbakan in Turkey who advocates the
traditions of Islam against the modern processes taking place in the West my
experience in  Apenzel has completely  different  origins. I  could  call it
result of "resplendent  comfort".  Millions of people in Western Europe  and
North America are entirely  satisfied by their lifestyles and do not want to
jeopardise the status quo.  Employment, security, mistrust of other cultures
are  reasons for which they  prefer  nationalism to the open  world and  the
advent of the New Civilisation.
     Do  not  be  angry with  the  conservatives of  Apenzel. This is not an
emotional but a widespread cultural  and political phenomenon. It  manifests
itself in many forms of protective nationalism  and is the social  basis for
potential serious conflict against  the Fourth Civilisation. About ten years
ago  the  French  Nationalist,  Le Pen, seemed a political  curiosity,  now,
however,  he  is  accepted  as  something  real   and  necessary   by   many
intellectuals. Such is the case with the Austrian Nationalist J.Heider whose
party categorically  won  third  place in  the country  and has even greater
political ambitions.
     Thus the  defenders of the old civilisation come not  only from amongst
the   ranks  of  the  fundamentalists,   the  supporters  of  Islam  or  the
ultra-nationalists from the lesser developed countries.  They also come from
the West, from its more conservative circles, from people who are frightened
of  losing  the  luxury  which  they  have  achieved.  Undoubtedly  the  New
Civilisation  will involve  the  intermixing of cultures and economies,  the
global  redistribution  and  harmonisation  of  resources,  production   and
benefits.  This  will  also  lead  to  structural  changes  and  even  cause
difficulties in the most developed countries of the West. Will the people of
these  countries  be prepared to concede some  of the privileges which their
current state of economic and political advantage allows them?
     This "drowning in  luxury" will continue to  hold  back the progress of
the New Civilisation and lead  to a  variety of conflicts and other hitherto
unknown phenomena.  Together  with the  slow and gradual  opening-up of  the
world  and its  cultural  intermixing  we  will  also  become  witnesses  to
processes of  temporary  "closing-up" and the victories of  nationalists and
fundamentalists. If in the richer countries  of the world those who live  in
states  of  "resplendent  luxury"  win  this battle imperial or neo-colonial
thinking and fundamentalism will inevitably increase.

     Section Three
     The Alternatives to the Fourth Civilisation
     Chapter Eight
     THE NEW ECONOMIC ORDER
     1. THE ECONOMIC HEART OF THE GLOBAL WORLD

     Throughout  the whole of the 20th  century  the economic dependence  of
nations grew to become  what is the now the nucleus of the New Civilisation.
One  essential  part of  the modern  infrastructure is  the  supra-sovereign
control of nation states. The main question  is whether this will lead  to a
new economic order or will it revive the familiar conflicts...

     T
     he economic  interaction  of countries and  peoples is at the  basis of
each  human community.  "Economic  interaction"  is  not always the  leading
factor  but is does always  dominate. It challenges not only the autonomy of
particular  communities but  also their unification into  nation states. The
new elements  of  the 20th  century  is  that  the modern global economy  is
becoming less  and less an object of control of  national governments and is
tending to form its own, independent relations.
     This process has been taking place throughout the 20th century. Between
1870  and 1913 world trade increased  by 6% annually. Between 1918 and  1938
there was practically no growth. This can be explained by the slow processes
of   reconstruction  after  the  First  World   War,  the  Great  Depression
(1929--193) and the self-imposed isolation of the USSR, Germany and a number
of  other  countries.  After  the  Second World War  international  economic
exchange reached  it  highest  level of  progress. This was mainly driven by
Western Europe, America and  Japan.  Between  1946 and 1973 world trade  was
increasing on average by 10% and doubled n volume from 1980--1995.
     Notwithstanding  wars,  political  confrontation  and the  accompanying
protectionism, the entire period of the 20th century was a time of expansion
and global  economic strengthening.  By resolving  their conflicts countries
began  more  and  more to see or were forced to see the  advantages  of  the
"open" economy  and to accept bi-lateral and multi-lateral customs and trade
unions. The Genoa conference  in  1922 and  the World Economic Conference in
1927  are  of  great  significance  despite the non-implementation  of their
decisions as a result of the crisis of 1929 and the Second World War.
     On  the 30th of October 1947 the General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs
(GATT)  was  ratified. This was a  milestone leading to the removal of trade
discrimination, the consolidation of the principle of "most-favoured nation"
status and the formation of customs unions. Between  1964--1967 the "Kennedy
round"  of talks in which 54 nations  took part  lead  to a 35% reduction in
trade  tariffs. A further  round of  talks held  in Tokyo in 1979 helped  to
further develop this process.
     Together with progress in trade there was also significant progress  in
economic integration: the complete economic opening  of the  American states
with each  other; the German  customs union  (1871), the  Belgium-Luxembourg
economic union (1921), the European Iron  and Steel Agreement and  the  Rome
Treaty of  1957 on  the  creation  of  a Common  Market  within  Europe; the
Committee for Economic  Cooperation (COMECON) in  Eastern Europe  (1949) and
the  European zone for free trade (1960). Despite the  political,  class and
military confrontation of the 20th century there has been a constant process
of opening-up and a reduction in the significance  of national borders. This
has  expanded with the  ratification of the Latin  American Association  for
Free Trade (LAFTA) in 1960 the Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM) in 1973. At
the  beginning of the  1990's a new stage in European integration began with
the reatification of  the  Maastricht  treaty. The  NAFTA agreement  on free
trade in North America was also signed in 1993.
     I mention these facts in order to show once again the constant increase
in the integrational  processes taking  place within the entire world.  As a
result total  world trade has  grown from  1635 billion USD in  1979 to 1915
billion USD in 1984  to 3667.6 billion USD in 1992. Through the exchange  of
goods  and  services  the  entire world  has become  linked  within a single
system. The major factor for integration  is  the exchange  of  goods in the
area of:
     --   communications,   including  satellite  television,  international
telephone  links  and  electronic  mail,  these  advances  are  particularly
significant;
     -- petrol which despite a marked decline has  continued to  account for
one third of world energy consumption;
     --  food and raw agricultural  products .-- trade with grain, sugar and
coffee are amongst the most important factors;
     -- metals and ore;
     --  transport and  machine building --  planes,  cars,  ships etc.. the
production of which is continuing to increase.
     A significant new phenomenon in recent decades has  been the linking of
the financial systems of practically all  the countries of the world  into a
unified system.  In the 16--18th century world trade was carried out  on the
basis  of national currencies,  gold  and silver.  During this  same  period
international trade was also  based  on trade credits and exchange  of goods
for goods. It was only in the second half  of the 19th century that the most
industrialised countries accepted  the gold standard and the predominance of
the British  Pound Sterling.  Up until the 1930's this  system  remained, in
general terms, in force.
     Later it was replaced by the Brenton Woods agreement and the domination
of the American dollar.  At the beginning of the 1970's  the  Brenton  Woods
system gave way to  floating exchange rates and  open financial and currency
markets. The predominance of the British Pound was undermined as a result of
the reduced importance and the  collapse of the British Empire. However, the
reason for the changes which took place in the 1970's was the  impossibility
of any single national currency to monopolise international markets. This is
a further  demonstration  of a  common phenomenon,  globalisation  does  not
stimulate  monopolies but, on  the contrary, it creates the  conditions  for
their destruction.
     In recent  decades the world has witnessed the  hitherto unseen linkage
of  countries  and  nations  via  currency  and  financial  mechanisms.  The
replacement of the Brenton Woods system  was in fact the removal of the last
barriers to the multi-directional fusion of national currencies and exchange
rates and  to banking and stock exchange operations. Floating exchange rates
served as a  shock  absorber for  the resolution of differences and a bridge
for overcoming global economic imbalance. During the last 20 years the trade
in securities reached previously unknown levels.  The trade in international
bonds has  increased  from 76.3 to  167.3 billion dollars[54]. In
practice this has meant the growing mutual dependency of capital markets. We
can add to this the enormous increase in Euro-dollar markets. After the fall
of the Berlin Wall  the  processes of linkage  of the capital markets in all
the  countries  of the world  has  become  undisputed and  to a large extent
irreversible.
     Another  particulary important  indicator  of  this  are  the  currency
policies of practically all the  countries in the world. Through a system of
mutual  convertibility,  the  maintenance  of official  reserves  in varying
currencies  and the  greater independence  of commercial banks, the national
economies of  countries over the  world  have become  more dependent on each
other.  After the  beginning of the 1970's  the international  role  of  the
dollar began  to subside slowly. This could be seen  in the reduction in the
size of the official  dollar reserves of  the industrialised countries to be
replaced in the main by the German mark and the Japanese yen.
     Perhaps  the clearest  indicator  of the economic growth of the  Fourth
Civilisation  is  the  level of  direct  investments  and the development of
trans-national  corporations.  In  the   world   today   there  are   37,000
trans-national  corporations  with over  170,000 branches. Of  these, 24,000
corporations are  based  in the  developed countries, 2700 in the developing
countries (mainly, South Korea, Hong  Kong, Brazil and China)  and less than
500  in  Central and Eastern Europe. In 1992, the  global  volume of  direct
investments reached  2  trillion dollars accounting for a level of sales  by
the  foreign  branches  of the trans-national corporations  of  5.5 trillion
dollars.[55]
     As  each year goes by the  internationalisation  of industry  increases
which will lead to the intermixing of cultures, manufacturing structures and
changes in the awareness of billions of people. Everywhere in the world, the
USA or France, Russia or Rumania, Kenya  or Ruanda  people are becoming more
and more aware  of the influence of the world  economy  on  their day to day
life. Most significantly the houses in which  we live and the services which
we use are becoming more and more internationalised.  I do  not know whether
it  is an exaggeration to  say  that  the modern  citizen of the  world is a
"product of the world". Everywhere in  the world, even in the  most isolated
of countries you will  come across cars from  the  USA, Japan  and  Germany,
household goods from Italy, coffee  and fruit from Latin America, electrical
goods  from Hong  Kong and Japan, carpets from Iran or Bulgaria and  clothes
from China and India etc..  If  you take a look at the raw materials used in
the production of the  finished goods then you  will see the labour and  the
talents of millions of people from many countries.
     All this  might be summed up as two basic phenomena  which show the end
of one human civilisation and the beginning of another.
     The first of these phenomena is that the mutual dependence of countries
has  reached  a  level  at  which  nation  states, autonomous religions  and
cultures  can no longer historically  dominate the  processes of integration
and universal  human interests.  It  is  true  that the danger of new class,
cultural  and religious divisions is  still possible but the  trend  towards
world integration is becoming more and more irreversible.
     The  new factor  is that the  most integrated regions in North America,
Europe and Japan have  created sound  economic and financial links with each
other. This has also lead to  the involvement of all the remaining countries
in  the world in the  global economy. If we take  foreign investments as our
criteria, we will  see that at  the beginning of the 1990's  the  three main
economic  centres of the world  had  direct  influence  over about 50  other
satellite countries  which accounted  for  over 3/4  of  the  world economic
product. Today, there is not a single country which can exclude  itself from
the world economy without causing serious damage to its own development. The
attempts by North Korea, Iraq and in the recent  past,  Albania  and Cuba to
develop independently in  conditions  of self-sufficiency have lead to their
economic collapse.  The huge level of economic inter-dependence in the world
has lead to more than just closer  integration. When different systems  grow
closer they form a common, more universal community which is more vital than
any individual national or regional, economic or political force.
     The second  phenomenon is  the  formation  of economic forces for which
national  identity  is more formal  than essential. Not  only  in  terms  of
behaviour, interests  and structures  these forces belong more to the  world
than to  any  particular nation  state. Above all, these are a part  of  the
trans-national corporations whose economic  activities are spread throughout
a number of countries and  whose connections and  dependencies upon national
governments are of less significance than, for  example, the  state  of  the
London Stock Exchange. We could also look  at the large  number of financial
institutions who  operate  on  a global  level  not  as  the citizens of any
particular country but as citizens of the world.
     I  believe  that both  the  level  of  mutual  economic  dependency  of
countries as  well as the several  thousand trans-national manufacturing and
financial corporations form the economic nucleus of the new civilisation. At
the end of the 20th century these  structures which  control the majority of
world manufacturing and trade are the most powerful globalising force in the
world. The 20th century was a time when the global world was born but also a
time  of the creation  of supra-national economic structures and the essence
of a new civilisation.
     When I speak of the economic nucleus of the Fourth Civilisation, I mean
the influence it has on  all areas of life  and  that  the objective changes
brought about by the integration of  manufacturing and finances have imposed
profound changes in the world economic order.

     2. NEW GROWTH AND NEW STRUCTURES

     The  trend of  the  20th  century  towards the constant  opening-up  of
national economies  will continue at  an  increasing rate for the  next  few
decades. This will  cause  the  wide-scale  redistribution of  manufacturing
forces and their re-structuring on a branch  level. The dynamics of national
and  world economic growth will be determined more and more by international
exchange...

     T
     here is  not doubt  that  the  globalisation of  the  world economy  is
accelerating. According to the predictions of  the World  Trade Organisation
the volume of goods traded in 1995 will increase by 8%. In  1994 this figure
was 9.4%.  The fact  that during the past ten years,  world  trade has grown
faster than the annual global domestic product (see table 8)  shows that the
integration and  opening-up of national borders continues  to be a  dominant
process.

     Table 8

     % annual growth
     1984
     1985
     1986
     1987
     1988
     1989
     1990
     1991
     1992
     1993
     1994

     World Trade
     8,0
     2,5
     4,1
     5,3
     7,9
     6,5
     4,5
     3,5
     4,0
     3,5
     9,5

     World GDP
     6,0
     2,4
     2,8
     2,9
     4,9
     3,4
     0,5
     -2
     -0,5
     0,2
     2,4


     Source: World Trade Organisation.

     How can this phenomenon be  explained?  Why for the greater part of the
20th  century has  world  trade  been greater than  manufacturing?  My brief
response to these two questions is as follows: the constant growth of  world
exchange has been caused not only by the growth of manufacturing but also by
the  cultural  and  political  opening-up  of  countries, the laws  of human
progress and technological development. The vast majority of the governments
in  the countries  of the  world realise  that  the  effectiveness of  their
efforts and  the  wealth  of  their  citizens  depends on  export  and their
successful  involvement in the international distribution  of labour. It has
become beneficial not only to exchange  newly manufactured products but also
those products created in the recent past as well as knowledge, services and
personnel.
     Of particular  significance is the difference  between  the  growth  of
trade  and  the growth in  World Gross  Product  over  the  past  six  years
(1990--1995) or since the collapse of the Berlin Wall. There has been a rise
in the levels  of export from the  most developed nations to Eastern  Europe
and Russia and a continuous increase in the exchange of trade with China. In
1984 alone  the  progressive Asian economies, including China but  with  the
exception of Japan, achieved a 20% increase in  their services  trade. There
is a simultaneous related increase in Eastern  Asia and  Central and Eastern
Europe. There is no doubt that we  are  witnessing a new rise in world trade
and a  reduction  in the  significance  of  national borders.  If we exclude
Africa and the Near East, there is evidence almost everywhere of a growth in
world trade and the resulting economic revival.
     The growth of export is a feature  of future change in the structure of
product manufacture. The most dynamic group of new products in recent  years
has  been   telecommunications  and  office   equipment.   I   believe  that
telecommunications will  continue to increase their share of world trade and
will be the most  dynamic  and  profitable export area.  This will result in
increased communications  between people and the intermixing of cultures and
manufacture in  the  world. Telecommunications are  a symbol  of the  Fourth
Civilisation and the main technological channel for its development.
     Clearly   telecommunications   will  continue  to  contribute   to  the
re-structuring of social life and the stimulation of growth, the  opening-up
of the world and  the linkage of millions and billions  of  people. The main
integrational  effect  will  be  the  linking  of  the   new  communications
technologies to televisions  and  computer technology.  The  American  media
group "Time Warner" has  already  developed and begun to  market  the  first
digital interactive  television  network in the  world.  Their "Full Service
Network" permits its subscribers to carry out banking operations from  home,
to  receive information  about products,  services and events, to buy and to
order and  to see  new films etc.. Consumers' choice is guaranteed. However,
at  the same  time, this allows the  television companies to guarantee their
monopoly  of the  market.  Whatever happens in  the  future, there is little
doubt that telecommunications will continue to expand their  share  of world
trade and be a  key factor in economic development and structural and social
changes. Together with  world finance which  has  developed as a  result  of
improved world  communications, telecommunications  will continue  to be the
most attractive area of the  world economy. The Internet has allowed tens of
millions of  people over  the  entire  world have become  part  of a  single
network of communications and access  to information. Computer networks will
lead to revolutionary changes in finances, trade and manufacturing.
     Despite certain  serious predictions concerning a fall in profits  from
manufacture and sale of aeroplanes[56], I believe that all modern
forms of transport  will continue to grow  dynamically. People of  different
races, ethnic groups and cultures are  coming closer to one another, running
to embrace each other.  They are beginning to  realise  how useful it  is to
travel together and to meet and use the experience of others.
     The conclusion which seems to suggest itself is that  the  branches  of
the  Fourth Civilisation (telecommunications, finances, services, computers,
information  technology,  transport, services  etc..)  have  made life  more
integrated and  are a  product of the new inter-dependency which is required
by  humanity.  The process will not  stop here.  On the basis  of these  key
branches  of  the New  Civilisation, still  more,  newer, branches  will  be
formed. Television and telephones will spur the creation of new audio-visual
telephones.  Paging  systems  and  mobile telephones will become cheaper and
will allow  parents to  have more control  over their  children  and to gain
information from their teachers. Doctors  and  policemen  will be called  to
where  they  are needed. This will change  politics and  management. It will
ease and  change ways  of voting.  There  is already  software available for
conducting trade over the computer with full legal support.
     In ancient times peoples  were separated from  one another  by years of
travel. In the Middle Ages the distance shortened to months. In modern times
distances can be covered  in  days. In  the New  Civilisation  the  whole of
humanity  is  connected within hours, minutes and seconds. I recently had to
fly from Sofia to Honolulu by  Lufthansa and United Airlines. I  covered the
distance in 15--16 hours. Twenty time zones to the other  side of the  globe
in 16 hours!  I am convinced that in the Fourth  Civilisation people will be
able  to circumnavigate  the world  in less time. Despite  the  opinions  of
certain sceptics  I am  sure that transport will  continue  to  improve  and
develop with leaps and bounds. This applies  to car manufacturing, aeroplane
construction,  shipbuilding  and  certain  other  completely  new  forms  of
transport. This will also  provide new prospects for  world economic growth.
New  technologies will  continue to stimulate  this growth  and  the dynamic
processes will never stop despite the critics who believe  that the computer
and audio-visual market are already satiated. The  limits of high technology
growth and integrational products have not yet been reached.
     It  is not certain whether this  growth will dominate the world economy
as a  whole. It is  most likely that the next 10--20 years will be years  of
technological  progress   but   also  slow   reconstruction.   The  lack  of
manageability and even elementary  order within the world economy means that
it is not clear which of the two will gain the upper hand.
     Above all this requires  the replacement of old  industrial  production
with new technology, a  process which has  been in progress for the  past 15
years.  This  process,  however, should not be perceived as  the  elementary
replacement of the "factory chimney with the computer", as some philosophers
believe.  The old industrial  sectors (metallurgy,  chemicals, machine  tool
engineering, energy production,  transport) will be partially reconstructed,
partially relocated  to  the  lesser  developed  countries  for  the sake of
cheaper labour and the lack of environmental pressure groups and opposition.
One only has to look to see what is happening with  the automobile industry,
machine  tool  production,  electronics  and the  electronics  industry  and
chemical  production.  Everything  now  involves  new  high  technology  and
computers. In modern automobile construction as  much money  is now spent on
new electronics as on improvements  to  engine design. The new generation of
aeroplanes,  "Boeing"  and "Airbus" are practically operated from the ground
taking off and  landing using electronic equipment,  while the pilots fulfil
mainly regulatory functions. The chemical industry is re-orienting itself to
new,  environmentally  clean technology  and  hitherto unknown products. The
construction industry is investing more  and  more in  new highly  resistant
materials. Just  as  in the 19th and 20th century  the industrial revolution
lead to revolutions in agriculture without replacing it,  the new technology
of the  New Civilisation will  revolutionise industrial  technology and will
change their essence but will not destroy it. Development does not allow for
absolute rejection. Revolution itself always means the  addition  of the new
to the old and its  transformation. It has been interpreted in other ways in
history, but that was just destruction.
     The second  very  important  area  in the restructuring  of  the  world
economy,  in  my   opinion,  is   the  huge  process  of  the   geographical
re-distribution  of  world production. Today, the citizens, trade unions and
politicians in Bavaria and California are concerned about the re-location of
manufacturing facilities  to  the countries  of  South  East  Asia and Latin
America. Millions  of  people are suffering as a result of the  reduction in
military production,  as  is  the  case in California. This fact  cannot  be
ignored,   but  this  is  only  the   beginning.  The  modern   geographical
distribution  of world production was formed at a time of colonial power and
consolidated  during  the bi-polar world. Given  the new world conditions of
the Fourth Civilisation, things will have to  change out of all recognition.
As paradoxical as it may sound  even the direction  of investments will have
to change. Amongst the favourites  are the countries of South East Asia. The
export of manufacturing potential from North America and Europe will expand.
This will  consist mainly of those products  which can be  easily adapted to
the new technologies and the constant increase in the  cost of labour in the
industrialised countries. Finally, the advent  of the  New Civilisation will
be accompanied by  the closure  of a number of manufacturing processes. This
process will be more intense  than at any other time during the whole of the
20th century.
     Whether we live in New York, Tokyo, Belgrade or Dakkar we are living in
a state of  transition between two civilisations.  This is  a  technological
transition,  a  transition  in  the  nature  of  economic  development.  New
manufacturing  sectors  and products  will  come  to  the fore. The distinct
division between intellectual and physical labour  and the manufacturing and
non-manufacturing sector will disappear. This is indisputable  and supported
not only by P.Drucker but also by  the chairman  of  the majority in  the US
Congress N.Greenwich.
     The state of change is indeed similar to that which existed at the  end
of  the 18th century  and the  beginning of the  19th. Let  us hope that the
consequences for the  people of the world will not  be as  dramatic as  they
were then. During the processes of industrialisation millions of people were
thrown  out  onto  the  streets  or  transformed  into factory  slaves.  The
developed societies were  divided into  classes causing huge  social unrest.
Today the experience of the past and the bitter  lessons of the 20th century
provide  us  with the hope  that  the  great  changes in  technological  and
economic growth will not inevitably lead to chaos and social strife.

     3. WHO WILL DOMINATE THE WORLD ECONOMY

     Recently,  everyone  has  been  trying to convince  us that  the  three
economic  centres -- the  USA, Japan  and Europe dominate the world and that
the technological and  financial power  of  Japan will replace  the economic
power of the East. I do not believe in these prospects...

     D
     uring the  Third Civilisation the power of  countries was determined by
their military  and political power. This was based on economic strength but
was not always the most decisive element in  the  consolidation  of power of
one  country  over  another.  The  Ottoman  Empire  was  not  more  advanced
materially  when  between  the 13--16th centuries it conquered one third  of
Europe as far north as Vienna. France under Napoleon the 1st was no stronger
economically than the rest of the countries in Europe but managed to conquer
with better military organisation and leadership.
     The Fourth Civilisation precludes the military resolution of conflicts.
The achievement of nuclear parity and the nature of nuclear weapons makes it
absurd  to  wage nuclear  war. This is  also true conventional conflicts  as
well.  Let us take the example of the war  in Bosnia.  There have  been over
200,000 deaths (perhaps many more), the complete destruction of industry and
infrastructure,  valleys  of  blood  and violence. The  war ended  with  the
signing  of the peace accord in Dayton,  USA which brought the sides back to
their  starting  points.  The reason  for such absurdities is the  potential
possibility  of  the mutual  neutralisation of the nuclear powers  and their
influence on the smaller warring countries.
     I begin this  chapter in  this way since in the 1960's and  1970's when
nuclear parity was achieved a "new concept" of world economic domination was
born.  There are still people  in a number of countries who believe that the
USA or Japan can play the role  of a world economic super power. In the 20th
century  many countries have aspired to such a  role but all of them lost in
the  long  run.  I  believe that today on the  basis  of  the  laws of human
development  the imposition of economic domination by one country or a group
of  countries over the rest can only be a temporary state. In the context of
globalisation the economic  levels of  the countries of the world have begun
to level  out. This process can only be stopped by political coercion or the
isolation  of  countries  from each other. In  the  civilisations which have
existed up until now, nations began their development  in different climatic
conditions  and  with different resources. In  the 19th and  20th  centuries
these same nations  began to realise how wide  was the gap had grown between
them.
     During the  last  50 years a  series  of processes began to take  place
within the heart of the bi-polar model which proved that economic domination
from an  historical point  of  view is purely  illusory. Let us  take  as an
example   the  most  powerful  institutions   of  the  world   economy,  the
trans-national  corporations.  Immediately  after the  Second World  War the
American corporations were  the undisputed  dominating  forces of the  world
economy and  only  a  group of  British  companies  managed  to  upset their
hegemony. In  1962 of  the 500  largest  companies in the world, 300 (with a
total product of 365 billion dollars) were  in the USA and 200 (with a total
product of 174  billion USD)  in  other countries. Today  this  picture  has
changed beyond recognition. In 1992, of the 50  largest industrial companies
in the  world, only  14 were in the USA, 13 in Japan, 2  in  the  U.K., 7 in
Germany, 3  in  Italy, 5 in France, 2 in South Korea etc..  This  trend will
continue. We can expect a serious increase in trans-national companies  from
Germany, Russia, South Korea, Brazil and also a number of smaller countries.
     The process of levelling will take place slowly. This is the inevitable
result  of the opening and expansion of  the world market. In contrast to 40
or  50 years ago, today investments,  manufacturing processes  and goods are
being  exported  everywhere  it is  economically  viable  to do  so.  At the
beginning  of  the  new technological  revolution in the  1970's  and 1980's
investments were directed at the  most developed  nations which had educated
and well-trained  personnel.  I  believe that since the 1990's a significant
part of the world  investments will be redirected mainly to some of  the new
"dragons"  of  South  East Asia, Australia, China, Latin America and,  given
greater political stability, Eastern Europe.
     Similar changes are  taking place in the commodity  and  stock markets.
Only a  few years  ago the  stock exchanges  in  New  York  and London  were
dominant. Today the Tokyo stock  exchange has  changed all that  and is  now
quite convincingly the leading stock market in  the world.  There has been a
gradual, almost invisible  process whereby  the  new  financial markets have
developed. This will lead to the re-distribution of the  economic power  and
new hitherto unseen trends.
     Until the end of the 1980's and  in particular during the period of the
Cold  War, the major  criterion for political and  economic  power was still
closely associated with the military and armaments industry. If the positive
trends  of world  development  continue economic  power will  depend more on
technology,  information  and  resources and  will  guarantee  the future of
promising industrial sectors. This will  lead to the re-determination of the
power  and wealth of the countries and nations of the world and  their place
in the  global division of labour.  The  new  technologies  will  not permit
monopolisation. They  will  guarantee advantages  for  the  countries  which
possess  them  only  until  they  are  mastered  by  other  countries.  High
technology  in  the  modern  world  is  being  spread via the trans-national
corporations and the activities of governments.
     Japan, despite its world domination in  the development and  production
of  new  technology  is  also  a  major  exporter of  high-tech products and
know-how.  In  South  East Asia  and  Latin  America  there  are  number  of
production facilities with the  most modern  telecommunications  technology.
Competition  between the trans-national corporations is  the main reason for
this. I believe  that  this is  in principle  impossible for technology  and
information to  be  monopolised in  the  aims of the domination  of  certain
countries over others especially in the context of the modern scientific and
technological revolution. The New Civilisation will still maintain the trend
of the free movement of technology and information.
     The direct  result of this is  the formation over the past 30--40 years
of a new  global distribution of manufacturing and technological priorities.
Each  of the developed countries to a certain extent have found their market
niches  and has  established itself  in  world export.  For  example  at the
beginning  of  the  1970's  the  USA  exported  77.5%  of  world   aeroplane
production; 44.1% of organic chemicals; 55.9% of office  equipment; 35.2% of
computer technology; 39.3% of industrial  refrigeration; 35.8% of grain  and
37.1%  of steel export etc.. In  1985 Germany  accounted for  23.2% of world
automobile  export; 19.8% of  plastics; 51.5%  of  rotary  printing presses;
32.4% of synthetic  organic  dies;  34.1%  of packaging equipment; 30.4%  of
textile  and  leather processing machinery.  In  the same years, 1985, Japan
possessed 30.8%  of world automobile  export; 37.5%  of lorries  and trucks;
80.7% of  televisions  and tape  recorders;  82%  of  motorcycles;  62.2% of
cameras and video-cameras;  55.7% of microphones  and  amplifiers; 37.9%  of
peripheral electronic equipment and 31.7% of tankers etc.. It is interesting
that  during  the  same  period  a  number  of  smaller  countries  achieved
significant  levels of long-term  exports. For example Sweden accounted  for
41.7% of the world export of paper and boxes; 17.2% of centrifuges; 15.5% of
sulphate  cellulose. The Swiss accounted for 45.1% of textile looms;  34% of
wrist    watches;    25.3%    of    synthetic    dies    and    20.6%     of
herbicides.[57]
     Another criterion is the state of the available natural  resources in a
given country and whether they can exert influence on the power and strength
of countries  and their role in the world economy. The freer the exchange of
goods, services and labour the more open countries become  to each other. In
this case the power of countries will be determined  by their total national
wealth based not only  the existing manufacturing facilities but also on the
available natural resources. On the basis  of this logic, in  September 1995
the World  Bank  published  an  analysis  of  the  ecologically  sustainable
development and  the  natural  resources  of  the  countries  of the  world.
Accordance to their classification of the available national wealth per head
of  population (table  9)  Australia  came out  in first place  followed  by
Canada, Luxembourg, Switzerland and Japan.
     The USA was quite far down the list in  12th place and Germany in 15th.
Other countries  with enormous reserves of natural resources such as Russia,
Brazil, Argentina and others are outside the classification due to their low
levels   of  existing  production  facilities   and   human  resources.  The
methodology of the World Bank  is  flawless:  resources are of benefit  when
there is an adequate material base and human resources.  On  the other hand,
those countries who do not have such resources will have to pay for them and
to compensate for the inequity with more labour and technology.

     Table 9

     Classification of  the 15  leading  countries on  the basis of national
wealth
     per head of population.

     State
     Wealth per head of population
     Sources of national wealth %



     population
     capital assets
     natural resources

     Australia
     Canada
     Luxemburg
     Switzerland
     Japan
     Sweden
     Iceland
     Qatar
     UAE
     Denmark
     Norway
     USA
     France
     Kuwait
     Germany
     835
     704
     658
     647
     565
     496
     486
     473
     471
     463
     424
     421
     413
     405
     399
     21
     22
     83
     78
     81
     56
     23
     51
     65
     76
     48
     59
     77
     62
     79
     7
     9
     12
     19
     18
     16
     16
     11
     14
     17
     22
     16
     17
     9
     17
     71
     69
     4
     3
     2
     29
     61
     39
     21
     7
     30
     25
     7
     29
     4


     Source: World Bank, 1985

     These figures show  the constant increase in  the number  of  countries
with an established position in the global division  of labour. There are at
least 30 countries with a high level of economic potential and another 60 or
70  with the potential  to join  them  in  the  next 30  or  40 years.  Most
significantly, in the current situation no one country can impose a monopoly
on another.  The  USA,  Europe and Japan are inter-dependent on each  other.
Their mutual dependence  is unilateral and  is  not only  between  the three
established economic centres. As a result of structural reforms in the world
economy, there is a whole group of countries aspiring to reach the levels of
the  top three  and as a result of narrow  specialisation and resources they
will soon catch up with them.
     Is it then  true that  economic power will move from the USA and Europe
to Japan? A number of academics seem to believe this. I believe that this is
possible but that it will be a short-term and  limited trend.  The reason is
that  the  global market  is  now strongly influenced by  significant market
forces  which  are  capable of  balancing  out the economic  levels  of  the
country.  Only  with  strong  protectionism or  as  a  result  of  political
cataclysm  will  one  country  or  another  be able to reach  a situation of
monopoly or privilege. During the entire period of the  20th century only as
a result of political  and military conflicts has one or a  group of nations
been able to establish such a position of privilege which has transformed it
into a political force.
     This  time  is  over.  No-one  any  longer recognises  the legality  of
protectionism or  uses  political  arguments  in the resolution of  ordinary
economic  issues.  The choice  is  great and the competition  offers  better
alternatives. Manufacturers  and merchants in the  whole world  are  forcing
their governments to remove prohibitions and  limitations. There is a number
of cases where the opposite is true,  for example the European  agricultural
policies  and the limitations on import into Japan.  However,  no-one can be
convinced of the strategic benefit of such policies. The Fourth Civilisation
offers simultaneously the gradual  approximation of  economic levels and the
creation  of  similar,  equitable conditions for economic  activity and  the
mutual  conditionality  of these two processes. The  20th century opened the
way  for  this  process  which  is irreversible  whatever  difficulties  the
transition might bring.
     Despite  the  influence  of  Japanese  commercial,  manufacturing   and
investment  expansion and  despite  the  fact that in the  1970's and 1980's
Japan was the most  dynamic economic force in the  world, I believe it  will
not be remain single most powerful leader of the world economy. The economic
dynamics of South Eastern Asia will continue but  this will  give  rise to a
reverse wave of investments to other regions and countries.  It is true that
in  the last  15 years the USA  has lost a part  of its  share of the  world
market and Japan has increased its market share by 15%. The  American  share
of the heavy machinery market has fallen from 25% to 5%  in  30 years  while
Japan has increased its share  from 0% to 22%[58].  However, even
this  cannot  convince  me  that  this  process  will  continue  to  develop
unilaterally  and that the Japanese economy will dominate while the American
economy will flounder as this  was once predicted  by the former director of
the European Bank, Jacques Atalie.
     I am writing these  lines early in  the  morning in perhaps one of  the
least American and the most Japanese  of the United States of the America. I
can see  through my  window the  waking lights of the beautiful capital city
and  perhaps  one  of the  most  beautiful places in  the  world.  My  first
impression  is that  the  atmosphere  is  mainly  Asian  and  in  particular
Japanese. Only the  liberal  spirit of the  USA  could allow  for  the  mass
concentration  of Japanese,  Chinese, Korean and Vietnamese influences in  a
single, albeit island, state. It is here that I can understand the arguments
in  favour of another type of thinking, that the majority of the older Asian
immigrants as  well as the new arrivals consider themselves to be  Americans
or  at least citizens of the  world and that  Honolulu  has become  a bridge
between  the  USA  and  Japan  and  that it is  such  bridges which create a
balanced market.
     Japan and the smaller Asian "dragons" cannot  become the masters of the
world. However, they have indisputably destroyed the economic, technological
and financial monopoly of the Atlantic countries of the USA and Europe. They
have  created  conditions  for  a  completely   new  distribution  of  world
manufacturing production and hitherto  unknown geo-economic  structures.  In
the  19th century Britain and France and  eventually Germany  dominated  the
world. During the first half of the 20th century the USA and the USSR caught
up and eventually became the world leaders in a bi-polar world. Between 1960
and  1990 Japan  indisputably  became  a member of  the family of the  world
economic leaders  and this  list will  continue to grow. There are  at least
another 5 or 6 countries in the next 20--30 years which will win significant
economic positions and will find  their niches in the world market, balanced
between the old  leaders. At the end  of the 20th century and clearly at the
beginning of the 21st century the stimulus will continue to  come  from Asia
-- not only  from Japan but also from China  where  the growth  rate  at the
beginning of the 1980's deserves admiration, from Australia  whose resources
and its  "bridge" policies between the USA, Asia and Oceania  have  given it
tremendous  advantages and from Indonesia and the Philippines which are also
making strong progress.
     There are good  grounds  to  expect that at  the beginning of the  21st
century the  more powerful Latin American  economies will also begin to move
ahead beginning no  doubt with Brazil. If  they achieve political  stability
and  a  balanced  process  of  denationalisation  then a  number of  Eastern
European  economies  will  also  begin to  make  progress. Russia  with  its
colossal, untapped resources will also begin to play a serious role.
     I am leading to a statement of  my opinion that further economic growth
will of  necessity require the  removal of economic monopolism. Despite  the
ambitions of  dictators,  selfish politicians and  militant  ideologues  the
globalisation of the world has not lead to the economic domination of one or
two countries or  individual  governments.  At the  end  of the 20th century
there  is also another clear growing trend which will  be predominant in the
New  Civilisation. I could  call this  "economic polycentrism" or  in  other
words, the trend towards the re-distribution of economic  power and strength
between a larger  number  of countries with the  gradual involvement  of new
ones.  It  should  not  be  considered  that  such  a trend towards economic
polycentrism will summon in  a "glorious  future".  There  is  not  a single
country  (or group  of  countries)  which  can independently control  global
finance, natural resources or the markets. There is no one country  which is
in a condition to force the others to  follow it. Directly after the fall of
the Berlin Wall the theory of the "responsibility of the single super power"
become popular. Some  people in the  USA  between 1991--1994 developed  this
idea, combined it with the American dream and  tried to establish a complete
doctrine  on  this basis.  Fortunately, the majority of American politicians
and the  majority  of American intellectual  elite have  realised that  this
concept is unreal and have rejected it. During my many meeting with American
politicians and diplomats  in  the  State  Department  of  the  USA  between
1995--1996 I became growingly aware of the rejection of  this  idea but also
of  the impossibility of this task  from  the point of view of finances  and
resources.  The experience of the USSR  and the USA during the last 50 years
has shown categorically that to take on the role of a  world super  power to
defened  the  sovereignty  of the  remaining  states  means  to take  on  an
unsupportable financial burden. The collapse of the USSR and the growing gap
between the  USA  and  Japan  are  to a  large  extent due to  the burden of
military expenditure.
     Polycentrism is at the root of world  economic development  and at  the
root of democracy. It  is  a counter-trend to the experiences of imperialism
which has dominated world politics for the last 150 years.

     4. IS THERE A NEED FOR GLOBAL ECONOMIC REGULATION?

     If the global economic world is becoming more  polycentric is there not
a  danger of permanent  chaos? Is global economic regulation a way  to avoid
it...?

     T
     he new  civilisation  which  humanity is  entering is the antipathy  to
imperialism. Instead  of the  super powers and the great powers of the Third
Civilisation the main trends of the Fourth Civilisation are polycentrism and
the  possibility  for  an  increased  number  of  countries  and  people  to
participate fully  in  the  international  division  of  labour.  The mutual
dependency of the countries and state leaders make this process sustainable.
To this we should  add one more element which was discussed in chapters five
and  six, the transfer of a significant portion of the economic power of the
nation state  to corporations, companies and individuals or, in other words,
organisations  and the civil society. The combination of these two processes
has lead to great changes in global economic structures but has also posed a
number of new  questions  of principle about  world development in  general.
During the past four  or five  hundred years everything  seemed to be clear:
all  dependended  on  the  state  and  their   monarchs  or  leaders,  later
governments  and parliaments.  Today things have altered significantly.  The
multi-national corporations control the  major processes of the global world
and  more and  more people including  political leaders realise that this is
the  case.  The  lack  of  correspondence  between   globalisation  and  the
nationally organised  activities of governments  could  lead  the world into
serious new crises as was discussed in chapter three.
     If politicians are aware that they are losing their grip over power and
realise  that  they  cannot  guarantee  their  election  promises  to  their
electors, what  should they do? The most logical  solution  would be for the
large international companies  to assume  national  responsibility  for  all
their activities and to be put under some sort of legal control. This should
also  extend  to  the  investments  of  large  sums  of  money  abroad. Such
experiments have  been made and will continue  to be made.  The results  are
usually  disastrous since they lead to the "closure" of the national economy
depriving it of any possibility to  rationalise its  manufacturing industry.
If  any  particular  government  or  parliament  imposes   limitations  upon
companies which are acting within their jurisdiction,  then they will simply
leave  the country and  will  find  other  more  accommodating partners  and
patrons.  Experiments to impose  limits  on the movement of  capital  or  to
impose  direct  influence  on  the  management  of  corporations  in  modern
conditions is doomed to failure. Such methods are within the  arsenal of the
outgoing civilisation.
     So  there  remains another possibility,  the creation  of  an  adequate
system of global economic regulation. The aim of this new system is  to form
common  economic  conditions  and  regulations  for  the  activities  of all
economic  subjects operating within the global market.  I  am convinced that
sooner  or  later such a system of global regulation will  become a reality.
History cannot be halted. It is not possible to turn back the trans-national
corporations  upon  which  so  much  of modern progress  relies,  nor is  it
possible to delay the progress of globalisation which is stimulated by them.
     Progress means the establishment of a new world economic order based on
the common global rules of  the game. Years perhaps even  decades will  pass
before  such  an  order  is established but  even today the need  for  it is
evident. This  is  the only guarantee against  the  threat  of  a return  to
imperialism,  the widening of  the  gap  between  the  poor and the  wealthy
nations. One must be aware  of two  possible misconceptions,  firstly,  that
there is  a need for the creation of a united world government and secondly,
that the  role could be  fulfilled by the United  Nations. Undoubtedly,  the
generations which will  live through the second half of the 21st century  or
later will find  some  solution  to the matter of a world government. Today,
however, this  is still a Utopia and not only  because it will be derided by
the  vast  majority  of  politicians  but  because  nation  states  have not
exhausted their  functions. For this and  many  other reasons the UN  cannot
take on the responsibility of global governmental functions.
     Globalisation   which  is  being   propelled   by   the  multi-national
corporations and  new technology presupposes the  gradual development, above
all, of a new world economic order. The quicker this takes place, the sooner
humanity will enter a new, more mature stage of its development.
     When  after  the   Second  World  War  the  Brenton  Woods  system  was
established, governments bore the complete responsibility for the management
and movement of monetary flow. The medium and long term transfers of capital
were  managed  by  national governments and  the  international  finance and
currency  organisations. In these conditions  fixed exchange rates played an
important role  as  a stabilising factor and the International Monetary Fund
complemented the  role of the  central banks as a reserve fund.  This system
functioned for three decades.
     The  main reason for  the end of the Brenton Woods system was that as a
result  of  the  turbulent  development  of  world  trade,  the  majority of
international liquid  funds  overflowed beyond  the  limits  of  the  nation
states. This mass of funds  increased by  such a huge amount that the volume
of international currency speculation began to overtake the volume of  trade
in  goods.  In  such  a  situation  the  world  stock  exchanges  became   a
significantly more influential factor than  fixed  exchange rates. With  the
transition  to  floating exchange rates the world  entered  an  intermediate
state. The abilities of the national governments to "manage" their economies
independently became significantly hampered. This was a state of  "paradise"
for the  trans-national corporations and world financial  players. The world
has  lived  with  this system now for more  than  twenty  years.  I  can now
categorically  say  that this  system  based  on  floating  exchange  rates,
enormous  levels  of currency speculation and  the uncontrollable  growth in
government borrowing can last no  longer. We are sitting on top of a  powder
keg as  a result of the  huge mass of  money which is outside the control of
financial institutions. This system has created privileges  for corporations
which  possess  large amounts  of  free  money  and  those  who  exploit the
instability of the system to multiply their billions.
     As an antidote  to the present international practice of "liberalism" I
propose the  logic  of balanced development. This requires the creation of a
set  of common rules  for the movement of monetary flow, compulsory reserves
in  the case  of investments, stronger controls of "off-shore" zones and the
environmental responsibilities of investors etc.. Such measures will lead to
a reduction in interest rates which in turn will be of benefit to the weaker
nations and will lead  to a re-direction of investments into the real sector
of the world economy. I do not know whether there will be enough willingness
or readiness on  the part of governments  and  central banks  of the largest
countries to carry out a common global macro-economic policy on the basis of
general  agreements and long-term accords. The problems could be resolved by
the financial  and  governmental  leaders of  7--10 countries and  given the
current state of the world, the rest would follow.
     The other  possible solution would be to create a real World Bank which
would  guarantee universal  conditions  for  the  exchange of currency and a
single global macro-economic policy. Such an  idea, if it was supported by a
number of  financial experts would  have  a revolutionary, radical character
and might be able to put a stop to instability. I am not convinced, however,
that  at this stage  the national  governments  and the central  banks would
agree to such a  step,  although  I, personally, am strongly in  favour. The
majority of world financial strategists still hope that the Federal  Reserve
System of the USA[59] and the central banks of Germany, Japan and
a number of  other  countries will  be in  a position to  control the  world
currency markets. During the past twenty years this has, more or  less, been
the case. When the world financial markets begin to "hit below the belt" the
central  banks  of  the  major  countries  coordinate  their  activities  to
intervene.
     There is sufficient evidence to show that this practice is ineffective.
One only has to look back to the collapse of the US dollar against  the  yen
in 1995. This was  a clear enough sign  that the  restoration of  balance is
becoming more  and more difficult and  the powers of the central banks  more
and more inadequate. This process is inseparable from the universal logic of
the collapse of  the institutions  of the Third Civilisation.  First of all,
liberal international economic relations in the last couple of  decades have
caused  the increase  in  the strength of the "free"  players on  the  world
financial markets and made  their  structures  infinitely more  complicated.
Secondly,  the polycentralism  of the  world  economy  has brought many more
national  currencies  into the  "turnover"  of the  world  stock  exchanges.
Despite the interest of many countries the dollar will no longer  be able to
play the role of an international currency.
     Consequently,  there is little likelihood that the  current system will
survive. It will be necessary to begin negotiations on the creation of a new
system of  global  economic regulation or to  develop  an entirely new World
Bank  with similar regulatory  functions. I believe that  there will be more
and  more  support for  the issuing  of a currency which will be  subject to
multi-lateral control and which could be based on the special issuing rights
of the International  Monetary Fund or other forms of securities which could
be issued by a new World Bank.
     The  system of global economic  regulation is an inevitable new feature
of the Fourth Civilisation. We shall gradually have  to become  used  to the
idea of accepting universal standards of  economic and  human activities and
the formation of international courts which will resolve any conflicts which
may arise. These will be above all a series of environmental standards about
which the  people  of the  world are  particulary  sensitive at the  moment.
However, at the same  time  there will  have to  be new  standards  for  the
payment of labour, social security  and  arbitration etc..  It is a shameful
fact  that  many  of  the  trans-national  corporations  have  moved   their
production facilities to  less developed nations to avoid pressure in  other
countries. Recently  a large  number of  workers  in  Ecuador appealed to an
American  court to request compensation  for  being  poisoned by  pesticides
while working for  an American company. It is not clear whether the American
court will be able  to pass  judgement on  matters pertaining to  foreigners
outside  their  jurisdiction.  However, it  is clear  that  the  absence  of
acceptable  international  standards and  an  adequate  international  court
system is a  precondition  for inequality amongst nations. What it cannot do
in  the USA, an  American registered  company may do  in  Ecuador. There are
innumerable examples of such practice in our modern world of inequality.
     One of the  main aims of the  system of global economic regulation will
be the increase  of global savings with a view to the increase  in the level
of investments on a world scale.  The needs for investments in Asia, Eastern
Europe and Latin America are constantly on the increase. As a result  of the
opening-up of the world and  after the  fall of the Berlin Wall the need for
investments will continue to rise until the end of the 20th century  and the
beginning of  the  21st. If the levels of savings reduce as  they did in the
1980's, this will create extremely serious problems and will hold back world
development.
     In  general  terms  the  system of  global  economic regulation is  the
mechanism which will limit and will, eventually, put a stop to the processes
of the  chaotic  development of  the  world  economy.  This would  provide a
stimulus to the development of  many countries creating the  opportunity for
the gradual balancing of  the economic levels of the  countries of the world
assisting  in the formation of universal world criteria for economic growth.
Sooner or later this system will become reality.  The  problem is for people
to become aware of its necessity sooner rather than later.

     5. VIVAT EUROPA AND THE DEATH OF THE INTROVERTS

     One of  the possible scenarios for the future  is  the division of  the
world into  regional blocs.  Is there a risk that the integration  of Europe
and the aspirations  of the Europeans  to create  a common home will lead to
the  new division of the  world  or will  globalisation turn  the regionally
integrated blocs into marginal powers...?

     T
     he establishment of the  global institutions of the Fourth Civilisation
will take place from the bottom up through a gradual process of the transfer
of  the  rights  of  the  national  governments,  legislative  and  judicial
institutions to international organisations. The best example in the history
of  humanity  is the  unification of Europe: from  customs  unions, the free
movement  of  people, capital and  knowledge, the  creation  of  a  European
parliament,  government  and court to  the  decisions  to  create  a  common
European monetary  union (EMU) and the single currency (EURO). Over a period
of 30 years the builders of the European Union have not only established the
Common Market  on  the  basis  of  tremendous  dedication  and  created  the
foundations for universal citizenship but  also created a common  feeling of
belonging  for all the citizens  of the member countries.  In answer to  the
opinion  poll  carried  out by the "Eurobarometer"  in  July  1994 "Are  you
frightened of  or  do  you  believe in the European Market?",  53%  believed
strongly or relatively  strongly, 35% were afraid  or  relatively afraid and
12% had no opinion. I  mention these statistics here because I want to prove
the most unbelievable fact that only fifty years after the most  destructive
war in  Europe, former enemies have  realised that the borders  between them
are of little significance and that the road to progress is not through  war
and disputes but via a single market.
     There is no need to dwell on the details of European integration. There
are literally hundreds of books written on the subject which say practically
all there is to say. For the  needs  of my study, the European experience of
integration has a different  meaning.  If  the advocates of  integration  in
Europe succeed (and they almost have) this will have an exceedingly positive
effect  on global processes. The European  Union has proved in practice that
the processes of integration are stronger than national prejudices. It is no
accident  that  the European  continent which  during the  20th  century has
suffered more than any other region of the world has managed to overcome its
divisions and  the selfishness  of its national interests. Europe has learnt
from its suffering and torment. More than 60 million Europeans died in world
and civil wars in the 20th century alone.
     The collapse  of the Berlin  Wall and the unification of the two halves
of the divided  Europe was of particular  significance for  the pan-European
processes.  It   posed  the  question  of  whether  the  model  of  European
integration  can be applied in other parts of  the world. Would this example
be followed in  North  and Latin America  or  Asia? Are  the European Union,
NAFTA  and  the far-Eastern  processes of integration  comparable? Would the
regional processes of integration push globalisation to one side?
     One of  the possible scenarios  for the future is  the division  of the
world into regional trade blocs. The European market and currency union, the
North American Free  Trade  Agreement (a new  version based on the  old 1960
agreement), The Caribbean  Common Market and a new far-Eastern zone for free
trade are trading blocs which could become a basis for conflict. There are a
number of writers,  L.Thorou, for example who believe that  the 21st century
will be a time of regional trade blocs and their  selfish domination of  the
world.
     There are  a number  of political concepts based on this.  The USA will
distance itself from  Europe.  Europe  will strengthen its  borders with the
East to  isolate Russia. Military security will coincide with the borders of
the integrated regions etc.. Such ideas are logical only if the intellectual
horizons  of  the advocates  are  no  further than  the ends of their noses.
Regional  isolation within the  limits  of  whatever  integrated  bloc is an
extremely dangerous prospect.  It  will lead to  a chain reaction within the
whole world and the creation  of similarly isolated  regions within American
and Asia. While there is little  likelihood of  this taking place within the
new  Asian  dragons, or the  newly  confident  Latin  American  economies or
Australia,  this  prospect  does  not  look  too  improbable for Europe. The
European  syndrome of  "protecting one's achievements" and "strengthening of
one's borders" in order not "to let chaos take over"  is  still alive and in
real danger of being provoked.
     Of all the  autonomous economic  regions  in  the  world  at the moment
Europe  is one of  the  most  closed.  Its  internal  exchange of  trade  is
extremely  high it  providing  between  60  and 80% of the imports into  the
larger  countries of the Union. While  as the  European economy  is strongly
dependent  on  Asian  markets,  its  investments  in Asia  have  reduced  in
comparison to American levels. Europe cannot profit from this "integrational
introversion". It profits from its own integration but is losing as a result
of  its introversion  and from the lack of sufficient aggression in relation
to  other markets. This  is further stimulated by the fact that the share of
national ownership in Europe is significantly higher than in  other parts of
the world.
     At the end of 1995 there was a meeting in Spain of the leading European
industrialists.  I  was  able  to  talk   to  one  of  the   major  European
industrialists after the conference, the president of the Swiss company ABB,
David de Puri. The European industrialists understand the simple  truth that
"openness is at the root of success". They  are in favour of the "more rapid
integration of  the countries  of Central and Eastern Europe into the common
European market" and also that it is up to the "Europeans to re-discover the
open world economy". I quote  the opinion  of David de  Puri not only out of
respect for his undisputed talent as a global leader but also because of the
significance  of his views in general. Each regional  integration, including
European integration will be successful if it takes into account the laws of
globalisation and if it finds its place within the open  global world. There
is no doubt that if the  European  Union becomes transformed into  a more or
less closed community,  if  it becomes a closed  bureaucratic multi-national
state, this will reduce its prospects. As a Bulgarian politician I am firmly
in  favour of the acceptance of Bulgaria as  a member  of the European Union
and  I  believe Bulgaria  to  be  part of the  European cultural  tradition.
However, I am not  blind. Europe is the richest part of the world, with  the
vast majority of historical and cultural archaeological sites and monuments.
However, it  is only  one part  of  the world. In the  same way as  I cannot
accept the term  Americanisation,  Westernisation  or Japanisation, I cannot
accept the term Europeanisation. I would like to be able to shout out, "Long
Live  Europe",  "The  end of  European  isolation",  "The  end  of  European
introversion" -- "Yes, to the open world!"
     This brings me to  my main conclusion. The regionalisation of the world
is possible and  a probably  inevitable stage in world  integration,  of the
transfer  of  the  authority of  the  nation  states  to the  supra-national
economic and political institutions.  Regional integration is typical of the
transition between the  Third and the Fourth Civilisation. It was typical of
almost the whole of the  20th century during  which alliances between states
began  to take on more long term features. After  the  Second World War they
took on  an  economic character. On the eve the new  century,  however,  the
regional processes of integration  will  become more and more subordinate to
global  processes.   The  globalisation  of  financial,  raw   material  and
information  markets  will  not permit  anyone,  including  the champions of
integration from Europe to close themselves up from everyone else. This will
just be ineffective and of no benefit to anyone.
     The  Fourth   Civilisation   will   accept  the  regionally  integrated
formations  as a intermediate  stage  in  the  framework  of the polycentric
organisation of the world economic order. For a certain period of  time they
will make  up for the absence of global  economic  regulations without being
able  to  replace  it  completely. Thus,  step  by step, stage  by stage the
structures and  the  institutions  of  the  new  human  civilisation will be
formed.

     6. THE BALANCING OF ECONOMIC LEVELS

     The balancing  of economic levels of countries is also as important  as
their opening-up to the world. Each of these processes is impossible without
the other.

     G
     lobalisation  and  regionalisation,  economic  polycentralism  and  the
openness  of  countries,  trans-national  corporations  and  global economic
regulation, the new  global  communications and the reduction of the role of
the nation states,  the deregulation and socialisation of ownership -- these
features best describe the economic essence of the Fourth Civilisation. This
could also  be  called global reconstruction or  a new  economic  order or a
number  of other titles.  Countries  are opening  up to each other but  this
inevitably requires the balancing of economic levels of development. Each of
these categories is impossible without  the other at least at the end of the
twentieth century.
     Today there are 1  billion  rich people in  the world, 2 billion people
with medium income and 3  billion poor people. It may be madness to speak of
the balancing of economic levels in such conditions. However, if there is to
be a new economic order based on the criteria  of the New Civilisation  this
is not impossible. To ignore  the problems of  poverty and  the widening gap
between the poor and the rich countries  is not only amoral but ineffective.
If  the  world  continues  to be divided into rich metropolises  and a  poor
periphery this will  lead to  further isolation.  Sooner or later  this will
give  rise to further serious conflicts and new utopias and  a new return to
totalitarian doctrines. Rich countries will not benefit from this.
     Rich people do not like to live next  door to poor families  since they
feel  that this will affect them. In the  same way in the global village the
rich  countries will  be faced with more and more problems from  the  poorer
countries.  Earlier in the book I wrote about the problems of realisation of
poverty by the poor and their possible reactions. Now I am writing about the
slow but  inevitable process  of  realisation of poverty on the part of  the
rich.
     The balancing out of economic levels of countries and nations will be a
slow and drawn-out process. It is a general  consequence, a common result of
all the structural and institutional changes which will accompany the advent
of the Fourth Civilisation. The huge level of imbalanced development between
the countries  and  nations is  caused by the disintegrational processes  of
isolated  development  of  nations  during  the  past  three  civilisations.
Different tribes and later national communities  developed in the context of
completely new  climatic conditions, resources and socio-political  context.
It is entirely  logical  that certain nations  should develop  further  than
others. First of all the Shumerians and  the Egyptians, then the Greeks  and
the  Romans followed by  the  Chinese and  the Indians. By the  15th century
there was already a clear trend towards European  domination over  the other
countries  of the world. It is only now at  the end of the 20th century that
this domination could be said to be coming to an end.
     What are the differences in the development of the individual countries
of the  world now in the  20th century? If we take as  our basis the GDP per
head  of  population we  can divide  the  countries of  the world into three
groups, the rich with a GDP per head of population  of more then 10,000 USD,
the  medium-rich with a GDP of 2-10,000 and the poor with a GDP of less than
2000 USD.


     Table 10

     Gross    Domestic    Product    per     head    of    population    (US
Dollars)[60].

     Wealthy countries
     Medium wealthy
     Poor countries

     Switzerland
     Luxemburg
     Japan
     Bermuda
     Sweden
     Finland
     Norway
     Denmatk
     USA
     Iceland
     Canada
     Germany
     France
     Austria
     UAE
     Belgium
     Italy
     Holland
     U.K.
     Australia
     Brunei
     Qatar
     Hong Kong
     Singapore
     Spain
     New Zealand
     Israel
     Bahamas
     Ireland
     33,515
     30,950
     26,919
     26,600
     25,487
     24,396
     24,151
     23,676
     22,560
     22,362
     21,254
     21,248
     20,603
     20,379
     20,131
     19,295
     18,576
     18,565
     16,748
     16,595
     16,554
     15,484
     13,192
     12,869
     12,461
     12,136
     12,092
     11,708
     10,789
     Cyprus
     Taiwan
     Kuwait
     Dutch Antibbes
     Saudi Arabia
     Malta
     Bahrain
     Barbados
     Greece
     South Korea
     Puerto Rico
     Lybia
     Portugal
     Macao
     Estonia
     Gabon
     Trinidad
     Surinam
     Latvia
     Russia
     Belorus
     Fm. Yugoslavia
     Brasil
     Mexico
     Uruguay
     Argentina
     Czech Republic
     Lithuania
     Hungary
     Cuba
     Venezuela
     Botswana
     Malaysia
     South Africa
     Kazakhstan
     Mauritius
     Ukraine
     Iran
     Moldova
     Chile
     8,641
     8,546
     8,520
     7,300
     7,300
     7,217
     7,075
     6,581
     6,498
     6,356
     6,338
     5,842
     5,626
     5,417
     3,829
     3,777
     3,620
     3,585
     3,418
     3,220
     3,111
     2,956
     2,921
     2,874
     2,860
     2,794
     2,714
     2,711
     2,690
     2,620
     2,614
     2,585
     2,503
     2,474
     2,467
     2,429
     2,336
     2,205
     2,176
     2,163
     Ruanda
     Vietnam
     Malawi
     Laos
     Burundi
     Bangladesh
     Madagascar
     Zaire
     Chad
     Cambogja
     Afganistan
     Nepal
     Buthan
     Uganda
     Ethiopia
     Somalia
     Tanzania
     Mozambique
     Sierra Leone
     261
     227
     227
     226
     216
     216
     213
     213
     211
     208
     199
     195
     178
     177
     164
     116
     100
     86
     72


     All  the countries  of  the  first group are inseparably linked to  the
world  economy.  They  have  open economies and a relatively stable position
within the international  distribution of  labour. One  part  of  the second
group has the potential of catching up with the  first if they are permitted
to  participate  in  the  integrational  processes  and  are  provided  with
sufficient  investments.  Greece,  Portugal,  Mexico,  China,  South  Korea,
Hungary  and  the  Czech Republic, Poland,  Estonia,  Lithuania  and Latvia,
Brazil, Venezuela, Thailand, Malaysia, The Republic of South Africa and even
Kazakhstan  have  sufficient potential to  make serious  advances.  Table 10
shows a third group of countries whose position is practically hopeless  and
whose manufacturing structures are hundreds of years behind that of the most
developed countries.
     Of  course, the GDP criterion  is not exhaustive.  It  only  shows  the
actual productivity of  the world population. Many  countries in the  second
group will face  problems due to the  high costs  of servicing their foreign
debts,  especially when compared with GNP. Table 11 shows this ratio for  40
countries whose manufacturing  industry  is not in  a  position  to  pay the
rapidly  accumulating  foreign   debts.  15  of  them  are  medium-developed
countries including  Hungary,  Poland,  Bulgaria,  Malta,  South  Korea  and
others. Of  course, the foreign debt problem  will hamper attempts  to reach
the necessary level of economic development.
     The paradox of  the transition  to the Fourth Civilisation is that  one
group of  countries is already within  its embraces,  another is standing at
the  threshold while a third group is still living  within the conditions of
the pre-industrial era. The  majority of  the population of Tanzania, Kenya,
Mozambique, Nigeria and other countries still live in huts. Large numbers of
children in Somalia, Ethiopia, Ruanda  and  Congo are dying  of  starvation.
Given such a situation, are  we right to pose the  question of the balancing
of economic  development? I believe  that  we are right and that this is the
only way for the New Civilisation to establish itself.

     Table 11

     Foreign Debt as a percentage of Gross National Product[61]

     Syria
     Bolivia
     Uganda
     Oman
     Costa Rica
     Bangladesh
     Pakistan
     Bulgaria
     Tanzania
     Cyprus
     Mozambique
     Ghana
     El Salvador
     Kenya
     South Korea
     Papua New Guineau
     Tunisia
     Poland
     Lebanon
     Malta
     728,4
     426,0
     283,4
     262,6
     250,8
     225,3
     222,6
     221,7
     214,7
     181,7
     167,5
     155,9
     148,3
     142,4
     130,2
     129,9
     118,1
     114,5
     113,8
     109,8
     Mauritius
     Hungary
     Ethiopia
     Zaire
     Barbados
     Zimbabwe
     Panama
     Sri Lanka
     Dominican Rep.
     Togo
     Gabon
     Benine
     Jordan
     Egypt
     Nepal
     Nigeria
     Uruguay
     Laos
     Cameroon
     Lesotho
     109,2
     108,8
     104,9
     95,4
     94,8
     89,6
     88,1
     88,1
     85,3
     85,0
     84,6
     82,3
     81,0
     80,0
     79,0
     77,0
     73,6
     72,9
     72,6
     71,5


     If the existing world  structures and the  liberal  structures  of  the
world economy are preserved, the gap between  the most develop and the least
developed  countries will continue to increase. Only  in the  last  30 years
this  gap  measured on the basis GDP per head  of population has doubled. If
these  policies continue in the future there will be no  significant change.
It  is  true that  the economic development of  China and the smaller  Asian
"dragons" and the expected  revival in  the economies of Latin America  to a
certain extent will fill this vacuum. However, this is not the case for many
countries in Africa or for another fifty or so poorly developed states where
there is little hope .
     The pure market  approach will not  guarantee balanced development  for
another reason. 8-10 of the first group of the most developed countries will
for some time to come continue to "rule the world" and to aspire to the role
of an independent economic regulator. I am not saying that the global market
will  not impose  limits  on  this  trend  but  the intense competition  for
investments  in the developed  countries will give  the poorer  countries  a
chance and  will  force investors to  take risks. However, this will not  be
sufficient. I  believe that the  decisive  factor will  the  combination  of
market trends  with  global regulation  which will  stimulate  a significant
increase in investments from the wealthier to the poorer nations. Of course,
each  of   them  will  have  to  take  additional  responsibility   for  the
establishment of stability, order  and  the  fight  against  corruption  and
crime.  For  the  moment  things  have been  left  to  the  interest of  the
multinational  groups.  With  certain  notable   exceptions   this  has  not
stimulated  the  improvements  to  infrastructure  in  the  poorly-developed
countries which they need for further economic development.
     The problem of world poverty and in a broader context  -- the balancing
out of economic levels  will  be resolved at  a global  level. This will  be
accomplished by the United Nations, the IMF or the World Bank but above all,
by changes in  the  world economic order and the creation of institutions of
global economic regulation. Certain statesmen, including the  late President
of  France, Francois Mitterand,  believed  in the  need for  a comprehensive
agreement  between the  North and  the South,  between the rich and the poor
states. This was a good if  not  realistic idea. I believe that it  would be
much more effective  to develop  specific economic programmes for individual
countries aimed at the  stimulation and  guaranteeing of private investments
via specialised  funds and the integration of  the poor  states in the world
economy. Only  about 2% of the global military budget would be sufficient to
carry out such programmes, or  about  10-12 billion US dollars.  This  would
give a powerful impetus to the process of resolving  the  problems of hunger
and  illness,  the  reduction in the birth  rate and the  creation  of  more
sustainable forms of income for specific populations.
     The  balanced development of the  world requires  a change in direction
from  charity and  hand-outs to  policies  aimed  at  changing the  economic
infrastructure of the least developed nations in  the world. It is true that
this will not at all be easy and that the reduction of military budgets does
not mean  the sudden  release of  huge funds  for investments. In many cases
these funds will "sink"  out of sight as a result of corruption, the lack of
organisation  and  the  desperation  of   the  hungry.  However,  these  are
inevitable difficulties which should not stop the process.
     If humanity and especially the wealthiest nations  do  not take serious
steps  to change the trends in the development of the poorest nations,  this
will  lead to  the  appearance of new utopias,  open the  way  to  religious
fanaticism and  confrontation and  incite new local, regional and even world
wars. If humanity finds the strength within itself to begin the processes of
resolving this matter this will lead to  a change in the  face of the earth.
New opportunities will be  opened up  not  only to  the people  of  the poor
countries but to all. What seems impossible and too expensive as an approach
to  the struggle against poverty in actual fact will save money in  the long
run because future  generations  will not have to pay the bill. Such are the
laws of the mutually dependent global world.

     Chapter Nine
     THE CULTURE OF THE FOURTH CIVILISATION
     1. THE BEATLES, MICHAEL JACKSON AND
     THE BULGARIAN CAVAL

     Some of the strongest driving forces of the Fourth Civilisation are the
new   global  communications.   They   permit  not  only  the   simultaneous
distribution  of information products  all over the world  but  also promote
cultural  images and  standards,  universal  models and  styles. With  every
passing day the world is being taken over by a new universal culture.

     W
     hen  I heard the Beatles for the first time in 1966 I was 12 years old.
This was  in  Sofia  at a  time  when television,  radio  and the newspapers
divided the world into the "good"  (socialism) and the "bad" (capitalism) in
the  most terrible and  primitive manner. The Beatles  came  into our small,
closed country via the radio. I remember that first of all, one or two of my
classmates and then almost  everyone began to swap information about them --
who  they were, where they came from and we began to learn  off by heart the
titles and the melodies of  their songs. The popularity of the Beatles began
to worry some of those responsible for education in  Bulgaria I remember one
day our teacher saying to us, "Even if we like their music, the way in which
they dress and their behaviour is unacceptable".
     This fact  alone demonstrates that the Beatles were much more than just
music and that they were much more than just another  pop-group. From  their
appearance  in  Liverpool  and  their  first  concerts in Scotland in  1963,
Germany  and  Britain  the  Beatles  transformed their  music into  a  world
cultural and  social  phenomenon.  The entire youth of the 1960's and 1970's
took  John  Lennon, Paul Macartney, George Harrison and  Ringo Star to their
hearts.
     In  1964  and  1956  the  Beatles  conquered  Europe,  North  American,
Australia and New  Zealand. In 1966, much to surprise of  the sceptics, they
took Japan and the Philippines by storm. Their concerts  in Tokyo and at the
national stadium in Manilla  were no  less successful than their concerts in
Europe and  America.  The  sensation  was  undisputed. It was a  new  global
phenomenon for  which there were no borders or, perhaps, which destroyed the
existing cultural barriers and prejudices. Beatles'  records went all around
the world and their songs were sung in Africa, Asia and in Latin America.
     The Beatles were a phenomenon of special  cultural value. For the first
time  a pop-group had achieved such universal global fame. This is, however,
not to  underestimate other such famous performers such as  Elvis Presley or
Edith Piaf  or  Caruso. Although each  of  them was a part  of the  cultural
treasury of the 20th  century, the Beatles  phenomenon was  an expression of
and the beginning of something entirely new.
     The undoubted reason for their  success was the talent of the musicians
from Liverpool.  However, if  they had been born 30 years earlier with  even
greater  talent  they  would have not  achieved  such  colossal success. The
Beatles appeared  at the moment when the electronic media  had  just begun a
global revolution. This was  not only a matter of  electric guitars but  the
new means of information transfer and the speed and methods of disseminating
new cultural images. The Beatles were the first swallows of the new era  and
heralds  of our current civilisation.  The process  of the  globalisation of
world culture began with  the Beatles. New musical  styles  began  to appear
within a given  country, in a particular  town or bar but as a result of the
electronic media they became international and lose their local and national
significance.
     The language of music is a language equally understandable  in all  the
corners of the world. It was logical to expect music to be the main and most
natural channel for  the dissemination of  universal  cultural  symbols  and
images  and  that  music would  be  the  starting  point for  the process of
globalisation of culture.
     Moreover, together  with the dissemination  of  cultural images created
within one individual state the  1960's were  also  a time of the  intensive
intermixing of  cultural styles and  the  search for points of  intersection
between formerly  autonomous national and cultural  traditions. The  Beatles
looked to the cultures  of India  and Japan for some of their motifs. In the
1970's  many   African  and  Latin  American  musicians  gained  significant
popularity.
     Generally speaking, in culture as in economics there were  two types of
phenomena which  could no longer  be defined  as purely  national either  in
terms  of  their significance nor  in  terms  of  their specific  legacy  of
cultural  traditions.  Some symbols  appeared in a local  context  and  then
gained  global  recognition.  Other   appeared  as  a  result   of  cultural
intermixing and the creation of cultural models and styles which organically
combined or synthesised individual national cultures.
     What  national and  cultural  style is  expressed today by the music of
Michael Jackson? The Anglo-Saxon cultural tradition? Hardly.  The culture of
black  America?  Yes, to a  certain extent. As he grew more independent  and
more  creative, his  music became  more primal separated from local concepts
and traditional criteria of beauty and aesthetics.  Michael  Jackson's style
and his songs  have been  influenced by  a number  of cultures. However, his
primal attraction  and personal musical energy are products of a time  which
does  not recognise  national borders  and which  forms  global cultural and
aesthetic standards of beauty and values.
     In  previous centuries  cultural  influences  were  imposed  mainly  by
coercion and they tended to effect only individual parts of the world. Today
modern global  communications and  the global media do not only  disseminate
the  best  manifestations  of global culture but  also  require the creative
artists  to observe the  new cultural criteria and  requirements  of the new
world art. Anyone who wishes to achieve world fame must be allowed access to
the  hearts and  souls of people in the different  parts of  the world.  The
Beatles  and  Michael  Jackson,  Madonna  and Queen  as well  as  many other
musicians  have  created works  of  music and artistic influences  which owe
their success  to  a  hitherto  unknown  musical  style  and to  the  unique
combination of dynamism and expressivity which knows no national boundaries.
     There have been  similar  phenomena in  the other art forms. Television
and  video,  and  advertising  have begun to penetrate  the whole  of  world
culture. First of all they penetrate a local culture and then in conjunction
with other less culturally specific products form a part of global culture.
     I recently listened to an interview given by the world famous  designer
Lacroix in  which he was describing his attempts to combine  influences from
different cultures, "Intermixing -- this is the essence of  things". This is
the essence of the new and it is a  logical consequence of the opening-up of
the  world  and  the influence of global communications. The intermixing  of
cultural traditions  is an expression  of the  same synthesis  which is  now
apparent in global economics.
     It  was his death from AIDS  which elevated Freddy Mercury  to a status
perhaps greater than he was in  life. However, Queen's  music was not purely
English or European but a more  universal music of  the  future  world as an
integrated  community. Who does the music of Jean Michel Jarre belong to? It
has nothing in common with the powerful tradition  of the chanson. The music
of Jean Michel  Jarre is a product  of the electronic society  not  only  in
terms  of  technology but  in terms of its historical  significance and  the
beginning of the new  age. The  main result of this process is the formation
of a universal  spiritual and cultural  content  of the world. This is above
all  manifested  in the appearance of a growing  number of cultural products
which have no national borders and limits. Music was the  first of these but
now  similar  processes  are  taking place in the cinema,  fashion  and  art
resulting in  the appearance of millions of new bonds between  the people of
the whole world.
     I  live  in a country with rich and  ancient cultural traditions.  I am
saddened by  the  destruction of traditional culture which  has been  taking
place since  1992.  However, I am  encouraged by  certain  new and important
phenomena -- the combination of the  global culture with national traditions
on the one hand and the adaptation of national traditions  to global trends.
Few people  would recognise the  Bulgarian folk instrument, the Caval. There
are  similar looking wind instruments in  other countries of the  world, but
the  Bulgarian Caval  in terms of  its  construction and  sound  is  unique.
Theodosi Spasov has used it to win many significant international awards and
has  conquered  the hearts  of  many people. His performances have little in
common with the  traditions of  the Bulgarian  Caval. His improvisations are
filled  with the  spirit of the  new and  his compositions  are  a symbol of
modern  musical philosophy. For  this reason  he is understandable anywhere.
There is  no  chronological distinction between his  art  and  that  of  the
greatest modern composers.
     This is only  one example. Many others could be  drawn from the various
areas of art. Most significantly even  the smallest of  world  cultures  can
produce global culture.  All they  need to  do  is  to find the link between
their own identity and the  universal  global  cultural  processes.  Between
1984--1995  the famous  Bulgarian folk-singer  Stefka Subotinova recorded  a
number  of Bulgarian  folk songs  with  a  modern arrangement which achieved
enormous popularity. Other famous Bulgarian pop singers such as Lili Ivanova
and Georgi Hristov  also  combine Bulgarian  and  global  cultural elements.
There are similar processes at work all over the world.
     The most  important conclusion  which  I  draw  here is  that after the
1960's  together   with  the  appearance  and  the  spread  of   new  global
communications  and  the  media  there  also began  a  new  process  of  the
globalisation of world culture or in other words,  the creation of a culture
with  a supra-national character. This  culture  created global criteria and
values,   overcame  national,  cultural  and  religious  prejudices  and  is
undoubtedly an element of  the coming  Fourth  Civilisation  which the  21st
century will bring us. This  culture is creating the  future. It is a bridge
to  it and a bridge  to the unification of new generations from all over the
world.
     This new culture became possible as a result of the mass influence  and
cultural mixing  born by the world media. Satellite television made possible
the removal of  borders without tanks and violence without the dissemination
of  militant  ideology  and   doctrines.   The  world  is  united  with  new
communication networks -- a process which will clearly continue with growing
intensity into  the coming  century. This is  the greatest guarantee for the
continued  globalisation of  world culture. A shining example of this is the
creation of television  networks  which cover the entire  globe. It  can  be
easily predicted that  such  global  television  networks will  continue  to
penetrate all the corners of the earth. Part of them will carry information,
some of them will broadcast art, while other will show sports. However, they
will all be the most powerful integrational factor in the world.
     While the collapse of the Eastern  European totalitarian systems  was a
political  revolution,  the  first  part  of  the  collapse   of  the  Third
Civilisation, the new communications will  be the material manifestation  of
the new age. Microchips, computers and satellite televisions spell death for
bureaucracy,  partocracy and  the restrictions of human rights. The Beatles,
Freddy Mercury, Jean  Michel  Jarre and Theodosi  Spasov  are  all  directly
linked. They are but  different manifestations  of one  and the  same global
phenomenon, the globalisation of art and new  cultural dimensions which will
combine  the strongest  national  traditions  with  a new, hitherto  unknown
global culture which will belong to no one single nation.
     Will   national  traditions   and  cultures  disappear?  Will  cultural
differences not become a  reason  for the new division of the world? Is  not
global culture a covert form of media dictatorship? These questions will  be
answered later.

     2. THE TRAVELLING PEOPLES

     Until  only fifty  years  the majority of  people travelled only to the
neighbouring  town or village and  foreign travel was  a privilege of only a
select few. Each subsequent generation bears within itself the spirit of the
global world. Today millions and billions of people travel around the world.
Travel has  become a bridge  over which the peoples  of the world can get to
know one another and exchange their cultures.

     T
     he  globalisation  of world culture has lead  to a  particular form  of
cosmopolitanism  which has  flourished as a  result  of new technologies and
communication.  Cosmopolitanism,  however,  is  not  characteristic  of  all
countries  and peoples  nor is there any direct link between cosmopolitanism
and the level  of technological  and economic progress which a given country
has  achieved.  Switzerland is one of  the  most advanced countries  in  the
world.   However,  they   are  more  conservative  than  cosmopolitan.  They
acknowledge and service the cosmopolitanism  of others without accepting  it
for themselves. Everything depends from an  historical  point of view on the
development  of a given nation, its openness to the world  and  at the  same
time  its  ability to preserve its integrity. Many peoples exiled from their
native lands over the centuries have dissolved into foreign ethnic groups or
have  been simple either  enslaved or  annihilated.  Therefore the  decisive
factors are not only national openness  and mobility but also loyalty to one
roots.
     Those nations  in history which  were the first to  master new forms of
communication were able to  spread their culture to other  states. I like to
refer to these nations as the  "travelling  nations".  In  this process they
achieved  significant  historical  advantages  and  became  leaders  in  the
processes  of  integration.  The modern  world  is  now  dependent  on those
"travelling nations". Joel Kotkin calls them the "global tribes". For Kotkin
these  global tribes  combine a  strong  feeling of loyalty  to their family
roots, observe the principles of national fidelity and despite being  spread
all over  the world identify with one specific geographical area.  According
to  my  analyses  these  global nations are not  only a  continuation of  an
historical tradition but are, above  all, a powerful integrating element  of
the modern world.  In  the  same way  that the ancient  Greeks  spread their
culture to Scythia  and Rome, today the  global nations are amongst the most
effective bridges for the dissemination of capital, technology and  culture.
Each of these peoples left their native land and later established positions
of strength in dozens of other countries and created an invisible network of
families,  relatives or national ties  or channels for the  dissemination of
economic  and  cultural  values.  A  typical  feature  of  these "travelling
nations" is their facility  to become naturalised successfully in  different
countries amongst varying ethnic groups  at  the same time preserving  their
national  roots and traditions.  There  are  several reasons  for this:  the
absence of  a homeland state; colonisation of cultivable lands; migration as
a  result  of wars  and  natural  catastrophes;  political, ideological  and
religious  conflicts. These are  the most  common reasons  which instill the
spirit of the pioneer and traveller.
     The  Jewish  people are a  typical example of  this.  The modern  world
economy and world corporations were founded by Jews. Expelled as a result of
persecution and the lack of their own homeland, as early as the 18th century
the Jewish people  began their own processes of economic integration. At the
time when  everything functioned  within narrow national  borders, the  Jews
exploited  the  differences between  national manufacturing  conditions  and
today it is  no accident that  their representatives are amongst the richest
people in  the world. The  religious prohibition against Christians  lending
money with interest allowed  them to master the secrets of banking. The lack
of their own state institutions and land made  them into the best traders in
the  world.  Perhaps  their  greatest strength  was  the  close  network  of
connections and their efforts to preserve the  traditions of  the old Jewish
families.
     Today  the Jews, the oldest travellers, are  not alone. One might go so
far as to say that  their trans-national monopoly has been taken from  them.
There is another group of peoples  who are keenly following the achievements
of world communications and are gradually  catching  up with, and in certain
cases overtaking, the achievements of the  Jews. The British, the Armenians,
the Chinese, the  Indians and more recently  the Americans and  Japanese are
gradually becoming global nations or in other words, people who are links in
a complex chain  spanning the world  with  millions  and  millions of  other
links.
     Many of these global peoples have specialised themselves in significant
parts of world manufacturing and trade. For example the Jews from generation
to generation have expanded their influence in the  entertainment  industry,
the  world  of finance  and the diamond trade.  The Japanese are  the  world
leaders in precise engineering, in the production of high powered  computers
and  computer  technology. The  Indians  are amongst the  world  leaders  in
software,  the  British  in  banking  and  communications, the Americans  in
telecommunications,  aerospace  engineering  and  the  Chinese   in  textile
manufacture etc..
     Perhaps, the  most important factor is while  preserving their relative
specialisation and  making  their own contributions  to  the global cultural
treasury,  these travelling nations  have helped greatly in the  removal  of
borders between the nations  of the world. Thanks to them the world today is
closely  integrated  and  the  intermixing of  their  cultures  has  reached
tremendous  levels.  The  global world  would be  impossible  without  these
"travelling peoples".
     The preservation of national cultural traditions and tolerance to other
cultures has allowed  them to become some  of the  leading architects of the
new world. At the opposite extreme those  who are isolated and intolerant to
other cultures have no  chance. They will either remain  at  the tail-end of
world  progress or  they  will  incite  conflicts  which  will  have serious
consequences for themselves.  The totalitarian regimes were typical examples
of  this.  Totalitarianism can  flourish  only in  isolation.  The Russians,
Czechs,  Bulgarians and  Poles  were  isolated  from  progress  and the  new
technological revolution  which embraced the world in the 1960's. Today they
are having to redouble their efforts to make up for lost time.
     On the other hand, there is the example of the eternal  Jews. They have
occupied  key  positions in the economic,  cultural  and  political life  of
France, Russia, the United States and the Republic  of South Africa. Members
of the  same  families can be found in London, Paris, New York, Capetown and
even Hong  Kong. It  is  these families and clans which  have been the major
channels for the explosion in world trade over the past 30--40 years.
     Another similar example is that of the Indians who apart from operating
within their own  country  exert strong  influences  in London, Los Angeles,
Chicago  or Lagos. If you visit Nairobi  the capital  of Kenya,  you will be
amazed  to  see  how many  Indians there are in the financial and commercial
sectors. As a result of their powerful navy and great colonial empire in the
19th century, the British have very strong  global positions.  The influence
of   the  British  financial  networks  is  particulary  strong  in  Sidney,
Singapore, Toronto or San Francisco.
     The majority  of the travelling nations became established in  the 19th
century and  the  first half  of  the  20th.  They opened the  way  for  the
globalisation of  the world. They not only gave  birth  to this process they
were  also  its children. Today the "old travellers" are  accompanied by new
"travelling nations" who are more dynamic and  will perhaps make up for what
they missed out on.
     One of the  newest travelling nations are  the  Japanese. They have the
biggest  banks  in the world,  the most progressive  world technologies  and
their own "settlements" within all the world economic  and cultural centres.
I would say that from the 1960's onwards the  Japanese  have spread all over
the world. Some people consider  that this is a planned invasion with a view
to  conquering new  economic  influence  and living  space.  Others  say the
opposite, that the Japanese  economy  is like a  balloon  which if  it is to
avoid bursting needs first to be deflated.
     I do not believe  that from  an historical  point of view any one given
nation can dominate  the rest and by the same token  I do  not believe  that
international Japanese invasion  has reached its apogee. The Chinese and the
Indians will have a hard job to try and take their place. At least until the
beginning of the next century the  Japanese global diaspora will continue to
exert  a strong  influence  on the formation  and  development  of the whole
world.  The  strong  Japanese  influence  on  the  American  economy,  their
penetration  into European economic structures and their strong overtures to
Latin America and  some African countries demonstrate that the Japanese will
continue to  be one  of the leading travelling nations. Only one example  is
sufficient. Each  year the  Japanese  economy  invests huge amounts  of free
capital into  real estate  in the USA and Europe. According to some analysts
almost 40% of the property in the centre  of  Los Angeles  in Japanese.  The
same can be said of the huge skyscrapers in New York. There are thousands of
Japanese enterprises in the USA some of which occupy  leading  positions  in
technology. One of the most prestigious world resorts, the  Hawaiian islands
are owned to a  large  extent by the Japanese. If you walk along the coastal
boulevard at Waikiki beach you are  more likely  to hear  Japanese than  any
other language and you will see  that the majority of the marvellous  hotels
by the beach are Japanese.  What the Japanese  were  unable to achieve  with
their attacks  and their bombs against Pearl Harbour they  have achieved  by
hard work, money and consistency. Today only a few kilometres from the place
where in December 1941 Japanese  bombers inflicted their  most  serious blow
against  the  American Pacific  Fleet there  is a  chain  of luxury Japanese
hotels.
     The Japanese  have two amazing features. They have a tremendous ability
to adapt and  to achieve  progress quietly and consistently. Take  a look at
the  streets  of any  of  the world's large  cultural,  financial or tourist
centre.  Practically  everywhere  you  will  see  Japanese  tourists  taking
photographs, taking notes  and  they are always  in little groups. They  are
soaking  everything  up.  They will  later analyze the information they have
taken  away  with them  and  then  they  will  come  back,  this  time  with
investments  and specific ideas for entering the market, quietly, slowly and
unnoticed.
     The other new  global travellers  who  can be  seen  everywhere are the
Chinese.  According  to  some statistics, the Chinese who  live  outside the
border of China control the larger part of the hard currency reserves of the
world. There are "Chinatowns"  in Los Angeles and San Francisco, Toronto and
New York.  They are becoming  more and more  influential  and add their  own
colour and new cultural phenomena to the countries in which they live. There
is a  growing Chinese  influence in  Japan and Australia. Clearly the reform
government  of  China is trying to emulate the experience of Japan to create
conditions  for new world domination  on the  basis  of traditional  Chinese
domination. If  the  current rate of Chinese economic growth persists to the
end of  the century  and the hard  currency reserves of  the  Chinese living
outside China continue to increase then within 10--15 years they will become
the  most  dynamic  "travelling  nation"  in  the  global  world.  With  new
simplified  procedures,  an  ethnic economy, strong national links,  extreme
hard  work and consistency  -- these are the characteristics which guarantee
great chances of success  for the Chinese. The Indians and the South Koreans
whose  economic elite are  becoming  more  and more self-confident will also
direct their attention to a similar global approach. It can be expected that
the Asian  economies will not only experience an ardent renaissance but that
their  development will have a colossal  global effect. The example of South
Korea and a number of  smaller  Asian  states  is indicative that  it is not
necessarily only the larger peoples which become "travellers" and take on  a
global significance. Perhaps their example will be infectious.
     The collapse  of the bi-polar model and the destruction  of the  Berlin
Wall gave the Eastern Europeans a chance to  discover the advantages  of the
open  world.  Very  soon after 1990--1991  the  Slavs and  in particular the
Russians began to re-settle all over the world. Although  it is too early to
make any sort of conclusion, the Russians seem to be turning into one of the
new  "travelling  nations". The large export  of capital (according  to  the
Russian official figures --  over 40 billion dollars between 1991--1994) and
the creation of a Russian suburb in New York, the purchase of real estate in
London, Paris and  Madrid,  these  are  all features of the  new,  long-term
Russian presence in the global world.
     When I speak of  the  "travelling  nations" I am  not  emphasising  the
leaders of this group. I mean the general trend towards the re-settlement of
people, people travelling  for  the purposes  of business or leisure. People
are no longer restricted  to their own states as they once were. They do not
only travel  to neighbouring countries. Younger generations are losing their
feelings of  loyalty to the country  in  which  they were born  and are more
capable of  living anywhere where there  is a chance of good work and decent
living conditions. For the past 20 years the number of people travelling  by
air has constantly been on the increase. The forecasts for the year 2010 are
particularly significant.

     Table 12

     The number of people travelling on international airlines
     (millions)

     Year

     Passengers
     1986

     318
     2000

     485
     2005

     624
     2010

     789


     Source: The World in 1995. L.,1995.

     As can be seen from table 12, for the next 15 years the number of those
travelling on  international airlines will double. If we also add the number
of people travelling by other means of transport  we will see that more than
one third of the world's population travels to different parts of the world.
Most of the travellers are from the industrialised countries and  there is a
logical  trend  arising, the greater the material progress of a given nation
the more they are inclined to travel.
     The "travelling nations" are uniting the world in an inimitable manner.
Their  families  and  ethnic   and   cultural  connections,  their  national
affiliations unite countries and continents, frequently in spite of official
government policies. They  are the bearers  of  globalisation and  it  is no
accident that  they  produce  the  vast  majority of the  representatives of
global culture.
     Only those nations  which can adapt  to  the  conditions  of new  world
communications  will  be  able   to  survive  and  to  dominate  the   world
intellectually and  economically. The Jews, the  British, the Americans, the
Japanese  and   Chinese  are  the  leading  nations  in   the  processes  of
globalisation. They are immediately followed by the  Indians  and  Armenians
who in their own way  and in  different  scales  have attempted to establish
their own networks. The Armenians are fewer in number  but very closely knit
while the Indians are motivated by their desire to catch up with the rest of
the world. It  should, however, be noted  that very soon the  benefits which
can be gained by "travelling" will be discovered by others. There is a great
likelihood  that the Russians,  Brazilians,  Mexicans,  Nigerians and  South
Koreans will follow in the footsteps of the other "travelling nations".
     Some  people  say  that  the  time  of  ethnic  groups  has  arrived, I
personally believe that now is the turn of the "travellers".

     3. MAN WITHOUT ETHNIC ORIGIN OR THE REBELLION OF ETHNICITY

     No-one can say how many people of mixed blood live on the earth. No-one
can say how many mixed marriages  there are, but one fact is certain -- that
they are on  the increase.  There are hundreds  of millions of people who by
blood or by spirit do not belong to  one nation or group of people. They are
simply citizens of the world or a part of the New Civilisation.

     T
     he  demographic statistics of the  UN  show that about one third of the
modern  world population is  of mixed  ethnic  origin.  This may include the
majority of the population of multinational countries, the children of mixed
international marriages and so on. I am convinced that all the figures which
have been collated in relation to this question are relative  simply because
of  the  different types  of  methodology  used  and  the  lack  of  precise
statistics. There is one  significant element: the more globalised the world
becomes the more people will become the bearers of multicultural traditions.
     This is another demographic aspect of globalisation and global culture.
While the "travelling  nations"  stimulate the  processes of opening-up, the
children  of international marriages are  the truest  expression of  the new
civilisation.  It is not important where a  person is born and what passport
he possesses. Even if  a person is defined as an American, although he is of
Italian-Irish  or  Russian descent or even if he is Tatar-Ukrainian, this is
not  the  most  important. What  is  most  important  is  that  there is  an
increasing  number of  people  in  the world  who  on  the  basis  of  their
behaviour,  their  lifestyle   and  their   value  systems  demonstrate  the
characteristics   of  the  multicultural  society  and  the  intermixing  of
different traditions and customs.
     There is a growing number of people all over the world who are becoming
aware of their  global belonging and regard their specific citizenship  as a
relative and distant concept.  The daily life of  these people  bears little
resemblance to that of their mothers and their  fathers. They may  have come
from India, Egypt,  Zimbabwe or Thailand but they dress like Europeans, live
in apartments with simple  modern  furniture and  eat international cuisine.
Their  ethnic  origins  might  be  expressed only  through  certain national
dishes,  items  used to furnish  their  homes or the  celebration of certain
national feast days.
     With the intermixing of trade and communications and national cultures,
man himself is changing. Little  by little  day  by  day he  is  becoming  a
citizen of the world. Born of a European mother and a  Latin American father
he might wake up  in  an apartment  in New York, watch the world news on the
BBC  and go  to  work in  a Japanese company. He might  lunch  in a  Chinese
restaurant and then go to Russia on  business. This  Mr.X might have a house
which is furnished with  items "made in  the world", he  might have a Polish
wife and  his  children  might  be learning  Italian. There are  innumerable
examples of this. They are the signs of an emerging, unclassified phenomenon
-- the appearance of a universal human culture and common global awareness.
     The main centres of this intermixing  used to be in  university cities,
tourist areas or companies with employees from many countries  of the world.
Today these processes of drastic change are taking place all over the world.
There are certain exceptions, where the women of a  certain country are  not
allowed to marry foreigners or  to have  children by them. The Palestinians,
for example, do this for reasons  of national survival. When the  Jordanians
require the children of mixed marriages to  take  Jordanian citizenship this
is mainly for religious reasons.
     The  ethnic and  the cultural  intermixing of the world  is a slow  and
evolutionary process. It can be seen in cultural adaptation, the use  of one
and the same  language and the  intermixing of lifestyles and cuisine  etc..
Let us take for example language learning.  As can be seen from table 13, at
the  moment there  are 12  major languages in the world. In total  there are
between  4000  and 10,000  spoken languages and between 20--50,000 dialects.
There  is an  undisputed trend towards the gradual disappearance of  a large
number  of dialects and  languages. The process of cultural intermixing also
is taking place  in languages. On  the one hand this is a sign of  the trend
towards  the  use  of a  single or small  number  of  languages as  a global
lingua-franca. To a  great extent this is the role of English. On  the other
hand there  are  a  large  group  of  local  languages  which  thanks to the
electronic  media will survive  and  will  play  a  significant role  in the
survival  of  the culture  of certain  nations.  At the  moment  more than 1
billion people  in the world use English as an international language.  This
is due  to  the fact that the  English  speaking group is the second largest
group of people in the world (table 13) as well as the fact that it has been
the  English-speaking  countries  which have provided  the main  stimuli for
progress  and  that  the  world  media  broadcast  in  English.  English  is
undoubtedly the major language in  North America, one of the major languages
in  Europe  and is used  widely in  Japan, India  and  Latin  America as  an
international language.
     Globalisation will  require sooner or later  one of the world languages
to become a global language. It is very likely that this English will fulfil
this role. This is because the most active processes of globalisation during
the last 50 years  have come about  as a result of the domination of the USA
in the  world  economy.  It is possible,  however, that in  the processes of
economic  polycentralisation English will  lose part of  its  domination  to
French  or  German  or  one  of the eastern  languages such  as  Chinese  or
Japanese.
     Whatever the outcome I believe that the future  of culture and language
lies  in a combination of global language and culture, national cultures and
languages  and  the  unsustainable  cultures and  languages  of the  smaller
nations. There are notably over 2 billion people in the world, mainly in the
poorer countries  who  do not speak any of the  12  major  languages  of the
world.


















     Table 13
     The major languages of the world.


     Chinese More than 1 billion China, Taiwan, Singapore
     English 300-400 million people United Kingdom, USA, Canada, Ireland,
     India, Nigeria, Australis, South Africa
     (official language of 87 nations and
     territories)
     Hindi 250-300 million North Africa, Trinidad, South Africa,
     Mauritius
     Arabic 165 million North Africa, Near East
     Russian 250-300 million Republics of the Former Soviet Union
     Malay 180 million Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei
     Bengali 150 million Bangladesh, India
     Spanish 180-520 million Official language of 20 nations and
     territories in Europe and America
     French 100-150 million Official language in 37 countries and
     territories in Europe, Africa, America
     and Oceania
     Japanese 125 million Japan, minorities in USA and Brasil
     German 150 million Germany, Switzerland, Luxemburg,
     Lichtenstein, Austria and Belgium
     Urdu 50-90 million Pakistan.




     Source: the Universal Almanac 1996 ed. J.Wright, Kansas City, 1995.

     It  is still unclear which  of  them will preserve their languages  and
which of them will fall under the influence of the stronger cultures.
     Neither one extreme, the  disappearance of ethnicities  within a global
culture,  nor  the other,  their isolation  and conservation is  capable  of
answering the  needs of humanity. It has  already  been  mentioned  that the
explosion of ethnic groups is more or less an attempt  at self-defence and a
consequence  of  aggression   against  smaller  cultures   and  nations.  If
migration, mixed marriages and the world media  stimulate the intermixing of
culture, then education and concern for the smaller cultures is a compulsory
precondition for the preservation of local traditions and universal harmony.
The Fourth Civilisation will be an era of global cultural phenomena but also
the preservation of all the smaller cultures which express the  diversity of
the human species. This process cannot be stopped and there  is little doubt
that there will be an  increase in the number of people who  will lose their
"pure"  ethnicity  but  this will not lead inevitably  to the destruction of
national  traditions  and features. There  have been periods throughout  the
history of humanity when the mixing of blood for many nations was considered
shameful.  Many nations  aspired  to preserve the purity of  their roots and
people  through  the purity  of  their blood. The formation  of  nations and
nation states coincided logically with this process.
     The New  Civilisation places the  emphasis on  the moral aspect  of the
common human spirit, the search for the  common elements between  autonomous
cultures and peoples. Only  in this way can the new dimensions of  technical
and  spiritual progress  be  combined with  tolerance, mutual  influence and
unification of difference cultures.  The  other alternative is  isolationism
and conflicts between civilisations  and religions. Whether the 21st century
will be a century of wars between cultures and civilisations as S.Huntington
seems to believe or a century which places the priority on the universal and
humanitarian elements of development -- this is a question of choice between
the past and the future.

     4. GLOBAL AWARENESS

     The  19th and  the 20th centuries were a  time of mass ideology. Global
awareness rejects the closed ideologies of confrontation. It is a reflection
of the common elements which unite the inhabitants of the earth  but also of
the differences between us and our neighbours. Global awareness is the  main
driving  force  of  the  Fourth  Civilisation.  It  is  the  sense  of   the
compatibility and legitimisation of these differences.

     H
     umanity is constantly adapting itself to the common spiritual values of
integration. The integration of manufacturing and communications has lead to
a growing awareness of  the common problems of people and the ways in  which
they can be resolved.
     Religions are a typical expression of this unified awareness. Sometimes
they are imposed through  methods of conviction more frequently by  violence
and  coercion.  Religious  conflicts  over  the  past 2 millennia have  been
struggles between spiritual values and the different systems and  structures
of  human awareness. Homo Sapiens  in his  evolution from the apes inherited
and developed  this  common  awareness. Over  the centuries group ideologies
became more and more massive. General or mass awareness  is reflected in the
common  features and standards of life, in common gods and religions and  in
common spiritual values.
     The industrial age from the end of the 18th century saw a new period of
structuring  of  mass  values.  The unifying  nature  of  existing  dogmatic
religions  was  gradually  replaced   by  unifying  ideologies.  Liberalism,
Marxism,  Leninism, nationalism, fascism and Maoism are just  some examples.
Certain ideologies reject  religious awareness, others try  to adapt  it  to
their  value systems. Until the 19th century violence was  the basic, albeit
limited,  means for the solution of all conflicts between  peoples, cultures
and ideologies. Mass ideologies gave rise to mass violence. The most radical
religious ideologies  of  the  20th century were  undoubtedly communism  and
fascism. Although they were essential different  and  had different economic
bases  they both used violence as a key political method. Zbignew Brzezinski
was correct when he referred to such  ideologies as "coercive utopias". Such
ideological religions allow for only  one  truth and exalt one system as the
true system. They share the  same eternal  ideas and the same  laws of human
society. This is  not only an  expression of  the  primitivism of  Utopia or
subjective  illusions imposed  through coercion  but a definite stage in the
development of humanity. Ideological religions are an expression of the mass
awareness  which  is  caused  by  violent and  radical integration,  by  the
coercive persecution of the rural  population and their  transformation into
industrial  workers,   the  exploitation   of  hired  labour,  the   violent
colonisation  of hundreds of nations and billions of people. Mass ideologies
are the result of violence but also carry its seeds.
     How otherwise is to explain that communism,  the greatest utopia of the
20th  century was accepted by  practically half  of  humanity?  Or that  the
Germans,  Italians, Spanish and Japanese believed  in  fascism?  Ideological
religions  appeared on  the  historical  scene  as  a  result  of the  great
cataclysms of the 19th and 20th centuries but above all  as  a result of the
internationalisation  of  manufacturing  forces  and  spiritual  life.  This
internationalisation  of manufacturing gave birth  to  the illusion that the
world might be  ordered on the lines  of a ready-made political model on the
basis of dogma imposed by a group of people. Utopias become transformed into
mass  credo  only  when  the social  conflicts  and  chaos  have caused huge
destruction. Historically, mass poverty and mass violence have always caused
mass reactions which has prepared the ground for the appearance  of coercive
utopias.
     Ideological  religions  create different  types  of  culture.  In their
extreme forms  these ideologies  have given rise to the cult  of personality
and the exaltation  of leaders. Just as  the ancient peoples prayed to  Amon
Ra, Zeuss or Tangra in the 20th century they prayed  to Hitler,  Stalin, Mao
and Pol Pot. Of course, the cult of personality is not the only type of mass
utopia.  The  ideological  religions  also created  the cult  of the  system
itself, the notion of the future, power and its structures. All this was the
imposition  of freedom of thought. In certain countries  and certain peoples
this type of  mass awareness lead to accompanying forms of daily life, dress
and behaviour humiliating man in favour to ideology.
     One  of the most important consequences of the collapse of the  Eastern
European  totalitarian regimes was the destruction of the totalitarian  type
of mass awareness. The collapse of  the  Berlin wall not only destroyed  the
communist  utopia  but  also  created  the  opportunities   for  the  entire
historical  removal of ideological  religions. Hitler,  Stalin and  Mao  had
aspirations  of  disseminating their  utopian notions over the entire world.
Fortunately  this did not happen. The  destruction of ideological  religions
did not mean the  ideological  and spiritual  division of  the world not the
final removal of the danger of new coercive utopias. The removal of the iron
curtain  does still not mean the final end  to  global inequality,  economic
violence  or  the  impossibility  of  the   appearance  of  new  ideological
religions.  IN order to put a stop to such a danger many things will have to
change in this world.
     Global awareness is radically  different from the ideological religions
and the culture of  the coercive utopia. It is developing as a result of the
new communications and the natural technological progress of humanity. It is
not a consequence of violence and  coercion but of the  modern technological
and cultural revolution.  Its origin has to be looked for in the intermixing
of values and  the criteria for the most  advanced cultures of the world and
in their constant enrichment. The  intermixing  of different cultural values
leads  to the formation of common thought processes with common  foundations
which have began to develop rapidly since the falling of the iron curtain.
     Global awareness  is  the common understanding of people for the common
problems of the world  which cannot  be resolved by one or a single group of
countries or by one or a  group of  peoples. This is the realisation  of the
interdependence of  the world and that the  tragedy of one individual people
might lead to a tragedy  for all. Global  awareness is  also a change in the
hierarchy of human values and in  the extent to which common human conflicts
come  to the fore.  The  enormous problems  of  pollution, the appearance of
holes  in  the ozone layer,  global warming,  the destruction  of  the  rain
forests, AIDS,  cancer and other mass  illnesses  of the  20th  century, the
dangers posed by nuclear  energy and  numerous other problems are  occupying
the  thoughts  of people around the world more and more and motivating their
actions.
     Global  awareness  is reflected  in the growing realisation of a larger
part of  humanity  that only human  rights,  individual  freedom, freedom of
speech and  the  press and  the  gradual improvement in  labour  and  living
conditions  around the world can  guarantee the  preservation  of the  human
species.  The  most  important thing  is  that  in this  way,  gradually but
undeviatingly the common criteria  for good and evil, justice and injustice,
progress  and stagnation are being formed. This is  the basic meaning of the
new  theoretical  and ideological  synthesis which has been  mentioned in an
earlier chapter.
     Global awareness is  developing on the basis of the cultural images and
standards of world significance and which do not belong  to any one national
cultural school. Education and science, information and the media, trade and
finances, sport  and tourism, food and daily life are a part of this growing
awareness.  Today  over  90%  of the adult population  of  the world receive
information from more and more accessible and homogenous sources of culture.
The universal heroes, the universal film  stars, the universal sports  idols
are  all  symbols  of one and the  same phenomenon.  Claudia Schiffer, Naomi
Cambell  and Cindy Crawford are the  greatest models at the end  of the 20th
century because they  are  a  reflection  of the  diversity of the ideal  of
beauty and universal aesthetic standards. The travelling peoples have  taken
their cuisine all  over  the  world  to Latin America, the USA,  Russia  and
Africa. Pele was the world football idol and the death of the racing  driver
Aerton  Senna was  mourned all over the world. The reason is because we  are
becoming  citizens  of  one  global  village  about  which  each  subsequent
generation will know more than we do.
     Today,  global awareness  is still  just a trend  but  a trend which is
developing in  the space of hours and  minutes. The world  corporations, the
global  culture,  mixed  marriages,   the  "travelling  peoples",  universal
communications and values and common experiences are all an undisputed fact.
However, the trend  towards the formation of a universal global awareness is
still  at its  very  beginning.  It  has to  cope  with  national and  local
prejudices,  ethnic  enmity as well  as social and economic inequality. This
trend towards  the formation of the  global awareness of humanity cannot  be
stopped. It will take a long time and will most probably  reach its  peak in
the next century.

     5. MULTICULTURE AND GLOBAL CULTURE

     Multiculture  or the combination of global, mixed and local cultures is
the main feature of the Fourth Civilisation.

     T
     he  modern  era  was  a  time  of  cultural  coercion.  The  violation,
plundering and export of huge amounts of works of art to Europe  and America
was a symbol of colonialism. Fascism and Communism  with their ideologies of
unification destroyed many cultural  traditions and opened  the  way  to the
violent  imposition  of monolithic cultural products. Imperialism in all its
manifestations bore  within itself the idea of unification  and multiculture
or, in other words, the domination of  one culture and the transformation of
others into museum exhibits. One only has to compare the ancient cultures of
Benin and Nigeria and their artifacts exhibited in the British museum or the
culture of Bukhara and Samarkand preserved in the vaults of the Hermitage in
St.Petersburg with what has remained in the local museums.
     The  20th century  was  a century  of  colonialism  and  imperialism, a
century of  the greatest progress  of  humanity. It was at the same  time  a
century  of the greatest destruction  and oppression. One can but  hope that
the  New Civilisation will  resolve  the  problems  of cultural  aggression.
However, this will be conditional upon the removal of media imperialism as a
threat to cultural imperialism. Only the future will tell whether the trends
of  imperialism   and  cultural  monopolism  associated  with  the  outgoing
civilisation or the global trends of the Fourth Civilisation will prevail. I
personally believe that historical progress  and  the global changes in  the
world  are taking us towards  something different  from cultural imperialism
and the dominance  of one culture over others. There is, however, absolutely
no guarantee that we will turn the clock back.
     If the trend towards imperialism persists and is not modernised, if the
media and cultural  unification  of the world takes place as a result of the
cultural  domination  of  a  number  of  countries  via  the  trans-national
corporations  then  the  forecasts  of Samuel  Huntington may very well come
true. The 21st  century will be a century  of conflicts between cultures and
civilisations  and  the   slow   and  turbulent   development   of  economic
polycentrism and associated cultural structures.
     The  cultural  equivalent  of  economic polycentrism  is  multiculture.
Multiculture  is  the  combination  of many  different  cultures  and  their
intermixing and  also the preservation and the development  of international
and supra-national relations. The  preservation of the cultures of small and
large nations will be preserved with  the relevant legislation  and economic
conditions.   Multiculture  means  the   rejection  of  media  and  cultural
imperialism. Together with economic  and political  polycentrism this is the
next  most important feature of  the Fourth Civilisation. Integration causes
either oppression or intermixing which is at the foundation of multiculture.
It  is  this  intermixing  stimulated by  economic growth  will be the  main
cultural feature of the 21st century.
     The most  obvious  manifestation of  this process  is  in  the area  of
showbusiness, art and  music, dance and the fine  arts.  The  resolution  of
religious conflicts, however, will  be more difficult.  The  formation  of a
global culture and the localisation of cultural ethnic communities will have
determinate  roles in both economic and  political  processes. Globalisation
and  autonomisation  are  already  leading  to  the  huge  re-structuring of
cultural communities.  Everything  I  have  mentioned in  this chapter:  the
intermixing of cultures and global culture, the intermixing of ethnic groups
and the "travelling peoples", the formation of global awareness are features
of this process.
     There are, of course, no absolute or automatic processes. I am speaking
only of  a  determining trend  for  the future. There will be  processes and
events  which  will  lead us  forward but  there  will  also  be  retrograde
influences. There will be a struggle for the  establishment of new relations
between civilisations  and the temporary victories of  the protectors of the
past. The greatest task faced by the modern world is the removal of cultural
imperialism,  the  intermixing  of  religions   and  cultures   with  mutual
tolerance.  The international  media  have  great  responsibility  to  avoid
becoming the  advocates of new forms of oppression. However, they could also
become the  proponents  of a new spirit of  multiculture.  In practice  this
means the protection and support of  small and large cultures, a respect for
the daily  life  and traditions of smaller nations,  the  implementation  of
policies  of mutual  adaptation of  different cultures and, importantly, the
rejection of totalitarian cultural forms.
     The  last of these steps is of particular importance. As can be seen in
table 14,  there are in the world  today five basic religions. Each of these
religions and the  cultures which are associated have their own geographical
and historical roots and form part of  the world's cultural and  ideological
treasury. However, at the  same time each of these religions  has  its sects
and branches which would like  to transform their religion into one of world
dominance   and    demonstrate   intolerance    and   irreconcilability   to
non-believers. This is as  true for Christians as  it is of the Muslims. The
gentle nature  and  lack  of aggression inherent in  Orthodox  Christianity,
perhaps,  make it  the  only exception.  After the collapse of  the two-bloc
system of  the world  the ideological vacuums were filled by religions and a
semi-overt struggle for domination began.  A number of evangelical Christian
sects  decided that the time was ripe for them to impose their own belief on
the world with little concern for the  fact  that  they were depriving  many
people   of  their   individual   freedom  and  turing  them  into  obedient
instruments.

     Table 14

     Region
     Christianity %
     Islam %
     Hinduizum %
     Buddhism %
     Judaism %

     Africa
     East Asia
     South Azia [62]
     Europe
     Latin America
     North America
     Oceania
     Fm. USSR[63]
     236300
     22300

     125900
     420300

     392200

     227200

     21500
     102200
     15,3
     1,4

     8,1
     27,2

     25,3

     14,7

     1,4
     6,6
     215800
     22300

     534900
     9200

     600

     2600

     100
     31500
     26,4
     2,7

     65,5
     1,1

     0,1

     0,3

     *
     3,9
     130
     *

     644000
     600

     600

     700

     300
     *
     0,2
     *

     99,5
     0,1

     0,1

     0,1

     *
     *
     *
     143400

     150900
     200

     500

     200

     *
     400
     *
     48,5

     51,0
     0,1

     0,2

     0,1

     *
     0,1
     300
     *

     3900
     1500

     1000

     7900

     100
     3100
     1,7
     *

     21,9
     8,4

     5,6

     44,4

     0,6
     17,4

     Total
     1548500
     100
     817000
     100
     647500
     100
     295600
     100
     71800
     100


     *100000, 0,1% Source: The World Christian Encyclopedia, 1985.

     Islamic  fundamentalism  has   also  displayed  public  intolerance  to
non-believers  and the  representatives  of  other countries. The murders in
Egypt and  the execution of  foreign hostages  in Algeria  and international
Islamic  terrorism are examples  of intolerance  towards  the traditions  of
others. It is extremely important that such features of  modern religions be
overcome. This  will  not be resolved by  force but with the efforts of  the
world  community and states and their  politicians and government to achieve
reconciliation.  If  modern  Islam  turns towards  modernism  combining  its
profound cultural heritage with the achievements of the modern world it will
become  part  of the  New tolerant  Civilisation.  The other  alterative  is
isolationism and the division of global cultures and traditions. During  the
middle ages in  Asia  Minor  and other  places in  the world  Islam was  the
embodiment  of progress and was a source of innovation and new philosophical
and cultural trends, in the modern world it could assume a similar role.
     The opening-up of cultures  and religions to each  other is a  slow and
clearly  painful process.  It requires people to live  democratically and in
mutual  tolerance  particularly of  those nations  which live  in the border
areas  between  two geographically  and  religiously  different  zones.  One
shining example is that  of the Israelis and the Palestinians who since  the
historical   events   of   1993  have  been  attempting   to   find  a   new
non-confrontational  model   for  the  resolution  of  their  conflict.  The
Bulgarians,  Greeks and  the Turks also have a  vital role to play living as
they do on two sides of the divide  between Christianity and Islam. There is
much dependent on the way in which these countries will resolve the problems
of  their  ethnic  minorities  and  international  relations.  Cultures  and
religions  have to  be sensitive to other cultures and  religions. This does
not only mean  avoiding conflict but  actively assisting  and  complementing
each  other. Only in this way  will the principle of multiculture be able to
throw off the burden of the outgoing world of imperialism.
     Perhaps, the ideal model of multiculture  and tolerance for others  can
be  seen  on  the Hawaiian islands. Japanese and Polynesians, Americans  and
Koreans, Buddhists and evangelists live in harmony and peace on such a small
piece  of land. After  so  many centuries  of  inter-cultural  conflicts the
nations which make up the multicultural communities of the USA have achieved
an impressive state of tolerance and unity.
     I am convinced that the idea of global multiculture is not at odds with
the  universal processes of globalisation. Clearly  the structures of  world
culture  and the  structure of  the  New  Civilisation and  will contain the
following mutually influential components:
     --  the emerging global culture is being developed and disseminated via
the world  media  and  is  becoming distinct from the culture of  the  large
nations which have done much to create it;
     --  the  culture   of  the  large   nations  which  together  with  the
establishment of the  principles of political  polycentrism and multiculture
will  gradually lose  their  ability to influence and  erase the  culture of
smaller nations;
     --  the culture of the smaller  independent nations  which require more
specific forms of protection and whose preservation  and development is  one
of the most important issues in the modern world;
     -- intermixed or border  cultures as a  product of the mutual influence
of individual nations.
     There  is little doubt that during  the 19th century and for the entire
period of the 20th, there was a great deal of  inequity between cultures and
religions.  This was  a  result of  colonial  oppression, of two  world  and
hundreds  of  local conflicts and  the violent  attempts to impose  cultural
domination.  After the collapse of the two world systems humanity  has every
opportunity  to  stop this trend and open up the way for multiculture as the
direct alternative to cultural  imperialism. A balancing element to this  is
the undoubted  development of global cultural values  which will take  their
inspiration from the  larger  countries and nations  who  control  the world
communications.  The responsibility of  the owners of global  communications
and the  governments  of the  countries  in which they  function will  be to
ensure the development  of the smaller countries  and their integration into
global culture exchange.
     There is no doubt that sooner or later this process will require strict
forms of global regulation, less passive and powerless than perhaps  that of
UNESCO but, nevertheless, similar in terms of its profound and multi-lateral
experience. Many small nations and languages  have  already disappeared  and
this  process  will,  no doubt,  continue  for a  number  of years to  come.
Countries living  in  isolation  can  not  but be affected by this  process.
Cultural autonomy is closely associated with weak  economies. Weak economies
permit a low level of economic integration and lead to conflicts rather than
cooperation between  ethnic groups and culture.  This is an almost universal
truth  and  can be seen in Iran  and  Iraq,  Israel and Turkey,  India,  the
Balkans and the Caususus.
     The opposite  example of cultural intermixing and emergent multiculture
can be seen in those regions of the  world where  people  have realised  the
senselessness of cultural  assimilation and  the value of peaceful  cultural
co-existence. The USA, Australia, Europe, Cuba, Brazil and a number of other
countries in the world are fine examples of the intermixing  and cooperation
of different races and cultures.

     Chapter Ten
     THE NEW POLITICAL ORDER
     1. THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPERPOWERS

     The Fourth Civilisation will change the global political order. This is
a logical consequence of the end of the cold war the appearance of new world
economic powers and the globalisation of finances and the stock markets.

     T
     he political  history  of humanity has  developed  through a  number of
large cycles. The First  Civilisation was  a  time of  great empires. Later,
over  a period of about 10 centuries, from  the 4th to the 13th century, the
world  was  witness to  the  collapse of  empire and the formation  of small
unstable states and the large scale  migration of tribes and entire nations.
The Third Civilisation saw the development of nation states and new imperial
aspirations which reached  their  height with the creation  and the struggle
between the two world systems. The New Civilisation will to a certain extent
once  more return  us to  the features of the Second  Civilisation but to  a
qualitatively  new  cultural  and  economic  level of  development  as  well
migration of large groups of people the collapse of great blocs and empires,
the redrawing of national borders. Is this part of a logical cycle  or is it
merely a temporary political cataclysm?
     I believe that  the cycle  of predominant political  concentration  has
already come to an end and we are entering a  new cycle of the domination of
global culture  and the  parallel development  of local features.  This,  of
course, does not mean that globalisation  will come  to a halt but that  the
parallel processes of  globalisation and  localisation will  exert  a strong
influence on current state and  political  formations. The 19th century left
us  a legacy of the concept of the Great Powers. The 20th century brought in
the concept of the two superpowers: the USA and the USSR.
     With the  collapse  of the USSR  the world found itself faced with  two
possible alternatives: either to develop monocentrically with the domination
of  the  single  remaining  superpower,  the  USA, or to  search for  a  new
geo-political  form. A number of researchers,  politicians  and  journalists
seemed to be in favour  of the idea of the exclusive role of the USA  as the
superpower to lead the world into the 21st century. Indeed, during the first
years after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union this seemed
possible.  Without its  basic enemy, the USA was  transformed into  the most
powerful economic and political force in the world. After 1989--1990 the USA
seemed to be the only power capable of resolving a number of world conflicts
and  stabilising the world  order.  The war in the Persian Gulf in 1991, the
intervention in Somalia, the positive role of  the USA  in the peace process
in Bosnia in  1995 and the resolution of the problem of Palestinian autonomy
served to strengthen this conviction.
     The  USA  are  still  the strongest  nation  state in  the  world  but,
nevertheless,  I believe that the time of  the superpowers  has passed.  The
Fourth Civilisation  will finally  reject  them  and even  now,  during  the
transition between eras,  there  are already noticeable trends and processes
which support this.
     The gradual twilight of the superpowers is for  a number  of  reasons a
general process.  It  is consequence of the trend towards global balance and
the expected balancing  of the global market. It is also due to a number  of
reasons associated with the cyclic development of geopolitical structures. I
mentioned earlier  that  the  economic  development of the world  has become
polycentric. Japan,  South Korea, more recently China and a number  of other
Asian economic powers have achieved significant economic  strength. European
integration has undoubtedly  raised the  importance of the European Economic
Community in the  world division  of labour. The Latin American markets have
become more attractive for investments. The globalisation of the economy has
allowed  for  many  more  countries  to  accumulate  economic  strength  and
self-confidence. During the cold  war and up to 1989  the appearance  of new
powerful and  independent  economic  centres  was  of  secondary importance.
Military  power  and  nuclear  weapons  were  an undisputed  factor  in  the
determination of political power. This trend persisted for the entire period
of the  20th  century.  In the  1960's and  the 1970's  there was a  growing
conviction that there would  in fact be no victor after  a nuclear conflict.
Indeed, after the  collapse  of the Berlin wall there are  still people  who
continue to wag  their  sabres  and claim  that  they can achieve their aims
through armed conflict. Nevertheless, things  do seem to  have changed.  The
emergence of new technology and new economic opportunities  have come to the
fore.
     This  has reduced, at  least for the time being, the role of  Russia in
world politics leaving it to  ponder the questions of its domestic political
and economic restructuring. For the  same reasons, the USA now finds  itself
in a completely new situation.
     The  vacuum which  was formed  after the collapse  of  COMECON and  the
Warsaw Pact (1990--1991) has  begun  to be  filled  not only  by the USA but
Germany,  France, Japan and the European community as a whole. Although this
process is rather veiled and timid it  will continue in the  future. Germany
demonstrated its new-found self-confidence with its  independent position on
Bosnia. The nuclear  tests carried out by France in the Pacific in 1995 were
more significant from  a political point  of view  than scientific.  Similar
ideas  can be read into  the applications by  Japan and Germany to join  the
Security Council.
     The other issue which has always seemed to dog  the  USA and which will
undermine its potential as the only superpower in  the world is the issue of
economic expenditure. Since  the Second World War  the USA has run up a huge
armaments  bill which has  lead to a colossal increase  in its foreign debt.
Today the  world's financial  systems is under an enormous strain because of
the  constant  increase  in  American borrowings,  especially  in the 1980's
(table 15). In the 1970's and 1980's, however, this seemed not to  be such a
serious matter. The  USA at the  time was the leading figure  in the Brenton
Woods system and  the dollar was the  only reserve currency in the world and
the  US  was able  with  some  ease  to  compensate  for  the debts  it  had
accumulated. In  the 1980's the USA was paying 250--300  billion dollars  in
interest  alone  on its  foreign  debt.  The  majority  of global economists
believe that if this trend  persists for  much  longer the  American economy
will begin to slide and the dollar will lose its position to the yen and the
German mark.

     Table 15
     Federal debt of the USA

     Year
     1900
     1920
     1950
     1960
     1970
     1980
     1990
     1992
     1994

     Billion Dollars
     Per head of population (USD)
     Interest paid on debt (bill)
     % of federal income
     1,2


     16,6

     -

     -
     21,2


     228

     -

     -
     256,1


     1688

     5,7

     13,4
     284,1


     1572

     9,2

     10,0
     370,1


     1814

     19,3

     9,9
     907,7


     3985

     74,9

     12,7
     3233


     13000

     264,8

     21,1
     4064


     846

     292,3

     21,1
     4692


     026

     296,3

     80,3


     Source: Bureau of Public Debt, US Dept of Treasury.
     There is  little doubt that the  USA and Russia will progressively have
to reduce their  military expenses  which  are  the main  causes  for budget
deficits  and  huge  debt.  IN  1994 the USA spent 280.6 billion dollars  on
defence which  more than all  the other countries  of the world put together
with the  exception of Russia. US military expenditure  was 9  times greater
than  that of Germany  (35 billion dollars);  9  times  that  of  France (34
billion); 7 times that of the UK (41 billion); 50 times  that  of Japan (5.9
billion dollars);  100  times that  of China (2.7 billion)[64]. I
have never seen accurate  or proven figures for Russia but I believe that up
to 1990 they were similar to the  US. There is no economy in the world which
can  compensate for such expenditure and bear  the burden of  competition in
the global market. For this reason the role of the USA and Russia as the two
superpowers has begun to  subside.  Superpower tension might reappear in the
world only  if  the two-bloc system  is revived. There  is,  however, little
likelihood  of this  since  global  financial markets are so interlinked and
interdependent and for all the other  reasons  associated  with the emergent
New Civilisation.
     This leads on to the other question of where the new centre of economic
and  political  power  will  develop  and  who  will take on the  roles  and
responsibilities  of  the USA  and  Russia. Russia  clearly  needs  time  to
reorganise  its economy and bring it  in line with the needs of the  market.
However, even if this were to take place within the shortest possible period
of time  --  10--15 years, it  would  not be  able to assume  the  role of a
superpower, nor would it want to. On the other hand Jacques Atalie and other
writers  have  forecast  that "economic  power is moving  away  from America
towards Europe and the Pacific".[65] I believe that it would more
accurate  to make  another  conclusion.  It  is  true that during  the Third
Civilisation the Euroatlantic powers made great progress in their domination
of  the world at the beginning of the processes of globalisation. It is also
true that after the 1960's the Asian economic powers began gradually to free
themselves from the protectionism of the USA and Europe and they will play a
very active global role in the coming 21st century.
     This fact, however, is insufficient to support the claim that "economic
power is  moving  away  from America towards Europe and  the Pacific". It is
more likely that  there will  be a period of  levelling and  mutual  balance
between the Japanese, American and European economies. This is  possibly the
most  effective  solution.  Of  course,  this is  also associated  with  the
reduction in the responsibilities and burdens of the USA and the involvement
of other countries such as Japan. The superpowers will disappear but it will
not necessarily follow that the USA will preserve their role  as  one of the
world's main political and economic centres. The world can no longer benefit
from American domination or  its downfall. In  the  same way the world could
have done  without  the political and military conflicts  within  the former
USSR.

     2. FROM IMPERIALISM TO POLYCENTRISM

     "The old geopolitical order has left  the stage and  a new  world order
has been born".
     Jacques Atalie

     T
     he central issue is what will replace the two-bloc world order based on
the dominance of the  superpowers. Other similar  periods of  transition  in
history have  lead to geopolitical chaos, conflicts, wars  and huge  loss of
human life. The first years  after the overthrow of the  totalitarian regime
in Eastern  Europe seemed to bear out this sad truth. Today the dangers have
not yet  passed and seem to confound those who are optimistic of a new world
order.
     There is no single or single group  of powers  capable of  establishing
this  order. It will have to be created through a amalgamation of local  and
regional  resolutions and  the renunciation of  ideas  associated  with  the
domination of one country  or nation. This is  the main  feature of  the New
Civilisation. During the entire period of the outgoing civilisation monarchs
were engaged  in struggles  for power, conquering  and losing  territory and
making  plans on  how  to expand  their  dominions.  In  the  19th and  20th
centuries the  idea of world domination arose and  the  revival of the  huge
empires  of Caesar of Fredrich Barbarossa. The greatest empires of the Third
Civilisation were  the  two political and military blocs which dominated the
world for 50 years.
     I believe that the era of  imperialism will be replaced by a  new world
order based on the principle of polycentrism, the alternative to imperialism
and  monocentrism.  This  principle is  a rejection  of  the monopolism  and
imperial aspirations of any single nation or ideology. Polycentrism is  that
level of  international relations  which  is  the most  concomitant for  the
opening up of the world and its globalisation.
     Polycentrism  will  not  appear  overnight.  However,  I am  more  than
convinced that  it  is  inevitable  and  part of  the  logic  of  historical
development.  The  alternative is new  confrontation,  new violence with the
accompanying  threats  of  thermo-nuclear  conflict.  There  are  two  basic
conditions without  which  polycentrism and the  natural competition between
nations and countries cannot develop:
     Firstly,  the  inevitable, albeit gradual, disappearance  of the  super
power phenomenon.
     Secondly, the evolutionary nature of the development of polycentrism as
a system of international relations. The natural replacement of the bi-polar
model with polycentric structures will pass through a number of phases, each
of which will take differing lengths of time.
     We  are already experiencing the first of these  phases.  The world  is
undergoing  transition  from  the  bi-polar  model  of  confrontation  to  a
multi-polar world. It is quite realistic to  assume that in the  next ten or
so years  we  will pass  into a transitory  phase of a tri-polar world. This
tri-polar  world began to emerge based  on  the  existing  framework  of the
bi-polar world as early as the 1970's and 1980's. This model is based on the
USA and a number of  states which  gravitate around  it,  Europe and the Far
East lead by Japan.  These three  economically integrated  poles  have  been
developing gradually over  the past 25--30 years. They are economically very
compact and consist mainly of the economic interdependence of the individual
countries. At  the  same  time these  three  economic  centres  are strongly
dependent   on  and  open  to  each  other  creating  one  of  the  greatest
opportunities for the peaceful development of the world. The tri-polar world
is the closest alternative to the bi-polar world but  is not an easy way out
of the current  crisis. The tri-polar model is to a large extent conditional
on the development of common global trends.
     At the very  beginning of the 21st century  both Russia  and China will
aspire  to become involved in the three large centres of economic power. All
the  most sensible  politicians in the world believe that without Russia and
China the  world cannot develop  successfully. This has been a clear feature
of US policy during the Clinton administration. During the next 20--25 years
we shall no doubt witness the development of a five-six-polar world in which
the three main centres will be joined by a number of other new ones. China's
rapid economic development and Russia's enormous resources of raw  materials
and  its strategical  capability will  exert  significant influence on  this
process. The triangular community of the USA, EC and Japan has quite quickly
replaced the bi-polar model the development of a multi-polar model will take
at least  15--20 years. Russia  will need time  to stabilise its economy and
China will need to consolidate its reform process and balance out its levels
of development.
     There is, however, a question of  principle here. Will this not take us
back to the beginning of the  modern age, to a  situation  where five or six
great powers dominated the world creating a series of  conflicts  which  may
develop  into  regional  or even world wars? May this not also  lead  to the
grouping of these powers into two or three political and military groups and
a repeat of the  Third Civilisation? It  is here that the difference between
the outgoing civilisation  and  the new  era lies. The new  powers will  not
arise only on one continent, Europe or America. They will develop in all the
continents and within the framework of a single global economy.
     I,  therefore,  believe that the second phase, the transition to  a new
world order will be characterised by the gradual transition from five or six
centres  to  a  multi-polar  or polycentric world  structure.  Even  at  the
beginning of the transition period countries like  Brazil, India, Australia,
South Africa and  others will increase their geo-political roles.  They will
be balanced between  the other  "great  powers" and  with their geographical
position and size and increased economic potential they will gradually begin
to  assume   greater  geo-political  significance.  When  speaking  of   the
polycentric  structure  of the world,  I  am  not  concerned  only with  the
political aspect but also with the economic and cultural sides of the issue.
At the same  time global  integration will take place  simultaneously in all
countries but will lead to the creation of a number of regional formations.
     I  also believe  that we  can  expect that  the  poles of the new world
structure will be defined via  the development of  a number of  economically
integrated blocs which  of necessity  will  be open to one another and  will
autonomous units within an expanding integral entity. L.Thorou forecast that
the 21st century  would  be a century  of  "quasi-commercial  blocs applying
managed trade".  This is  true to a certain extent  but only in the  initial
stages  since  I  believe  that  with  the  emergence  of  polycentrism  the
autonomous economic regions  and commercial blocs will gradually become very
interwoven and to lose their primary borders.
     The principle of polycentrism is at the  heart of the new  world order.
However, these are not the same world centres which existed in the  13th and
the  19th centuries and  whose monarchs and presidents  went  to  war  every
10--15  years to re-distribute their dominions. They will  not be  the  same
centres  which colonised  the entire world and imposed  their will  on other
nations.  Polycentrism is  the  principle  of  balance  between  the world's
powers,  the  umbrella under  which new  centres will develop  and a  bridge
leading  to  a more complete integration of the  world. The  essence  of the
Fourth Civilisation is in the gradual formation of this new world order.

     3. THE FATE OF THE NATION STATE

     Do not be in  a  hurry  to destroy the nation  state.  It will  not die
suddenly of cardiac arrest but will gradually fade away...

     T
     he functions and the borders of the nation state depend directly on the
economic   maturity  of  societies.  Historically  the  nation  state  is  a
transitory category.  It  appeared when nations were  being created  and the
economic  conditions  of   life  were  imposing  certain  certain  types  of
government  and  regulation.  There were  different versions of statism  and
state government during the  First Civilisation and the Second Civilisation,
more commonly know as the Middle Ages. Nation states, however, are a typical
feature of the Third Civilisation.
     The reduction in their role  and changes in their functions is a result
of the same phenomena  which  created  them.  The  globalisation  of  modern
economies and culture, the media invasions,  transnational corporations  and
everything  else  which  has been  mentioned in  other parts of the book are
leading to changes in the borders  and the essence of  the concept of nation
state as well as in the structure of government and  economies. For a number
of  decades  the inhabitants of  the  most  developed  nations  have  become
growingly aware that the governments for which they may  have  voted are not
the only centres of power and  that the promises of politicians seem to have
little in  common  with realities  and that the  implementation of  policies
depends on other factors and phenomena.
     P.Drucker  frequently  speaks  of  a  new  pluralism.  In  this  he  is
absolutely correct. Pluralism does not mean competition between parties  and
their leaders. It  is  a  very  diverse pluralism of  economic,  government,
cultural and  lobby groups. What is even  more significant is that  this new
pluralism  is  becoming  more   and  more  international.  Corporations  and
political parties,  foundations  and  association,  information  groups  and
trans-national  media have transformed pluralism  in to an universal concept
and the nation state into an annoying but not insurmountable barrier.
     It is quite evident that as society  develops governmental restrictions
decline along with the significance of  national boundaries. For this reason
open societies are a symbol not only of democracy but progress in general. I
believe in  the truth  of this argument but it  is not so  simple.  Openness
which  is  inevitable  and  necessary means nothing in  isolation  from  the
economic  processes.  Many  underdeveloped,  ex-colonial countries are  both
absolutely open and absolutely poor. Progressive  and stable openness  comes
about as  a  result  of economic and political progress, the attainment of a
certain level of economic balance. This is not a political whim but a result
from the accumulation and maturity of a given society.
     We should not, therefore,  be  in a hurry  to  depose the  role  of the
nation states. They will not disappear overnight but will fade slowly in the
process  of the development of relative  economic balance. During the  Third
Civilisation state power  was absolute. During  the Third Civilisation state
power  was  absolute.  Ludwig 14th, Napoleon,  Hitler, Mussolini,  Lenin and
Stalin were themselves incorporations  of the state. Today, however, this is
impossible. Dictators such as Idi Amin Dada  in Uganda, Boccassa 1st  in the
Central African  Republic  or Pol  Pot in Cambodia  have been  condemned  to
historical oblivion and  hatred.  However, many other democratically elected
government have felt obliged to "protect" the national output and to isolate
themselves with restrictive import duties and  other protectionist barriers.
Those who  feel  threatened and isolated as  a result of their  backwardness
rather  than integrated have to  pay a  high  cost in  terms  of  armies and
weapons.
     Therefore  in the  under  developed  countries  the nation  state  will
preserve its traditional  functions for a relatively  longer period of time.
This will  be both natural and progressive if the relevant  governments make
efforts to open and adapt their economies  to  the global market. Adversely,
their countries will continue to vegetate within the conditions of the Third
Civilisation and will begin to lag behind in universal world development.
     This  issue  has another  side to  its.  The  movements  towards  world
openness  and  integration is  a  resource of progress.  No government  will
succeed in the modern world to  integrate its people into processes of world
progress  if  it does not affiliate itself with the World Trade Organisation
and the  international  financial markets.  The decline  of the role of  the
nation state is  a universal process which  is taking  place more rapidly in
the developed countries and  more  slowly in those who are still aspiring to
become affiliated with them and slowest of all  in those countries who  feel
themselves obliged to defend their frail national identity. Nevertheless, no
one country will be able to ignore the common processes of the globalisation
of the world, markets, manufacturing and the media.
     What then will become of the nation state and its power?
     I believe that the main trends in world development will be as follows:
the role  of  the  nation states will decline in  significance  whereas  the
functions  of the  local  institutions of  authority and supra-national  and
global  coordinators will increase.  This  is taking place  at the moment in
Europe and all other states whose governments are  conceding  more  and more
power to the trans-national corporations, the world media  networks or other
autonomous  and influential non-governmental  organisations. Louis d'Or 14th
in an expression of the absolute nature of power once said, "L'Etat -- c'est
moi". From the second half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th
century governments began grudgingly to concede part of their economic power
to  the  owners  of  large private  enterprises.  Now as  a  result  of  the
globalisation the national governments have no choice other than to  give up
many  of  their  prerogatives. This is  a natural process which follows  the
logic of world development. Many people  find it difficult to understand and
regard national honour  and pride  as  a priority and  any suggestion to the
contrary  provokes nationalistic  reaction.  There  have  always  been  such
governments and there, no doubt, will be for many decades  to come. However,
such  policies  which  seem  to  forget  the  need  for  global  and  humane
responsibility will lead  nations into the back roads of development. Sooner
rather than later nations will realise that they have been deceived and will
seek recompense for the politicians who brought them to that state.
     The borders of states in the transition to the Fourth Civilisation will
continue to narrow as a result of major technological and social changes. If
you  remember the  message of A.Toffler  in chapter  four of this  book,  he
predicted  that the new technologies would transfer power both downwards  to
the local institutions of authority and upwards to the global regulators and
the  transnational  corporations.  On  one  hand  many economic  and  social
functions  will  become much more  effective if  they  are  transferred from
governments to civil societies and  are  controlled  by legislation. This is
the  case  with  the planning  and coordination  of  a series  of macro  and
micro-economic processes.  This is also the case with  social welfare and in
particular pension funds, health case and  academic and scientific research.
ON the other  hand national governments are not  in  a  position to regulate
independently  the  global environment,  world financial markets, the global
redistribution of  resources, goods  and  services, information flow and the
media etc.. The more people, goods and  services cross over national borders
the  less  significance these borders will have.  This  will in turn lead to
changes in the prerogatives of nation states.
     At the end of the 20th century the state is too small an institution to
resolve global  problems and too large to resolve its own local issues. This
is  also a result of the new technology, the restructuring of  manufacturing
and the market.
     A typical example  of such a bi-lateral change is offered by the member
countries of the  European Union.  According to some researchers  since 1957
about half of  the authority of the nation state has been transferred either
to local authority or  to  the  European  Commission  in  Brussels. This  is
perhaps  an  isolated example  of  a  regional  alliance. However, the  same
process seems to  be taking place in the USA  where  the  American political
system  has   been  stretched   vertically  upwards  by   the  transnational
corporations  and financial markets  and downwards  by the individual states
and  the non-governmental  and  private organisations.  Bill  Clinton  would
hardly  have  the  authority to implement  such a  wide ranging programme of
reform as  the "New Deal" of  President Roosevelt in the 1930's. Even in the
case of the states such as the USA national governments do not have the same
authority  that  they  had 40 or  50  years  ago. They have also  taken upon
themselves a  range of  global responsibilities with which to compensate for
the  decline  authority   and  the  transfer  of  the  real   power  to  the
trans-national corporations.  The specific global role  of  the  USA  at the
beginning  of the 1990's will soon have to be shared with others.  It is not
fair  on  the  American  people  to  carry   the  huge  burden  of  military
expenditure, the peace-keeping operations of the UN and  so on.  It will not
be  long before they  will also involve Russia, Japan and Europe (France and
Germany). IN  this way the gradual decline in the significance of the nation
state is as true for the USA as it is for everywhere else.
     A distinguishing feature of the modern nation state  is its integration
and  strong  links  with the civil society. A  number of writers such as  P.
Drucker and J. Lukac have written that the sovereign  state will become just
one of  a number of centres for  identification and integration rather  than
the  only  one  and  will  coexist  and  compete  with  the  trans-regional,
supra-national and local, even tribal  structures. When this rule of logical
development  is applied  universally  then nations  attain a higher level of
enrichment.  Switzerland, for example, leads all statistical classifications
on the  basis of GDP per head  of population and this is not only due to the
success of the Swiss banks. This is rather  a  result of the co-existence of
the trans-national  corporations and the banks, strong local authorities and
the state  (government and  parliament) which fulfils  the role of a  bridge
between the  two  sectors. The lack of  bureaucracy, the active  role of the
local population in global business and the decision  making processes  is a
particulary strong feature of the Swiss political system.
     The modern  state  will have  less  and  less international  authority.
Globalisation  opens borders  and the world market  "erodes" sovereignty. By
transferring their authority  to the new global leaders and to local leaders
the national  governments  will  have  less  and  less  capabilities.  This,
however, raises the issue of the preservation of the identity of nations and
states  in the face of the emergent global culture  and global awareness. It
is the "travelling peoples" which will succeed with  their  sustainable  and
strong  cultural links which not only produce avant garde technology but use
it  to  effect. It  is not states  and weapons  but technological power plus
knowledge which will play a decisive role in this question.

     4. AFTER THE CRISIS OF POLITICAL IDENTITY

     The  modern-day left is like the  right undressed  and  the  modern-day
right is like a well dressed left.

     (political jokes from the end of the 20th century)

     A
     lthough  I  frequently  speak  of  the  Fourth  Civilisation,  the  new
ideological and theoretical synthesis and balanced development I realize how
difficult it is for these  new concepts to be accepted by the modern  world.
This is particularly true for the smaller (albeit  proud) countries such  as
Bulgaria.  In  face of  the  new global  changes and  challenges there is no
difference between the small and the large countries. We are all part of the
same game. Some are quicker while  some are slower but we are all undergoing
the same profound changes. In Eastern  Europe three years were sufficient to
understand the  crisis of  universal political identity  which the West  has
long been aware of.
     For more  than  100 years  the  political left in  the world  has  been
associated  with  the  new  role  of  the  working class, social guarantees,
nationalisation of  the basic means of production and the expropriation from
the expropriators etc.. The right has always been linked with the defence of
large  and medium scale private capital, traditions  and security, no  state
intervention in business and non-involvement in social matters.  However, in
the modern world at the end of the 20th century, with the exception of a few
fringe parties  and movements, there is no country or political party in the
world which resembles these traditional concepts of the left and right.
     Together with  the  collapse  of the Third  Civilisation  we  are  also
experiencing  a crisis of political  identity. This is a consequence of  the
new ideological and theoretical synthesis, the changes  in ownership and the
social  and  class  structure  as well as  the end of the  traditional state
mechanisms. The object of  the differences between the left and the right is
disappearing.  The  entire  world  is  undergoing  a  process  of  ownership
socialisation and  states are being integrated into civil societies in which
neither  the  old  left nor the old  right  can  preserve their  traditional
status.
     During  the present time of  chaos and the growing mistrust towards the
traditional  leaders,  of left-wing promises made by right-wing  politicians
and the concern of  the business sector for  social issues we should  expect
too much.  The political inertia  is very strong  and  only a minority would
take the electoral risk of trying to overthrow the traditional symbols. What
we are witness to at the moment is the adaptation of the  old phraseology to
new world realities. Whether they want it or not the left and the right wing
parties in  the  world are intuitively moving  towards a state  of "balanced
development" and will fight for domination of its ideological territory. The
"left" no longer  reject the  concept of private  capital  and do not demand
nationalisation.  The  "right"  are no longer  ashamed  to  speak  of social
programmes and the needs of the  poor. The borders  between  the traditional
electorates are  fading as a result of a process of irreversible  changes in
the social and class structure of society.
     As a  consequence many  new parties have appeared which give  voice  to
localised interests within  a given country or region. The "success" of Ross
Perot at  the  presidential  elections  in  1992  and national  independence
parties in Canada or Catalonia and Northern  Italy are features of  the same
phenomenon: the  change in the foundations and  structures  and economic and
social interests  is leading to changes in political doctrines and political
parties. The traditional parties which succeed in making the transition  and
re-orientate themselves  rapidly within  the complex situation of the modern
world will survive and their traditional names will  be no more than a  mere
decoration. Those who delay will fade away and gradually open the way to the
new political formations.
     The end of  the crisis  of modern  political identity  will come  quite
quickly. Many  of the parties of the Socialist and Liberal Internationals or
Christian Democratic parties are making timid steps towards changes in their
programmes. Some of them are rejecting their traditional programmes outright
with  the  justification  of  the  need  for  a new pragmatism.  The  former
communist parties of Eastern  Europe changed  their names  to "socialist" or
"social-democratic". Some  of them have  become so  closely  associated with
large-scale capital  that they already resemble the bourgeois parties of end
of the 19th century.
     Together  with  the changes  in  ownership  and  the social  and  class
structure, as well as the new borders of the nation state and the transition
to  global  polycentrism,  the  changes  in  modern  political  parties  and
doctrines is another important feature of the changes in world civilisation.
The rapprochement between party programmes and views  which  is taking place
at the moment is a consequence of the new ideological synthesis. It will not
be long before political  pluralism will take  its stand on the new problems
of the Fourth Civilisation and the transition to it.
     There  are two further  processes linked with the problem  of political
identity which I would like to mention. The  first  of these is  linked with
the  obvious need for regional  and trans-national political formations such
as the Party of European Socialists, for example. The second is the need for
new  types of voting systems and the  development  of  direct democracy.  My
friend the American political scientist  Theodore  Becker refers  to this as
"teledemocracy". The world telecommunication systems  such  as  the Internet
provide wonderful opportunities for the direct  involvement of millions  and
billions of  people in the  decision-taking processes. Today, there are very
few  politicians  who  are aware of  this,  a few others are  sceptical  and
concerned about preserving their own power and forces of manipulation.
     For me there is little doubt that  the Fourth Civilisation will lead to
enormous changes in political life and its structures, types  of government,
electoral mechanisms  and  decision taking. These  are  not utopias, nor are
they long-term forecasts. These are simply the results of something which is
appearing before out very eyes.

     5. THE GLOBAL COORDINATORS

     The Fourth  Civilisation will  be  at one and the same  time  an  open,
polycentric and integrated world. This will require a more  effective system
of global coordination.

     W
     hen analysing the system of the Fourth  Civilisation, I naturally  came
upon the problem of global coordination. This once again brought to  my mind
the unsystematic but indicative thoughts of Lenin on the "single factory for
all  workers and peasants",  Stalin's  idea  of  the  "world wide victory of
communism", Hitler's  thoughts on the "World Reich" and  Fukoyama's writings
on the  "End of History" etc.. A great  number of researchers from the World
Federation  for  Future Studies have also  written  on the need for a  world
government.
     There  is  clearly  some  logic to  this  argument. Globalisation  will
require  much  more  than  ever before  increased  global  control.  As  the
processes  develop and  political polycentrism  increases  there  will  be a
growing need for world coordination. Nevertheless, I  do not believe that it
will be possible in the  near future  to establish such a global government.
This  is an element of  the  distant  future  to  which  neither  I  nor  my
generation belong. Of course, the Fourth Civilisation will  cover the entire
period  of  the  21st  century  and  no  doubt  future  generations  of  our
grandchildren and great-grand children will have to face the issue.
     Today the world is faced with hundreds of global problems which lead to
collapse  of  the bi-polar  world structures.  There are  a  number of world
organisations involved  in  these  problems such as the UN, the World  Trade
Organisation and  the  IMF based on the need  for compromises between nation
states and their  products. Since compromise between nation states is at the
basis  of  the development of the world organisations their  capabilities to
act in the  real conditions of the modern world are seriously restricted. If
we  want the world organisations to succeed, they  will have to receive wide
empowerment and  responsibilities for the global problems which  are outside
the domain of nation states. This is the only way in which a united world of
small  and  large  states  and  cultures  will  be  able  to  face up to the
challenges of  supra-national  environmental  interests. It is,  of  course,
absurd  to speak of a world  government, but  it is clear that  there is  an
obvious need for a coordinating body which from the very outset will be able
to resolve military and ecological crises, regulate the conditions for world
finance and the fight against international crime etc..
     It is, therefore, evident that the modern world needs a revision of the
Constitution  of the United Nations and  the expansion  of the powers of the
Security Council as well  as the establishment  of new institutions. Many of
these have already  been  proposed by a number of leading world  politicians
and  intellectuals. These include the Council for Ecological Security of the
United Nations. A reflection of the new directions in  thought are  the  new
structures within  the  United Nations  and  its  specialised  organisations
including UNESCO, INIDO, FAO and others.
     This process of expansion has to be carried out very carefully with the
gradual empowerment of  specialised national organisations  with the  rights
and responsibilities currently born by nation states. I expect that the main
priority  will be  global  economic  control and the  resolution  of  global
environmental and  social issues. The restructuring of  the UN, the creation
of  an effective World Bank, the increase in the prerogatives of  the  World
Trade Organisation and the  empowerment  of all these organisations to  deal
with the  real  problems  of the world is  the path to balanced development.
This path will be difficult, slow and gradual but there is no other way. The
alternative is for the new communications, computers and automated factories
to dig a deeper gorge between the poor and the rich rather than a source for
democracy and freedom.
     At  the same time the large  nations  have to double  and treble  their
efforts to  create a  new climate in the world  and another  type of  global
intercourse. This may lead  to the institutionalisation  of the  meetings of
the  G-7  and its expansion to  include Russia and China  and  perhaps a few
other  nations. It may  be a good idea to hold regular meetings of the heads
of state  of the  whole world. There are a number of possibilities. The most
important thing is for us to realise that the new age  which we are entering
requires   new  type  of  thinking  and  a  new  understanding  of  our  own
responsibilities.

     THE NATIONS WHICH WILL SUCCEED, THE NATIONS OF THE FOURTH CIVILISATION
     (instead of a conclusion)

     T
     his book  is an expression of my inner spiritual world  and my thoughts
over a number  of years on the present state and the potential future of our
confused  world. I have  been profoundly  influenced  by the major political
changes which have taken  place since the  collapse of the  Eastern European
political systems and their economic structures. I am acutely aware that the
"Fourth Civilisation" will provoke  a number of  different reactions. During
such  a  watershed   period  in  our  history  unanimity  is  dangerous  and
unnecessary. Indeed,  the book  which  I  have written  contains a number of
generalisations on the character of global change at the  border between two
millennia, the periodisation of history  and the crisis of the entire modern
civilisation.  The  logic  of  my  research  has  lead me  to  a  number  of
conclusions  on the new geo-political nature  of the world and the necessity
of global economic and political regulation.
     The  "Fourth  Civilisation"  is  not based  on  abstract  proposals  or
invented eloquent phrases.  All my conclusions are  based on experience  and
suffering, on years  of research and reading as well  as specific practical,
academic experiments and  political experience. The "Fourth Civilisation" is
not a forecast, nor futuristic literature but an evaluation of  the facts as
they  are.  It  is an attempt to  overcome  the academic  dogma of  the 19th
century which have  existed for over 150 years. I am interested in the clash
of ideas and I realise that many  of my conclusions merit further  analysis,
something which I intend to do in the  future.  I can now see  with  delight
many new areas for creative work.
     The "Fourth Civilisation" is  not intended to reveal all the details of
the issues which  it raises but to unify them within one general concept and
to reveal  the universal  character of the  global change  which the  modern
world  in  experiencing. The common crisis  of the bi-polar  world  and  the
collapse  of  the  Eastern  European  regimes,   the  modern  conditions  of
geo-political chaos in  which we are living, the major re-structuring of the
world economy, culture and politics  shows that the new realities with which
we  are faced have a complex and accumulative effect.  Whether we want to or
not, they will lead us to  new solutions.  My book is  concerned  with these
solutions and  the new methodological  approach to  the  evaluation of world
processes. It is also concerned with the changes in ownership, political and
economic  structures  and the way  in  which they  are finding more and more
common  global  ground.  I  realise that  these  conclusions  may  be  quite
controversial but I  deeply believe in  them as indicative proof. Everything
which proves that the old  civilisation is fading and that we  are  entering
into a new Fourth Civilisation is based on the trends and processes to which
we are already witnesses.
     I  have  to confess that everything which I have touched upon  in  this
book is a starting point for further  work based on the country in  which  I
was born and bred. Bulgaria is now undergoing a difficult and complex crisis
caused  by  the transition from a totalitarian  to  a  market and  pluralist
economy.  I have spoken little about Bulgaria in  the  "Fourth Civilisation"
but  in actual fact all  my  conclusions concern  its fate. I believe that I
have  been right to keep my conclusions  about  Bulgaria to a separate book.
This has allowed my to concentrate  on the  features of global change and to
concentrate on the specific features of Bulgaria  at a later stage. For this
reason there is a direct and unifying link between the "Fourth Civilisation"
and my book about Bulgaria which is soon  to be published. I hope that  they
will both be of interest to all my friends with whom for over ten years  now
we have been discussing  the fate of  the changes and all my colleagues  all
over the world with whom I have argued about the future of our world and all
those people with whom I have  shared the good and the bad in the  political
life of Bulgaria over the past seven years.
     Whatever the fate of this book, on completing it  I  want  to thank all
those  without  whom it would not  have been possible.  I  owe so much to my
mother and  my  father who bore me and  brought me up, my  family  who  have
suffered the deprivations of my almost permanent preoccupation with work, my
teachers  from whom I learnt so much, and my  colleagues  and my friends who
helped me with the book. Nothing  in this life can be achieved  without love
and I thank all those who  believed in me since it was their  faith, hoe and
love which inspired so much of my conclusions.
     During  the  entire  period   of  writing  and  preparing  the  "Fourth
Civilisation" I asked myself the question, "Which  nations will succeed  and
will  not  be lost to  the chaos  of the  global  world?". During the  great
migrations of the Second Civilisation many nations and  ethnic  groups  lost
their potential  and remained on the periphery  of  the nation states  which
were  to emerge later.  Some of them have disappeared. I hope fervently that
the Bulgarian spirit  is not lost  and that it  does not become dissolved in
the  waves of  migration  of people, information and goods  which is  on the
horizon. I shall work and I shall struggle for this  not to the detriment of
any other nation. I shall work to consolidate the culture and the economy of
Bulgaria in the context of dignified competition.
     The nations which will succeed do not live only in the great countries.
These will be the nations which will accept the laws of the new age and will
become  the  people  of  the Fourth Civilisation. These nations  will not be
divided on the  lines of capitalist  or  socialist,  workers  or  bourgeois,
imperialist or colonial. These peoples will  not allow their civic  freedoms
to be usurped nor will they recognise cultural or political isolationism and
closed economies. The nations of the Fourth Civilisation will be united with
millions  and  billions of visible and invisible threads. They will  produce
the new values which belong to the whole of humanity.
     The road is  long and there will be many storms along the way. The  New
Civilisation  does  not  require social engineering  it  requires merely the
pursuance of  the logic  of progress which our fathers and the outgoing 20th
century have  bequeathed  to us. It is a difficult  but glorious  legacy,  a
legacy which will require us to be true to our time  and those who will come
after us.

     Sofia 1996.
     
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     ( These figures are collated  from  various sources. It should be noted
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     3 The term  civilisation (the level  of  development, the rejection  of
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     9 Although  between  Hobson, Hilferding  and  Lenin there  are  certain
differences about the historical fate of  imperialism, their  works relating
to  its  origin  and  features  are  worth  of  academic recognition.  [see.
J.Hobson,  Imperialism,  L.1902,  R.Hilferding, Financial  Capital,  L.1910.
V.Lenin,  Imperialism as the supreme state of capitalism, Essay No.5, Volume
27]
     10 P.Kennedy. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers [see table]
     11 P.Kennedy. The Rise and Fall of the Great  Powers. Table 28,  p.299.
N. Y. 1887.
     * Under 50 000. Source: Political Economy, Moscow, 1975. P. 150.
     12 Bzezinski. The Great Failure, Sofia 1991, pages 21-54
     13  The concept of the evolutionary rebirth of monopolistic capitalism,
of a society of trusts and cartels within a single world "super trust" or in
other words a united world society governed from a single  centre (a  single
super trust). The author of this concept was K.Kautski, 1915
     14 According  to  the Brent  Wood (USA) agreement in  1944  a system of
international  financial  organisations  was  established  resulting in  the
American dollar becoming the leading  currency in international finances. In
the 1980's this "system" was profoundly changed
     15 See V.I. Lenin, collected works, vol.27, page 408
     16 See also Z. Brzezinsky. The Great Collapse. S., 1981 (Statistics).
     17  In the  summer of 1986, the Bulgarian  leader,  T.Zhivkov published
what  for the  time was  a courageous reformist  article entitled  the "July
Conception".  It received  much  criticism  from  Mikhail Gorbachev  and his
entourage since it raised questions about the leading role  of the communist
party.  Of  course  the  Bulgarian  leaders  bowed  under  the  pressure  of
"comradely advice".
     18 See Z. Brzezinsky. The Great Collapse. Appendiy.
     19  Hundreds  of  books  have  been  written  on  the  subject  of  the
development of the Stalinist regime.  Some of them give a  particulary vivid
description of  the essence of  this process  -  e.g. D.Volkogonov - Stalin.
Triumph and Tragedy - 4 volumes. Moscow 1991.
     20 Ludwig Von Mizes. Socialism. M., 1994. Introduction.
     21  This can be  seen in all of the speeches made by Mikhail Gorbachev.
For Example M.S. Gorbachev. On the process of  implementing the decisions of
the XXVII  congress of the CPSU  and tasks connected with the advancement of
Perestroika. Moscow 1988.
     22 There is no doubt the Gorbachev  was  frequently  advised to use the
army to restore  "law and order" and the  status  quo. Ifhe had given in  to
such  advice  this would not only  have returned  the reform  process to its
initial starting point but would also  have  caused conflicts involving  the
spilling of blood.
     23 At this time G. Yanaev was Vice President of the USSR. V. Pavlov was
Prime Minister and V. Kruchkov -- Head of the KGB.
     24 According to  a number  of writers, including the  last advisor  the
Soviet president - Andrei Grachov,  the decisive factors for the resignation
of  Mikhail  Gorbachev  were  the  opinion   of  the  Minister  of  Defence,
B.Shaposhnikov and his support for Boris Yeltsin. In a conversation I had in
December 1995 A.Grachov once  more re-iterated his astonishment at this fact
and described it as the key factor in the collapse of the USSR.
     25 The Madrid summit meeting  of the  member  states  of  the EU  spoke
eloquently of this. Even if the deadline for the introduction  of the common
currency  is  postponed  there  is  apparently  no  doubt  of  its  eventual
implementation.
     26  The statistics  in  this paragraph  are taken from the Economist  -
World in figures L., 1994
     27 K. Marx. Das Kapital. V.1. C., 1984. P.484.
     28  This was  the  dominant thesis  of the  leaders of on  the  leading
parties in Bulgaria -- the union of democratic forces between 1990--1993.
     29 J. Grey. Liberalism. Sofia. 1991. P. 92.
     30 V. Lenin. Complete Works. V. 29. P. 121.
     31 These three conclusions were developed for  the  first  time  in  my
books "Socialisation  and democratic centralism"  (1987)  and "Socialism and
Self Management" (1989)".
     32 A.Toffler. Forecasts and pre-conditions, Sofia, 1991, page 64
     33 A.Toffler - Ibid
     34 See Fortune, 1995, April, August
     35 The Best Companies To Work For In America. N.Y. 1993. P. 285.
     36 Samuel Huntington.  The  Clash of  Civilisations? Democratic  review
ed.2-3, 1995, page 167
     37 Foreign Affairs, vol.72, No.4, page 16
     38 A. Toffler. "The Shock of the Future". S., 1991.
     39 See Creating A New History For Future Generations. Ed. By T. Him and
J. Dator. Kyoto. 1994.
     40 J. K. Galbraith. The Anatomy of Power. S., 1993, p. 54.
     41 A. Toffler. Forecasts and Preconditions.
     42 Employee Ownership. National Center for Employee ownership, 1985, p.
53.
     43 Calculated on the basis of "Germany's top 500", Frankfurt/Main 1995.
     44 A. Toffler. Forecasts and Preconditions.
     45 P.Drucker. Post-capitalist society. Harper, 1994, p.96
     46  J.Stalin.  Economic problems of the development of socialism in the
USSR  (in  his book,  J.V.Stalin on the Socialist  Economy). Sofia 1955. 47.
P.Drucker. Post Capitalist Society. N.Y.,1994
     47 P. Drucker. Post Capitalist Society. N. Y., 1994.
     48 See. H.Genov. The Path of the Dragon. Sofia, 1992.
     49 L.R.Braun. K.Braun  and S.Pastel.  I. The Condition of the Planet (A
Picture of a  Stable Society). S.1990.II. Thinking about Future Generations.
Tokyo.1994
     50 R.Allen. Mathematical economics. (Russian translation) Moscow. 1963.
     51 Leon Walras. Elements of Pure Economics. L.1954.
     52 What  I  am  referring  to here is  Marx's  claim  that  during  the
historical processes  "the  civil  society  will  come again  to engulf  the
state". This  conclusion which he  came to during the period  of  the  Paris
Commune (France 1871)  was entirely ignored by the majority of his followers
and especially the founder of "real socialism".
     53 Member  of the Politburo of the Central Committee of  the CPSU  with
responsibility for ideology during the term of Gorbachev.
     54 St. Gill and D. Law. The Global political economy, p. 151.
     55 UNCTAD World Investment Report. 1993.
     56 The world in 1996. L., 1995, p. 113.
     57 Based  on statistics by  M.Porter. The Competitive  Advantage. N.Y.,
1990
     58 Jacques Atalie. The Millenium. Sofia. P. 52.
     59 The Federal Reserve  system fulfils the role of the central  bank in
the USA. It is currently under the directorship of A.Greenspan.
     60 Based on "The Economist" World in Figures, L.1994.
     61 Based on the "The Economist","World in Figures" L.1994.
     62 Inc. Middle East.
     63 Republics of the Former Soviet Union.
     64 The military balance 1994--5. UK;Brassey.
     65 Jacques Atalie. The Millenium. S., 1992, page 15.
     ??







     THE FOURTH CIVILISATION


     ALEXANDER TOMOV


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