THE OLDEST MILITARY TREATISE IN THE WORLD
Translated from the Chinese
By LIONEL GILES, M.A. (1910)

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 From: V.Boldin (boldin@mail.south.ru)
 См. также: Суньцзы. Искусство войны
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1.Laying Plans
2.Waging War
3.Attack by Stratagem
4.Tactical Dispositions
5.Energy
6.Weak Points and Strong
7.Maneuvering
8.Variation in Tactics
9.The Army on the March
10.Terrain
11.The Nine Situations
12.The Attack by Fire
13.The Use of Spies



[This  is  the  basic text of Sun Tzu on the Art of War. It was
extracted from Mr. Giles' complete work as  titled  above.  The
commentary itself, which, of course includes this work embedded
within it, has been released as suntzu10.txt (or suntzu10.zip).
This  is  being released only as an adjunct to that work, which
contains a wealth of commentary upon this text.]







     1.Sun  Tzu  said: The art of war is of vital importance to
the State. 2.It is a matter of life and death, a road either to
safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry  which  can
on no account be neglected. 3.The art of war, then, is governed
by  five  constant  factors,  to be taken into account in one's
deliberations,  when  seeking  to  determine   the   conditions
obtaining in the field. 4.These are:

     1.The  Moral  Law;  2.Heaven;  3.Earth;  4.The  Commander;
5.Method and discipline.

     5.The Moral Law causes the people to be in complete accord
with their ruler, so that they will follow  him  regardless  of
their  lives,  undismayed by any danger. 6.  7.Heaven signifies
night and day,  cold  and  heat,  times  and  seasons.  8.Earth
comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open
ground  and narrow passes; the chances of life and death. 9.The
Commander  stands  for  the  virtues  of   wisdom,   sincerely,
benevolence,   courage   and   strictness.   10.By  method  and
discipline are to be understood the marshaling of the  army  in
its  proper  subdivisions,  the  graduations  of rank among the
officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may  reach
the  army,  and  the  control of military expenditure. 11.These
five heads should be familiar to every general:  he  who  knows
them  will  be  victorious;  he  who  knows them not will fail.
12.Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to  determine
the  military  conditions,  let  them  be  made  the basis of a
comparison, in this wise:-- 13.

     1.Which of the two sovereigns is  imbued  with  the  Moral
law?  2.Which of the two generals has most ability? 3.With whom
lie the advantages derived from Heaven and  Earth?  4.On  which
side  is  discipline  most rigorously enforced? 5.Which army is
stronger? 6.On which side are  officers  and  men  more  highly
trained? 7.In which army is there the greater constancy both in
reward and punishment?

     14.By  means  of these seven considerations I can forecast
victory or defeat. 15.The general that hearkens to  my  counsel
and  acts  upon it, will conquer: let such a one be retained in
command! The general that hearkens not to my counsel  nor  acts
upon  it,  will  suffer  defeat:--let  such a one be dismissed!
16.While heading the profit of my counsel, avail yourself  also
of  any  helpful  circumstances  over  and  beyond the ordinary
rules. 17.According as circumstances are favorable, one  should
modify  one's  plans.  18.All  warfare  is  based on deception.
19.Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when  using
our  forces,  we  must seem inactive; when we are near, we must
make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we  must
make  him  believe we are near. 20.Hold out baits to entice the
enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him. 21.If he is secure at all
points, be prepared for him. If he  is  in  superior  strength,
evade  him.  22.If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to
irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he  may  grow  arrogant.
23.If  he  is  taking his ease, give him no rest. If his forces
are  united,  separate  them.  24.Attack  him   where   he   is
unprepared,   appear  where  you  are  not  expected.  25.These
military devices, leading to  victory,  must  not  be  divulged
beforehand.  26.Now  the  general  who wins a battle makes many
calculations in his  temple  ere  the  battle  is  fought.  The
general   who   loses  a  battle  makes  but  few  calculations
beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and  few
calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It
is  by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely
to win or lose.







     1.Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war, where there  are
in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots,
and  a  hundred  thousand  mail-clad  soldiers, with provisions
enough to carry them a thousand li, the expenditure at home and
at the front, including entertainment of  guests,  small  items
such  as  glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor,
will reach the total of a thousand ounces of  silver  per  day.
Such  is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men. 2.When you
engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in  coming,  then
men's weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be damped. If
you  lay  siege  to  a  town,  you  will exhaust your strength.
3.Again, if the campaign is protracted, the  resources  of  the
State will not be equal to the strain. 4.Now, when your weapons
are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength exhausted and your
treasure  spent,  other  chieftains  will  spring  up  to  take
advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be
able to avert the consequences that must ensue. 5.Thus,  though
we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been
seen  associated  with long delays. 6.There is no instance of a
country having benefited from prolonged warfare. 7.It  is  only
one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can
thoroughly  understand  the  profitable  way of carrying it on.
8.The skillful soldier does not raise a  second  levy,  neither
are  his  supply-wagons  loaded  more  than  twice. 9.Bring war
material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus  the
army  will  have  food  enough for its needs. 10.Poverty of the
State  exchequer  causes  an   army   to   be   maintained   by
contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army
at  a  distance causes the people to be impoverished. 11.On the
other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices  to  go  up;
and  high  prices  cause  the  people's substance to be drained
away. 12.When their substance is drained  away,  the  peasantry
will  be  afflicted  by  heavy  exactions. 13.With this loss of
substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of  the  people
will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their income will be
dissipated;  while  government  expenses  for  broken chariots,
worn-out horses, breast-plates and helmets,  bows  and  arrows,
spears  and shields, protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy
wagons, will amount to four-tenths of its total  revenue.  14. 
15.Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy.
One  cartload of the enemy's provisions is equivalent to twenty
of one's own, and likewise a single picul of his  provender  is
equivalent  to  twenty from one's own store. 16.Now in order to
kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there may
be advantage from defeating the enemy,  they  must  have  their
rewards.  17.Therefore  in  chariot  fighting, when ten or more
chariots have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the
first. Our own flags should be substituted  for  those  of  the
enemy,  and  the  chariots mingled and used in conjunction with
ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and  kept.
18.This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one's own
strength.  19.In  war,  then, let your great object be victory,
not lengthy campaigns. 20.Thus it may be known that the  leader
of  armies is the arbiter of the people's fate, the man on whom
it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.







     1.Sun Tzu said: In the practical  art  of  war,  the  best
thing  of  all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact;
to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better
to recapture an army entire than to destroy it,  to  capture  a
regiment,  a  detachment  or  a  company entire than to destroy
them. 2.Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles  is  not
supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the
enemy's resistance without fighting. 3.Thus the highest form of
generalship  is  to balk the enemy's plans; the next best is to
prevent the junction of the enemy's forces; the next  in  order
is  to  attack  the  enemy's  army  in the field; and the worst
policy of all is to besiege walled cities. 4.The rule  is,  not
to  besiege  walled  cities  if it can possibly be avoided. The
preparation  of  mantlets,  movable   shelters,   and   various
implements  of  war,  will  take up three whole months; and the
piling up of mounds over against  the  walls  will  take  three
months  more.  5.The general, unable to control his irritation,
will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, with the
result that one-third of his men  are  slain,  while  the  town
still  remains  untaken.  Such  are the disastrous effects of a
siege. 6.Therefore the  skillful  leader  subdues  the  enemy's
troops  without  any fighting; he captures their cities without
laying siege to  them;  he  overthrows  their  kingdom  without
lengthy  operations  in  the field. 7.With his forces intact he
will dispute the mastery  of  the  Empire,  and  thus,  without
losing  a man, his triumph will be complete. This is the method
of attacking by stratagem. 8.It is the  rule  in  war,  if  our
forces  are ten to the enemy's one, to surround him; if five to
one, to attack him; if twice as numerous, to  divide  our  army
into  two.  9.If  equally  matched,  we  can  offer  battle; if
slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; if  quite
unequal in every way, we can flee from him. 10.Hence, though an
obstinate  fight  may  be  made by a small force, in the end it
must be captured by the larger force. 11.Now the general is the
bulwark of the State; if the bulwark is complete at all points;
the State will be strong; if  the  bulwark  is  defective,  the
State  will  be  weak. 12.There are three ways in which a ruler
can bring misfortune upon his army:-- 13.(1) By commanding  the
army  to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the fact that
it cannot obey. This is called hobbling  the  army.  14.(2)  By
attempting  to govern an army in the same way as he administers
a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in  an
army.  This  causes restlessness in the soldier's minds. 15.(3)
By employing the officers of his army  without  discrimination,
through  ignorance  of  the military principle of adaptation to
circumstances. This shakes  the  confidence  of  the  soldiers.
16.But  when  the  army is restless and distrustful, trouble is
sure to come from the other  feudal  princes.  This  is  simply
bringing  anarchy  into  the  army,  and flinging victory away.
17.Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory:

     1.He will win who knows when to  fight  and  when  not  to
fight.  2.He will win who knows how to handle both superior and
inferior forces. 3.He will win whose army is  animated  by  the
same  spirit  throughout  all  its  ranks.  4.He  will win who,
prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared. 5.He will
win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the
sovereign.

     18.Hence the saying:  If  you  know  the  enemy  and  know
yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If
you  know  yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained
you will also suffer a defeat. If you know  neither  the  enemy
nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.







     1.Sun  Tzu  said:  The  good  fighters  of  old  first put
themselves beyond the possibility of defeat,  and  then  waited
for   an  opportunity  of  defeating  the  enemy.  2.To  secure
ourselves against  defeat  lies  in  our  own  hands,  but  the
opportunity  of  defeating  the  enemy is provided by the enemy
himself. 3.Thus the good fighter  is  able  to  secure  himself
against defeat, but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.
4.Hence  the  saying: One may know how to conquer without being
able to do it.  5.Security  against  defeat  implies  defensive
tactics;   ability   to  defeat  the  enemy  means  taking  the
offensive. 6.Standing on the defensive  indicates  insufficient
strength;   attacking,  a  superabundance  of  strength.  7.The
general who is skilled in defense  hides  in  the  most  secret
recesses  of  the  earth;  he  who is skilled in attack flashes
forth from the topmost heights of heaven. Thus on the one  hand
we  have  ability to protect ourselves; on the other, a victory
that is complete. 8.To see victory only when it is  within  the
ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence. 9.Neither
is  it  the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the
whole Empire says, "Well done!" 10.To lift an autumn hair is no
sign of great strength; to see the sun and moon is no  sign  of
sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick
ear.  11.What  the  ancients called a clever fighter is one who
not only wins, but excels in winning with  ease.  12.Hence  his
victories  bring  him  neither reputation for wisdom nor credit
for courage. 13.He wins his  battles  by  making  no  mistakes.
Making  no  mistakes  is  what  establishes  the  certainty  of
victory, for it means  conquering  an  enemy  that  is  already
defeated.  14.Hence  the  skillful  fighter puts himself into a
position which makes defeat impossible, and does not  miss  the
moment  for  defeating the enemy. 15.Thus it is that in war the
victorious strategist only seeks battle after the  victory  has
been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and
afterwards   looks   for   victory.  16.The  consummate  leader
cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres  to  method  and
discipline;  thus  it is in his power to control success. 17.In
respect of military  method,  we  have,  firstly,  Measurement;
secondly,   Estimation   of   quantity;  thirdly,  Calculation;
fourthly,   Balancing    of    chances;    fifthly,    Victory.
18.Measurement  owes  its  existence  to  Earth;  Estimation of
quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity;
Balancing of chances to Calculation; and Victory  to  Balancing
of chances. 19.A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as
a  pound's  weight  placed in the scale against a single grain.
20.The onrush of a conquering force is  like  the  bursting  of
pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.







     1.Sun  Tzu  said: The control of a large force is the same
principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a  question
of  dividing  up  their  numbers.  2.Fighting with a large army
under your command is nowise different  from  fighting  with  a
small  one:  it  is  merely a question of instituting signs and
signals. 3.To ensure that your whole  host  may  withstand  the
brunt  of  the  enemy's  attack  and  remain unshaken-- this is
effected by maneuvers direct and indirect. 4.That the impact of
your army may be like a grindstone dashed against an  egg--this
is  effected by the science of weak points and strong. 5.In all
fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but
indirect methods will be needed in  order  to  secure  victory.
6.Indirect  tactics,  efficiently applied, are inexhaustible as
Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers  and  streams;
like  the  sun  and  moon, they end but to begin anew; like the
four seasons, they pass away to return once more.  7.There  are
not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these
five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard. 8.There
are  not  more  than  five  primary  colors (blue, yellow, red,
white, and black), yet in combination they  produce  more  hues
than  can  ever  been  seen.  9.There  are  not  more than five
cardinal  tastes  (sour,  acrid,  salt,  sweet,  bitter),   yet
combinations  of  them  yield  more  flavors  than  can ever be
tasted. 10.In battle, there are not more than  two  methods  of
attack--the   direct   and  the  indirect;  yet  these  two  in
combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers. 11.The
direct and the indirect lead on to each other in  turn.  It  is
like  moving  in  a  circle--you  never come to an end. Who can
exhaust the possibilities of their combination? 12.The onset of
troops is like the rush of  a  torrent  which  will  even  roll
stones  along in its course. 13.The quality of decision is like
the well-timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and
destroy its victim.  14.Therefore  the  good  fighter  will  be
terrible  in  his  onset, and prompt in his decision. 15.Energy
may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision,  to  the
releasing  of  a  trigger.  16.Amid  the  turmoil and tumult of
battle, there may be seeming disorder and yet no real  disorder
at  all;  amid  confusion  and chaos, your array may be without
head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat. 17.Simulated
disorder  postulates   perfect   discipline,   simulated   fear
postulates  courage;  simulated  weakness  postulates strength.
18.Hiding order beneath the  cloak  of  disorder  is  simply  a
question  of  subdivision;  concealing  courage under a show of
timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy; masking  strength
with  weakness  is  to  be  effected  by tactical dispositions.
19.Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy  on  the  move
maintains  deceitful  appearances, according to which the enemy
will act. He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at
it. 20.By holding out baits, he keeps him on  the  march;  then
with  a  body  of  picked  men  he lies in wait for him. 21.The
clever combatant looks to the effect of  combined  energy,  and
does  not  require too much from individuals. Hence his ability
to pick out the right men and utilize combined energy.  22.When
he utilizes combined energy, his fighting men become as it were
like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log
or stone to remain motionless on level ground, and to move when
on  a  slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if
round-shaped, to go rolling down. 23.Thus the energy  developed
by good fighting men is as the momentum of a round stone rolled
down  a  mountain  thousands  of feet in height. So much on the
subject of energy.







     1.Sun Tzu said: Whoever is first in the field  and  awaits
the  coming  of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever
is second in the field and has to hasten to battle will  arrive
exhausted. 2.Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on
the enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on
him. 3.By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy
to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can
make  it  impossible for the enemy to draw near. 4.If the enemy
is taking his ease, he can harass him; if  well  supplied  with
food,  he can starve him out; if quietly encamped, he can force
him to move. 5.Appear at points which the enemy must hasten  to
defend;  march  swiftly  to  places where you are not expected.
6.An army may march great distances  without  distress,  if  it
marches  through  country  where the enemy is not. 7.You can be
sure of succeeding in your attacks if you  only  attack  places
which  are undefended.You can ensure the safety of your defense
if you only hold positions that  cannot  be  attacked.  8.Hence
that general is skillful in attack whose opponent does not know
what  to  defend;  and he is skillful in defense whose opponent
does not know what to attack. 9.O divine art  of  subtlety  and
secrecy!  Through  you  we  learn  to be invisible, through you
inaudible; and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands.
10.You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you  make
for  the  enemy's  weak points; you may retire and be safe from
pursuit if your movements are more  rapid  than  those  of  the
enemy.  11.If  we  wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an
engagement even though he be sheltered behind  a  high  rampart
and  a  deep  ditch.  All we need do is attack some other place
that he will be obliged to relieve. 12.If we  do  not  wish  to
fight,  we  can  prevent the enemy from engaging us even though
the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground.
All we need do is to throw something odd and  unaccountable  in
his   way.  13.By  discovering  the  enemy's  dispositions  and
remaining  invisible  ourselves,  we  can   keep   our   forces
concentrated, while the enemy's must be divided. 14.We can form
a  single  united  body,  while  the  enemy  must split up into
fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against  separate
parts  of  a  whole,  which  means that we shall be many to the
enemy's few. 15.And if we are able thus to attack  an  inferior
force  with  a  superior  one,  our  opponents  will be in dire
straits. 16.The spot where we intend to fight must not be  made
known;  for  then  the  enemy  will  have  to prepare against a
possible attack at several different  points;  and  his  forces
being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall
have  to  face  at any given point will be proportionately few.
17.For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken  his
rear;  should  he  strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van;
should he strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should
he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. If  he  sends
reinforcements   everywhere,   he   will  everywhere  be  weak.
18.Numerical weakness comes  from  having  to  prepare  against
possible  attacks;  numerical  strength,  from  compelling  our
adversary to make these preparations against us. 19.Knowing the
place and the time of the coming  battle,  we  may  concentrate
from  the  greatest  distances  in  order  to  fight. 20.But if
neither time nor place be known, then the  left  wing  will  be
impotent  to  succor  the  right, the right equally impotent to
succor the left, the van unable to relieve  the  rear,  or  the
rear  to  support  the  van.  How  much more so if the furthest
portions of the army are anything under a hundred LI apart, and
even  the  nearest  are  separated  by  several  LI!  21.Though
according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh exceed our own in
number,  that  shall  advantage  them  nothing in the matter of
victory. I say then that victory can be achieved. 22.Though the
enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from fighting.
Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of  their
success.  23.Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity
or inactivity. Force him to reveal himself, so as to  find  out
his  vulnerable  spots.  24.Carefully compare the opposing army
with  your  own,  so  that  you  may  know  where  strength  is
superabundant  and where it is deficient. 25.In making tactical
dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain  is  to  conceal
them;  conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the
prying of the subtlest spies,  from  the  machinations  of  the
wisest  brains.  26.How victory may be produced for them out of
the enemy's own tactics--that  is  what  the  multitude  cannot
comprehend.  27.All  men can see the tactics whereby I conquer,
but what none can see is the strategy out of which  victory  is
evolved. 28.Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one
victory,  but  let  your  methods  be regulated by the infinite
variety of circumstances. 29.Military  tactics  are  like  unto
water;  for  water  in  its  natural course runs away from high
places and hastens downwards. 30.So in war, the way is to avoid
what is strong and to strike at what is weak.  31.Water  shapes
its  course according to the nature of the ground over which it
flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe
whom he is facing.  32.Therefore,  just  as  water  retains  no
constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions.
33.He  who  can  modify his tactics in relation to his opponent
and thereby succeed in winning, may  be  called  a  heaven-born
captain. 34.The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth)
are  not  always equally predominant; the four seasons make way
for each other in turn. There are short days and long; the moon
has its periods of waning and waxing.







     1.Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his  commands
from the sovereign. 2.Having collected an army and concentrated
his  forces, he must blend and harmonize the different elements
thereof before pitching his camp. 3.After that, comes  tactical
maneuvering,  than  which  there is nothing more difficult. The
difficulty of tactical  maneuvering  consists  in  turning  the
devious  into  the direct, and misfortune into gain. 4.Thus, to
take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy  out
of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach
the  goal  before  him,  shows  knowledge  of  the  artifice of
DEVIATION. 5.Maneuvering with an army is advantageous; with  an
undisciplined  multitude,  most dangerous. 6.If you set a fully
equipped army in march in order to  snatch  an  advantage,  the
chances  are  that  you will be too late. On the other hand, to
detach a flying column for the purpose involves  the  sacrifice
of  its  baggage  and  stores. 7.Thus, if you order your men to
roll up their  buff-coats,  and  make  forced  marches  without
halting  day  or night, covering double the usual distance at a
stretch, doing a hundred LI in order to wrest an advantage, the
leaders of all your three divisions will fall into the hands of
the enemy. 8.The stronger men will be in front, the jaded  ones
will  fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth of your army
will reach its destination. 9.If you march fifty LI in order to
outmaneuver the enemy, you will lose the leader of  your  first
division,  and  only half your force will reach the goal. 10.If
you march thirty LI with the same object,  two-thirds  of  your
army  will  arrive. 11.We may take it then that an army without
its baggage-train is  lost;  without  provisions  it  is  lost;
without  bases  of  supply  it is lost. 12.We cannot enter into
alliances until we are  acquainted  with  the  designs  of  our
neighbors.  13.We  are  not  fit  to  lead an army on the march
unless we are  familiar  with  the  face  of  the  country--its
mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes
and  swamps. 14.We shall be unable to turn natural advantage to
account unless we make use of local guides. 15.In war, practice
dissimulation, and you will succeed. 16.Whether to  concentrate
or  to  divide  your  troops, must be decided by circumstances.
17.Let your rapidity be that of the wind, your compactness that
of the forest. 18.In raiding and plundering be  like  fire,  is
immovability  like  a  mountain.  19.Let your plans be dark and
impenetrable  as  night,  and  when  you  move,  fall  like   a
thunderbolt.  20.When  you plunder a countryside, let the spoil
be divided amongst your men; when you  capture  new  territory,
cut  it  up  into  allotments  for the benefit of the soldiery.
21.Ponder and deliberate before you make  a  move.  22.He  will
conquer  who  has learnt the artifice of deviation. Such is the
art of maneuvering. 23.The Book of Army Management says: On the
field of battle, the spoken word does  not  carry  far  enough:
hence  the  institution  of  gongs  and drums. Nor can ordinary
objects be  seen  clearly  enough:  hence  the  institution  of
banners  and  flags. 24.Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are
means whereby the ears and eyes of the host may be  focused  on
one  particular point. 25.The host thus forming a single united
body, is it impossible either for the brave to  advance  alone,
or  for  the  cowardly  to  retreat  alone.  This is the art of
handling large masses of men. 26.In night-fighting, then,  make
much  use of signal-fires and drums, and in fighting by day, of
flags and banners, as a means of influencing the ears and  eyes
of  your  army.  27.A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; a
commander-in-chief may be  robbed  of  his  presence  of  mind.
28.Now a soldier's spirit is keenest in the morning; by noonday
it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent only
on returning to camp. 29.A clever general, therefore, avoids an
army  when  its  spirit  is  keen,  but  attacks  it when it is
sluggish and inclined to return. This is the  art  of  studying
moods.  30.Disciplined  and  calm,  to  await the appearance of
disorder and hubbub amongst the  enemy:--this  is  the  art  of
retaining  self-possession.  31.To  be  near the goal while the
enemy is still far from it, to wait at ease while the enemy  is
toiling  and  struggling,  to  be  well-fed  while the enemy is
famished:--this is the art of husbanding one's strength.  32.To
refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect
order,  to  refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and
confident array:--this is the art  of  studying  circumstances.
33.It  is  a  military  axiom not to advance uphill against the
enemy, nor to oppose him when  he  comes  downhill.  34.Do  not
pursue  an  enemy  who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers
whose temper is keen. 35.Do not swallow  bait  offered  by  the
enemy.  Do  not  interfere with an army that is returning home.
36.When you surround an army, leave  an  outlet  free.  Do  not
press a desperate foe too hard. 37.Such is the art of warfare.







     1.Sun  Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands
from the sovereign, collects  his  army  and  concentrates  his
forces  2.When  in difficult country, do not encamp. In country
where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not
linger  in  dangerously  isolated   positions.   In   hemmed-in
situations,   you   must  resort  to  stratagem.  In  desperate
position, you must fight. 3.There are roads which must  not  be
followed,  armies  which must be not attacked, towns which must
be besieged, positions which must not be contested, commands of
the sovereign which must  not  be  obeyed.  4.The  general  who
thoroughly  understands the advantages that accompany variation
of tactics knows how to handle his troops.  5.The  general  who
does  not  understand  these,  may  be well acquainted with the
configuration of the country, yet he will not be able  to  turn
his  knowledge  to  practical account. 6.So, the student of war
who is unversed in the art of war of varying  his  plans,  even
though  he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will fail to
make the best use of his men.  7.Hence  in  the  wise  leader's
plans,  considerations of advantage and of disadvantage will be
blended together. 8.If our expectation of advantage be tempered
in this way, we may succeed in accomplishing the essential part
of our schemes. 9.If, on  the  other  hand,  in  the  midst  of
difficulties  we are always ready to seize an advantage, we may
extricate ourselves  from  misfortune.  10.Reduce  the  hostile
chiefs by inflicting damage on them; and make trouble for them,
and   keep   them   constantly   engaged;   hold  out  specious
allurements, and make them rush to any given point. 11.The  art
of  war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy's
not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the
chance of his not attacking, but rather on  the  fact  that  we
have   made   our  position  unassailable.  12.There  are  five
dangerous faults which may affect a general:

     1.Recklessness, which leads to  destruction;  2.cowardice,
which leads to capture; 3.a hasty temper, which can be provoked
by  insults; 4.a delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame;
5.over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to  worry  and
trouble.

     13.These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous
to the  conduct  of  war. 14.When an army is overthrown and its
leader slain, the cause will surely be found among  these  five
dangerous faults. Let them be a subject of meditation.







     1.Sun  Tzu  said: We come now to the question of encamping
the army, and observing signs of the enemy. Pass  quickly  over
mountains,  and  keep in the neighborhood of valleys. 2.Camp in
high places, facing the sun. Do not climb heights in  order  to
fight.  So much for mountain warfare. 3.After crossing a river,
you should get far away  from  it.  4.When  an  invading  force
crosses  a river in its onward march, do not advance to meet it
in mid-stream. It will be best to let half the army get across,
and then deliver your attack. 5.If you are  anxious  to  fight,
you should not go to meet the invader near a river which he has
to  cross.  6.Moor  your  craft  higher  up than the enemy, and
facing the sun. Do not move up-stream to  meet  the  enemy.  So
much  for  river warfare. 7.In crossing salt-marshes, your sole
concern should be to get over them quickly, without any  delay.
8.If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have water and
grass  near you, and get your back to a clump of trees. So much
for operations in salt-marches. 9.In dry, level  country,  take
up  an  easily  accessible  position with rising ground to your
right and on your rear, so that the danger may be in front, and
safety lie behind. So much for  campaigning  in  flat  country.
10.These  are  the  four  useful branches of military knowledge
which enabled the  Yellow  Emperor  to  vanquish  four  several
sovereigns.  11.All  armies prefer high ground to low and sunny
places to dark. 12.If you are careful of your men, and camp  on
hard  ground, the army will be free from disease of every kind,
and this will spell victory. 13.When you come to a  hill  or  a
bank, occupy the sunny side, with the slope on your right rear.
Thus  you will at once act for the benefit of your soldiers and
utilize the natural  advantages  of  the  ground.  14.When,  in
consequence  of  heavy rains up-country, a river which you wish
to ford is swollen and flecked with foam, you must  wait  until
it  subsides.  15.Country in which there are precipitous cliffs
with torrents running between, deep natural  hollows,  confined
places,  tangled  thickets,  quagmires and crevasses, should be
left with all possible speed and not  approached.  16.While  we
keep away from such places, we should get the enemy to approach
them;  while we face them, we should let the enemy have them on
his rear. 17.If in the neighborhood of your camp  there  should
be any hilly country, ponds surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow
basins filled with reeds, or woods with thick undergrowth, they
must be carefully routed out and searched; for these are places
where  men  in  ambush  or  insidious  spies  are  likely to be
lurking. 18.When the enemy is close at hand and remains  quiet,
he  is relying on the natural strength of his position. 19.When
he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he is anxious for
the other side to advance. 20.If his  place  of  encampment  is
easy of access, he is tendering a bait. 21.Movement amongst the
trees  of  a  forest  shows  that  the  enemy is advancing. The
appearance of a number of screens in the midst of  thick  grass
means that the enemy wants to make us suspicious. 22.The rising
of  birds in their flight is the sign of an ambuscade. Startled
beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming.  23.When  there
is  dust  rising  in  a high column, it is the sign of chariots
advancing; when the dust is low, but spread over a  wide  area,
it  betokens  the approach of infantry. When it branches out in
different directions, it shows that parties have been  sent  to
collect  firewood.  A  few  clouds  of  dust  moving to and fro
signify  that  the  army  is  encamping.  24.Humble  words  and
increased  preparations  are  signs  that the enemy is about to
advance. Violent language and driving  forward  as  if  to  the
attack  are  signs  that  he  will  retreat.  25.When the light
chariots come out first and take up a position on the wings, it
is a sign that  the  enemy  is  forming  for  battle.  26.Peace
proposals  unaccompanied  by  a sworn covenant indicate a plot.
27.When there is much running about and the soldiers fall  into
rank,  it means that the critical moment has come. 28.When some
are seen advancing and some retreating, it is a  lure.  29.When
the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they are faint from
want  of  food. 30.If those who are sent to draw water begin by
drinking themselves, the army is suffering from  thirst.  31.If
the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and makes no effort to
secure  it,  the  soldiers are exhausted. 32.If birds gather on
any  spot,  it  is  unoccupied.  Clamor   by   night   betokens
nervousness.  33.If  there  is  disturbance  in  the  camp, the
general's authority is weak.  If  the  banners  and  flags  are
shifted about, sedition is afoot. If the officers are angry, it
means  that the men are weary. 34.When an army feeds its horses
with grain and kills its cattle for food, and when the  men  do
not  hang  their cooking-pots over the camp-fires, showing that
they will not return to their tents, you may know that they are
determined  to  fight  to  the  death.  35.The  sight  of   men
whispering together in small knots or speaking in subdued tones
points  to  disaffection  amongst  the  rank  and  file. 36.Too
frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the  end  of  his
resources;  too  many  punishments  betray  a condition of dire
distress. 37.To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright
at the enemy's numbers, shows a supreme lack  of  intelligence.
38.When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, it is
a  sign  that  the  enemy wishes for a truce. 39.If the enemy's
troops march up angrily and remain facing ours for a long  time
without  either  joining battle or taking themselves off again,
the  situation  is  one  that  demands  great   vigilance   and
circumspection. 40.If our troops are no more in number than the
enemy,  that  is amply sufficient; it only means that no direct
attack can be made. What we can do is simply to concentrate all
our available strength, keep a close watch on  the  enemy,  and
obtain  reinforcements.  41.He who exercises no forethought but
makes light of his opponents is sure to be  captured  by  them.
42.If  soldiers are punished before they have grown attached to
you, they will not prove submissive;  and,  unless  submissive,
then  will  be  practically useless. If, when the soldiers have
become attached to you, punishments are not enforced, they will
still be unless. 43.Therefore soldiers must be treated  in  the
first  instance  with humanity, but kept under control by means
of iron discipline. This is a certain road to victory. 44.If in
training soldiers commands are habitually  enforced,  the  army
will  be  well-disciplined; if not, its discipline will be bad.
45.If a general shows confidence in his men but always  insists
on his orders being obeyed, the gain will be mutual.







     1.Sun  Tzu  said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain,
to wit:

     1.Accessible ground;  2.entangling  ground;  3.temporizing
ground;  4.narrow passes; 5.precipitous heights; 6.positions at
a great distance from the enemy.

     2.Ground which can be freely traversed by  both  sides  is
called  accessible.  3.With regard to ground of this nature, be
before the enemy in occupying the raised and sunny  spots,  and
carefully guard your line of supplies. Then you will be able to
fight  with  advantage.  4.Ground which can be abandoned but is
hard to re-occupy is called entangling. 5.From  a  position  of
this  sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may sally forth and
defeat him. But if the enemy is prepared for your  coming,  and
you fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible, disaster
will  ensue. 6.When the position is such that neither side will
gain by making the first move, it is called temporizing ground.
7.In a position of this sort,  even  though  the  enemy  should
offer  us  an attractive bait, it will be advisable not to stir
forth, but rather to retreat, thus enticing the  enemy  in  his
turn;  then, when part of his army has come out, we may deliver
our attack with advantage. 8.With regard to narrow  passes,  if
you  can occupy them first, let them be strongly garrisoned and
await the advent of the enemy. 9.Should the army forestall  you
in  occupying  a pass, do not go after him if the pass is fully
garrisoned, but only if it is weakly garrisoned. 10.With regard
to  precipitous  heights,  if  you  are  beforehand  with  your
adversary,  you  should  occupy the raised and sunny spots, and
there wait for him to come up. 11.If  the  enemy  has  occupied
them  before  you,  do  not  follow him, but retreat and try to
entice him away. 12.If you are situated  at  a  great  distance
from the enemy, and the strength of the two armies is equal, it
is  not  easy to provoke a battle, and fighting will be to your
disadvantage. 13.These six are the  principles  connected  with
Earth.  The general who has attained a responsible post must be
careful to study them. 14.Now an army is exposed to six several
calamities, not arising from natural causes,  but  from  faults
for which the general is responsible. These are:

     1.Flight;     2.insubordination;    3.collapse;    4.ruin;
5.disorganization; 6.rout.

     15.Other conditions being equal, if one  force  is  hurled
against  another  ten  times  its  size, the result will be the
flight of the former.  16.When  the  common  soldiers  are  too
strong   and   their   officers   too   weak,   the  result  is
insubordination. When the  officers  are  too  strong  and  the
common  soldiers  too weak, the result is collapse. 17.When the
higher officers are angry and insubordinate, and on meeting the
enemy give battle on  their  own  account  from  a  feeling  of
resentment,  before  the commander-in-chief can tell whether or
no he is in a position to fight, the result  is  ruin.  18.When
the  general is weak and without authority; when his orders are
not clear and distinct; when there are no fixes duties assigned
to officers and men, and the ranks are  formed  in  a  slovenly
haphazard  manner, the result is utter disorganization. 19.When
a general, unable to estimate the enemy's strength,  allows  an
inferior  force  to  engage  a  larger  one,  or  hurls  a weak
detachment against a powerful one, and neglects to place picked
soldiers in the front rank, the result must be  rout.  20.These
are  six ways of courting defeat, which must be carefully noted
by the general who has  attained  a  responsible  post.  21.The
natural  formation  of  the country is the soldier's best ally;
but a power of estimating the  adversary,  of  controlling  the
forces  of  victory,  and of shrewdly calculating difficulties,
dangers and distances, constitutes the test of a great general.
22.He  who  knows  these  things,  and  in  fighting  puts  his
knowledge  into  practice,  will  win his battles. He who knows
them not, nor practices them, will surely  be  defeated.  23.If
fighting  is  sure  to  result in victory, then you must fight,
even though the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not result in
victory, then you must not fight even at the  ruler's  bidding.
24.The  general who advances without coveting fame and retreats
without fearing disgrace, whose only thought is to protect  his
country  and do good service for his sovereign, is the jewel of
the kingdom. 25.Regard your soldiers as your children, and they
will follow you into the deepest valleys;  look  upon  them  as
your  own  beloved  sons,  and they will stand by you even unto
death. 26.If, however, you are indulgent, but  unable  to  make
your  authority  felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your
commands; and incapable, moreover, of quelling  disorder:  then
your  soldiers  must  be  likened  to spoilt children; they are
useless for any practical purpose. 27.If we know that  our  own
men  are  in  a  condition  to attack, but are unaware that the
enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only halfway  towards
victory.  28.If  we  know that the enemy is open to attack, but
are unaware that our own men are not in a condition to  attack,
we  have  gone only halfway towards victory. 29.If we know that
the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our men are  in
a  condition  to attack, but are unaware that the nature of the
ground makes fighting impracticable, we have  still  gone  only
halfway towards victory. 30.Hence the experienced soldier, once
in  motion, is never bewildered; once he has broken camp, he is
never at a loss. 31.Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and
know yourself, your victory will not stand  in  doubt;  if  you
know Heaven and know Earth, you may make your victory complete.







     1.Sun  Tzu  said: The art of war recognizes nine varieties
of ground:

     1.Dispersive  ground;   2.facile   ground;   3.contentious
ground;  4.open  ground;  5.ground  of  intersecting  highways;
6.serious  ground;  7.difficult  ground;  8.hemmed-in   ground;
9.desperate ground.

     2.When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is
dispersive  ground.  3.When  he  has  penetrated  into  hostile
territory, but to no  great  distance,  it  is  facile  ground.
4.Ground  the  possession  of  which imports great advantage to
either side, is contentious ground. 5.Ground on which each side
has liberty of movement is open ground.  6.Ground  which  forms
the  key to three contiguous states, so that he who occupies it
first has most of the Empire at his command,  is  a  ground  of
intersecting  highways.  7.When an army has penetrated into the
heart of a hostile  country,  leaving  a  number  of  fortified
cities  in  its rear, it is serious ground. 8.Mountain forests,
rugged steeps, marshes and fens--all country that  is  hard  to
traverse:  this  is difficult ground. 9.Ground which is reached
through narrow gorges, and from which we  can  only  retire  by
tortuous  paths,  so  that  a  small  number of the enemy would
suffice to crush a large body of our men:  this  is  hemmed  in
ground.   10.Ground   on  which  we  can  only  be  saved  from
destruction by fighting without  delay,  is  desperate  ground.
11.On  dispersive  ground,  therefore,  fight  not.  On  facile
ground, halt not. On contentious ground, attack not. 12.On open
ground, do not try to block the enemy's way. On the  ground  of
intersecting  highways,  join  hands  with  your  allies. 13.On
serious ground, gather in plunder. In  difficult  ground,  keep
steadily  on  the  march.  14.On  hemmed-in  ground,  resort to
stratagem. On desperate ground, fight. 15.Those who were called
skillful leaders of old knew how to drive a wedge  between  the
enemy's  front  and  rear;  to prevent co-operation between his
large and small divisions;  to  hinder  the  good  troops  from
rescuing the bad, the officers from rallying their men. 16.When
the  enemy's  men  were  united,  they  managed to keep them in
disorder. 17.When it  was  to  their  advantage,  they  made  a
forward  move;  when otherwise, they stopped still. 18.If asked
how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly array and
on the point of marching to the attack, I should say: "Begin by
seizing something which your opponent holds dear; then he  will
be  amenable  to your will." 19.Rapidity is the essence of war:
take advantage of the enemy's unreadiness,  make  your  way  by
unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots. 20.The following
are  the  principles  to  be observed by an invading force: The
further you penetrate into a country, the greater will  be  the
solidarity  of  your  troops,  and  thus the defenders will not
prevail against you. 21.Make forays in fertile country in order
to  supply  your  army  with  food.  22.Carefully   study   the
well-being  of  your  men, and do not overtax them. Concentrate
your energy and hoard your strength. Keep your army continually
on the move,  and  devise  unfathomable  plans.  23.Throw  your
soldiers  into  positions  whence  there is no escape, and they
will prefer death to flight. If they will face death, there  is
nothing  they  may not achieve. Officers and men alike will put
forth their uttermost strength. 24.Soldiers when  in  desperate
straits lose the sense of fear. If there is no place of refuge,
they will stand firm. If they are in hostile country, they will
show  a  stubborn  front. If there is no help for it, they will
fight hard. 25.Thus,  without  waiting  to  be  marshaled,  the
soldiers will be constantly on the qui vive; without waiting to
be  asked,  they  will do your will; without restrictions, they
will be faithful; without giving orders, they can  be  trusted.
26.Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with superstitious
doubts.  Then,  until  death  itself comes, no calamity need be
feared. 27.If our soldiers are not overburdened with money,  it
is  not because they have a distaste for riches; if their lives
are not unduly long, it is not because they are disinclined  to
longevity.  28.On  the day they are ordered out to battle, your
soldiers may weep, those sitting up  bedewing  their  garments,
and  those  lying down letting the tears run down their cheeks.
But let them once be brought to bay, and they will display  the
courage  of  a  Chu or a Kuei. 29.The skillful tactician may be
likened to the shuai-jan. Now the shuai-jan is a snake that  is
found  in the ChUng mountains. Strike at its head, and you will
be attacked by its tail; strike at its tail, and  you  will  be
attacked  by  its  head;  strike at its middle, and you will be
attacked by head and tail both. 30.Asked if an army can be made
to imitate the shuai-jan, I should answer, Yes. For the men  of
Wu  and the men of Yueh are enemies; yet if they are crossing a
river in the same boat and are caught by  a  storm,  they  will
come to each other's assistance just as the left hand helps the
right.  31.Hence  it  is  not  enough to put one's trust in the
tethering of horses, and the burying of chariot wheels  in  the
ground 32.The principle on which to manage an army is to set up
one  standard  of  courage which all must reach. 33.How to make
the best of both strong and weak--that is a question  involving
the proper use of ground. 34.Thus the skillful general conducts
his  army  just  as  though  he  were  leading  a  single  man,
willy-nilly, by the hand. 35.It is the business of a general to
be quiet and thus ensure secrecy; upright and  just,  and  thus
maintain  order. 36.He must be able to mystify his officers and
men by false reports and appearances, and  thus  keep  them  in
total  ignorance.  37.By altering his arrangements and changing
his plans, he keeps the enemy without  definite  knowledge.  By
shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents the
enemy from anticipating his purpose. 38.At the critical moment,
the leader of an army acts like one who has climbed up a height
and  then  kicks away the ladder behind him. He carries his men
deep into hostile territory before he  shows  his  hand.  39.He
burns  his  boats  and breaks his cooking-pots; like a shepherd
driving a flock of sheep, he drives his men this way and  that,
and  nothing  knows  whither he is going. 40.To muster his host
and bring it into danger:--this may be termed the  business  of
the  general.  41.The  different  measures  suited  to the nine
varieties of ground; the expediency of aggressive or  defensive
tactics;  and  the  fundamental laws of human nature: these are
things that must most certainly be  studied.  42.When  invading
hostile  territory,  the general principle is, that penetrating
deeply brings cohesion;  penetrating  but  a  short  way  means
dispersion. 43.When you leave your own country behind, and take
your  army  across neighborhood territory, you find yourself on
critical ground. When there are means of communication  on  all
four sides, the ground is one of intersecting highways. 44.When
you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious ground. When
you  penetrate  but  a little way, it is facile ground. 45.When
you have the enemy's  strongholds  on  your  rear,  and  narrow
passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground. When there is no place
of  refuge  at  all,  it  is desperate ground. 46.Therefore, on
dispersive ground,  I  would  inspire  my  men  with  unity  of
purpose.  On  facile  ground,  I  would see that there is close
connection between all parts  of  my  army.  47.On  contentious
ground,  I  would  hurry up my rear. 48.On open ground, I would
keep a vigilant eye on my defenses. On ground  of  intersecting
highways,  I  would  consolidate  my  alliances.  49.On serious
ground, I would try to ensure a continuous stream of  supplies.
On  difficult  ground,  I would keep pushing on along the road.
50.On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way  of  retreat.  On
desperate   ground,   I  would  proclaim  to  my  soldiers  the
hopelessness of saving their lives. 51.For it is the  soldier's
disposition  to  offer an obstinate resistance when surrounded,
to fight hard when he cannot help himself, and to obey promptly
when he  has  fallen  into  danger.  52.We  cannot  enter  into
alliance  with neighboring princes until we are acquainted with
their designs. We are not fit to lead  an  army  on  the  march
unless  we  are  familiar  with  the  face  of the country--its
mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes
and swamps. We shall be unable to turn  natural  advantages  to
account unless we make use of local guides. 53.To be ignored of
any one of the following four or five principles does not befit
a  warlike  prince. 54.When a warlike prince attacks a powerful
state,  his  generalship  shows  itself   in   preventing   the
concentration of the enemy's forces. He overawes his opponents,
and  their  allies  are  prevented  from  joining  against him.
55.Hence he does not  strive  to  ally  himself  with  all  and
sundry,  nor  does  he  foster  the  power  of other states. He
carries out his own secret designs, keeping his antagonists  in
awe.  Thus  he  is  able  to capture their cities and overthrow
their kingdoms. 56.Bestow rewards without regard to rule, issue
orders without regard to previous arrangements; and you will be
able to handle a whole army as though you had to do with but  a
single  man.  57.Confront  your  soldiers with the deed itself;
never let them know your design. When the  outlook  is  bright,
bring  it  before  their  eyes;  but tell them nothing when the
situation is gloomy. 58.Place your army in deadly peril, and it
will survive; plunge it into desperate  straits,  and  it  will
come  off  in  safety.  59.For it is precisely when a force has
fallen into harm's way that is capable of striking a  blow  for
victory.   60.Success   in   warfare  is  gained  by  carefully
accommodating  ourselves  to   the   enemy's   purpose.   61.By
persistently  hanging on the enemy's flank, we shall succeed in
the long run in  killing  the  commander-in-chief.  62.This  is
called  ability  to  accomplish a thing by sheer cunning. 63.On
the day that you take  up  your  command,  block  the  frontier
passes,  destroy  the official tallies, and stop the passage of
all emissaries. 64.Be stern in the council-chamber, so that you
may control the situation. 65.If the enemy leaves a door  open,
you must rush in. 66.Forestall your opponent by seizing what he
holds  dear,  and  subtly  contrive  to time his arrival on the
ground. 67.Walk in the path defined by  rule,  and  accommodate
yourself  to  the  enemy until you can fight a decisive battle.
68.At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden,  until  the
enemy  gives you an opening; afterwards emulate the rapidity of
a running hare, and it will be too late for the enemy to oppose
you.







     1.Sun Tzu said: There are  five  ways  of  attacking  with
fire.  The  first is to burn soldiers in their camp; the second
is to burn stores; the third is to  burn  baggage  trains;  the
fourth  is to burn arsenals and magazines; the fifth is to hurl
dropping fire amongst the enemy. 2.In order  to  carry  out  an
attack,  we must have means available. The material for raising
fire should always be kept in readiness. 3.There  is  a  proper
season  for  making  attacks  with  fire,  and special days for
starting a conflagration.  4.The  proper  season  is  when  the
weather  is  very dry; the special days are those when the moon
is in the constellations of the Sieve, the Wall,  the  Wing  or
the Cross-bar; for these four are all days of rising wind. 5.In
attacking  with  fire,  one  should  be  prepared  to meet five
possible developments: 6.(1) When fire  breaks  out  inside  to
enemy's  camp,  respond  at  once  with an attack from without.
7.(2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy's soldiers
remain quiet, bide your time and do not attack. 8.(3) When  the
force  of  the flames has reached its height, follow it up with
an attack, if that is practicable; if not, stay where you  are.
9.(4)  If  it  is  possible  to  make an assault with fire from
without, do not wait for it to break out  within,  but  deliver
your  attack  at  a  favorable  moment. 10.(5) When you start a
fire, be to windward of it. Do not  attack  from  the  leeward.
11.A  wind  that  rises  in the daytime lasts long, but a night
breeze soon falls. 12.In  every  army,  the  five  developments
connected  with  fire must be known, the movements of the stars
calculated, and a watch kept  for  the  proper  days.  13.Hence
those  who  use fire as an aid to the attack show intelligence;
those who use water as an aid to the attack gain  an  accession
of strength. 14.By means of water, an enemy may be intercepted,
but not robbed of all his belongings. 15.Unhappy is the fate of
one  who  tries  to  win his battles and succeed in his attacks
without cultivating the spirit of enterprise; for the result is
waste of time and general stagnation. 16.Hence the saying:  The
enlightened  ruler  lays his plans well ahead; the good general
cultivates  his  resources.  17.Move  not  unless  you  see  an
advantage;  use not your troops unless there is something to be
gained; fight not unless the position is critical. 18.No  ruler
should  put  troops  into  the  field merely to gratify his own
spleen; no general should fight a battle simply out  of  pique.
19.If  it  is  to  your advantage, make a forward move; if not,
stay where you are. 20.Anger may in time  change  to  gladness;
vexation may be succeeded by content. 21.But a kingdom that has
once  been  destroyed  can never come again into being; nor can
the dead ever be brought back to life. 22.Hence the enlightened
ruler is heedful, and the good general full of caution. This is
the way to keep a country at peace and an army intact.







     1.Sun Tzu said: Raising a host of a hundred  thousand  men
and  marching  them  great  distances entails heavy loss on the
people and a drain on the resources of  the  State.  The  daily
expenditure  will  amount to a thousand ounces of silver. There
will be commotion at home and abroad, and men  will  drop  down
exhausted  on  the  highways. As many as seven hundred thousand
families will be impeded in their labor. 2.Hostile  armies  may
face  each  other  for years, striving for the victory which is
decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in  ignorance
of  the enemy's condition simply because one grudges the outlay
of a hundred ounces of silver in honors and emoluments, is  the
height  of inhumanity. 3.One who acts thus is no leader of men,
no present help to his sovereign, no master of victory. 4.Thus,
what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to  strike
and  conquer,  and  achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary
men, is  foreknowledge.  5.Now  this  foreknowledge  cannot  be
elicited  from  spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively from
experience, nor by any deductive  calculation.  6.Knowledge  of
the  enemy's  dispositions can only be obtained from other men.
7.Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes:

     1.Local spies; 2.inward spies; 3.converted spies; 4.doomed
spies; 5.surviving spies.

     8.When these five kinds of spy are all at work,  none  can
discover the secret system. This is called "divine manipulation
of  the  threads." It is the sovereign's most precious faculty.
9.Having local  spies  means  employing  the  services  of  the
inhabitants  of  a district. 10.Having inward spies, making use
of officials of the enemy. 11.Having converted  spies,  getting
hold  of the enemy's spies and using them for our own purposes.
12.Having  doomed  spies,  doing  certain  things  openly   for
purposes  of  deception, and allowing our spies to know of them
and report them to the enemy. 13.Surviving spies, finally,  are
those who bring back news from the enemy's camp. 14.Hence it is
that  which  none in the whole army are more intimate relations
to be maintained than with spies. None should be more liberally
rewarded. In  no  other  business  should  greater  secrecy  be
preserved.  15.Spies  cannot  be  usefully  employed  without a
certain intuitive sagacity. 16.They cannot be properly  managed
without  benevolence and straightforwardness. 17.Without subtle
ingenuity of mind, one cannot make  certain  of  the  truth  of
their  reports. 18.Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for
every kind of  business.  19.If  a  secret  piece  of  news  is
divulged  by  a  spy before the time is ripe, he must be put to
death together with the  man  to  whom  the  secret  was  told.
20.Whether  the object be to crush an army, to storm a city, or
to assassinate an individual, it is always necessary  to  begin
by  finding out the names of the attendants, the aides-de-camp,
and door-keepers and sentries of the general  in  command.  Our
spies  must  be commissioned to ascertain these. 21.The enemy's
spies who have come to spy on us must be  sought  out,  tempted
with  bribes,  led  away and comfortably housed. Thus they will
become converted spies and available for our service. 22.It  is
through  the  information  brought by the converted spy that we
are able to acquire and employ local and inward spies. 23.It is
owing to his information, again, that we can cause  the  doomed
spy  to  carry  false tidings to the enemy. 24.Lastly, it is by
his information that the surviving spy can be used on appointed
occasions. 25.The end  and  aim  of  spying  in  all  its  five
varieties  is  knowledge  of  the enemy; and this knowledge can
only be derived, in the first instance, from the converted spy.
Hence it is essential that the converted spy  be  treated  with
the  utmost  liberality. 26.Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty
was due to I Chih who had served under the Hsia. Likewise,  the
rise  of the Chou dynasty was due to Lu Ya who had served under
the Yin. 27.Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise
general who will use the highest intelligence of the  army  for
purposes  of  spying  and  thereby  they achieve great results.
Spies are a most important element in water,  because  on  them
depends an army's ability to move.


Популярность: 49, Last-modified: Thu, 14 Jan 1999 09:12:39 GMT