rvices,
Albanian leaders Bairam Cur and Isa Boljetinac were preparing for another
incursion into Serbia. At the end of March, 1914, several hundred ethnic
Albanians crossed the border, having received news that an uprising against
the Serbs broke out in some villages near Orahovac. The uprising spread to
four villages. Cur and Boljetinac planned to bring members of the
International Control Committee to the rebelling areas, where the local
ethnic Albanians would express their wish for Djakovica, Pec, Prizren and
regions until the railway Urosevac (Ferizovic) - Mitrovica, to be annexed to
Albania, as promised by Austria-Hungary. Tension at the borderline did not
cease.9
1 I. Balugdzic, op. cit., 521-522; D. Mikic, Albanci i Srbija u
balkanskim ratovima, pp. 75; more elaborate documentation: Dokumenti o
spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije, VI/2, Doc. No 75, 77, 80, 86, 93, 100,
105, 124, 130, 135.
2 Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije, VI/3, Doc. No 194,
239, 253,
3 B. Hrabak, Arbanaski upadi i pobune na Kosovu i u Makedoniji od kraja
1912. do kraja 1915. godine (Nacionalno nerazvijeni i nejedinstveni Arbanasi
kao orudje u rukama zainteresovanih sila), Vranje 1988, pp. 33-38.
4 Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije, VT/3, Doc. No 406,
cf. Doc. No 347, 351, 359, 378, 379, 418.
5 B. Hrabak, Arbanaski upadi i pobune na Kosovu i u Makedoniji, pp.
52-64.
6 Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije, VI/3, Doc. No 407,
408, 409.
7 B. Hrabak, Arbanaski upadi i pobune na Kosovu i u Makedoniji, pp. 57.
60-61.
8 B. Hrabak, Muslimani severne Albanije uoci izbijanja rata 1914,
Zbornik za istoriju Matice srpske, 22 (1980), pp. 52-53.
9 B. Hrabak, Arbanaski upadi i pobune na Kosovu i u Makedoniji, p. 93.
In World War One
The direct cause leading to World War One was the assassination of
Austro-Hungarian heir to the throne, Franz Ferdinand, in Sarajevo, by
Serbian students (on St. Vitus' Day, June 28th, 1914), thus symbolically
marking the commencement in the outcome of Austro-Hungarian and Serbian
confrontation. Serbia's victories in the Balkan wars proved its military,
political and economical strength; in the Yugoslav provinces of the Dual
Monarchy, national movement grew, turning to Belgrade as the pillar of
national and South-Slavic assemblage. War with Serbia turned over from a
considerable delay of punitive expedition to a war to destroy the Serbian
state. The Viennese diplomacy found reliable allies first with Albania and
then with Bulgaria.1
The opening of the war found the borderline between Serbia and Albania
unrestful and unconsolidated. Essad Pasha, follower of Balkan cooperation,
was in emigration, while civil war raged in Albania. The insurgents, called
"Ottomans", demanded a Muslim for a ruler, and for the flag, and the
character of state administration to be Ottoman. Refugee Albanian leaders
from Kosovo, organizers of the previous incursion into Serbia, did not take
part in the uprising; they awaited the opportunity to incite a rebellion and
seize Kosovo, Metohia and west Macedonia from Serbia.
Two days before war was declared to Serbia, consular officials in
Albania received orders from Vienna to assist the Albanian insurrection on
Serbian territory. Bairam Cur, Hasan Pristina and Isa Boljetinac obtained
money, arms and ammunition from Austro-Hungarian consuls to prepare for the
insurrection. In Constantinople, a contract was concluded for
Austria-Hungary to finance and urge the insurrection, while the Young Turks
would handle the propaganda, military organization and operations of the
insurrection. Incursions onto Serbian territory and the Albanian
insurrection in Kosovo, Metohia and Macedonia were to have been the basis
for opening another front against Serbia, which had, after the
Austro-Hungarian attack, distributed its troops along the border with the
Dual Monarchy. The at first small-scale attacks were recorded already at the
beginning of August, 1914. Turkish and Austro-Hungarian association was
growing closer, thus sealing the destiny of Prince Wilhelm von Wied. After
several unsuccessful attempts to crush the insurrection, abandoned by his
volunteers, the prince left Albania for good at the beginning of September,
1914.2
Shortly before the war, Serbia strove to win over some of the chiefs of
mid and north Albania for cooperation. The agents cruised Albania
endeavoring to make contact with dissatisfied chiefs. It was soon disclosed
that Albanian tribal and feudal chiefs were inconstant, bribable and
unreliable, that they easily changed sides for money and, being without a
clear political conception and strong national awareness, cared most of all
about their personal and tribal interests. Internal political polarization
between them was determined by religious affiliation which ascended over
national feelings.3
Incursions into Serbia, though mostly skirmishes with bordering
stations and gendarmes never ceased since the war began. Even though small
in number and always rapidly checked, they increasingly disturbed competent
circles in Serbia. Informed of preparations for new incursions of broader
dimensions, on the delivery of arms to Albania and the arrival of Young Turk
and Austro-Hungarian officers to join Albanian companies at the
Serbian-Albanian borderline, the government sought a way to neutralize the
preparations for the insurrection. Military circles proposed a preventive
military intervention.4
With the departure of Prince von Wied, no one held power in Albania. At
an assembly, a senate of rebelling towns in mid and north Albania chose
Essad Pasha for their leader, while the Serbian government immediately
appealed to him to take over rule. Nikola Pasic contracted with him an
agreement of friendship, aid and customs union, in Nis, mid-September, 1914.
Aided by Pasic's government, supplying him with money and arms, Essad Pasha
mustered around 5,000 Albanian volunteers, crossed over to Albania and
entered Durazzo at the beginning of October without strife. He immediately
formed a government and proclaimed himself Premier of Albania and Supreme
Army Commander.5
At the beginning of November, Turkey engaged at war on the side of the
Central Powers and declared Holy War (jihad) to the Entante and its allies.
Essad Pasha was considered an enemy to Islam, being a friend to Serbia, and
therefore, an ally of the Entante. The declaration of jihad caused a new
pro-Turkish insurrection of Muslim-fundamentalist forces, this time against
Essad Pasha. The rapidly spreading insurgent masses were lead by Young Turk
officers. The entire movement was of anti-Serbian orientation; the
insurgents demanded the restoration of Albania under the sovereignty of the
Ottoman Empire, with Kosovo, Metohia and west Macedonia included in its
composition. Greece and Italy benefited from the new opportunities. The
Greeks took north Epirus, while Italian troops first occupied the island
Sasseno and then Valona.6
Essad Pasha's position in Durazzo was becoming increasingly uncertain.
Thus the Premier appealed to the Serbian government more than once for
military intervention in Albania. In December, 1914, Serbia successfully
withstood an Austro-Hungarian offensive. The Serbian government feared that
following their defeat north, the Austro-Hungarian state and military
circles would urge the ethnic Albanians to war Serbia, which imposed
preventive military action as a solution.
Incursions of broader dimension announced Hasan Pristina's attempt to
organize an insurrection in Serbia in February, 1915, with a company
numbering around 200 men. Three bordering villages on Serbian territory
joined the insurgents, but in the first clash with a stronger Serbian unit,
Hasan Pristina's company was crushed and banished to Albania.7
Pro-Turkish insurgents besieged Essad Pasha in Durazzo and demanded of him
to recognize the sultan's power and declare war to Serbia. Pasic thus
believed it was best to intervene immediately rather than wait for
Austro-Hungarian and Young Turk officers to muster an Albanian army against
which a whole Serbian army would be forced to fight. When a Serbian diplomat
reported at the end of May that Essad Pasha's position was desperate, and
since Albanian companies had then attacked the Serbian border at two places,
the Serbian government decided to move its army and take strategic positions
in Albania. Around 20,000 Serbian soldiers invaded Albania from three
directions. In only ten days the Serbian troops crushed the rebellious
movement, took Elbasan and Tirana and liberated the besieged Essad Pasha in
Durazzo. A special Albanian regiment was formed from Serbian troops in
Albania to implement thorough pacification in Albania and consolidate Essad
Pasha's position.8 Essad Pasha did not succeed in establishing
power in all the northern and middle regions of Albania. In the Mirdit
region, Isa Boljetinac, Bairam Cur and Hasan Pristina were hiding, while in
the Mat region, pasha's relative Ahmed Bey Zogu strove to come to an
agreement with the Serbian military authorities; at his personal request he
went to Nis for negotiations with Pasic.9
Serbia's military intervention met with general complaints in allied
circles, especially with Italy, whose claims to the Albanian coast,
warranted by a secret London Treaty (1915), were thus jeopardized by the
entrance of Serbian troops. Pasic replied to protests sent by ally
diplomacies that it was only a matter of temporary action and the troops
would withdraw after consolidating Essad Pasha's regime. To secure Serbian
positions in Albania after the war was over, the Serbian government
contracted a secret agreement in June, 1914, in Tirana, anticipating an
actual union between the two countries. Essad Pasha consented to rectify the
border to Serbia's advantage, and in return received warranty of Serbia's
support for his choice of ruler to Albania.10
The beginning of the German - Austro-Hungarian offensive against Serbia
in autumn, 1915, Bulgaria's engagement in war on the side of the Central
Powers and its attack on Serbia, forced the Serbian army to war on two
fronts and withdraw to the interior of the country. Bulgaria's incursion
into Macedonia threatened to cut off the retreat of the Serbian army to
Greece. Its retreat and Bulgaria's penetration into the depths of Macedonia
emboldened ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, Metohia and Macedonia. Masses of
ethnic Albanians recruited into the Serbian army became deserters, and many
joined the Bulgarians who gave them arms. With Austro-Hungarian
advance-guards, they attacked Serbian soldiers whom they awaited in the Ibar
valley.
When the Serbian army reached Kosovo, followed by many refugees,
various diversions and surprise attacks on field trains were effected. In
many villages ethnic Albanians refused to provide food for the refugees and
soldiers. In Istok, on November 29, 1915, a company of Serbian soldiers
lagging behind was massacred. Near the St. Marko monastery in the vicinity
of Prizren, ethnic Albanians of the Kabash clan deceitfully disarmed and
then killed 60 Serbian soldiers. After the Serbian army retreated from Pec,
ethnic Albanians pillaged many Serbian homes and sacked shops.
Austro-Hungarian guards prevented them from entering the hospital in Pec, in
front of which they gathered to massacre the wounded soldiers. They set
ambushes near Mitrovica, killed soldiers and looted refugees. Serious crimes
were committed in Suva Reka and other regions of Kosovo.11
At the end of November, after the Bulgarians cut off all connections
with Salonika, the Serbian Supreme Command decided to withdraw the army to
Albania and make the necessary reorganizations there. The withdrawal of the
Serbian army through Albania, in winter 1915-1916, has been retained as the
"Albanian Golgotha". With the entrance of the Serbian army into Albania,
Essad Pasha issued an announcement appealing to the Albanian people to help
the amicable army and sell their food. In regions under his immediate
control, Albanian gendarmes considerably helped to ease the withdrawal of
the starving army, inflicted by disease, through impassable mountains
covered with snow. Essad Pasha's gendarmes took care of overnight stays,
food supplies and guarded the roads.
The regions to which Essad Pasha's authority did not stretch,
particularly Ljuma, Mirdits, Drims and partly in Mati, the Serbian army was
forced to clear with guns, on its way toward the Adriatic Sea. In Mirdits,
Mat and other regions, Catholic friars called to the ethnic Albanians to
confront the Serbian army in arms. Rumors spread that Prince Wilhelm von
Wied was arriving from Prizren with Austro-Hungarian troops, ethnic
Albanians avoided confrontation with large military formations; they
preferred to wait in ambush in high gorges for lagging soldiers and
refugees, and then and murder them. The heaviest battles were waged in the
Mirdits by a Combined Regiment of the Serbian army that fell into ambush at
the gorge of the Fani river. Around 800 ethnic Albanians commanded by a
Catholic friar let the army pass through only after they were given large
quantities of supplies from the field train. In places where there were no
armed assaults, the ethnic Albanians refused to rent rooms for overnight
stay and sell food.12
General chaos encircled the withdrawal of the Serbian army, with Essad
Pasha endeavoring to restore order with his gendarmes; but chaos and fear
caught hold of his people and disobedience ensued. Still, most of his troops
protected the Serbian army during its retreat and, whenever necessary,
fought together with it against Albanian companies that joined
Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian troops. After much turmoil and long marches
toward the south, the Serbian army was transferred by allied ships from
Albania to Corfu. Squeezed in between Bulgarian and Austro-Hungarian troops,
Essad Pasha was forced to submit to the Italians; escorted by a Serbian
emissary, with a thousand most devoted followers, he crossed over to Italy
by boat.13
Kosovo and Metohia were divided into two Austro-Hungarian occupational
zones: Metohia entered the General Government "Montenegro", while a smaller
part of Kosovo with Kosovska Mitrovica and Vucitrn became part of the
General Government "Serbia". The largest part of Kosovo (Pristina, Prizren,
Gnjilane, Urosevac, Orahovac) was included in the composition of the
Bulgarian Military-Inspectional region "Macedonia".14
In Metohia and Kosovo, Austro-Hungarian authorities aimed to win over
the Albanian and Muslim populace: schools and the local administration were
conducted in the Albanian language. Albanian inhabitants were obviously
privileged. The occupational authorities of the Dual Monarchy immediately
established contact with the leaders. Many refugee chiefs returned from
Albania, while beys from Kosovo and former Turkish officers from Sandzak
cooperated most closely with the new authorities. Hasan Pristina and Dervish
Bey handled the conscription of volunteers who were assigned either to the
Bosnia-Herzegovinian gendarmes or the Turkish corps fighting at the front in
Galicia. A bulk of Albanian volunteers entered the service of
Austro-Hungarian military command in Kosovska Mitrovica and served in small
posse regiments. At the beginning of 1917, Dervish Bey was nominated as
commander of a distinct volunteer battalion (a force of 400 men), comprised
mainly of ethnic Albanians.15
The Bulgarian occupation of Kosovo has been retained by its great
oppression, internment of civilians, forced Bulgarization, and the
persecution and murder of priests. The former Raska-Prizren Metropolitan
Nicifor, was interned in Bulgaria and killed. Serbian priests suffered the
most, being persecuted and murdered on both occupational zones by ethnic
Albanians and Bulgarians. Bulgarian authorities assigned ethnic Albanians
and Turks to all village communities as chiefs, officials and gendarmes, who
helped their compatriots to raid and plunder without disturbance, to win
trials against Serbs in courts, and murders were often hushed up. In certain
villages, Turks and ethnic Albanians oppressed the Serbs of Kosovo in
conjunction.16
In the area between Juzna Morava and Kopaonik, a komitadji movement had
been growing since 1916, under the leadership of Kosta Vojinovic-Kosovac of
Mitrovica, which at the beginning of 1917 turned into a large national
insurrection with its seat at Toplica. ethnic Albanians took part in
persecuting Serbian komitadjis in the Mitrovica district. The armed
resistance was aided by many Serbs from Kosovo. Attempts made by insurgent
leaders to win over ethnic Albanians through negotiations failed. Albanian
companies attacked the insurgents, and in October, 1917, special Albanian
and Turkish units were formed to fight them.17
After being transferred to Corfu, the Serbian army, reorganized and
supplemented by volunteers, was disposed along the Salonika front along with
allied troops. Crossing over from Italy to Paris, with the aid of the French
diplomacy, Essad Pasha arrived at Salonika and formed a new Albanian
government which acquired the status of an emigrant ally cabinet, owing to
Serbian and French intermediation. A special army unit was formed from
around 1,000 gendarmes (Essad Pasha's camp and Albanian archers), and
disposed in juxtaposition to the Serbian Ohrid regiment as part of the
French East Army. Premier Nikola Pasic's idea was to admix the forces with
Serbian ones and direct operations toward Kosovo and north
Albania.18
In autumn, 1918, subsequent to the penetration of the Salonika Front, a
widespread national insurrection developed in Serbia. When the
Austro-Hungarian troops abandoned the line Skoplje-Pristina, the
insurrection spread to Kosovo and Metohia. French and Serbian troops
commanded by General Tranier emerged in Kosovo at the beginning of October,
liberating Pristina, Prizren, Gnjilane and Mitrovica. Serbian komitadji
companies, lead by Kosta Milovanovic Pecanac, met with French troops in
Mitrovica and immediately set off to Pec. Serbian komitadjis surrounded the
town, compelling the considerably stronger Austro-Hungarian troops to
surrender; then the French cavalry trotted into town. Divisions of the
second Serbian army also arrived in Kosovo and established civil and
temporary martial law.19
After the arrival of Serbian and French units, the Albanian people bore
themselves coldly and with reserve. When the bodies of troops continued to
advance toward Montenegro, ethnic Albanians began to assail solitary
soldiers at the end of October. The reason was the injunction given by
Serbian military authorities to collect all state property left from the
Bulgarian administration. Obtaining supplies from communities with arms left
behind, the ethnic Albanians began to assail Serbian civil and military
authorities, while the injunction to surrender arms met with heavy
resistance. Community seats, villages and small military garrisons were
attacked, while during November entire villages in Drenica and around Pec
deserted the Serbian authorities. Until mid-December, Serbian forces crushed
Albanian resistance and carried out the action of disarmament with great
difficulty.20
The Austro-Hungarian monarchy was disintegrating. In Belgrade, on
December 1, 1918, the union of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was proclaimed
into one kingdom under the Karadjordjevic dynasty. In Kosovo, the military
and civil authorities had no time to celebrate. The Albanian resistance,
helped by agitation from Albania, with Italy behind it, announced a new,
kacak (outlaw) movement.
World War One forestalled the formation of a clear policy for ethnic
Albanians within Serbian borders, even though all those that had not taken
part in rebellions against the Serbian authorities were warranted civil
rights. Two Balkan and one world armed clashes, which deepened the old and
created new hatreds between Serbs and ethnic Albanians, had direct political
aims, being supported by the warring sides, above all Austria-Hungary and
Turkey, and in Albania by allied Italy. Yet Serbia had, on the contrary,
persistently striven to create a counterbalance to the anti-Serbian movement
helped by Vienna and Constantinople, through cooperation with Essad Pasha
and a series of tribal chiefs in mid-Albania, and to build a foundation that
would bring ethnic Albanians and Serbs closer. Contracts signed with Essad
Pasha in 1914 and 1915 were, first, a draft of possible ways of contact (a
real union with small territorial concessions), second, security in case the
destiny of Albania would again be resolved without Serbia's participation
when the war was over.
Essad Pasha Toptani's fate, whose political plans for the future of
Albania were based on support and cooperation with Serbia, displayed a
prevailing strong anti-Serbian disposition among ethnic Albanians, who would
benefit from the aims of the Serbian army to capture and include within the
composition of the new state Scutari with the neighboring Serbian villages.
Due to widespread Italian influence, under whose wing a temporary Albanian
government was formed, Essad Pasha's repeated attempts to regain power in
Albania, where he still had many followers, produced no positive results.
Despite delegates supported by Italy in the name of Albania, with Serbia's
assistance Essad Pasha brought another unofficial delegation to the Peace
Conference in Paris, April 1919, and, appealing to the legitimacy of his
government and the declaration of war to the Central Powers, requested
permission to return to his country. His struggle ended with shots fired by
assassin Avni Rustemi on June 13,1920 in Paris.
1 .More elaborate: A. Mitrovic, Srbija u prvom svetskom ratu, Beograd
1985. passim
2 Ibid., 218-224; B. Hrabak, Arbanaski upadi i pobune na Kosovu i u
Makedoniji, pp. 124-145.
3 B. Hrabak, Muslimani severne Albanije uoci izbijanja rata 1914, pp.
49-80; D. T. Batakovic, Podaci srpskih vojnih vlasti o arbanaskim prvacima
1914, Mesovita gradja, XVII-XVIII (1988), pp. 185-206.
4 B. Hrabak, Arbanaski upadi i pobune na Kosovu i u Makedoniji, pp.
147-151.
5 D. T. Batakovic, Esad-pasa Toptani i Srbija 1915. godine, in: Srbija
1915, Beograd 1986, 300-306; for details see: B. Hrabak, Elaborat srpskog
ministarstva inostranih dela o pripremama srpske okupacije severne Albanije,
Godisnjak Arhiva Kosova, II-III (1966-1967), pp. 7-35.
6 M. Ekmecic, Ratni ciljevi Srbije 1914, Beograd 1973, 377, pp.
383-385; cf. J. Swire, Albania, The Rise of A Kingdom, London 1930. passim
7 A. Mitrovic, op. cit., pp. 225-226.
8 M. Ekmecic, op. cit. p. 344; for more details see: D. T. Batakovic,
Secanje generala D. Milutinovica na komandovanje albanskim trupama 1915.
godine, Mesovita grada, XIV (1985), pp. 115-143
9 Ahmed Zogu attempted to impose himself upon Serbian competitive
authorities as Esad-pasha's rival. He promised, given the necessary
warrants, he would turn to Serbia's side. An agent of the Serbian government
accompanied him always; more elaborate: D. T. Batakovic, Ahmed-beg Zogu i
Srbija, in: Srbija 1917, pp. 165-177.
10 D. T. Batakovic, Esad-pasa i Srbija 1915. godine, 308-310; cf. Sh.
Rahimi, Mareveshjet e qeverise serbe me Esat pashe Toptanit gjate viteve
1914-1915, Gjurmime albanologjike, VI (1976), pp. 117-143. "
11 P. Kostic, Crkveni zivot pravoslavnih Srba u Prizrenu i okolini u
XIX veku, pp. 141-143; B. Hrabak, Stanje na srpsko-albanskoj granici i
pobuna Arbanasa na Kosovu i Makedoniji, in: Srbija 1915, pp. 80-85; idem.,
Arbanaski upadi i pobune na Kosovu i u Makedoniji, pp. 186-195.
12 O. Boppe, Za srpskom vojskom od Nisa do Krfa, Zeneva 1918; P. de
Mondesir, Albanska golgota, memories and war pictures, Beograd 1936; Kroz
Albaniju 1915-1916, Beograd 1968.
13 D. T. Batakovic, Esad-pasa Toptani i Srbija 1915. godine, pp.
315-124.
14 A serious crisis broke out in 1916 over the issue on dividing
occupational zones between Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary (Istorija srpskog
naroda, VI/2, Beograd 1983, pp. 146-148).
15 A. Mitrovic, op. cit., pp. 329-393.
16 J. Popovic, Kosovo u ropstvu pod Bugarima, Leskovac 1921; on the
persecution of the clergy: Zaduzbine Kosova, pp. 745-750.
17 More elaborate in: M. Perovic, Toplicki ustanak 1917, Beograd 1973;
A. Mitrovic, Ustanicke borbe u Srbiji 1916-1918, Beograd 1987.
18 Petar Opacic, Solunska ofanziva 1918, Beograd 1980, pp. 358-375.
19 B. Hrabak, Ucesce stanovnistva Srbije u proterivanju okupatora 1918,
Istorijski glasnik, 3-4 (1958), 25-50; ibid., Reokupacija oblasti srpske i
cmogorske drzave arbanaskom vecinom stanovnistva u jesen 1918. godine i
drzanja Arbanasa prema uspostavljenoj vlasti, Gjurmime albanologjike,
191969), pp. 255-260; A. Mitrovic, Ustanicke borbe u Srbiji 1916-1918, pp.
520-522.
20 B. Hrabak, Reokupacija oblasti srpske i cmogorske drzave, pp.
270-279.
PART TWO: THEOCRACY, NATIONALISM, IMPERIALISM
SERBIAN GOVERNMENT AND ESSAD PASHA TOPTANI
I
The study of Serbo-Albanian relations in the first decades of the 20th
century is merely one chapter in a history long marked with conflicts which
in their strongest current bore traits of lasting political confrontation
and religious intolerance which had deepened over the centuries. Thus the
need for precisely defining in perspective the processes under study,
imposes itself as the primary obligation. Favoring a national and
ideologically neutral reflection is not simply an implicit inclusion of
historiographical principle, but an aspiration enabling a stratified account
of never unambiguous historical content, instead of a reduced image of the
past. Viewed from that angle, the figure of Essad Pasha Toptani, whom entire
Albanian historiography condemned as the biggest traitor of his own people
(for cooperating with Serbia), emerges in a different light, ideologically
impartial, alien to every industrious work on history.1
The era delimited with the beginning of the Balkan Wars and the end of
the Paris Peace Conference was marked by a fresh surge of old conflicts
between the Serbs and Albanians. The centuries-long commitment of most
Albanians in the Ottoman Empire to an Islamic structure of society (where
the Muslim belonged to a privileged status to which the Christian was
necessarily subordinate), was a major obstacle to any attempt at creating
more permanent political cooperation, and achieving national and religious
tolerance. In the first decade of the 20th century, the Albanian national
question began to undermine the very foundations of Ottoman rule in the
Balkans; subsequent to the great uprisings against the Young Turk
pan-Ottoman policy, it was supposed to end with the creation of an
autonomous Albanian unit within the frame of the Empire - in the spirit of
the decisions reached by the Albanian League in Prizren in 1878. Demands
were made to the Porte that an autonomous Albania be formed from the Kosovo,
Scutari, Bitolj (Monastir) and Janina vilayets - ethnically mixed areas to
which all the surrounding Balkan states (for many a good reason) lay claim.
Rejecting cooperation offered by the Balkan allies, primarily Serbia and
Montenegro, the leadership of the Albanian national movement decided, by
defending Turkey, to stand by the idea of an ethnic, Great
Albania.2
The proclamation of the independent state of Albania in Valona on
November 28, 1912, showed that despite the tremendous success of the Balkan
Allies at war against Turkey, the balance of forces in the Balkans depended
on the will of the most influential big power in the peninsula -
Austria-Hungary. Created primarily with support from the Dual Monarchy,
Albania was to serve as a dam to Serbia's major war objectives in the First
Balkan War - obtaining a territorial access to the Adriatic Sea at the
coastal belt between Durazzo and St Giovanni di Medua.
Serbia's diplomacy watched with strong suspicion the development of the
situation in Albania. Territorial access to the Albanian coast was jointly
assessed by all relevant political factors (the court, the government, the
army, the civil parties and public opinion) as the only possible way to
avoid the fatal embrace of the Dual Monarchy. By encroaching upon ethnically
different land, in Northern Albania, Serbia violated a principle to which it
appealed there until - the principle of nationality. State reason tipped the
balance which was justified by strategic needs and a historical right as
well as by the struggle for survival imposed by Austria-Hungary.
In fall, 1912, the Serbian troops took Allesio, Elbasan, Tirana and
Durazzo with quick actions and little resistance; the men ecstatically
jumped into the Adriatic, rejoicing over Serbia's sea. The ultimatum
presented by Austria-Hungary, threatening to attack the northern borders of
Serbia, compelled the Serbian government to renounce the access. The Great
Powers acknowledged the creation of the autonomous state of Albania at the
Conference of Ambassadors in London (1912-1913), initially under the
sovereignty and suzerainty of the sultan, and subsequently under their
control. Serbia was given trade access to the sea via a neutral and free
port in the north Albanian coast. The Montenegrin army, bolstered by Serbian
troops, managed to take Scutari after exhausting battles and many victims,
but was forced under a decision reached by the Conference to abandon it and
surrender it to the international forces.3
The new state was a cat's-paw in the hands of Vienna. The ministers of
Ismail Kemal's (Qemalli) provisional government were forced to draw up the
declaration on independence in Turkish, and write the provisions in Turkish
letters, since none of the government members were literate in the Albanian
Latin alphabet. The markedly pro-Austrian orientation of Kemal's government
did not meet with support from the wider population, which was through
centuries-long traditions attached to the Ottoman state and its ideology.
Muslims were in the majority in Albania (around 70% of the population), and
to them the only acceptable solution to the national question was to set up
a state under the rule of the Turkish prince, a demand which the government
in Constantinople was quick to point out. In northern Albania, the Catholic
Mirdits strove to create an independent state under the wing of the Catholic
powers: King Nikola I of Montenegro merely nurtured their demand for
independence. To the south, northern Epirus had little in common with the
tribes of central and northern Albania, being under Greek influence and of
Orthodox majority.4
Religious and tribal differences, an insufficiently formed national
awareness, a completely underdeveloped economy, illiterate masses and their
ignorance in politics held meager promises for a future stable state
community. Albanian tribal and feudal chiefs, who were accustomed to
reversing their positions and allies under the Turks for a handsome
gratuity, demonstrated neither enough political maturity nor national
solidarity. Clashes of different conceptions on the future of the country,
the involvement of the Great Powers and strife over power between regional
chiefs drew Albania into a whirlpool of civil war, even before its status
was defined and its borders fixed. Austria-Hungary benefited mostly from the
anarchy, with its consular and intelligence agencies encouraging a vengeful
policy of Albanian officials, flaring up old hatred between the Serbs and
Albanians, and building outposts for undermining and then destroying the
Serbian administration in the newly-liberated territories - Old Serbia and
Macedonia.5
The strengthening of influence by the Dual Monarchy in Albania, which
was threatening to become a tangible means of political and military
jeopardy to Serbia, disputes over demarcations and the status of individual
adjacent regions instructed the Serbian government to seek among prominent
Albanian tribal chiefs those who would be ready to resolve the issues within
the Balkan framework. The figure most suitable for that purpose emerged -
Essad Pasha Toptani, a Turkish general who gave Scutari over to the
Montenegrins in April 1913, and was allowed in return to leave the town with
his army and all their weaponry to become involved in the struggle over
power in central Albania.
1 K. Frasheri, The History of Albania, Tirana 1964, pp. 183-212; A.
Buda (ed.), Historia e popullit shqiptar, II, Prishtine 1969, pp. 371-516;
S. Polio - A. Puto, {ed.),Histoire de I'Albanie, Roanne 1974, pp. 181-212;
M. Qami, Shqiperia ne mareredheniet nderkombetare (1914-1918), Tirane 1987,
pp. 43-45, 107-112, 240-243,280-281, 313-315.
2 S. Skendi, Albanian National Awakening (1878-1912), pp. 438-463; P.
Barti, op. cit, pp. 173-184; B. Hrabak, Arbanaski ustanci 1912 godine, pp.
323-350; B. Mikic, The Albanians and Serbia during the Balkan Wars, in: East
Central European Society and the Balkan Wars (ed. B. K. Kiraly - D.
Djordjevic), New York 1987, pp. 165-196; Kosovo und Metochien in der
serbischen Geschichte, Lausanne 1989, pp. 311
3 Z. Balugdzic, op. cit, pp. 518-523; D. Djordjevic, Izlazak Srbije na
Jadransko more i Konferencija ambasadora u Londonu 1912, pp. 83-86; M.
Vojvodic, Skadarska kriza 1913. godine, pp. 125-137; 145-151. Cf Ismail
Qemalli. Permbledhje dokumentesh 1889-1919, Tirane 1982. An elaborate
insight in the documents is also provided by the Dokumenti o spoljnoj
politici Kraljevine Srbije 1903-1914, VI/1, Doc. Nos. 135, 389-393, 395,
411, 415, 460, 495-496, 506, 521, 527; VI/2, Doc. Nos. 23, 43, 80,
87-89,108,124.
4 M. Ekmecic, Ratni ciljevi Srbije 1914, pp. 372-377; J. Swire,
Albania, The Rise of a Kingdom, pp. 183-240, D. Mikic, op. cit. pp. 185-191;
M. Schmidt-Necke, Entstehung und Ausbau der Konigsdiktatur in Albanien
(1912-1939), Munchen 1987, pp. 25-40.
5 V. Corovic, Odnosi Srbije i Austro-Ugarske u XX veku, pp. 396-410; M.
Gutic, Oruzani sukobi na srpsko-albanskoj granici u jesen l913. godine,
Vojnoistorijski glasnik, 1 (1985), pp. 225-275; B. Hrabak, Arbanaski upadi i
pobune na Kosovu i u Makedoniji od kraja 1912. do kraja 1915, pp. 185-206.
II
The career of Essad Pasha Toptani (born in Tirana, 1863) was similar to
the careers of the biggest Albanian feudal lords. As the owner of vast
chifliks in central Albania, Essad Pasha quickly climbed up the Turkish
administrative hierarchy. At the opening of the century he was a gendarmery
commander in the Janina vilayet. He supported the Young Turk movement in
1908, and represented Durazzo as deputy to Turkey's Parliament; in 1909 he
was entrusted with the ungrateful duty of handing Sultan Abdulhamid II the
decree on his deposition. Prior to the Balkan wars, he held the post of
gendarmery commander in the Scutari vilayet where he successfully engaged in
trade with the Italians, giving them concessions for the exploitation of
forests. He took over command of Scutari in early 1913, demonstrating all
the qualities of a great military leader. He decided to surrender the city
only when the garrison, broken by famine and disease, decided, together with
the city chiefs, to stop resisting. The London Ambassadorial Conference of
the Great Powers had already decided that Scutari remain within the Albanian
composition. In those circumstances, surrendering Scutari in late April 1913
on honorable conditions was a wise political decision.1
Essad Pasha evaluated that to rely chiefly on Austria- Hungary when
Italy and Greece were laying open claims to the territory of the Albanian
state, would be fatal to his country's survival. By cooperating with the
center of the Balkan alliance - Serbia - and through it with Montenegro, he
was seeking foundations to build a stable Albanian state with a Muslim
majority, in which he would rely on the large beylics in the central and
northern parts of the country. Essad Pasha possessed the characteristically
Muslim trait of distrusting fellow-countrymen of another religion. The
bearing of the northern Albanian Catholic tribes, which aspired to separate
from Albania, and the pro-Hellenic orientation of the Orthodox Albanian
population in northern Epirus, were the reasons why he consented to adjust
the border to the benefit of Serbia, Montenegro and Greece: he believed that
an Albania smaller than the one stipulated in 1913 would, once homogeneous
in religion, be a much more stable country. The development of international
circumstances urged a closer cooperation with Serbia: Albanian territories
were an object of aspiration and, when World War I broke out, compensation
in the cabinets of big European powers.3
Already in early May, 1913, Essad Pasha informed the Montenegrin king
of his intentions to proclaim himself King of Albania, and of his readiness
to cooperate with the Balkan alliance. He said the Albanians owed their
freedom to the Balkan peoples and that he would establish with them the
borders of Albania without the mediation of other powers. Essad Pasha told
Serbian diplomat Zivojin Balugdzic at a meeting in Durazzo, that he wanted
an agreement with Serbia. Hesitant at first, the Serbian government
consented, assessing that the Pasha had showed by his bearing that he really
wanted an agreement with Serbia, which he regarded, Balugdzic quoted, as the
nucleus for mustering Balkan forces.4
It was crucial to the Serbian government shortly before the Bulgarian
attack to neutralize preparations in Albania against raids into Serbian
territory - especially in Kosovo, Metohia and western Macedonia. Around
20,000 men were in arms in the Albanian territory, mostly refugees from Old
Serbia and Macedonia whose leaders, Hasan Pristina and Isa Boljetinac, were
close associates of Ismail Kemal. They strove to fight the influence of
Essad Pasha, agitating an attack on Serbia and stirring up an uprising of
the Albanian people there.
The Bulgarian komitadjis trained Albanians for guerrilla actions, with
money and arms coming from Austria-Hungary. Essad Pasha refused to join them
and warned the Serbian government not to approve of their
action.5 At the end of September, 1913, a forceful raid was
carried out into Serbian territory. The around 10,000 Albanians, who charged
into the territory from three directions, were lead by Isa Boljetinac,
Bairam Cur and Kiasim Lika. Aside to them, Bulgarian officers also commanded
troops. Their troops took Ljuma and Djakovica, and besieged Prizren. They
were crushed only after two Serbian divisions were sent to the border.6
Essad Pasha used the crushing of the pro-Austrian forces to proclaim
himself (with the support of Muslim tribal chiefs and the big beylics in the
central parts of the country) governor of Albania in Durazzo, in late
September, 1913. Vienna assessed the act as positive proof of his
pro-Serbian orientation. Official Serbia simultaneously helped a number of
other small tribal chiefs who resisted Kemal's government, directing them
towards cooperation with Essad Pasha. The alliance between the Serbian
government and Essad Pasha was not stipulated in a special treaty: Pasic
nevertheless ordered that his followers be aided in money and arms. To the
Serbian prime minister, Essad Pasha served as a counterbalance to the
great-Albanian circles around Ismail Kemal. The new prince of Albania,
Wilhelm von Wied, backed the revanchist aspirations of Albanian leaders from
Kosovo and Metohia. As the most influential man in his government, Essad
Pasha held two important portfolios - the army and interior ministries. When
the unresolved agrarian question, urged by Young Turk officers, grew into a
massive pro-Turk insurrection against the Christian prince, Essad Pasha
supported the insurgents and in a clash with the Prince sought backing at
the Italian mission. After the arrest in Durazzo, Essad Pasha left for
Brindisi under protection of the Italian legate in Durazzo at the end of May
1914. After his departure, border raids into Serbia assumed greater
dimension and intensity.5
The threat Albania posed for Serbia abruptly increased at the beginning
of the world war. The relationship between different political trends within
the Albanian society towards the Central powers and the Entente powers was
to a large extent determined by their commitment towards Serbia. The
pronounced tendency towards pro-Austrian political circles grew with the
continuous influx of Albanian refugees from Serbia. Their revanchist policy
was the prime mover of a strong anti-Serbian movement in the war years, and
became after its end a basis for national forgather.
1 For details see: D. T. Batakovic, Esad-pasa Toptani i Srbija 1915,
pp. 299-303 (with earlier literature).
2 D. T. Batakovic, Esad-pasa Toptani, Srbija i albansko pitanje
(1916-1918), in: Srbija 1918, Zb. radova Istorijskog instituta, 7, Beograd
1989, p. 346
3 Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije, VI/2, Doc. No 135,
Z. Balugdzic, op. cit., 521-522.
4 0 B. Hrabak, Arbanaski upadi i pobune na Kosovu, pp. 52-64.
5 Ibid, pp. 33-38, 60-61.
6 D. T. Batakovic, Esad-pasa Toptani i Srbija 1915. godine, p. 305.
III
The beginning of the "Great War" left open the question about a precise
demarcation between Serbia and Albania. The International Demarcation
Commission discontinued work in mid-1914, thus state borders in areas of
dispute remained to be fixed. War caught unguarded the Serbo-Albanian
border. Austria-Hungary, not heeding for money, prepared fresh raids into
Serbian territory. Paši rightly anticipated the intention
ofVien-na's diplomacy to open, aided by the Young Turks, another front and
flank Serbian lands: he feared that the Albanian leaders financed by Vienna
-Hasan Pristina, Isa Boljetinac (Bollletini), Bairam Cur (Curri) and Riza
Bey Krieziu - would "attack Serbia when they receive orders from Turkey or
Bulgaria and weaken Serbian military action on the other side".1
Concerned with reportings about incessant unrest in the border belt and
endeavors to fomcnt an Albanian uprising in Serbia, military circles in the
New Region Troops in Skoplje proposed preventive military action.
Essad Pasha strove to preserve an independent position, crossing thus
from Italy to France. He planned to confront, with the help of the Entente,
Austria-Hungary's efforts to completely subjugate his country. He made
inquiries from Paris on the conditions upon which the Serbian government
would aid his return to Albania. In 1914, Paši imposed the following
conditions: that he sign a political-customs treaty with Serbia on a joint
defense, that Albania acknowledge the customs union at the chiefs' assembly,
and that a solution be reached at the following stage on forming a personal
or real union with Serbia. Essad Pasha confirmed by cable his acceptance in
principle of Paši 's conditions and immediately set off to
Serbia.2
The Serbian government policy towards Albania was aimed at pre-venting
subversive actions from Albania and creating preconditions to exert
influence at the end of the war on the demarcation of its borders,
particularly in the strip towards Serbia. Shortly before Essad Pasha's
arrival to Serbia, Pasic was interested in learning the stand of the Entante
Powers towards Albania: would they oppose "if Albania as a Turkish-
Bulgarian-Austrian instrument now attacked the Serbian border - could we now
not only fend them off, but incapacitate them for attacks in connection with
Turkey, occupy certain Strategie points and bring them under our influence
until the time comes when Europe would again resolve that issue, and
probably reach a better solution, which would ensure peace in Europe and the
Balkans".3
Essad Pasha obtained permission in Athens from the Greek diplomacy to
work in agreement with the Serbian government. At the same time he secured
backing from Italy, which hoped to have an open road to permanently
occupying Valona (Viore) once his regime was established in Albania. The
government in Rome saw Essad Pasha as the most appropriate figure to oppose
growing Austro-Hungarian and Turkish influence on conditions in
Albania.4
Essad Pasha did not give up his claim to the Albanian throne. He warned
the Serbian consul in Salonika that it would be perilous to Albania if its
prince came from the sultan's family, as that would, through detrimental
influence from Constantinople, open new hostilities towards Serbia and other
Balkan states. He thus pointed out himself as the most appropriate figure to
rule Albania. He sent messages to Pasic on the need for them to conclude a
special treaty before his departure for Albania.5
Upon arriving in Nis, Essad Pasha signed a secret alliance treaty with
Pasic on September 17. The 15 points envisaged the setting up of joint
political and military institutions, but the most important provisions
focused on a military alliance, the construction of an Adriatic railroad to
Durazzo and guarantees that Serbia would support Essad Pasha's election as
the Albanian ruler. The treaty left open the possibility that Serbia, at the
invitation of Essad Pasha, carry out a military intervention to protect his
regime. The demarcation between the two countries was to be drawn by a
special Serbo-Albanian commission. Essad Pasha was to confirm the treaty
only upon being elected ruler, with consent from the National Assembly: this
left maneuvering space for revising individual provisions. Serbia was
obligated to finance Pasha's gendarmery and supply the necessary military
equipment by paying off 50,000 dinars per month.6
After the defeat of Prince Wilhelm von Wied in clashes with pro-Turk
insurgents and his escape from Albania, anarchy broke out in the country.
The insurgents hoisted the Turkish flag, demanding that the country preserve
its Muslim quality. The senate of free towns in central Albania invited
Essad Pasha to take over power. With over 4,000 volunteers mustered in the
vicinity of Debar, Essad Pasha marched peacefully into Durazzo at the
beginning of October 1914, set up his government and proclaimed himself
supreme commander of the Albanian army. He did not question the ties with
Constantinople, and the consent in principle to the sovereignty of the
sultan over Albania. As the lord of central, particularly Muslim parts of
the country, Essad Pasha was compelled to approve of the pro-Turkish beylics
who had invited him to take over power. His first measures were directed at
protecting the Serbian border from raids of troops lead by Young Turk and
Austro-Hungarian officers in the northern parts of the country. He informed
the Serbian government of his move on the Catholic tribes to subdue Scutari
and capture Albanian leaders Isa Boljetinac, Bairam Cur and Hasan Pristina
who were in hiding in the northern parts of Has region.7
Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria believed that under the rule of
Essad Pasha Albania would come closer to the Powers of the Entante on a
European war. Germany and Austria-Hungary immediately recalled their legates
in Durazzo, and Bulgaria withdrew its diplomatic agent. At the same time
Austro-Hungarian and Young Turk officers stepped up joint work on a
preparation to raid Serbia. In keeping with the provisions of the Nis
agreement, Essad Pasha undertook action to prevent the troops from crossing
over to Serbian territory, but he was soon thwarted by a new pro-Turk
insurrection.8
In early November 1914, Turkey engaged in a war with the Central
powers, and included among the enemies of Islam Essad Pasha Toptani, as an
ally to Serbia and therefore the Entente. The declaration of jihad stirred
up a new pro-Turk insurrection of the Muslim population. The "Board for
Uniting Islam" from Constantinople called for another conquest of Kosovo:
"Hey Muslims! The until recently part of our fatherland - Kosovo - where the
Holy Tomb of Sultan Murad lies, where the flag of the crescent moon and star
fluttered, now flies the flag of the hateful Serb, who is turning mosques
into churches and seizing everything you have. That low people is forcing
you to fight in arms against allies and Mohammedan regents".9 The
illiterate Albanian mob was easily fanaticized with pro-Turk and pan-Islamic
slogans, thus the insurgents succeeded in winning over part of Essad Pasha's
followers. With regular supplies of money, arms and ammunition from
Austria-Hungary, the insurgents, commanded by Young Turk officers, posed an
increasing threat to Essad Pasha's territory. The entire movement gained an
expressly anti-Serbian character: demands were made that regions Serbia had
liberated in the first Balkan war be annexed to autonomous Albania under
Turkish sovereignty. Italy and Greece cleverly benefited from the whole
confusion:
Italian troops disembarked on Sasseno island, and then took Valona and
the hinterland, while Greek units marched into northern Epirus and set up
full authority there.10
Essad Pasha's position in Durazzo continuously deteriorated. Pressured
by the success of the insurgents, he called the Serbian government more than
once to intervene in Albania. A tacit agreement with Italy to fend off
Austria-Hungary occasionally provided money. Not only did he request guns
from Greece, but demanded that its troops encroach upon those regions where
his enemies mustered.11
The Serbian government ordered in December 1914 that preparations begin
for a military intervention in Albania. As the allied diplomacies at the
time exerted strong pressure upon the Serbian government to make territorial
compensation for Bulgaria, offering in return some substitutes in Albania,
Pasic wanted to incapacitate further bargaining over Macedonia with an
intervention in Albania. Yet only the Russian diplomacy approved his plan.
Legate Miroslav Spalajkovic from St Petersburg informed in early January
1915 that the Russian diplomacy was not opposed to a Serbian intervention in
Albania as long as it did not affect the course and scope of operations
against Austro-Hungarian troops. There was even mention that the Russian
diplomacy hoped an occupation of some parts of Albania would "this time be
constant and definitive".12 When Serbian armies broke off an
Austro- Hungarian offensive in the north, Pasic's government feared that
politicians and military circles in Vienna would use the lull to open war
against Serbia.
Raids organized sporadically by fugitive leaders of the Albanian
movement in Kosovo and Metohia, and carried out in co-action with Young
Turks and Austro-Hungarian officers, were not of wide scope, but roused
nervousness among Serbian military circles on the Albanian border. The
insurgents besieged Essad Pasha in Durazzo and demanded of him to
acknowledge the sultan's rule and declare war on Serbia. Pasic then
evaluated it was wiser to intervene immediately than wait for a bulk army to
muster in Albania with which an entire Serbian army would be forced to
fight.13
The allied diplomacies warned the Serbian government that military
intervention in Albania would strike an unfavorable response. The Russian
diplomacy advised Serbia to be content with the occupation of the strategic
points it had already occupied and refrain from actions that Italy might
regard as measures directed against its interests.14
In late May, 1915, the Serbian diplomatic representative in Durazzo
informed that Essad Pasha's position was critical: two new raids into
Serbian territory had taken place. Despite warnings from the allies, Pasic
decided on a military intervention.15 Over 20,000 Serbian
soldiers armed with guns marched into Albania from three directions at the
beginning of June, and took Elbasan and Tirana - the hotbeds of rebellion -
suppressed the Young Turk movement, liberated the besieged Essad Pasha in
Durazzo and turned over the captured insurgent leaders. A special Albanian
Detachment was set up to implement a thorough pacification of Albania and
consolidate Essad Pasha's rule. The regions inhabited by Mirdits, where Isa
Boljetinac, Hasan Pristina and Bairam Cur were in hiding, remained out of
reach for the Serbian troops; Ahmed Bey Zogu, lord of the Matis, who was the
closest relative to Essad Pasha, attempted to reach an agreement with the
Serbian government on his own, contrary to the Pasha: he set off to Nis on
his own accord for negotiations with Pasic.16 The Montenegrin
army took advantage of the favorable situation and marched into Scutari,
officially still under international regime.
Serbia's military intervention roused strong disapproval from the
allied diplomacies, especially Italy, whose claims to the Albanian coast and
central parts of the country, guaranteed under the secret London Treaty,
ensured its domination in Albania. Pasic replied to protests from the allies
that a temporary action was at stake and that the Serbian troops would
withdraw as soon as Essad Pasha's rule was consolidated.17 The
Serbian prime minister evaluated that the timing was right to permanently
tie Albania to Serbia, through Essad Pasha.
Serbian Internal Minister Ljubomir Jovanovic arrived in Tirana and on
June 28,1915, at St Vitus' Day, signed a treaty with Essad Pasha on a real
union between Serbia and Albania. Essad Pasha obligated himself to adjust
the border to Serbia's advantage on the strip between Podgradec and Has.
Serbia was to acquire the towns of Podgradec, Golo Brdo, Debarska Malissia,
Ljuma and Has to Spac, until the international powers drew the new borders.
Joint institutions envisaged an army, customs administration, national bank
and missions to other countries. The Serbian government was to place at
Essad Pasha's disposal experts to set up the authorities and state
institutions. With Serbia's help, Essad Pasha was to be elected prince of
Albania by an assembly of chiefs, he was to draw up a constitutional draft
in agreement with Serbia and form a government of people who would represent
the idea of Serbo-Albanian unity. The treaty anticipated that the Serbian
army remain in Elbasan and perhaps in Tirana until the provisions of the
treaty were executed, to persecute and destroy joint enemies. If Essad Pasha
was to learn of Italy's intent to occupy Durazzo, he was under the
obligation to call the Serbian army which would do so before the Italian
troops.18 The Tirana Treaty was the best political option for
Pasic's government in resolving the Albanian question. It stipulated to the
end Serbia's war aims towards Albania. The real union was a political form
allowing Serbia to influence the fate of those Albanian regions to which it
lay claim prior to and during the Balkan wars. Expecting that the fate of
Albania would again be discussed at a peace conference at the end of the
war, the Serbian government wanted a tangible ground with the union project
when putting forth its demands on Albania.
The Austro-Hungarian-German offensive on Serbia and Bulgaria's
engagement in the war with the Central powers helped - with frequent news
about the defeats and withdrawal of Serbian troops - the mustering again of
Essad Pasha's opponents in northern Albania. It was proposed at an assembly
in Mati that Serbia be attacked when a favorable condition rose and Albania
be expanded to Skoplje. Ahmed-bey Zogu, who through a commissioner, had
constant connection with the Serbian government, opposed their plans. No
joint action against Serbia took place but clashes
A decision by the allies to deliver to Serbia aid in arms and
ammunition via Albanian ports suddenly increased the importance of Essad
Pasha's alliance. Already at the beginning of November 1914, Essad Pasha
examined with the Serbian representative in Durazzo the possibility of
keeping Albania a safe base for the Serbian army. Fearing another pro-Turk
insurrection, Essad Pasha requested of the Serbian government that a French
or British regiment disembark in Durazzo and be deployed to strategic
positions throughout the country; he would in return prepare detachments to
aid the Serbs in combating the Bulgarians. The Serbian prime minister,
however, proposed that Essad Pasha receive a battalion of the Serbian army
in Durazzo to thus prove that Serbo-Albanian interests stood before the
interests of the Entante Powers. Pasic feared that Italy would use the
plight of Serbian armies in the north to land its troops in Albania and
occupy the whole territory. Pasic pointed out to Essad Pasha that the
Entante Powers considered him a friend and a "kind of ally", and that after
their victory his alliance would be rewarded with guarantees from the
powers.19
1 Arhiv Srbije, Beograd. Ministarstvo inostranih dela, Strogo
poverljivo (further in text: AS; MID, Str. pov.), 1914, No 233. For details
on joint work among Austro-Hungarian Young Turk and Bulgarian services in
Albania see: A. Mitrovic, Srbija u Prvom svetskom ratu, pp. 218-229.
2 B. Hrabak, Muslimani severne Albanije uoci izbijanja rata 1914.
godine, pp. 53, 66-67.
3 AS, MID. Str. pov. 1914, No 233.
4 G. B. Leon, Greece and the Albanian Question at the Outbreak of the
First World War, Balkan Studies, 1/11 (1970), pp. 69-71.
5 AS, MID, Str. pov., 1914, No. 290, 308. Essad Pasha also had
arrangement with Montenegrin diplomats on principle to settle the
controversials border issue by agreement, thus from Athens he requested of
the Serbian government to inform Cetinje that he would "leave for Montenegro
later on, as he had promised". (Ibid, No. 250)
6 Sh. Rahimi, Marreveshjet e qeverise serbe me Essat pashe Toptanit
gjate viteve 1914-1915, Gjurmime Albanologjike, VI (1976), pp. 125-127; D.
T. Batakovic, Esad-pasa Toptani i Srbija 1915. godine, p. 307.
7 AS, MID, Str. pov. 1914, No. 438
8 D. T. Batakovic, Esad-pasa Toptani i Srbija 1915. godine, p. 307.
9 M. Ekmecic, op. cit., p. 387. The insurgents in northern Albania
declared holy war against Serbia. Public Record Office London (later in text
PRO, FO), vol. 438/4, No. 1071
10 G. B. Leon, op. cit., 78-80; M. Ekmecic, op. cit., 385-386. Cf P.
Pastorelli, Albania nella politico estera italiana 1914-1920, Napoli 1970,
pp. 19-32; James H. Burgwyn, Sonnino e la diplomazia italiana del tempo doi
guerra nei Balcani nel 1915, Storia Contemporanea, XVI, 1 (1985), pp.
116-118.
11 G. B. Leon, op. cit., p. 79
12 AS, MID. Str. pov., 1914, No 863, tel. M. Spalajkovic to MID, St.
Peterburg 25. 12. 1914 / 7. 01. 1915. Cf. B. Hrabak, Albanija od julske
krize do proleca 1916. godine na osnovu ruske diplomatske gradje, I,
Obelezja 5 (1973), pp. 71-75.
13 AS, MID, Str. Pov., 1914, No. 810, 877; B. Hrabak, Elaborat srpskog
ministarstva inostranih dela o pripremama srpske okupacije severne Albanije
1915. godine, Godisnjak Arhiva Kosova, II-III (1966-1967), pp. 7-35
14 Arhiv Jugoslavije, Beograd, 80-2-604. Tel. M. Spalajkovic from St.
Petersburg, 23. 04/6. 05. 1915, No 704; PRO FO, vol. 438/3, No. 100, 118.
15 The most vicious raid into Serbian territory was lead at the about
200 persons to stir up the tribes around Prizren, but his host was crushed
near the village of Zur. The Serbian government informed the allies that
around 1,000 armed ethnic Albanians had crossed the border (PRO, FO, 438/5,
No. 53; A. R,195
16 Essad Pasha complained about the conduct of the Serbian military
authorities who pursued their own policy in Mati and other regions and
attempted to agitate among individual Albanian chiefs for acknowledging as
ruler of Albania a Serbian prince. (D. T. Batakovic, Secanja generala
Dragutina Milutinovica na komandovanje albanskim trupama 1915. godine,
Mesovita grada, XIV (1985), pp. 128, idem, Ahmed-beg Zogu i Srbija, in:
Srbija 1916. godine, Zb. radova Istorijskog instituta, 5, Beograd 1987, pp.,
165-177). Cf. M. Ekmecic, op. cit., pp. 394-395.
17 Pro, Fo, vol. 371, Nos. 184, 187, 200, 624,; vol. 438/5, No. 75;
vol, 438/6, No 1444; M. Ekmecic, op. cit., pp. 392-394; A. Mitrovic, op.
cit., pp. 230-232,
18 Sh. Rahimi, op. cit., pp. 137-140; D. T. Batakovic, Esad-pasa
Toptani i Srbija 1915. godine, pp. 309-310.
19 Ibid, pp. 313-314.
IV
The retreat of the Serbian army into Albania in late 1915 and early
1916 put the alliance of Essad Pasha to a serious test. In regions whereto
his authority did not extend, particularly Catholic tribes in the northern
parts of the country, the Serbian troops were forced to shoot their way
through to the Adriatic ports where allied ships were waiting for them.
Essad Pasha's gendarmery aided the Serbian army, secured safe passageways,
accommodation and food, and engaged in skirmishes with Albanian regiments
that attacked Serbian units and pillaged unarmed refugees. Essad Pasha
issued a special proclamation calling Albanians to help the Serbian army,
and informed military commanders about the advancement of enemy forces, the
emergence of rebellious regiments and the mood of individual
tribes.1
The "Albanian Golgotha" was the greatest war trial of the Serbian
people. Of the 220,000 soldiers which broke through Albania towards Corfu
and Bizerta, only 150,000 reached the destination; of about 200,000 refugees
spread along Albanian crags and marshes by the coast barely a third (60,000
people) escaped death.2 Serbia's losses would have been much
heavier were it not for Essad Pasha and his followers during the retreat and
embarkation.
During the retreat Essad Pasha maintained contact with the Serbian
government. He rejected Pasic's proposals to proclaim his treaty with the
Serbian government and admit Serbian officials in his administration,
explaining that his enemies were already calling him Essadovic because of
his alliance with Serbia. He wanted the allies to guarantee that Italy would
not occupy entire Albania after the retreat of the Serbian army. Realizing
that Austro-Hungarian troops would soon take Durazzo, Essad Pasha proposed
to Pasic that he be conveyed to Corfu with his government and gendarmes, so
as to be able, when the allied offensive was launched, to take up positions
on the left flank of the Serbian army and operate towards Albania. At the
demand of the Italian diplomacy, Essad Pasha and several hundred gendarmes
crossed at the end of February 1916 to Brindisi escorted by Serbia's charge
d'affaires. Prior to his departure, he declared war on the Central powers,
thus taking upon himself full responsibility for his cooperation with Serbia
and the Entente powers.3
Despite promises that he would be recognized as the Albanian prince,
and faced with open endeavors by the Italian government to exert complete
influence over him, Essad Pasha continued on to France to seek backing from
the allied diplomacy. Political circles in Paris admitted him as the prime
minister of a legitimate government. Military experts evaluated that Albania
was a reservoir of good soldiers which could be winged over for the allied
cause by Essad Pasha only. In late August, Essad Pasha reached Salonika in a
French vessel. Through the mediation of the Serbian and Greek diplomacies,
his government acquired the status of an exiled alliance cabinet. Essad
Pasha's camp was set up at the Salonika battlefield from 1,000 gendarmes and
followers under the command of Albanian officers. Deployed to positions
towards Albania, he operated within the composition of the French eastern
army. According to Pasic's intentions, his camp was to operate mixed with
Serbian troops towards Kosovo and northern Albania.4
During work in Salonika, Essad Pasha continuously strove to obtain firm
promises from France and Great Britain that when the war was over rule over
Albania would not be given to Italy, and that he would be allowed to
reinstate his administration in the country. At the end of 1916, Korea was
proclaimed an autonomous republic under the protection of French military
authorities, and power was given to the local liberals. Essad Pasha
complained to Pasic about the actions of the French military command, and
warned of Italy's web of intrigues, emphasizing that he had tied his fate to
Serbia. He feared that the Italian troops in Argirokastro were preparing an
assassination. Instead, General Giazzinto Ferrero proclaimed the state of
Albania, in early June, 1917, under the Italian protectorat.5
The Serbian government followed with anxiety the consolidation of
Italian positions in Albania. Immediately after the protectorate was
proclaimed, the Serbian government protested to the allied powers calling on
the decisions of the Ambassadorial Conference in London, to which Italy was
a signatory, and warned that the one-sided proclamation of Albanian
independence violated the "Balkans to the Balkan peoples" principle. The
news that the Italian military authorities were promising the Albanians
considerably wider state borders than those established in London in 1913
aroused particular concern. Pasic therefore made it especially clear that
the Italian protectorat resembled a similar attempt by Austria-Hungary to
"secure for itself a protectorat over Albania, and indirectly over the other
Balkan peoples by creating a new Great Albania to the detriment of other
Balkan peoples".6
Essad Pasha also protested to the Italian government. Dissatisfied with
the development of the situation, he resolved to set off for Switzerland,
the center of various Albanian committees, and through the French government
to secure backing from the British diplomacy which supported Italy's policy
in Albania. He obtained no guarantees in Paris, and failed to secure backing
from the Geneva committees, tied firmly to Austria-Hungry which financed
them.7
Increasingly insecure about winning support from the allies and
concerned over implications that his special obligations towards Serbia were
no longer a secret, Essad Pasha demanded of Pasic that the government
provide more money and secure after the war his administration in Albania
within the borders drawn by the Conference of Ambassadors in London. On his
return to Salonika at the beginning of 1918, Essad Pasha in talks with
Regent Aleksandar linked the distrust of the French diplomacy with the
Tirana Treaty and Italy's endeavors to compromise France. In talks with
other Serbian diplomatic officials, Essad Pasha complained that the
provisions in the Tirana Treaty impeded him in political work. Finally, he
made a demand to the Serbian government to procure permission from the
French military authorities for introducing his administration in the Korea
Republic, where Italians were freely agitating against him. The French
command, however, dissolved the Korea republic in February 1918, and took
over command of Essad Pasha's units, which held the front between Podgradec
and Shkumbi River, due to low combat morale.8
The Serbian government strove to aid Essad Pasha as appreciably as
possible within its means. Its policy towards Albania was, in principle, to
any thwart plans on foreign protectorates and reinstate the regime that
existed prior to the withdrawal of the Serbian army. The Serbian government
protested several times against the consolidation of Italian positions in
Albania, striving to give as much prominence as possible to Essad Pasha and
prepare the conditions for his return to power. Essad Pasha realized himself
that Serbia was his last outpost and that without its support he had no
chance with the allies to win back his return to the country. Thus in a
message to US President Woodraw Wilson in the summer of 1918, he said that
only a future Yugoslav state could guarantee for the integrity and
independence of his country.9
In the event that Pasha's return to power was not possible, Pasic was
preparing to leave open the question of the border with Albania. (The
Entente had prior to the breakthrough of the Salonika front signed an
agreement in Paris on the division of spheres of interest whereby Albania
was ceded to Italy.) In early November 1918, Pasic sent the following
message: "Our policy in Albania is to establish, if possible, the situation
as it was prior to the evacuation, when Essad Pasha was the Albanian prime
minister, and occupy territories from the Mati river beyond and in agreement
with the tribal chiefs, reestablish local administration which will act on
the instructions of our authorities."10
He called Essad Pasha - at the time in France seeking backing - to
return to Salonika and at the same time demanded that territories taken in
Albania be occupied by mixed allied forces: he proposed also that the
Albanian camp be used, mixed with Serbian officers. The French command,
however, disbanded Essad Pasha's troops on October 12. By a decision of the
interallied Supreme War Council, Albania was to be controlled by the Italian
army up to the Maca river.11
Still, the Serbian prime minister did not rule out the possibility that
the situation would develop enabling the return of Essad Pasha to Albania,
to the region north of the Mati river which Serbia considered its sphere of
interest. Italy persecuted Pasha's followers in the occupied parts of the
country, and at one particular time made a demand to France for his
internment. It all ended with the withdrawal of the French representative to
his government.12
1 Ibid, pp. 315-317.
2 Veliki rat Srbije za oslobodjenje i ujedinjenje Srba, Hrvata i
Slovenaca, vol. XIII-XIV; Kroz Albaniju 1915-1916, Beograd 1968; M. M.
Zivanovic, O evakuaciji srpske vojske iz Albanije i njenoj reorganizaciji na
Krfu (1915-1916) prema francuskim dokumentima, Istorijski Casopis (XIV-XV),
pp. 231-307.
3 D. T Batakovic, Esad-pasa Toptani i Srbija 1915. godine, pp. 321-324.
4 D. T. Batakovic, Esad-pasa Toptani, Srbija i albansko pitanje
(1916-1918), pp. 348-349.
5 AS, MID, Str. pov., 1917, No. 232 Memoire: Proglas protektorata
Italije nad Albanijom i uopste rad Italije 1917 Krf, D. T. Batakovic,
Esad-pasa Toptani, Srbija i albansko pitanje (1916-1918), pp. 350-351; P.
Pastorelli, op. cit., pp. 36-41; I documenti diplomatici italiani, Quinta
serie, vol. VI, Roma MCMLXXXVIII, NOs, 119, 390, 394, 427, 438, 445, 448,
831.
6 AS, MID, Str. pov., 1917, No. 182. Pasic's note dated 30. 05/13.
06.1917.
7 D. T. Batakovic, Esad-pasa Toptani, Srbija i albansko pitanje
(1916-1918), pp.
8 Ibid, pp. 353-358.
9 Ibid, pp. 359.
10 Ibid, pp. 360.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid, pp. 361-362; B. Hrabak, Reokupacija oblasti srpske i
crnogorske drzave s arbanaskom vecinom stanovnistva u jesen 1918. godine i
drzanje Arbanasa prema uspostavljenoj vlasti. Gjurmime albanologjike, 1
(1969), pp. 262-265, 285-286.
V
After the war, Italy became the main rival of the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes in Albania. Rome strove to use the disintegration of the
Dual Monarchy to step up its positions in the Balkans and turn the Adriatic
Sea into an Italian lake. Albania was in its schemes the country wherefrom
Italian influence would be wielded onto the neighboring regions. The Italian
troops occupied the largest part of Albania and, by meeting the demands of
various committees (particularly the Kosovo Committee) in annexing to
Albania Metohia, Kosovo and western Macedonia, they presented themselves as
the protector of the interests of all the Albanian people. An interim
government of Turhan Pasha Permeti was set up in Durazzo under the wing of
Italy at the end of December 1918, which was ready to recognize as its ruler
a prince from the House of Savoy. At the Peace Conference in Paris, Italy
strove to secure the possession of Valona and hinterland and obtain a
mandate over the other parts of Albania.1 The envoys of the
pro-Italian Durazzo government demanded at the Peace Conference a revision
of the 1913 borders - they wanted Prizren, Djakovica, Pec, Pristina,
Mitrovica, Skoplje, Tetovo and Debar to be included in the composition of
the Albanian state.2
The policy of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes towards Albania
did not deviate much from that of Pasic's government. Belgrade evaluated
that the consolidation of Italian positions in Albania would be a source of
continual threat to Kosovo, Metohia and the neighboring regions. Head of the
delegation to the Conference, Nikola Pasic, also shaped the policy of the
new state as regards Albania. In order to repress Italian influence in the
Balkans, he demanded the restoration of Albania within the 1913 borders, as
an independent state with autonomous and national rule. If the Great Powers
should nevertheless decide to divide the Albanian territories among the
neighboring states, the delegation demanded that the Yugoslav state be given
northern Albania from the Veliki Drim to Scutari.3
Under the aegis of the Kingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenes, Essad
Pasha brought his delegation to The Peace Conference in Paris. Having
submitted a memorandum to the Conference at the end of April, he called on
the legitimacy of his government, its allied status in Salonika and the
declaration of war on the Central powers. Seeking the restoration of
independent Albania within the 1913 borders, Essad Pasha demanded to be
recognized as the only legal representative of his people.4
The Peace Conference, however, did not officially discuss the fate of
Albania as it was formally considered a neutral state during the war. The
question of its future was being resolved at the Ambassadorial Conference of
the Great Powers. The diplomatic circles of the Western allies assessed that
Albania was insufficiently nationally constituted and that its development
had to be under the control of a big power. As time passed, the
representatives of the Great Powers saw the solution to the Albanian
question in granting a mandate to Italy - its troops controlled the largest
part of the Albanian territory and its diplomats persisted on the allies
meeting the provisions taken over by the 1915 London Treaty.5
Pasic evaluated that the Albanian question was to be resolved soon. He
strove to set it apart from its natural linkage with the Adriatic question,
which was considered an object of compensation. Even though France and Great
Britain paid heed to the interests of the Kingdom of Serbs Croats and
Slovenes, Pasic believed that the key role in resolving the Albanian
question would be assumed by United States President Woodraw Wilson and
Italy. He persistently maintained the stand that the Delegation of the
Kingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenes demanded the restoration of Albania
within the 1913 borders, and that border alteration towards Serbia and
Montenegro be resolved in agreement with the tribes that lived there. If the
stand prevailed that the provisions of the London Treaty should be met,
Pasic demanded - as a Great Power was coming to the Balkans and in the
immediate vicinity of the Yugoslav state - stronger strategic borders as
compensation, "The Glavni (Veliki) Drim from the sea to the confluence of
the Crni Drim, then the Crni Drim up to a point beneath Debar, to the
confluence of the Zota river left of the Crni Drim, encompassing entire
Ohrid Lake with the watershed to remain on our side."6
Since Valona and the hinterland was being ceded to Italy under the 1915
London Treaty, as well as protectorat over central Albania, while Northern
Albania was intended for Serbia and Montenegro, Pasic proposed that the
northern Albanian tribes be given the right to self-determination, "to say
themselves if they wish to join the central Muslim Albania under the Italian
protectorat, or to form a separate small state - some sort of small 'buffer
state', or if they desire to join our state as a small autonomous
state".7 Thus from the beginning of 1919, petitions of individual
Catholic tribes demanding to be annexed to Serbia were collected at the
border belt, with backing from the military and civil authorities of the
Kingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenes.8 This way Pasic wanted to
parry the pro-Italian delegation to the Peace Conference and deputies of the
American Albanian society "Fire", which demanded the forming of a Great
Albania inclusive of considerable regions of the former Serbian and
Montenegrin state. Thus he supported those groups of Albanian delegates in
Paris that maintained it would be the most benefitial for Albania if it came
to terms with the Kingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenes, and accepted a
border alteration to its advantage, in keeping with the wish of the local
population. Pasic set out they believed that their independence "would best
be ensured if they entered into an alliance with us, especially to set up a
customs union. The group comprises Essad Pasha's followers and those
opposing the Italian protectorat".9
On the ground, particularly those areas in Albania under occupation (by
agreement with the French army, after the Austro-Hungarian troops were
driven out) - Pishkopeja, Gornji and Donji Debar and Golo Brdo - the Serbian
military authorities, and subsequently those of the Kingdom of Serbs Croats
and Slovenes, tried to help organize Essad Pasha's followers. A committee in
Debar was entrusted with the task of setting up rule in the border areas and
preparing the conditions for Pasha's return to the country. His
commissioners exerted the strongest influence in regions between Golo Brdo
and Gornji Debar, in Podgradec and Starova while deep into the country, in
the central parts, Italian troops gradually and successfully checked Essad
Pasha's followers. Despite continuous dissipation, Essad Pasha still enjoyed
considerable support especially among the old Muslim beys, who viewed with
distrust the consolidation of Italian positions in central
Albania.10
Beside the Conference, Italy and Greece signed in late July 1919 a
secret treaty - the so-called Tittoni-Veniselos Treaty - on the division of
the Albanian territory. At the beginning of December the allied powers
recognized Italy's sovereignty over Valona and the hinterland, and offered
it a mandate to set up administration in the remaining part of Albania under
the control of the League of Nations. The same memorandum envisaged and
defined territorial compensations to the advantage of Greece. Pasic again
set out that in that case the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes had to
stand by their demand for more favorable borders towards Albania. He
proposed that the region of the entire length of the Mace river to the Crni
Drim be demanded as the maximum, and the stretch along the Crni and Veliki
Drim rivers to their confluence as the minimum.11
Cooperation with Essad Pasha never ceased for a moment. The delegation
of the Kingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenes backed his demands that he be
paid war reparations as an ally to the Entante Powers and thus indirectly
acquire an allied status. Pasha's followers in the country dissipated and
gathered again, depending on current circumstances, and were unsparingly
helped in actions against those supported by the Italians. He sent messages
several times to his followers that he was returning to the country and
advised them to act in cooperation with Serbia and to decisively oppose the
Italian occupation.12
While a bitter diplomatic battle over Albania's destiny was being waged
at the Conference, a movement rose against the Italian occupation in the
country. The government in Durazzo was condemned and replaced at a national
congress of Albanian chiefs in Ljusnje in early 1920, and strong protests
were lodged with the Peace Conference and Italian parliament. The delegates
demanded the creation of a Great Albania; command over the army was
entrusted to Bairam Cur.13 Essad Pasha's followers who convened
at the People's Assembly in March made strong demands that the Italian
troops be routed. Ahmed Zogu, the interior minister in the government of
Suleyman Delvina, strove to neutralize Essad Pasha, sending to that end
special emissaries to Paris at the end of May. The delegation offered Essad
Pasha the post of prime minister, on the condition that he abandon
aspirations to rule Albania.14 At the time Bairam Cur lead a
decisive battle against the detachments of Pasha's followers. Finally, on
June 13, 1920, an Albanian student, Avni Rustemi, by order of Lushnje
government, killed Essad Pasha in front of the Continental Hotel in Paris,
believing that as an ally to Serbia and then to the Kingdom of Serbs Croats
and Slovenes, he had betrayed the interests of the Albanian people. Essad
Pasha was buried with the last honors in the Serbian army cemetery in Paris.
1 P. Pastorelli, op. cit., pp. 63-86; V. Vinaver, Italijanska akcija
protiv Jugoslavija na albansko-jugoslovenskoj granici 1919-1920. god.,
Istorijski zapisi, XXIII, 3 (1966), pp. 477-515; Z. Avramovski, Albanija
izmedju Jugoslavije i Italije, Vojnoistorijski glasnik, 3 (1984), pp.
164-166.
2 Arhiv Jugoslavije, Delegacija Kraljevine Srba Hrvata i Slovenaca na
Konferenciji mira u Parizu (later in text: AJ, Delegacija), f-27, No 296; D.
Todorovic, Jugoslavija i balkanske drzave 1918-1923, Beograd 1979, p. 50.
3 The Question of Scutari, Paris 1919; A. Mitrovic, Jugoslavija na
Konferenciji 1919-1920, Beograd 1969, pp. 169-176; Documentation in: B.
Krizman - B. Hrabak, Zapisnici sa sednice delegacije Kraljevine SHS na
mirovnoj konferenciji u Parizu 1919-1920, Beograd 1960, pp. 321-324, 365-366
4 Memoir pr sente la Conference de la Paix Paris par son Excellence
le general Essad Toptani pr sident du gouvernement d'Albanie, Paris 16 Avril
1919. (Essad Pasha's correspondence with the Serbian government and his
letter addressed to the Conference in: A3, Delegacija, f-27. The same file
contains the memoirs of Leon Krajewski dated January 2, 1919, focusing
mainly on Essad Pasha's relations with France)
5 AJ, Delegacija, f-27, No 7289; P. Pastorelli, op. cit., pp. 189-225;
D. Todorovic, op. cit, pp. 53-64. Cf P. Milo, L'attitude du Royame
serbo-croato-slovene a I'egard de I'Albanie la Conference de la paw. a
Paris (1919-1920), Studia Albanica, 1 (1989), pp. 37-57.
6 AJ, Delegacija, f-28, Pasic to Prime Minister; A. Mitrovic,
Jugoslavija na Konferenciji mira, pp.
7 Ibid
8 D. Todorovic, op. cit., pp. 49. The originals of a number of
petitions (submitted to the Peace Conference) on the annexation of the
northern Albanian tribes to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes are
kept in: AJ, Delegacija, f-28.
9 Same as footnote 49.
10 AJ, Delegacija, f-27, Nos. 5504, 5376, 6275, 6451, 6589.
11 Z. Avramovski, op. cit., p. 167.
12 AJ, Delegacija, f-27, Nos. 5504, 5376, 6275, 6451, 6589.
13 Ibid, Nos. 5484 - 5489; i. Avramovski, op. cit., pp. 169-170.
14 AJ, Delegacija, f-28, Nos. 6724, 6725.
VI
The cooperation of the Serbian government and subsequently the
government of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes with Essad Pasha is
an important chapter in the history of Serbo-Albanian relations. It was the
first joint effort to resolve issues of dispute between two peoples in the
Balkans to the Balkan peoples principle, in a manner that was, with certain
territorial concessions to Serbia, and subsequently to the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes, to wipe out old hotbeds of mutual conflict. The
strategic aspirations of the Serbian government to curb the influence of
Great Powers in Albania did not emanate solely from old aspirations to
permanently master northern Albania, but from actual political estimates
that under the influence and protectorat of a Great Power, the Albanian
state would pursue the course of maximalist and national claims to
territories that were inhabited, aside to the Serbian people, by Albanians
-- Kosovo, Metohia and western Macedonia.
PART THREE: RELIGION AND CIVILISATION
KOSOVO AND METOHIA: CLASH OF NATIONS OR CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS
Kosovo and Metohia is the native and ancestral land of the Serbs. The
Serbian Jerusalem, which spread over an area of 10,800 km2, is covered with
a dense of about 200 medieval monasteries, churches and fortresses. Kosovo
was the scene of the famous battle held on St. Vitus Day (June 28) in 1389,
when Serbian Prince Lazar and the Turkish emir Murad both lost their lives.
The Ottoman's breakthrough into the heart of Southeast Europe also marked
the beginning of the five centuries long clash of two civilisations:
European (Christian) and Near Eastern (Islamic). The conflict, alive to this
day, is generated in the visible layer also in the clash of the two nations:
the Serbs, mainly Orthodox Christians, and the ethnic Albanians, mainly
Muslims.
The oath of Prince Lazar, derived from the New Testament tradition of
martyrdom that it was better to obtain freedom in the celestial empire than
to live humiliated in the oppression of the earthly kingdom, became during
the centuries of Turkish rule, the key of Serbian national ideology. The
Kosovo oath, woven into the national epos, became the basis upon which the
Serbs built the cult of resisting and not accepting injustice. The Kosovo
pledge was like a flag raising rebellions against the Ottomans and heading
towards its final aim: the restoration of the Serbian national state. Many a
generation of Serbs received its first notions of itself and the world by
listening to folk poems describing the Kosovo sufferings: the apocalyptical
fall of Serbian Empire, the tormentous death of Prince Lazar, the betrayal
of Vuk Brankovic, the heroism of Milos Obilic who, consciously sacrifying
himself, reached the tent of the emir and cut him down with his sword.
Withdrawing in front of the Turks towards west and the north, the only
political tradition of the Serbs was the Kosovo pledge. Through the Pec
Patriarchate, the historical traditions of the Serbs crystalized into a epic
tradition of an exceptionally national character. Even before the creation
of modern nations, the Serbs found in the Kosovo covenant firm basis for a
future national integration.
When the firsts national revolution in the Balkans broke out in Serbia
in 1804, during the Napoleonic wars, its leaders dreamed of a new battle of
Kosovo with which they would reestablish the lost empire. The historicism of
the romantic epoch only blended harmoniously with the already clearly formed
picture the Serbs had of their past and the tasks that were assigned to them
as a nation. The influence of the Kosovo covenant, functioning towards the
creation of national conscience, continued throughout the entire 19 century.
It the two Serbian states, Serbia and Montenegro, independent since 1878,
the Kosovo ideology (called also the covenant Serbian thought") was
institutionalized, conformed the needs of state nationalism: their national
program had as its final revenge of Kosovo and the restoration of the large
Serbian state in the center of the Balkans. The centuries-dreamed-of fight
with the Turks occurred in the fall of 1912. The Serbian army liberated
Kosovo in a few week, while the forces of Montenegro marched triumphantly
into Metohia. Negotiations on the final unification of the two Serbian
states were interrupted by World War I. Serbian students from Bosnia and
Herzegovina (occupied by Austria-Hungary 1878), inspired by the Kosovo idea,
like new Obilic heroes, assassinated the heir to the Habsburg throne on St.
Vitus Day in 1914, in Sarajevo.
The Kingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenes, later named Yugoslavia, was
created on the remnants of Austria-Hungary after the Great War ended. A
union of South Slav peoples was created instead of unified Serbian national
state. The Serbs, almost all of them, found themselves within the framework
of one state for the first time in history. It should have been the
guarantee of their civil and national rights. Having underestimated the
influences of thousand-year-long civilisational differences, the Serbs,
although representing the relative majority, found themselves faced with
unsolvable problems regarding differences in religion, historical
traditions, political mentality and national aims. The case of ethnic
Albanian minority in Kosovo and Metohia is a paradigmatic example of the
impossibility of overcoming civilisational gaps caused by the erosive force
of history.
The Kosovo and Metohia were, in the moment of liberation in 1912, a
backward agricultural community with mixed Serbian and ethnic Albanian
population, devastated by the raging of tribal anarchy. Serbs, however, even
then made almost half of the entire population in spite of the huge waves of
emigration in the previous period (about 150,000 from the region Kosovo,
Metohia and the neighboring Raska and northern Macedonia). The Pan-Islamic
policy of Abdulhamid II (1878-1909) made Kosovo and Metohia, beside Armenia,
"the most unfortunate land in the world", as witnessed contemporaries from
Victor Berard and George Gaulis to H. N. Brailsford to Frederick Moore. The
Kurds were crushing the Armenians in Asia Minor, and ethnic Albanians in the
European provinces were dealing in the same way with the unreliable
Christian subjects of Sultan: Serbs, Greeks and Bulgarians. The three
centuries long domination of Islamized ethnic Albanians in the Balkans,
culminated at the beginning of the 20th century. Living for centuries with
the gun in hand, the tribes of ethnic Albanians discovered in the plains of
Kosovo and Metohia the space for their further biological expansion. Islam
granted them the right to persecute Christians, lower grade citizens, and
stay unpunished. In time, a strange conviction settled itself among the
ethnic Albanians' tribes that Islam was the religion of free peoples and
Christianity that of slaves. In the Kingdom of Serbia, constitutional
monarchy with multiparty system and democratic institutions, the ethnic
Albanians mostly minded the fact that their yesterday serfs now became not
only their equals, but the ruling class in the state as well.
Islam marked strongly the national emancipation of ethnic Albanians and
defined their civilisational image. Although not fanatical believers, ethnic
Albanians have also built their national identity on the basis of Islamic
traditions, in fierce opposition to the neighboring Christian states. The
national elite from Catholic and Orthodox tribes in the north and south of
today's Albania did not succeed in imposing Europe-shaped solutions in the
fight for a national state: the Muslim majority dominated in all phases of
the development of the Albanian state. The rule of the founder of Communist
Albania, Enver Hoxha, in spite of the decree banning all religions in the
country, showed that it owed most to solutions represented in the past by
national leaders with Islamic background. His regime, created by mixing
oriental feudalism and Stalinist type of communism, was the ideological
framework accepted without hesitation as a political model for national
movement by ethnic Albanians in communist Yugoslavia.
In the inter-war period, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, by colonizing the
rich but uncultivated spaces of Kosovo and Metohia, tried not only to return
the Serbian character to these areas, but also to establish modern European
institutions, as it did in other provinces of the Yugoslav state. The ethnic
Albanian population on Kosovo found it most difficult to adjust to the civil
order in the Europe-organized state where, instead of status of absolute
privilege during the Ottoman rule, they received only civil and political
equality and with the former rayah at that-people whom they had only
recently treated as serfs.
World War II showed that the national breach developed from the
religious one: after driving the colonists out and burning down their homes,
the ethnic Albanians, mostly Muslims, set fires to and robbed many Orthodox
churches, and Orthodox cemeteries were constantly desecrated.
The development of political circumstances in communist Yugoslavia
suited the further ethnic Albanians' national emancipation. Biologically
exhausted (1,200,000 in World War I in Serbia only, and at least that many
in World War II, now coming mostly from Vojna Krajina in Croatia,
Montenegro, Herzegovina and Bosnia), and, after the brutal destruction of
the civil class, politically decapitated, the Serbs became pawns in the
hands of the new regime. Accepting Yugoslavia again as an inevitable
solution to their national question, the Serbs did not realize for a long
time that a national integration of other nations was going on in the
communist Yugoslavia and almost entirely to their disadvantage. The Kingdom
of Yugoslavia was organized as a centralist state of French type. The
communists on the other hand thought that centralism in that "Versailles
creation" was the most typical expression of the "Greater Serbian hegemony".
Tearing apart the political domination of Serbs in Yugoslavia, the
communist created several federal units dividing Serbian lands after the
World War II. The communist authorities in 1945 forbade with a special
decree all forcibly moved out colonists to return to Kosovo, Metohia and
Macedonia and their estates were mostly confiscated and afterwards granted
to emigrants from Albania. The ethnic Albanians, however, in the divided
Serbian state, have been given not only schools and cultural institutions
but full political power. The communists were making amends for the sins of
the "Greater Serbian hegemony" in the inter-war period.
During the World War II, the majority of ethnic Albanians from
Yugoslavia accepted, under the wing of fascist Italy, the creation of the
satellite "Greater Albania" and thus cooperated in large numbers with the
fascist and Nazi military authorities, unmistakably showing that they were
in favor of the unification with Albania; notwithstanding this, their
secessionist tendencies were completely revitalized after the war. A plan
existed to form a Balkan federation (Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania under
the leadership of Tito), and that is why Tito supported the large
colonization of Albanians from Albania and promised Kosovo to Enver Hoxha if
he entered the joint federal state. After the split with USSR and Cominform
in 1948, Albania, turned into Yugoslavia's toughest enemy. The relations
were normalized as Yugoslavia's insistence only in 1971, when an unusually
lively and wide exchange of ideas and functionaries began between Kosovo and
Albania. Under auspices of Albanian regime a 19th century type of national
romanticism mixed with Albanian version of Marxism-Leninism, religious
intolerance and almost racial prejudice towards Slavs became the essence of
the ethnic Albanian's national movement in Kosovo and Metohia. Ideological
and theocratic monism along with the strong tribal traditions as heritage of
Ottoman empire fit well into a ideological monism of totalitarian ideology
of communist Albania.
Kosovo and Metohia has already then been an autonomous province on its
way towards acquiring the attributes of a state within Yugoslav federation.
The confederalization of communist Yugoslavia, finalized with the 1974
Constitution, excluded both provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina) from Serbian
authority, turning them into state entities with almost independent
governments. In order to legalize formally the Albanization of the Province,
the ethnic Albanian communist leadership threw out of its name the word
Metohia (of Greek origin meaning church-owned land). It turned out that the
hundreds of attacks the ethnic Albanians made upon Orthodox believers,
priests monks and nuns, churches and monasteries, and the annexation of
monastery property in the post-war period, were manifestations of centuries
deep religious and national intolerance.
The restoration of religious life of the Muslims in Kosovo and Metohia
was conducted parallely with the Albanization. New mosque sprang up (about
700 mosques were built in Yugoslavia under communist rule, more than during
the several centuries long Ottoman dominion; at the same time, about 500
Catholic and 300 Orthodox churches were erected); the Muslim clergy's
primary demand from the believers was for them to have as many children as
possible. The highest birth-rate in Europe derived also from religious
traditions of ethnic Alb